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Abstract of Thesis (500 words):  
 
‘THE SEMIOTIC PASSION’ – A THEOLOGICAL RESPONSE TO JULIA KRISTEVA’S 
CONSTRUCT OF THE SPEAKING BEING FROM THE ‘THEOLOGIA CRUCIS’ 
 
This thesis develops a theological critique of Julia Kristeva’s project of the ‘speaking 
being. The main purpose of the thesis is to establish the theological context of a secular 
‘atheist’ thinker, whose engagement with Christian texts is permanent throughout the oeuvre. 
The principal aspect of Kristeva’s project is the ‘speaking being’ and her Freudian 
materialist critique of religion. The thesis argues that Kristeva’s analysis of the ‘speaking 
being’ discloses itself as the crisis of the ‘exhausted subject’. The crisis of the ‘exhausted 
subject’ of modernity and post-modernity is the central problem of her work, which is not 
fully answered by her psychoanalytic regime. Kristeva’s understanding of the ‘speaking 
being’ leads to an ‘ontic’ exhaustion of the subject, which can only be resolved through a 
theological engagement, namely, the ‘Semiotic Passion’, which is a comprehensive response 
from the theology of the cross. The thesis speaks of the ‘semiotic Passion’ because 
Kristeva’s methodology involves an intertextual and linguistic analysis, and therefore she 
has to be engaged with on that level. Central to the thesis is also an exploration of the key 
texts of Kristeva’s work which disclose a ‘mourning’ for the loss of a theological discourse 
and its potentials, albeit that this is never made explicit. 
 
 The thesis identifies the ‘linguistic gap’ (ontological, epistemological, semantic, 
ideological and methodological), to which the ‘Semiotic Passion’ is presented as a response. 
By ‘semiotic Passion’ is meant a re-reading of the Passion which aims both to respond to 
Kristeva in her own terms, and to incorporate her anthropological insights and elements of 
her own semiotic analysis. It is proposed that the ‘semiotic passion’ allows us to revisit the 
image of the Father, the regenerative dynamic of divine love, as a necessary completion of 
Kristeva’s ‘semiotic’ resourcing. The ‘Semiotic Passion’ makes this claim by developing a 
renewed imagery of the cross, by drawing also on Kristeva’s metaphor of ‘maternal 
suffering’. The solution that the ‘Semiotic Passion’ offers enters into a critical dialogue with 
the underlying materialist ontology of Kristeva’s model. It demonstrates that the theologia 
crucis has sufficient resources for doing this. 
 
The overall concern of the study is to introduce Kristeva’s post-structuralism and her 
Freudian regime to the domain of systematic theology. At the same time, the other aim of the 
thesis is to show how Kristeva is an important dialogue partner and resource for theology. 
Kristeva’s complex Freudian anthropology is necessary for theology if it wants to develop a 
relationship with culture, which is not locked within apologetics. As a result of this, it 
becomes possible to develop a theological model of the secular through the image of the 
‘Father’, which gives a more thorough understanding of the contemporary subject, which is 
central both to a theological project as well as to a humanist and a philosophical one. The 
‘Semiotic Passion’, being also a theoretical proposal, outlines a core to a Christian 
anthropological program which can ground such a non-apologetic model of the secular. 
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS 
 
My work explores Julia Kristeva’s construct of the ‘speaking being’ for 
systematic theology. The thesis argues that Kristeva’s analysis of the ‘speaking being’ 
discloses itself as the crisis of the ‘exhausted subject’. The crisis of the ‘exhausted subject’ 
of modernity and post-modernity is the central problem of her work, which is not fully 
answered by her psychoanalytic regime. Kristeva’s understanding of the ‘speaking being’ 
leads to an ‘ontic’ exhaustion of the subject, which can only be resolved through a 
theological engagement, namely, the ‘Semiotic Passion’, which is a comprehensive response 
from the theology of the cross. 
 
Advancing my argument takes place against the challenging background that Kristeva 
has no established response from systematic theology. We can speak of her theological 
reception as virtually non-existent. That is why, in my work, the problem of situating 
Kristeva for theology and the actual analysis of her project go together. Kristeva, the French 
psychoanalyst, linguist, non-believer thinker, offers to theology a fascinatingly fresh 
discourse on love. This discourse, in the first instance, is radically different from what 
theology is used to. Traditional ‘intra-theological’ approaches are simply insufficient for 
reading her psychoanalytical treatment of culture, the question of God and religion, love and, 
most of all, the crisis of the subject. Yet, my study presents Kristeva as the most timely 
dialogue partner. What systematic theology can develop from this encounter is making the 
‘Father’ a central theological image again in dialogue with contemporary culture. Kristeva 
offers a fascinating ‘hidden’ discourse on the ‘Father’. Though the focal point of her themes 
is ‘motherhood’, Kristeva points to the ‘lack of the father’. If theology takes pains to 
comprehend this meta-discourse it can be a most rewarding business. Tradition can develop a 
new sensibility for dialogue with secular discourses, from which ‘orthodoxy’, for historical 
reasons, is cut off.  
 
Constructing the method to access Kristeva theologically was a task in its own right. The 
argument rests upon this scaffolding. That is why, before the summary of the thesis, it is 
necessary to outline the three general theological ‘narratives’ through which Kristeva, as 
‘unknown land’, became approachable. In this way this Introduction moves from the 
‘general’ to the ‘particular’.  
 
First, the specific linguistic gap between our discourses had to be identified. Kristeva 
compares psychoanalysis and faith in the following way: 
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 ‘As theology, that once vast continent, vanished between the time of Descartes and 
the end of the nineteenth century, psychoanalysis (along with linguistics and sociology) 
became the last of scientific disciplines to set itself up as a rational approach to the 
understanding of human behaviour and its always enigmatic “meaning”. Unlike the other 
human sciences, however, psychoanalysis has not been faithful to the positivist 
conception of rationality. Freud divorced psychoanalysis from psychiatry so that it might 
encompass a domain which for many is still that of the “irrational” or “supernatural”. In 
fact, the object of psychoanalysis is simply the linguistic exchange − and the accidents 
that are a part of that exchange − between two subjects in a situation of transference and 
countertransference.’ 2 
 
Kristeva situates psychoanalysis between theology and rational humanism. In this 
particular account, theology is regarded as a bygone world. It leaves the viewpoint of faith 
with some unease. It is an unusual feeling for theology, as it is forced to imagine that it is 
replaced by another discourse. Psychoanalysis resembles theology; yet, it speaks a very 
different language. We also have to know that Kristeva’s viewpoint is consistently that of a 
non-believer. As there is no connection whatsoever between Kristeva and ‘confessional’ 
theology, it will be a laborious journey to arrive at a common discourse on the ‘Father’.  
 
In theory, but only in theory, the closest theological agenda which could frame the 
encounter with the ‘Freudian’ Kristeva is the problem of ‘nature and grace’. Though my 
study does not take this classic direction, yet, it needs to keep it as a general reference. What 
my study takes over from its twentieth century version is the objective to relate human nature 
and grace in a non-dualistic way. Revisiting the ‘nature’ – ‘grace’ debate, theology has laid 
the foundation of an important critical dialogue with secular humanism. This new sensitivity 
serves as the ground of my dialogical interest in Kristeva and confirms the hope that such a 
dialogue is possible: 
 
‘Many debates which mark the history of theology are ultimately debates about 
nature and grace… From the sixteenth to the twentieth century the problem of nature 
and grace was technically resolved in such a way as to generate a variety of dualisms 
that were to bedevil Christian life, the dualisms of the sacred and the profane, the 
religious and the secular, the Church and the world, faith and reason. Only recently have 
new viewpoints on nature begun to exorcise these old dualisms.’3 
 
 Resolving these dualisms is an unfinished business. The stake of overcoming the 
separation of ‘world, faith, and reason’ is a renewed dialogue with ‘the secular’. My purpose 
is to find a fresh viewpoint on these inherited conflicts. Kristeva’s work is an excellent 
                                               
2 Julia Kristeva, In the Beginning Was Love: Psychoanalysis and Faith, Columbia University Press, 
New York 1987, Questia, Web, accessed 24, May 2011, p.1.  
3 Stephen J. Duffy, The Graced Horizon, Nature and Grace in Modern Catholic Thought, The 
Liturgical Press, Collegeville, Minnesota (Theology and Life series, Volume 37) 1992, p.21. 
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opportunity to respond to the linguistic gap between the Church and our ‘post-Freudian 
culture’ as she is a keen observer of human nature ‘outside grace’. 
 
I have also chosen a less conventional, second theological context for my work. My 
critique will recurrently resort to Peter Homans’ concept of ‘cultural mourning’. Homans’ 
theory is a very useful model to connect discourses which respond to a paradigmatic change 
in culture in an opposing way. It is very fortunate that he developed his idea in order to 
understand better the Freudian shift in culture and the parallel conflict with religion. The 
story told by Homans is the second ‘gateway’ through which the dialogue with the 
ideological differences in Kristeva becomes possible. That is why I introduce Homans’ 
model of dialogue here.  
 
According to Homans, with the collapse of the unified worldview of ‘Christendom’, the 
distance between Transcendence and ‘man’ was lost. This distance or difference between the 
Divine and the human was orienting, securing, and universally accepted. With the collapse of 
this structure, this lost orientation had to be rebuilt. The Freudian turn and traditional religion 
‘restored’ the ultimate reference of the human self very differently. In Homans’ idiom, their 
respective ‘cultural mourning’ produced opposite results. On the side of religion 
Transcendence was ‘reinvented’. As a counter reaction to uncertainty and doubt in a 
weakened God, God as a ‘cultural superego’ was re-emphasised. To give a fresh orientation 
to culture, Christianity, regardless of denomination, developed the notion of a ‘High 
Transcendent’ God who is ‘strongly’ in control. This ‘super’ Transcendence meant a God 
who was seen above human nature and history. A strong sense of ‘distance’ was restored. In 
the Freudian solution this ‘High Transcendence’ was radically questioned. The God that this 
restoration produced as an ‘oppressive authority’, as a rigid ‘patriarchal Father’, was 
rejected. The ‘psychoanalytical turn’ offered a new vision of the human self based not on 
‘Transcendence’ but on the analysis of the human self in its psychic and social relationships. 
The relationship between Kristeva and theology lies somewhere within this conflict. 
 
There is a wider, cultural dynamic of ‘mourning’ in which we can also envision the 
Kristeva – theology relationship. In explaining the process of reflection on the past, Homans 
extended the original psychological concepts of object loss and narcissistic mourning from 
the psychological level to ideals, values and traditions. He calls the process ‘de-idealisation’. 
We can attribute to this broader sense of ‘symbolic mourning’ the emergence of new values, 
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new cultural symbols, and new psychological, social and religious structures. 4 At the 
endpoint of this ‘mourning’ we find the emergence of new paradigmatic discourses of 
culture, e.g., the ‘secular Enlightenment’, ‘counter-Reformation’, ‘Marxism’, or the Freudian 
turn itself. What Homans’ model encourages is re-reading the conflict between theology and 
psychoanalysis in terms of a cultural dialogue. 
 
My work presents the encounter with Kristeva’s updated Freudianism as an opportunity 
for a highly intense ‘cultural mourning’. The translation between the opposing positions 
indeed requires entering into the specific dynamic that Homans calls the ‘ability to mourn’. 
Entering into a genuine dialogue between the traditions of faith and philosophical atheism 
will require a painful ‘de-idealisation’ of positions, which were secure simply for the reason 
that they were uninterrupted by the paradigms of the opposite side. This conflict, which is 
my second working hypothesis, requires a ‘symbolic mourning’ which means an active 
interest in the ‘symbolic language’ of the interlocutor.  
 
The ‘Semiotic Passion’ in the title of the thesis anticipates a shared symbol building. 
The ‘semiotic’ refers to a key feature of Kristeva’s project; the Passion refers to the flagship 
of theological discourse. The thesis, as my most overall concern, argues that the dialogue 
with Kristeva’s model is possible. The fact that I developed the theological reading of 
Kristeva from the theology of the cross, literally the heart of Christian thought, expresses the 
fact that this dialogue is not only possible but is of vital importance. The ‘Good Friday 
dialogue’ sub-title adds even more to it. This dialogue is crucial for both discourses. 
 
The third context I chose for engaging with Kristeva is a shift within secular humanism 
itself. Jürgen Habermas draws attention to a growing awareness that ‘something is missing’ 
from the ‘philosophically enlightened self-understanding of modernity’.5 To name properly 
this absence is the central interest of my study. I will present the Passion of Kristeva’s 
‘speaking being’ as the main evidence to ‘what is missing’. The Semiotic Passion to which 
my study arrives, will reclaim what is ‘missing’, that is, ‘grace’ through which the self is 
embedded in its ultimate ground, God. This reinstatement of ‘grace’ into the discourse will 
happen as a result of the dialogue with Kristeva’s materialism. 
 
As a fourth theological context, my study resorts to a specific body of theological 
                                               
4 Peter Homans, The Ability to Mourn, Disillusionment and the Social Origins of Psychoanalysis, The 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, London 1989, pp. 25-26.  
5 Jürgen Habermas, An Awareness of What is Missing, Faith and Reason in a Post-Secular Age, 
translated by Ciaran  Cronin, Polity Press, Cambridge 2010 (first published  in German as Ein 
Bewutsein von dem, was fehlt, Suhrkamp Verlag Frenkfurt am Main 2008), p.16. 
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speech within the tradition of the theologia crucis. My motives for doing so are twofold. 
First, in the Passion the human person − in the light of the divinity of Christ − is central. 
With this, a shared framework for the critical analysis of ‘suffering’ in a nihilist culture is 
given. The second reason for turning to key players in the ‘theology of the cross’, like 
Rahner, Moltmann, Metz and Balthasar, is a historical one. Kristeva’s humanist authorities 
are from the world of ‘modernity’. It is natural that their philosophical atheism is addressed 
by their late contemporaries from theological modernity.  
 
The underlying claim of my work, namely, that Kristeva is a timely issue for theology, 
was given two important, indirect confirmations. First, in the autumn of 2010 an official 
‘interreligious dialogue’ with atheism was launched by the Pontifical Council for Culture.6 
The objective of this project was dialogue with ‘unbelief’, once equated with atheism.7 I 
developed my project independently from this initiative. My context is not the traditional 
program of re-evangelisation. The medium in which my investigation takes place is not the 
‘faith’ – ‘unbelief’ dichotomy. Instead, my focus is on the relationship between the ‘subject’ 
and nihilism, which offers a more direct dialogue. The Court of the Gentiles Foundation 
invited everyone to reflect on the philosophical foundations of a possible cooperation 
between ‘those who believe in heaven and those who do not believe in it.’ Julia Kristeva was 
one of the participants in the event. The first reports on the event highlighted the difficulty of 
this dialogue, which the participants themselves confirmed. Philosopher Fabrice Hadjad 
expressed the explicit wish to go beyond the level of a ‘stilted and formal ceremony where 
everyone comes to fulfil their function’, and the need for a discussion where all sides can 
relate to the question of God in a meaningful way.8 The meticulous work of ‘decoding’ 
Kristeva’s atheism for systematic theology has convinced me that the ‘official dialogue’ will 
remain for a long time a polite ‘formal ceremony’ without a major achievement. The future 
of this very important conversation will be decided at lower, unofficial levels. It necessarily 
has to take place there, at the ‘borders’ of official discourses. Back to our Homansian 
background, ‘what is missing’ is the work of a meticulous ‘revision’ of our concepts, 
                                               
6 Cardinal Gianfranco Ravasi, head of the Pontifical Council for Culture, announced the inaugural 
event of the Courtyard of the Gentiles Foundation that took place in March 2011 in Paris. Pope 
Benedict XVI had already called for the establishment of the permanent structure in 2009. The 
wording of the Pope’s initiative is significant: ‘Today, in addition to interreligious dialogue, there 
should be a dialogue with those to whom religion is something foreign, to whom God is unknown and 
who nevertheless do not want to be left merely Godless, but rather to draw near to him, albeit as the 
Unknown.’ The project is to be part of the new evangelisation. Fr Laurent Mazas FSJ (Freres de Saint-
Jean), an official at the Vatican’s Culture Council, was directing the event. The 24-25 March launch 
included lectures on ‘Religion, Enlightenment and Common Reason’. See The Tablet (29 January 
2011), p.31. 
7 See Martine de Sauto, ‘Comprendre: Incroyance et Athéisme’, La Croix online version, 25/3/2011, 
accessed 29 Aug. 11 (www.la-croix.com/Religion). 
8 See the correspondence by Bruno Bouvet, ‘Paris inaugure le “Parvis des Gentils”’, La Croix online 
version 25/3/2011, accessed 29 Aug. 11 (www.la-croix.com/Religion). 
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methods, solutions, and even strategies. All this is within a common ‘symbolic language’. 
My work aims at elaborating this form of dialogue.    
 
The second confirmation of my project came from Julia Kristeva herself, not 
independently from the above context. She showed a genuine interest in my reading of her 
work within a theological framework. Kristeva confirmed my presentiment that the ‘what is 
missing’ from secular and theological humanism might not find its place in an official 
dialogue. She expressed this in a brief response to the specific nature of my project. Raising 
the important questions inevitably requires putting oneself at the margins of his or her 
‘native’ discourse.9 The Semiotic Passion aims to evaluate Kristeva for systematic theology 
in a way which pushes both her Freudianism and theology to the limits of their regimes. It is 
in this borderline situation that the theologian can truly witness to the fact that ‘Tradition is 
the way in which the ontology of faith comes to act.’10 
  
The fact that Kristeva is not researched by ‘systematic theology’ deeply affects the form 
and content of my work. As Kristeva is unfamiliar to the British theological audience, I have 
had to resolve three tasks simultaneously. First, I had to introduce what her project is about. 
Second, I had to develop the ‘hermeneutic’ which translates Kristeva for the theological 
mindset as this ‘code of reading’ is simply missing. Third, I had to develop my argument. 
This would have been much easier if the authors of a rich theological ‘secondary literature’ 
had communicated with each other. In our case the discourse itself has had to be constructed, 
‘starting from scratch’. This threefold task, respectively, requires a different style. This 
explains the relative ‘textual empiricism’ of my work. Primary texts and their interpretation 
naturally have required ‘space’ and a significant role in my study. I could not refer to these 
texts separately in an ‘Appendix’ as they had to be interpreted in the main body of the thesis. 
These texts are in the service of a theological interpretation of Kristeva. 
 
When a ‘theological narrative’ has to be constructed, which accommodates a critique and 
through which the critique itself operates, the existing ‘academic resources’ attain a new 
                                               
9 ‘‘Cher Gabor Balint, Je suis évidemment très intéressée par votre recherche, je comprends que les 
églises traditionnelles sont dubitatives voir réticentes à l'égard d'une pensée comme la vôtre. Mais 
vous savez que c'est par une certaine dissidence que les choses avancent, et qu'il faut beaucoup de 
courage pour continuer dans cette voie. Je vous le souhaite en tout cas et je suis persuadée que votre 
foi aussi vous guidera dans cette autonomie de pensée qui est la vôtre. Tenons nous au courant de la 
suite de cette échange et comptez sur moi pour une lecture dans un avenir pas immédiat. En vous 
souhaitant un excellent été et peut-être dans l'espoir de nouvelle rencontre. Très cordialement à vous, 
Mme J. Kristeva’ 07.06.2011 
10 James Hanvey, ‘Conclusion: Continuing the Conversation’ (pp.149-171) Ch.10, in Radical 
Orthodoxy? A Catholic Enquiry, edited by Laurence Paul Hemming, Ashgate, Aldershot, Burlington 
USA, Singapure and Sydney 2000, p.170. 
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significance. Accessible treatments of the field, however limited, have been revaluated. 
Sources and authorities in a situation like this need to be used differently. The primary 
purpose of my work, besides arguing my thesis, was to develop the ‘host narrative’ which 
can accommodate and welcome Kristeva, including secondary literature, into dialogue with 
systematic theology.  
 
Now, against the above general perspective, I summarize the ‘particular’ contents of my 
thesis. Part One explores Kristeva’s materialist position and the motives of her ‘semiotic 
symbol building’. The underlying interest of this evaluation is that it explores the challenges 
of her project for theology. Part One argues that the underlying problem of the ‘speaking 
being’ is the ‘exhausted subject’. 
 
Chapter 1, ‘Adventures and Impasses’, situates Kristeva with the methodological 
challenges in relation to theology. It offers a brief overview of Kristeva’s academic 
background and introduces her project for a theological readership. This introduction shows 
Kristeva in a tension with ‘rational humanism’. It presents her project as a revolt against 
‘rational humanism’. The introduction also shows her tension with theology both in terms of 
the ‘gap’ with her founding discourses, and also in terms of the virtually missing response 
from systematic theology. This exposition makes the suggestion that the possibility of a 
critical dialogue between Kristeva and theology should be examined. This proposal takes 
place in view of the fact that the tension between Kristeva and mainstream secular humanism 
promises a less fertile co-operation than her encounter with theology. 
 
Chapter 2, ‘The Exhausted Subject’, contains three analyses (I. The ‘exhausted subject’ 
as the underlying problem of the oeuvre, II. ‘Transcendence’, III. ‘Mourning’ ) In general 
these analyses seek a way to find a theological access to Kristeva’s work. Analysis I makes 
the important hermeneutical proposal to identify the ‘exhausted subject’ as the central 
problem of the oeuvre. The chronological reading of Kristeva’s work will bring to surface 
the ‘exhausted subject’. This serves as the ground for exploring the ‘speaking being’ as a 
complex materialist ‘ontological’ vision of the self. My study establishes a connection 
between Kristeva’s immanent resourcing and the ongoing ‘exhaustion’ of the subject in a 
nihilist culture. In this ‘historical reading’ of Kristeva’s work, it will emerge that her project 
responds to the ‘exhaustion’ of the subject of modernity and postmodernity with a materialist 
resourcing of the self. Analysis II will focus on Kristeva’s strategy for the inner resourcing 
of the ‘speaking being’. This is what my study calls the problem of ‘Transcendence’ in 
Kristeva’s work. Here my central concern will be her ‘linguistic reinterpretation of 
Transcendence’. I give an in-depth analysis of her program of the ‘self-transcending subject’ 
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and how it is based on a materialist world-view. I pay specific attention to Kristeva’s concept 
of the ‘chora-thetic’, which I identify as the core of both her linguistic and psychoanalytical 
strategies. My study is also concerned with identifying the limits of Kristeva’s ‘semiotic 
strategies’ for the recovery of the subject. My critique highlights that the underlying 
materialism of her project prevents a full reading of ‘psychic suffering’. Despite her 
objectives, Kristeva’s method ‘exhausts’ the subject, and this ‘exhaustion’ is pre-built in her 
materialism. As ‘grace’ is ontologically excluded from her system, it is inevitable that this 
materialism overlooks the religious dimension of the subject’s ‘ontic’ crisis. Analysis III 
pays attention to Kristeva’s novels. My critique points out that a very intense personal and 
collective mourning for the self’s religious past is taking place in her fictional writings. It is 
this ‘melancholy mourning’ which remains unanswered in Kristeva’s project. In the novels it 
surfaces as an existential problem, whereas in the theoretical writings we encounter a highly 
disciplined psychological understanding of religion. 
 
As a response, Chapter 3, ‘Aporias and Resolutions’, evaluates Kristeva’s materialist 
horizon. This evaluation shows that Kristeva’s project can be seen as a complex ‘ontological 
program’ from a materialist position. This program offers a ‘semiotic’ soteriology. As the 
external form of a comprehensive response, I will suggest an ‘ontological critique’ of 
Kristeva. My evaluation will point to the fact that it is not sufficient to reground ‘reason’ in 
its quasi transcendent horizon, the ‘sub-conscious’. I will make the claim that control over 
reason cannot be limited to the immanent discourse on love. Reinstating the Transcendent 
horizon as a relevant reference for dealing with the nihilist crisis is also necessary. I argue 
that reinstating the religious meaning of Transcendence is an important resource for 
responding to the problem of the ‘isolated self’ which her materialism reveals. The central 
task of this chapter is to find a solution through which a non-apologetic response to the 
‘ontological’ conflict with her materialism becomes possible. My solution will be raising the 
critique onto a symbolic level. This will be given a support by Kristeva’s novels and the 
development in her relationship to religion. The ultimate confirmation that a shared 
‘symbolic reflection’ is possible is Kristeva’s recently emerged dialogical position with 
religion. 
 
The chapters in Part Two will bring to realisation the closing insight of Part One, 
namely, that it is possible to bring to realisation the suggested ‘ontological critique’, if 
theology, through its own efforts to renew its language on God, enters into dialogue with 
Kristeva’s ‘semiotic symbols’. That is why Part Two further advances the thesis of Part One: 
Kristeva’s project can best be responded to from within the theology of the cross. It brings 
out the non-apologetic dimension of my critique by arguing that a shared symbol building 
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with Kristeva is possible. My critique in this phase will identify, as the centre of a shared 
‘cultural mourning’, the need to recover the Father’s Love for the (‘exhausted’) post-modern 
subject. This shared objective provides the platform to argue the relevance of a ‘graced’ 
Loving Third Party. Basically, Part Two will present three different, yet interrelated, 
readings of the Passion. 
 
Chapter 4, ‘The New Situation in Culture: The Lost Father’, presents, as the starting 
point for dialogue, the situation of the lost Father. First, I present the historical expression of 
the problem in Freud. My specific focus will be how the ‘Father’s love’ in reference to the 
Christian God-image emerged in Freud’s ‘historical mourning’, that is, in his reading of the 
Christian Passion. In this way, the critique of Kristeva’s materialism will be taken up by 
making the question of the ‘God-image’ central. This ‘bridge’ with Freud is important as 
through him it becomes possible to engage with Kristeva’s ‘atheistic’, psychological, and 
humanist sub-texts through a shared focal point. This focus is the theological problem of 
presenting a relevant image of God to culture. The problem of correcting the God image, 
namely, the distortions of the images of atonement theology, will recapitulate the ontological 
conflict with Kristeva. That is why I will suggest the correction of the image of the ‘Father’ 
in the ‘bloody representation’ of the Passion as the platform from which the comprehensive 
response of theology to Kristeva can be articulated. The image of the Father in the Passion, it 
will be argued, can be presented as a narrative which integrates the problems that the 
encounter with Kristeva raises. The advantages and limits of her materialist anthropology, 
her critique of religion, and her critique of nihilism can all be linked to the Christian God-
image in the Passion.  
 
Chapter 5, ‘Kristeva’s “Semiotic Passion”: Reinstating the “Father” of Religion’, 
presents Kristeva’s recent reading of the Passion. It is organically linked to Freud’s critique 
of the God-image in two aspects. First, her dialogue with Christians on ‘Suffering’ is a 
recapitulation of her Freudian regime for the Christian interlocutor. Here specific attention 
will be paid to her correction of Freud’s premise, namely, that religion is not an illusion. 
Belief in the ‘loving Third’, as we shall learn from Kristeva’s new dialogical position, is a 
shared existential dynamic with religious faith. Kristeva, with her dialogical position in the 
Passion, herself brings the image of the Christian Father to the fore. My study will argue 
that, for the first time in the oeuvre, we see theology in a co-ordinate relationship with her 
regime, as a partner. If theology lives with this chance, it can argue that religion can speak 
with anthropological relevance to Kristeva’s humanism.  
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Chapter 6, ‘Theology’s “Semiotic Passion”: Renewing the Image of the Father from the 
Theologia Crucis’, will demonstrate that the theology of the cross, as the ‘cultural mourning’ 
of theological modernity, has sufficient resources to respond to the problems of the 
‘speaking being’. Drawing on the theologies of Rahner, Metz, Moltmann and von Balthasar, 
I show that theology has a genuine anthropological discourse, which provides vital data for 
answering the needs of the ‘exhausted subject’. On the one hand, it will be a response to 
Kristeva’s early position which regarded religion (theology) as an ‘expired’ discourse. On 
the contrary, theology’s ‘symbolic mourning’ has explored areas which were overlooked by 
the ‘anthropological turn’ in culture. Thus, Kristeva’s substituting psychoanalysis for 
religion on the ground that the latter lacks a proper contemporary anthropology does not 
hold. It is true that this lack can be stated in the classic theological concepts such as the 
‘person’ and ‘God’. My point will be that the ‘symbolic’ development of the theologia crucis 
recognised this lack, and made significant corrections. However, I will conclude critically, 
this ‘anthropological mourning’ remained unfinished.  
 
Chapter 7, ‘The ‘Semiotic Passion’: The Linguistic Imagery of the Father’, is going to 
submit a theoretical proposal, which is theology’s ‘semiotic reading’ of the Cross. This is the 
linguistic imagery of the Passion in the form of a theoretical model. It suggests those 
corrections which not only Kristeva’s ‘anthropological demands’ raise, but which the 
objective situation of the ‘exhausted subject’ also raises. My general argument throughout 
the study is that the crisis of the postmodern subject challenges both the humanist and the 
theological narratives. This challenge requires a co-operation between Kristevan 
psychoanalysis and faith. The Semiotic Passion submits an ‘experimental’ image of the 
Father which responds in relevant ways to ‘postmodern exhaustion’. It articulates a 
theological metaphor in its own right, which I term the image of the ‘mourning Father’. Its 
relevance is that the ‘unprecedented closeness of the Father’ posits a genuine dynamic of 
healing. As a comprehensive response to Kristeva, my study demonstrates that it is possible 
to represent the Christian Father within the self. This corrected imagery of the Passion, my 
claim will be, achieves a ‘new credibility’ of the ‘Father’ for the contemporary subject. It 
speaks directly to his ‘exhaustion’, when the subject’s last possession is language. Language 
will be presented as the ultimate ‘ontological’ narrative of postmodern identity. I will 
conclude that presenting the image of transcendent Love on this ‘horizon’ can remove a 
major cause of ‘mistrust’ in the Christian narrative. The Semiotic Passion as a whole will 
show that the banal images of God with which culture operates can be corrected. This 
unchallenged banality is a major hindrance that prevents the postmodern self (and our 
culture) from ‘mourning’ the lost ‘Christian past’. The Semiotic Passion serves as a narrative 
through which making ‘ontological statements’ on the subject becomes possible again in a 
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new way. In the narrow sense, it demonstrates that, for Kristeva, a much more fertile 
dialogue is possible with theology than with ‘Habermas’s’ rationalist recovery of 
Enlightenment humanism. In the wider sense, the revision of the banal images of God 
associated with the ‘bloody’ Cross aims at grounding a further dialogue with Kristeva. As a 
starting point for a further dialogue, by presenting non-banal images of the Father, the 
Semiotic Passion initiates a renewed communication between secular humanism, Tradition 
(orthodoxy), and the post-modern self.   
 
Chapter 8, ‘Summary of the Thesis and Conclusions’, gives an overview of the thesis 
with some strategic outcomes. 
* 
In order to assist the reader, I am introducing the major most frequently recurring 
hermeneutic concepts of my study in the ‘Appendices’. These critical keywords bring to the 
surface the necessary critical tension and, at the same time, ground a non-apologetic 
dialogue.   (See Appendix 1.a) 
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PART ONE: PREPARING THE DIALOGUE  
 
My thesis argues that the central problem of Kristeva’s work is the crisis of the 
‘exhausted subject’ of modernity and post-modernity, which is not fully answered by her 
psychoanalytic regime. Her understanding of the ‘speaking being’ leads to an ‘ontic’ 
exhaustion of the subject, which can only be resolved through a specific engagement with 
theology, namely with the ‘Semiotic Passion’, which is a comprehensive response from the 
theology of the cross. 
 
The two parts of my work relate to each other as exposition and conversation. The 
specific task of Part One is to situate Kristeva as a potential dialogue partner for theology. It 
does this by elucidating the first proposition of the thesis that the ‘exhausted subject’ is the 
underlying problem of Kristeva’s ‘speaking being’, and that it is her materialist horizon that 
prevents her from recognising the crisis of the post-modern self in its totality. Part Two will 
initiate a conversation to resolve this problem. It will spell out the second proposition of my 
thesis, namely that the historical exhaustion of the subject can be responded to best from the 
theology of the cross.  
 
My critique engages on three major levels with Kristeva. Part One is the first step, 
establishing a contact between theology and Kristeva’s texts. This, as the ontological tension 
with her materialism will show, is a preliminary ‘apologetic relationship’. As a second stage, 
my purpose in Part Two will be to resolve this impasse by exploring an inter-textual 
relationship11 (potential dialogue) with theology, which lies beneath the initial tension. The 
closing step will be a demonstration that even the closest ‘intra-textual’ relationship (actual 
co-operation) is possible. These levels of engagement cover the critique of Kristeva’s 
materialism (Part One), the engagement through representatives of the theologia crucis, and 
the dialogue between Kristeva’s ‘semiotic symbols’ and theology in the Semiotic Passion 
(Part Two). 
 
Kristeva’s agnostic atheism posits an unusual challenge for a critique articulated from 
the position of faith. From the onset, my study challenges the position of ‘post-metaphysical 
consciousness’ that rejects an ‘ontological discourse’ with theology. Part One’s general 
working hypothesis is that Kristeva’s psychoanalytical discourse reveals a situation between 
secular humanism and theology in which the revision of this position is necessary. 
                                               
11 See Appendix 1.a 
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1 ADVENTURES AND IMPASSES − SITUATING KRISTEVA’S ‘SEMIOTICS’ FOR 
THEOLOGICAL DISCOURSE  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to situate Kristeva for theological discourse. Though 
Kristeva could be examined in her French academic context, I deliberately draw on her 
English speaking authorities as my concern is to introduce Kristeva to the British theological 
audience.  
 
This chapter situates Kristeva for theology in the following aspects. It examines (1) her 
unique relationship to mainstream secular discourse (the ‘Habermasian centre’), (2) her new 
contribution to psychoanalysis, (3) how her project, as a psychoanalytical ethic and a critique 
of culture, sees the ‘speaking being’, (4) and the questions that her engagement with 
religious texts raise for theology.  
 
 
 1.1 Submitting the Paradox: The Possibility of Ontological Discourse In a ‘Post-
metaphysical Age’? 
 
Situating Kristeva for theology has to start with showing her unique position among 
‘post-metaphysical discourses’. Locating her within the humanist tradition offers a crucial 
direction for a critique. It also frames her professional contexts. Kristeva is caught up in a 
challenging inner tension. While sharing the Habermasian program that secular reason is not 
allowed to make ‘ontological pronouncements on the constitution of the being as such’,12 
because the experience of faith is unverifiable by rational knowledge, her Freudianism is 
also in revolt against the hegemony of reason.  
 
Kristeva’s philosophical context is undeniably mainstream secular humanism which 
defines itself as post-metaphysical thinking. My study deliberately relates Kristeva to 
Habermas’ recent call for a critical revision of the humanist project. He critically proposes 
that ‘something is missing’ from these discourses. This ‘something’ ‘intrudes into modernity 
as the most awkward element from its [religious] past’.13 The complementarity and the 
tension of their positions provide a vital orientation for my critique. Kristeva herself is 
                                               
12 Jürgen Habermas, “Religion in the Public Sphere: Cognitive Presuppositions for the ‘Public Use of 
Reason’ by Religious and Secular Citizens” (pp.114-147), in Jürgen Habermas, Between Naturalism 
and Religion, Polity Press, Cambridge 2008, p.140. 
13 Habermas, An Awareness of What is Missing, p.16. 
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involved in this debate. 14 She fully agrees with Habermas in recognising the autonomy of 
reason over metaphysical thought. Both assign a leading role to critical reason in resolving 
the crisis of culture. They also share the need to revise the relationship between the 
Enlightenment and religion. Both urge a further criticism of the humanist project. 
 
Yet, paradoxically, it is the Habermas – Kristeva disagreement which leads to the 
rehabilitation of ‘ontological discourse’ on Kristeva’s part. The paradox is that while 
Kristeva does not buy into ontological statements, her discourse relates to Habermas as an 
‘alternative metaphysics’ which corrects ‘rational’ humanism.  Kristeva rebels against the 
hegemony of reason in terms of the falsity of the ego.15 The psychoanalytic shift, she argues, 
presented the subconscious as the interruption of Cartesian reason. Kristeva challenges the 
ego cogito, the thinking subject, from the position of the ego amo, the subject believing in 
the other.16 In terms of this new dynamic, it is a real, quasi ‘metaphysical’ distance. The 
discovery of the unconscious was a paradigm shift in the development of the humanism of 
the Enlightenment. It brought it the missing ‘greater complexity’ and sophistication.17 
Kristeva, unlike Habermas, lets reason dream of love, its genuine other. We can evaluate this 
interruption of reason as reintroducing a ‘transcendent’ dynamic. Rational reason is raised to 
a level which is beyond the ‘physis’ (nature) of self-totalising reason. 
 
There is a second level, where Kristeva gets ‘quasi-metaphysical’. This is her use of 
symbolic language. In contrast to the rationalist humanism of Habermas, Kristeva engages 
directly with Christian texts. We can locate her discourse between a corrected rationalist 
humanism and the interest of religion in the ‘beginnings’. This latter Habermas deems as 
‘irrational’, ‘opaque’ and ‘totally alien’ to the agnostic reason.18 When he suggests a 
cognitive approximation between ‘self-reflexive humanism’ and a ‘self-reflexive theology’ it 
remains a theoretical suggestion. Unlike this ‘post-metaphysical suspicion’, Kristeva engages 
in a symbolism which she shares with Christians. A section in This Incredible Need to 
Believe, ‘The Debt of the Human Sciences toward Onto-theology’, tells of this overstepping 
of a border. Kristeva goes much further than the ‘splendid isolation’ of Habermas, when 
offering a second Freudian correction to ‘rationalist humanism’. ‘The remains of the 
                                               
14 Kristeva, Julia. ‘ “Rethinking Normative Conscience”: The Task of the Intellectual Today’ (pp.219-
226), Common Knowledge Spring 2007 13(2-3) (The article was a contribution to ‘A Dictatorship of 
Relativism’? Symposium in Response to Cardinal Ratzinger's Last Homily) 
15 Kristeva draws her alternative in terms of a ‘negativity at the heart of consciousness’. A very fine 
exposition of this ‘metaphysical beyond’ or underlying dimension of consciousness is the section 
‘Negativity, “I”, “Bad Faith”’ (pp.129-133), in Julia Kristeva, Intimate Revolt, The Powers and Limits 
of Psychoanalysis, Columbia University Press, New York 2002. 
16 Julia Kristeva, This Incredible Need to Believe, Columbia University Press, New York 2009, p.33. 
17 Kristeva, ‘Rethinking Normative Conscience’, p.221. 
18 Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion, p.143. 
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ontotheological continent, too rapidly decreed sunk, seem less and less like “dead letters” 
and more and more like laboratories of living cells whose exploration might allow us to 
clarify present aporias and impasses.’19 To do justice to Habermas, they agree in 
‘internalising’ the religious contribution. Part of ‘what is missing’ is the need to recognise 
the Christian metaphysical tradition within modernity as part of its own genesis.20  
 
The third level, where Kristeva goes beyond the Habermasian centre, is her turn to the 
subject. For Kristeva the human person is always an open system and not a substance and, 
just like language, is never transparent. It opposes Habermas whose subject is autonomous 
and an effective political agent.21 Here Kristeva’s project is much further ahead of Habermas 
whose analysis is limited mainly to the crisis of discourse. Kristeva articulates the crisis of 
culture also in terms of the crisis of the subject of discourse. This subjective turn is where 
Kristeva goes beyond the strict demarcation between agnostic post-metaphysical thinking 
and religion.22 My point is that any description of subjective crisis necessarily is ‘meta-
physical’ in as much as it raises the problem of the resourcing of the person. The classic 
metaphysical questioning, ‘What is existent?’, ‘What is really there?’, is reformulated in 
Kristeva: what is a sufficient support to the person and his community? In practice, 
Kristeva’s project reintroduces ‘ontology’ into the post-modern situation. The question of the 
grounding of the self, that is, the need of re-orientation, sufficient resources, and the need for 
secular humanism to find a critical distance from its crisis, generates an ‘ontological 
discourse’.  
 
The fourth level, where Kristeva emerges as a ‘transcendent discourse’, is the way her 
psychoanalytical regime, compared with Habermas, discloses its ideological subtexts. For 
Kristeva, coming out of one’s own discourse is necessary, because it is the only way to 
scrutinise the founding premises of the secular Enlightenment. The problem with the post-
metaphysical position is that it refuses to question its ideological foundations. Compared 
with Habermas, as we will see, her model is more open for ‘ontological’ and ideological 
scrutiny. Kristeva allows us to see her ideological premises, her materialism, her 
Freudianism and ‘Marxism’ as an atheism. Mainstream secular humanism (‘Habermas’) does 
not. The ‘ontological correctness’ of the post-metaphysical age, in a sense, is based on a 
denial. The latter is reluctant to admit that ideologically it is not un-biased at all. The ‘split’ 
                                               
19 Kristeva, This Incredible Need to Believe, p.32. 
20 Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion, p.141. 
21 Nöelle McAfee, Habermas, Kristeva, and Citizenship, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London 
2000, pp.74.78. 
22 See their definite separation in Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion, cf. pp.143-147. 
 23 
between Kristeva and Habermas reveals that secular discourse is founded on unchecked 
ontological premises. 
 
It is against this background, before all subsequent engagements, that my study can 
clarify in what sense Kristeva’s project is ‘ontological’. On the one hand, strictly speaking, 
Kristeva does not buy into metaphysics. In fact, she regards her theories as ‘anti-
metaphysical’. However, against the above backdrop, we encounter a deep epistemological 
ambiguity in her project. The second paradox emerges in her relation to Christian 
‘metaphysical’ discourse itself. Kristeva draws heavily on elements of its metaphysical 
language, even if their original weight is replaced by a metaphorical or psychological 
meaning. ‘Psychoanalysis seems to be alone in radically making immanent what Western 
metaphysics considers transcendent.’23 It is in view of this ‘immanent’ transposing of 
meaning that Kristeva speaks of her preoccupation with the ‘sacred’. ‘My preoccupation 
with the sacred is, in fact, anti-metaphysical…By understanding the “semiotic” as the 
“emergence of meaning” we can overcome the dichotomies of metaphysics (soul/body, 
physical/psychical).’24  
 
With metaphysical language, Kristeva also dismisses religious ontology. In practice, 
however, she produces a complete materialist ‘ontology’ of the person. Her description of 
the ‘sub-psychic’ and love demonstrate all the functions of an ontology. Sneyder gives 
support to my approach, when he advances Kristeva’s ‘semiotics’ as a metaphysical quest. 
Interestingly, Sneyder sees her as taking up Kant’s unfinished project from the metaphysical 
tradition of the Enlightenment. Kristeva revisits the unexamined ‘roots’ of human 
subjectivity. 25 Her important references to Heidegger, as the archetypal writer between 
anthropology and metaphysics, give further support to the ‘ontological’ line I take.26 My 
ontological approach is given a further confirmation by Philippa Berry. She brings attention 
                                               
23 Kristeva, Intimate Revolt, p.234. 
24 ‘Thinking About Liberty in Dark Times’ (pp.3-23), Julia Kristeva, Hatred and Forgiveness, 
Columbia University Press, New York 2010, p.11. 
25 We find Charles Sneyder’s paper cited in full on Kristeva’s official homepage. It means that she 
agrees with labelling her work as an ‘ontological’ update on the humanism of the Enlightenment. See: 
Charles Sneyder, ‘‘Psychoanalysis and the Problem of Metaphysics: Kristeva, Primary Identification’, 
originally published in Kristeva’s periodical, L’Infini (Automne 2008), French title  «Psychanalyse et 
le problème de la métaphysique: Kristeva, l’identification primaire.» 
In http://www.kristeva.fr/snyder_en.html, accessed: 26 August 2010. 
26 Kristeva engaged extensively with Heidegger through Hannah Arendt. She examines in detail how 
Arendt’s action centred philosophy departs from Heidegger’s reconstruction of metaphysical 
discourse. This study shows how well Kristeva is rehearsed in the classic metaphysical tradition. See, 
Ch 2 ‘Arendt and Aristotle, An Apologia for Narration’ (pp.11-29), in Julia Kristeva, Hannah Arendt, 
Life is A Narrative, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, Buffalo, London 2001, and her monograph 
Hannah Arendt, Columbia University Press, New York 2001 (Original French publication Le Génie 
feminine, Hannah Arendt, by Librairie Arthéme Fayard, 1999.), especially sections ‘Arendt and 
Aristotle: A Defense of Narration’ (pp. 69-86.) and ‘The Tale of the Twentieth Century’ (pp.86-99.) 
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to ‘the feminist alternative’ that Irigary and Kristeva spelled out in developing further 
Heidegger’s correction of the Western metaphysical tradition. Berry convincingly argues that 
Kristeva’s semiotics can be seen within the development of Western ontology and points out 
a direct contact with the late Heidegger’s key concept, the Lichtung, ‘clearing’ or ‘open 
place’ within which Being can manifest its hiddenness. Kristeva’s concept of the ‘chora’, 
Berry argues, is an original articulation of a ‘space’ ignored by the Western metaphysical 
tradition, in which the dualisms produced by a ‘patriarchal conceptual and experiential 
horizon can be corrected. Core elements of Kristeva’s semiotic program, like extase or 
jouissance, the maternal origins of meaning, point to the possibility of another kind of 
thinking which is missing from ‘patriarchal metaphysics’. Kristeva, Berry argues, resolves 
the philosophical dilemmas of the late Heidegger by reconfiguring (dissolving) the 
boundaries between sacred and profane, the bodily and the intellectual style of knowing. 
This kind of ‘ontological approach’ offers a correction of the implicitly masculine subject.27 
Berry also draws attention in Of Chastity and Power to the fact that the first secular 
canonisation of this subjectivity took place in late Renaissance philosophy. This masculine 
horizon was further manifest in the distinctive rational subject of late sixteenth and 
seventeenth century philosophy and science. Berry’s important thesis is that it is upon this 
radical paradigm shift in Western discourse on the ‘sacred’, the emergence of a masculine 
humanism with its epistemological regime, that the Enlightenment project has been erected 
up to the present.28 Despite the fact that my strategy of deconstructing theology’s ‘strong’ 
Father-narrative will rely on theological classics untouched by the feminist discourse, my 
study fully agrees with Berry in that Kristeva articulates the necessary correction of the 
masculine subject, the agent of modernity’s discourses on the sacred, secular and religious 
alike. Kristeva’s ‘ontological revision’ in Tales of Love examines the paradigm shift that 
Berry points out, not only in the Renaissance but also in the medieval period.29 
 
This preliminary situating of Kristeva holds two things in readiness for my critique. The 
first is her ambiguous position in ‘post-metaphysical’ discourses. This provides the potential 
for her critical position to re-introduce the question of ‘beginnings’. Secondly, if Kristeva 
can be seen as reopening ‘ontological discourse’ within the secular tradition, then, what 
directions can her discourse take? Is her emphasis on the subject pushing her towards the 
Habermasian ‘centres’ in terms of locking her in polemics with ‘normative reason’, or is it 
                                               
27 See Ch 19 ‘Woman and Space According to Kristeva and Irigary’ (pp.250-264), in: Shadow of 
Spirit, Postmodernism and Religion, edited by Philippa Berry and Andrew Wernick, Routledge, 
London and New York 1992., cf. pp.256-259. 
28 Philippa Berry, Of Chastity and Power, Elizabethan Literature and the Unmarried Queen, 
Routledge, London and New York 2006 (First published in 1989), p.2. 
29  See Chapters 4-6 on the concept of love in Thomas Aquinas, Bernard of Clairvaux and Renaissance 
literature. Tales of Love, Columbia University Press, New York 1987 (French original1983).  
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pushing her towards an ‘ontological description’ of subjective suffering, which she has 
initiated? More explicitly, can Kristeva’s Freudian premise that reason has to be challenged 
outside reason lead to a critical dialogue with Christianity about the ‘beginnings’ and ‘ends’ 
of human potential? 
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1.2 Kristeva’s New Contribution to Psychoanalysis 
 
Julia Kristeva’s corpus includes more than 26 volumes, including her novels. This 
introduction gives a comprehensive overview of Kristeva’s work. For systematic theology it 
is quite a process to learn the coherence and ‘autonomy’ of her post-structuralist 
psychoanalysis. The primary task of the following sections is to make clear that Kristeva’s 
‘ontological’ reference is the language of the ‘speaking being’. It is from this core that she 
addresses critically both secular and theological discourses on the subject. It is crucial to see 
from the outset that Kristeva’s work always retains a fundamental link with religion. This 
relationship is best summed up by Arendt’s program, with which Kristeva entirely identifies. 
Religious tradition has to be rethought (“believing in God”) by constantly questioning 
transcendence.30 
 
 
1.2.1 Autobiographical Background 
 
A brief autobiographical overview from Ives31 will explain much of the ‘story’ of the 
‘speaking being’, as Kristeva’s theories respond to particular historical situations and cultural 
conditions of the human person. This overview also gives insights on the major influences on 
her as a thinker. 
 
 Kristeva was born in communist Bulgaria in 1941. She was educated in part by French 
Dominican nuns. She was involved with the Communist Party’s children’s groups and youth 
organisations. In her adolescence, she lost her orthodox faith. Kristeva attributed this loss not 
so much to the influence of atheist indoctrination, as to a personal conflict with the ‘bodily 
desires’ she experienced of her emerging adulthood. The faith of childhood never developed 
into the faith of an adult, despite her frequent references to her father’s faith and their 
visiting churches together when she was young.  
 
In 1965 Kristeva moved to France with the Charles de Gaulle scholarship and the 
intention of not returning to Bulgaria. Now she is regarded in France as one of the most 
important thinkers of the era. Early on, Kristeva was associated with the Parisian avant-garde 
leftist journal Tel Quel, and the Tel Quel group of writers and philosophers: Michael 
Foucault, Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida, Philippe Sollers and others. As a young linguist, 
                                               
30 Kristeva, Hannah Arendt, p. 104. 
31 Kelly Ives, Julia Kristeva, Art, Love, Melancholy, Philosophy, Semiotics and Psychoanalysis, 
Crescent Moon Publishing, London 2008 (first published 1998). 
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she was greatly influenced by the function and workings of texts in modern avant-garde 
literature. Examining the ‘text’ in the modern novel, in her Le Texte du roman, Kristeva’s 
references were Georg Lukacs, Ferdinand de Saussure, Noam Chomsky, Mikhail Bakhtin, 
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. In Séméiotike: Recherches pour une Sémanalyse (a 
collection of her early essays between 1966 and 1968), she referred to Sigmund Freud and 
Jacques Lacan. Georges Bataille’s philosophy, with its emphasis on negativity and loss was 
an important influence on her own way of interpreting culture and the psychic space. In her 
hermeneutics Kristeva made central the category of ‘loss’. The philosophy of negativity that 
Kristeva developed includes the historical dialectic materialism of Marx, Freud’s drive-
theory, and her theory of the loss of the mother as a grounding event of language.  
 
Kristeva’s visit to China in 1974 resulted in her break with political Marxism and 
Maoism (About Chinese Women32). Her doctoral thesis, Revolution in Poetic Language 
(1974) made her a philosopher and a critic. She turned to the transformative power of literary 
texts. While already developing her own original work, she was learning Lacanian 
psychoanalysis. In 1979 Kristeva became a practising Freudian psychoanalyst, while keeping 
a chair in linguistics at the University of Paris VII. Psychoanalysis, poetic language, gender, 
maternity and identity are her lasting topics from the 1980s. Borderline states of identity, 
exile, the foreigner are intertwined in her writings and result in a cosmopolitan ethics for the 
‘cosmopolitan individual’. These themes of her work developed into her recent concern, the 
problem of how to preserve European identity as a cultural identity.33  
 
 
1.2.2  A Brief Recapitulation of Kristeva’s Semiotic Program 34  
 
Julia Kristeva applies the structural tools of the psychoanalytic tradition to the dynamics 
of post-modern culture. Her thought, though critical of Jacques Lacan, the French Freudian 
psychoanalyst, is also indebted to him especially in his exploration of the ways in which 
language is the medium of subjectivity. For Kristeva, the relationship between the ‘semiotic’ 
                                               
32 Julia Kristeva, About Chinese Women, Urizen Books, New York 1977 (Originally published in 
France in 1974 as Des Chinoises by Editions des Femmes). 
33 In the above biographical and thematic summary I followed closely Ives’ stresses in Kristeva’s 
biography. In Ives, Julia Kristeva, pp.27-31. 
34 I follow closely Hanvey’s excellent and pioneering summary of Kristeva’s psychoanalytic project, 
which is the evaluation of a systematic theologian. To my knowledge, Hanvey’s is the first assessment 
of Kristeva’s psychoanalytical strategy from a Trinitarian point of view. Hanvey contextualises 
Kristeva similarly to Beardsworth regarding the corpus as a psychoanalytic response to modern 
nihilism. (See: Sarah Beardsworth, Julia Kristeva, Psychoanalysis and Modernity, State University of 
New York Press, New York 2004.). James Hanvey SJ, ‘Other than Stranger’ (pp.121-142), in Values 
in Public Life, Aspect of Common Goods, edited by Patrick Riordan, Studies in Religion, Ethics and 
Public Life, Lit, Berlin 2007.; quoted and extracted from pp.125-128. 
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and the ‘symbolic’ is the constantly shifting site of the subject who emerges in language; that 
is why human beings are ‘the speaking subject’. It is her perception that meaning and 
subjectivity depend on the ability to connect the ‘semiotic’ and the ‘symbolic’ if self-
relating, other-relating and world-relating are to be possible.  
 
The ‘semiotic’ is the affective, desire-driven, non-discursive dimension in language and 
the person. It is almost like the ‘unconscious’ embodied in language which is present in and 
communicated through the ‘symbolic’, or ordered, rational, law-governed language. The 
semiotic is an expression of the life of the chora, a concept Kristeva takes over from Plato’s 
Timaeus. It is directly connected to the thetic function, which connects the bodily drives with 
the symbolic order, ‘renewing meaning’ through the drive inscription. These ‘semiotic’ 
drives represent the creative inchoateness, to some extent, the maternal primal womb, from 
which life forms, and from which new proposed meanings emerge for the ‘Symbolic’. In 
return for accommodating the drive-irruptions, the chora-thetic accepts the renewed 
authority of the Symbolic order. The chora/thetic thus has the power to express and inscribe 
bodily drives, which is why Kristeva is so attentive to the relationship between body and 
language.  
 
Revolution in Poetic Language (1974) and Desire in Language (1980, collected essays 
from 1969-76) show Kristeva’s post-structuralist period which culminates in the elaboration 
of the subject as a ‘heterogeneous contradiction’. Many highlight the ‘subject-in-process or 
on-trial’ as the dominant metaphor of the oeuvre.35 According to Kristeva, the unitary ego of 
modernity is an untenable definition of identity, as the subject is never stable but is in a 
permanent crisis. It is a divided subject, which is also constituted by his ‘unconscious’, 
desires, memories, and ‘bodily drive’ eruptions. The subject always emerges from the 
interaction between body and language. In her series, Tales of Love (1983), Powers of 
Horror (1982) and Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia (1989), Kristeva traces this 
‘emergence’ through its cultural symbolic forms. This major trilogy of the 1980s shows her 
exploring the ‘wounded narcissism’ that arises in the primal drama out of which subjectivity 
emerges. This is what psychology traditionally calls the period of ‘primary identifications’, 
that is, the separation process from the maternal with the help of paternal ‘authority’. Each 
work represents dimensions in this emergence: pre-historical identification (love), abjection 
(separation), melancholy (nonverbal sadness in the face of the loss of the maternal). In these 
dimensions of suffering subjectivity, Kristeva, as analyst, exposes the underlying modern 
nihilism, that is, the loss of meaning and idealising narratives which, as telos, give a value 
                                               
35 Carol L. Schnabl Schweitzer, The Stranger’s Voice, Julia Kristeva’s Relevance for a Pastoral 
Theology for Women Struggling With Depression, Peter Lang, New York 2010, p.32. 
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orientation to person and culture. In subsequent works, especially in Strangers to Ourselves 
(1991) and Nations without Nationalism (1993), Kristeva attempts to develop the insights of 
her cultural analysis into a new, ‘therapeutic’ ethic. Her later important works, the trilogy of 
three feminine geniuses (Hannah Arendt, Melanie Klein, Colette), New Maladies of the Soul 
(1995), the Sense and Non-Sense of Revolt (1996), Intimate Revolt (1997), This Incredible 
Need to Believe (2009), and Hatred and Forgiveness (2010), and The Severed Head (2012) 
develop her ‘therapeutic’ critique of culture. 36    
 
 
1.2.3 Kristeva’s Relationship to Lacanian Psychoanalysis37 
 
Kristeva’s critique of Lacan was crucial in developing her construct of the ‘speaking 
being’. Her departure from Lacan and from Freud helps theology to grasp the dynamic of 
Kristeva’s hermeneutics of culture. Deploying the ‘semiotic’ viewpoint offers her a unique 
penetration into the subject-culture relationship, and a powerful critical potential. Lacan’s 
influence goes much further than grounding Kristeva’s linguistic horizon. Lacan also 
represents an appropriation of Marxist analysis to psychoanalytic theory. It is through Lacan 
that we can speak of Kristeva’s ‘Marxian subtext’. Lacan can also be regarded as her 
‘metaphysical subtext’. It is through Lacan’s ‘excessive reduction’ of the old metaphysical 
and moral framework that Kristeva can be linked, however indirectly, with the Christian 
metaphysical tradition. Kristeva herself refers to him in this context: ‘Lacan maintains the 
trans-Christian value of subjective interiority but radicalises it to the extreme… Lacan also 
had the courage to raise the question, not treated by Freud, of the ethics of psychoanalysis.’38 
The ethical thrust that she draws from Lacan/Marx is the driving force in articulating her 
project not only as the linguistic model of the person but also as a psychoanalytical ethic.  
 
My study also highlights Lacan as an important element of the ‘cultural mourning’ 
which takes place in Kristeva. Marcus Pound showed how Lacan’s developing of his 
Freudian psychoanalysis was grounded on actual contacts with texts of medieval 
                                               
36 I followed closely Hanvey’s evaluation. In Hanvey, ‘Other than Stranger’, pp.125-128. 
37 Because of their technical precision and lucidity, in this section I mostly refer to the formulations of 
Buhle whose work is one of the finest feminist contextual readings of the oeuvre. The importance of 
this technical summary is to show that psyschoanalysis is a complex and autonomous field the 
motives of which has to be understood first. Mari Jo Buhle, Feminism and Its Discontents, A Century 
of Struggle with Psychoanalysis, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London 1998.  
38 Kristeva shows how this Lacanian ‘radical reduction’ preserves moral questioning and the problem 
of freedom from the original Christian framework. See the sections ‘A Little History: Freud and 
Lacan’ (pp.226-231), ‘Is Psychoanalysis a Comprehensive Moralism’ (pp.231-234), and ‘Why Is 
Psychoanalysis an Atheism’ (pp. 234-239.) in Kristeva, Intimate Revolt, p.230 
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scholasticism under the influence of the French nouvelle théologie.39 He convincingly argues 
for seeing a genuine historical contact between the nouvelle théologie and the nouvelle 
critique in their aim to deconstruct ‘extrinsic’ metaphysical and psychological concepts.40 
Pound’s reference is all the more significant, because prominent representatives of the  
nouvelle critique (New Criticism), French post-war critical theorists, like the structuralist 
Roland Barthes, or the surrealist poet and anthropologist George Bataille, are Kristeva’s 
immediate references.41  
 
As a ‘metaphysical-subtext’, Lacan points to a structural similarity with the role of 
‘Revelation’ in religious experience. Revelation challenges the ‘homogeneity’ of human 
knowledge, the ‘ego’ understood as a closed system. This economy of interpretation from 
the outside, like ‘Revelation’, transforms the self’s knowledge of himself and of the world. 
In Lacan’s recognition it is a structural similarity, as psychoanalysis challenges the 
conscious from the unconscious. Through language, which connects the two realms, 
psychoanalysis, just like ‘Revelation’, aims at removing the illusions of the ego, which are a 
hindrance in telling the story of a genuine self – world/history relationship.42 This program 
of transposing the religious economy of ‘Revelation’ underlies Kristeva’s concept of 
language. She attributes to it a ‘transcendent dynamic’ through which the ‘speaking being’ 
transcends itself and emerges into signification (‘meaning’). I propose Lacan’s program of 
‘transposed’ metaphysics as a major interpretative framework for theology when reading 
Kristeva’s theories. 
 
                                               
39 In mid-twentieth century, nouvelle théologie initiated the project of ressourcement, a return to the 
scriptures, to the Fathers, and to the liturgy, in order to retrieve a fuller, more contemplative 
understanding of faith. This definition refers to Daniélou’s seminal understanding of ressourcement 
from his programmatic essay (Jean Daniélou, ‘Les orientations présentes de la pensée religieuse’, 
Études, 249 (1946), 5-21.). In : Gerard Loughlin, Ch 2 ‘Nouvelle Théologie: A Return to 
Modernism?’ (pp.36-50), in Ressourcement, A Movement for Renewal in Twentieth-Century Catholic 
Theology, edited by Gabriel Flynn and Paul D. Murray, Oxford University Press, New York, Oxford 
2012 (First published 2012), p.48. 
40 Like Aquinas, Peter Abelard, Bernard of Clairvaux, or later engagements with the French Jesuit 
Teilhard de Chardin (his concept of intériorité, Pound suggests, could have influenced Lacan) or 
through the Augustinian expert philosopher Étienne Gilson. See Marcus Pound, ‘Lacan’s Return to 
Freud: A Case of Theological Ressourcement?’ (pp.440-456), in Ressourcement, cf.pp.443-449. 
41 Barthes’ interest in the sensory dimension of the texts of St. Ignatius of Loyola was an important 
influence on Kristeva, just like the avant-garde language of Bataille who represented the ‘subject in 
process’ See: on Barthes: ‘Writing as Strangeness and Jouissance’ (pp.251-256) in Kristeva, Hatred 
and Forgiveness; and Ch 7 ‘Barthes: Constructor of Language, Constructor of the Sensory’ (pp.95-
114), Ch 8 ‘Barthes: The Intractable Lover’ (pp.115-122), and Kristeva’s reference on Bataille’s 
avantgarde poetry in Kristeva, Intimate Revolt, p.130. 
42 See cf. pp. 449-452 from Pound, ‘Lacan’s Return to Freud: A Case of Theological Ressourcement?’ 
in Ressourcement. 
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Kristeva’s model of the ‘speaking being’ originates from the possibility of a new 
synthesis of feminism and psychoanalysis, which Lacanian psychoanalysis offered.43 Lacan 
rehabilitated basic elements of Freud’s original system. The unconscious, sexuality, and the 
Oedipus complex were useful sources to articulate ‘difference’ as the central agenda of 
feminism, a parallel discourse with Freudian psychoanalysis.  Kristeva’s other formative 
tradition, post-structuralist linguistics, was, in a sense, a twin-discourse of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis. Post-structuralism focused on the texts of the subject, which revealed the 
shaken identity of modernity. With Brennan, we can identify the post-structuralist source of 
Kristeva’s interest in history. Lacan here emerges also as Kristeva’s ‘historical subtext’. He 
added a psychoanalytical dimension to the Marxist critique of history. Lacan’s critique of 
history was influential in confirming the ‘sub-psychic’ viewpoint of Kristeva’s critique of 
culture. Lacan re-contextualised the critical agenda of Marx by setting into parallel the age of 
the capital and the activity of the uncontrolled ‘ego’.44 This was the ground of a 
psychoanalytic critique of history, making the crisis of the ego its central object. My point is 
that Lacan’s concept of history is important for seeing the general thrust of Kristeva’s 
critique of nihilism. What Lacan called the ‘era of the ego’ shows the inflated narcissism of 
the subject. According to the Lacanian critique, this wounded narcissism has led to a ‘social 
psychosis’. The totalised ‘ego’ acts itself out as domination. This ‘self’ extends at the cost of 
eliminating all genuine otherness and reducing everything to its sameness. It goes together 
with aggression and domination in history in order to gratify the needs of ego-narcissism.45. 
Kristeva’s critique of the ‘false selves’ (produced by consumerism) shows a similar merge of 
the linguistic, psychoanalytical and the social view-points. Kristeva takes up the idea from 
Lacan ‘to make the patient capable of love.’46 This program is the basis of her 
psychoanalytical ethics.  
 
Lacan’s psychoanalytic model showed a remarkable compatibility with post-structuralist 
linguistics. He had borrowed resourcefully from ‘French’ discourses on language: from 
Lévi-Strauss, Marleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, the surrealist aesthetics of Breton, from 
Saussure’s linguistics; from Descartes he took over with fascination the body-mind 
dualism.47 Lacan saw in Freud a remarkable opportunity for synthesising these discourses. 
                                               
43 Buhle, Feminism and Its Discontents, p. 321. 
44 Teresa Brennan, History After Lacan, Routledge, London, New York 1993 (First publication), p.3. 
Also see the Introduction by the same author in Exhausting Modernity where she confirms a dialogue 
between the viewpoints of Marx’s critique of capitalism and the Freudian psychoanalytic critique of 
culture. in Teresa Brennan, Exhausting Modernity, Grounds for a New Economy, Routledge, London, 
New York 2000 (First Publication), cf.pp. 2-8. 
45 See Brennan, History After Lacan, pp. 90-91 
46 Kristeva, Intimate Revolt, p.231. 
47 Buhle, Feminism and Its Discontents, p.324. 
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By inviting discourses on language, he hugely influenced Kristeva’s own particular 
rediscovery of Freud and the development of her own interdisciplinary approach. 
 
Kristeva also developed her work as a critique of Lacan. She challenged Lacan’s most 
famous edict that the unconscious is structured like language.48 Kristeva rejects the idea that 
the genesis of language can be modelled exclusively by the father’s language. Lacan took 
over the role of the father from Freud. He refashioned the Oedipus complex in terms of the 
notion of the child’s submission to the ‘Law of the Father’ being developed into a notion of 
the ‘law of language’. This ‘father’ mandates society’s norms both socially and 
linguistically. He, as the ‘Symbolic’ order, reigns as the carrier of speech and ‘grammar.’49 
In the Lacanian model this authority is internalised by the speaking being as an individual 
and as a member of culture. A central element of Kristeva’s notion of the ‘speaking being’, 
the ‘work of the negative’, is taken over from this model. The child comes to terms with the 
trauma of separation from the mother through the intertwined process of repression and 
naming. In Lacan, the child resolves the Oedipus complex by exchanging gratification 
promised by the mother for the privileges of a new psychic register, the Symbolic Order. It is 
this language, then, specifically the father’s language, through which the child gains access 
to civilisation. The famous premise of Lacan is that the phallus is not a real penis or an 
object; neither is it a fantasy nor a phenomenon or force directly knowable. The phallus can 
never be uncovered. It functions to produce a subjectivity that is sexed. 50 Kristeva is not 
satisfied with this solution which did not say much about what happens outside the oedipal 
phase, predating it. 
 
Kristeva develops further the new direction that Lacan’s theoretical proposal of the 
‘Mirror-stage’, as a correction of Freud’s oedipal scheme, opened up. Lacan had inserted the 
‘Mirror-stage’, the early months of the infant into Freud’s scheme. Somewhere between the 
ages of six and eighteen months, Lacan proposed, the infant emerges from primary 
narcissism where ego boundaries are still unknown. In the ‘mirror’, the infant encounters 
otherness for the first time. The child observes both his own image and that of the person 
holding him, the ‘mirror’. The infant achieves a joyous sense of self-recognition while 
realizing, paradoxically, that this sense of self depends on the Other for validation. In 
Lacan’s other metaphor, this is the realm of the Imaginary. In it, the mother and child are in 
a mutual dependence, which is not altogether pleasant. The image of the self in the ‘mirror’ 
is also a distortion, a misrecognition. It is the role of the father to ‘rescue’ the infant from 
                                               
48 Buhle, Feminism and Its Discontents, p.326. 
49 Ibid., p.326. 
50 Ibid., pp.326-327. 
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this undefined unity with the maternal container by severing the subject into Language. This 
mirror stage, Lacan states, never completely disappears from our psychic memory.51 Lacan, 
in contrast to Freud who did not say much about women’s otherness, by raising the 
importance of the ‘pre-oedipal phase’, has invited feminist approaches to psychoanalysis. He 
posited this uncharted otherness in the lingering (indefinable) power of the Imaginary 
femininity.52  
 
This technical recapitulation of Lacan with the help of Buhle was necessary for 
understanding in what sense Kristeva further developed Freud in a revolutionary way. She 
elaborates what in Lacan and Freud was left as an undiscovered ‘dark continent’. This is the 
presence of the mother and the loving father. It is a significant shift to the pre-oedipal realm 
of individual pre-history. Kristeva’s central concept, the ‘Loving Third party’, which is 
basically a metaphor of pre-oedipal love, is a deliberate break with the father of the oedipal 
phase for two important reasons. First, the mother’s role and the dynamic of love before 
language were unrecognised in previous Freudian models. ‘Meaning’ was exclusively 
associated with the authority of the Father. The same applies to the culture of modernity. It 
was the unquestionable authority of ‘masculine reason’ which, as an exclusive source, 
determined meaning. For Kristeva, the experience of motherhood decentralises the ‘language 
of the father’ and masculine theory.53 The second reason for the shift to ‘pre-oedipal love’ is 
historical. Freud clearly belonged to the classic world of modernity. Lacan, despite his 
presence in emerging post-modernity, still belonged to the world of the powerful ‘Father’. 
For him, though the Father’s authority was weakening, nevertheless it was still a functioning 
‘phallic’ authority. Kristeva, in contrast to them, fully observed the ‘symptoms of post-
modern society: the collapse of taboos, the prevalence of sadomasochistic sexuality, 
delinquency, vandalism, and new maladies of the soul: psychosomatosis, drug addiction, the 
diffusion of psychosis in neurotic structures’.54 Kristeva responded to the collapse of 
modernity’s ‘phallus’, or unscrutinised reason.  
 
In order to compensate this loss, Kristeva submits an alternative source of meaning. It is 
what we can call her ‘semiotic resources’. There are two great cycles of her ‘semiotics’: the 
‘semiotic’ constituent of meaning, and pre-oedipal love (the ‘Loving Third party’). There is 
                                               
51 The above recapitulation of Lacan’s ‘mirror stage’ is from Buhle, Feminism and Its Discontents, 
p.327. 
52 Ibid., p.328. 
53 Ives, Julia Kristeva, p.34. 
54 What is of significance is Kristeva’s explicit reference to the postmodern period in which she 
locates her psychoanalysis. Kristeva, Intimate Revolt, pp.235-236 
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no point in separating Kristeva’s inventions. From the very beginning these ‘semiotic 
resources’ intertwine and give support to each other.  
 
Chronologically, in terms of its elaboration, I mention first Kristeva’s groundbreaking 
discovery, the ‘semiotic’ dimension of language. She states that underlying what we know as 
the fully functioning language there is an archaic, pre-lingual layer. This is the ‘semiotic’, 
which is just as constitutive of language and meaning as the ‘Symbolic Order’. The 
‘semiotic’ is a complex metaphor. In the narrowest sense, it is a pre-lingual, uncontrollable 
flow of rhythms, vocal cathexes and melodic fragments. This ‘invisible’ dimension of 
language is already a pre-signification and is directed towards the Symbolic. In the 
‘semiotic’ the ‘fullness’ of language is already, as it were, pre-coded. The theory of the 
‘semiotic’ is a clear example of how, as a replacement of classic metaphysical discourse, 
Kristeva’s ‘Lacanian’ psychoanalysis ‘biologizes the essence of man’.55  
 
 To this ignored pre-verbal ‘semiotic’ dimension is closely linked the unrecognised 
mother in individual prehistory. This second semiotic resource is Kristeva’s second major 
theoretical invention, as part of her theory of pre-oedipal love. Here Kristeva elaborates the 
world of primary identifications (Lacan’s mirror stage and the Imaginary). She presents the 
drama of pre-oedipal love. It takes place between the ‘archaic mother’, the nascent individual 
to be severed from her, and the loving father of individual pre-history. Kristeva’s 
fundamental correction of Lacan and Freud is that the ‘alchemy of love’ is an event equally 
formative of meaning, as is the world of secondary identifications. In this latter, the ‘Father’ 
speaks the ‘Language of Law’, and fully represents the ‘Symbolic Order’. The Loving Third 
party can be seen as the dominant metaphor of the oeuvre, which becomes especially 
dominant in Kristeva’s psychoanalysis and cultural critique. This love emerges on the 
threshold of identity, before the acquisition of language. The love of the ‘loving Third party’ 
is active in the most sensitive phase of psychic formation, when the ‘speaking being’ leaves 
behind the ‘semiotic’ pre-verbal regions and becomes integrated into the Symbolic Order of 
spoken language. In this model, Kristeva closely associates the ‘semiotic’ dimension of 
language with the maternal. The love of the ‘Loving Third’ is deeply self-giving and 
unselfish. Kristeva is aware that this is a hypothetical construct but she finds it necessary to 
postulate it as a creative force in the genesis of the subject.  
 
The most significant element in this theory is that Kristeva does not set up a mechanical 
opposition between the archaic mother and the loving father. Their relationship does not 
                                               
55 Kristeva, Intimate Revolt, p.230. 
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repeat the ‘passive mother vs. active father’ dualism of the oedipal scheme where we see 
them in a subordinating relationship. The ‘archaic mother’ equally participates in the 
‘severing power’ of the ‘loving father’ who invites into language. The novelty is their 
positive co-operation. The ‘Father’s love’ integrates the love of the mother. He does so by 
teaching the mother to abandon her original ‘narcissistic withdrawal’ into a language-less 
joy, when she is one with her baby. In Kristeva’s model, the mother needs to learn how to let 
the child go and become an autonomous individual, separate from her. A mother’s love thus 
undergoes a transformation when it becomes ‘unselfish’ and joins with the Father’s ‘spoken’ 
love. The mother’s separation from the child is not definitive; it is not an absolute break. 
Through Language, the Mother and the elements of the world will be named in love. In this 
sense the ‘Symbolic Order’ is the gift of the Loving Third party. ‘Symbolised love’ retains 
the link between the mother and the child. 
 
The above elements constitute a complete genesis-story of the subject. It is very 
important to highlight that Kristeva understands the subject not as a static but as a dynamic 
identity. Individual ‘pre-history’ reveals an invisible ‘semiotic drama’, which remains at 
work in us. Underneath the crystallised surface of language there is a sleeping volcano. An 
important observation of Kristeva’s psychoanalytic theory − she draws on Freud’s theory of 
the death drive − is that this ‘semiotic chaos’ can burst onto the surface if identity is shaken. 
This fragility of meaning is pivotal in Kristeva’s critique of culture. Nihilism is always a 
threat to identity. It is the dynamic equilibrium between the ‘semiotic’ and the ‘Symbolic’ 
which is a defence against the loss of meaning. Their co-operation makes the ‘semiotic’ a 
vital and positive resource for ‘linguistic rebirth’; we speak of the recovery either of the 
individual or of culture.  
 
 
1.2.4 Kristeva’s Psychoanalytical Critique of Culture and Ethics 
 
The above theoretical innovations serve as ground not only for Kristeva’s linguistics and 
psychoanalysis. The full deployment of her innovative concepts takes place in what can be 
regarded as the ‘third cycle’ of her ‘semiotics’, Kristeva’s critique of culture and her 
psychoanalytical ethics. Thus, her linguistics, psychoanalysis, psychoanalytical hermeneutic 
of culture and her ethics comprise a unified whole. I refer to this coherence as Kristeva’s 
‘regime’.  
 
This ‘regime’ hinges on Arendt’s thesis: ‘life is a narrative’. One would miss Kristeva’s 
innovative linguistics if overlooking the primary motive of her project, the ethical revision of 
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European history. ‘Psychic rebirth’ and ‘linguistic re-beginning’ on the sub-psychic level are 
the prototype of ‘rebirth’ on the level of culture. This is an important completion of her 
argument that Cartesian reason has to be challenged from its subconscious ‘semiotic’ 
regions, most of all the discourse on love. My critique identifies and highlights her discourse 
on history, which underlies her ‘semiotics’. It can be seen as another important mode of her 
making ‘ontological’ statements in a post-metaphysical age. 
 
Among Kristeva’s critics no one regards her as what she most intensely is, a ‘historian’. 
However striking this labelling may be, Kristeva’s most important innovation is re-writing 
‘history’ for the ‘post-metaphysical age’, right at the heart of post-modernity. That is why it 
is a fundamental misunderstanding to pigeonhole her as a ‘post-modern’ thinker. While it is 
true from the post-modern perspective that she is a writer of ‘minor histories’ of love 
(Beardsworth), yet Kristeva also writes a collective history. Hers is a specific form of writing 
history. It is at the very ‘semiotic’ origins of language that Kristeva restores the ethical 
telos56 of history. My study highlights her monograph on Arendt as a hermeneutical key to 
her ‘semiotics’. Among her formative traditions, Arendt is Kristeva’s most important 
‘historical subtext’. Kristeva takes over from Arendt’s action-centred philosophy the 
permanent ‘disclosure’ of the historical subject. The underlying question she raises is the 
same as in Arendt: what is the way to manifest who I am, not what am?57 Kristeva reconnects 
the Arendtian ideal of the polis, where the uniqueness and freedom of the subject is manifest, 
with the ‘psychic space’, Kristeva’s locus for history. Today she adds, in retrospect to 
Arendt’s situation, the exhaustion of modernity’s resources.  It is psychoanalysis which 
creates the possibility of a life told as a narrative.  
 
‘The classic narrative, which was Arendt’s implicit point of reference, has now been 
damaged. Through such a narrative, a writing in search of rejoicing and demystification 
seeks to record the human condition. Like an expansion of Arendt’s “narrative”,…such 
writing [psychoanalysis] explores and renews the psychic realm, while using the 
recollection as a basis for examining the retrospective bond between man and meaning, 
between the creature and the eternal, and between the subject and Being, it exposes and 
puts into practice an incessant tendency toward conflict: a revolt. Life as a revolt is 
actualised in the no thought of writing. It also seeks to grow within the permanent 
questioning of recollections, pleasures, certainties, and identities, a questioning that 
underlies the psychoanalytic experience despite its worldly trappings.’58  
 
Directly quoting Arendt from The Human Condition, Kristeva emphasises the continuity 
between psychoanalysis and the Arendtian program of ‘examined life’, which leads to the 
historical rebirth of the subject: 
                                               
56 From the Greek τέλος, meaning ‘end’, ‘purpose’, or ‘‘goal’. 
57 Kristeva, Hannah Arendt, p.72. 
58 Ibid., pp.43-44. 
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Life ‘is realised only if it constantly questions meaning as well as action: “the 
revelatory character of action as well as the ability to produce stories and become 
historical, which together form the very source from which meaningfulness springs into 
and illuminates human existence.”’59 (The second quote is Arendt’s text, the italics are 
mine) 
 
Kristeva’s ‘obsession’ with psychic and linguistic beginnings is a radical, micro-focal 
actualisation of Arendt’s concept of history in the post-modern context. Arendt, having 
witnessed the catastrophe of the holocaust, recognises that the moral purification of history is 
possible only through historical re-beginnings. This takes place through the rebirth of 
historical consciousness, which is based upon the rebirth of critical consciousness. It is in 
this sense that Kristeva’s quest for ‘semiotic beginnings’ is a historical telos, moreover an 
ethical one. She points out that identity is always dynamic, always has to be renewed, and 
never should be conceived as ‘homogeneous’ or fixed. The speaking subject (person) is a 
sujet en procès (‘subject-in-process’ or on-trial). Schweitzer draws attention to the fact that 
the French word procès always has a legal or ethical connotation.60 Kristeva herself 
emphasises the ethical in the ‘the process/trial of the subject in language’:  
 
‘Nous entendons par éthique la négativation du narcissisme dans une pratique ; 
autrement dit, est éthique une pratique qui dissout les fixations narcissiques (étroitement 
subjectales) auxquelles succombe le procès signifiant dans son effectuation socio-
symbolique. La pratique, telle que nous l’avons définie posant-dissolvant le sens et 
l’unité du sujet, recouvre ce que nous venons de dire de l’éthique.’61 
 
‘ “Ethics” should be understood here to mean the negativizing of narcissism within a 
practice; in other words, a practice is ethical when it dissolves those narcissistic 
fixations (ones that are narrowly confined to the subject) to which the signifying process 
succumbs in its socio-symbolic realization. Practice, such as we have defined it, positing 
and dissolving meaning and the unity [identity] of the subject, therefore encompasses the 
ethical.’62 
 
  Narrated history, of which the very ‘semiotic’ beginning of selfhood is also part, in 
Kristeva’s reading of Arendt offers the  
 
‘possibility that we can envision birth and death, that we can contemplate them 
within time and that we can speak about them with the Other by sharing with other 
people − in a word, the possibility that we can tell a story − is at the heart of the specific, 
non-animalistic, and non-physiological nature of human life.’63 
                                               
59 Kristeva, Hannah Arendt, p.42. 
60 Schweitzer, The Stranger’s Voice, p.32. 
61 Julia Kristeva, La révolution du langage poétique, L’avant-gardé à la fin du XIXe siècle: 
Lautréamont et Mallarmé, Éditions du  Seuil, Paris 1974, p.203. 
62 Julia Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, Columbia University Press, New York 1984,p.233. 
63 Kristeva, Hannah Arendt, p.41. 
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In Kristeva, the ‘sub-psychic’ is the ‘self-transcending’ cell of human history. Her 
semiotic genesis-story of language in Revolution in Poetic Language (1974) is an archetypal 
expression of the need to re-begin failed human history, as the above ethical definitions of 
‘the subject in processes showed. As our ‘post-metaphysical age’ is based on immanence, it 
explains Kristeva’s strategy of formulating the ethical imperative in language. The 
interruption of history necessarily has to take place through ‘the story of language’. This is 
the only available narrative of the self and its most direct experience. 
 
With this, my critique wishes to highlight how the sub-psychic is the ground of 
Kristeva’s critique of culture. In her ‘turn to the subject’, an appreciative theological reading 
should recognise the attempt to establish a new universalism. This identifying of the 
Arendtian subtext of the ‘speaking being’ is important because it will allow an ethical 
evaluation of Kristeva’s materialism, not leaving critique alone with the mere ‘ontological’ 
conflict. My point is that Kristeva’s ‘semiotic symbol building’ starts here, in tracing the 
earliest ‘sub-lingual’ beginnings of personhood and culture. Her ‘semiotic symbols’, both in 
the early abstract and the later more ‘narrative’ forms, always want to express a universal 
humaneness. Kristeva’s critique of culture witnesses to what Arendt proposes as the 
universal dignity of the person: 
 
‘The main point of Arendt’s argument was to advocate the toleration of radical 
differences in the social realm to prevent them from spilling over into the private and 
political realms, where they could become destructive… 
 
….Arendt wanted black children to feel “pride”, which she defined as “that untaught 
and natural feeling of identity with whatever we happen to be by accident of birth”, and 
which she distinguished from racial, ethnic, or national pride.’64  
 
From Kristeva’s micro-focusing on biological beginnings a powerful symbolism 
emerges. The more her ‘empirical observations’ evolve into an ethic and a critique of 
culture, the more symbolic Kristeva’s language becomes. From the disciplined materialist 
account of language in Revolution in Poetic Language, powerful images of love emerge, like 
‘Narcissus’, the post-modern subject looking for love, the ‘imaginary Father’, the ‘feminine 
sacred’, or the ‘passion according to motherhood’.  
 
The objective of Kristeva’s critique of culture in a narrow sense is to defend the ‘psychic 
life’ of the subject. The two most helpful evaluations of Kristeva’s hermeneutic of culture in 
English are Kelly Oliver’s Reading Kristeva: Unravelling the Double-Bind, and Sarah 
                                               
64 Kristeva, Hannah Arendt, p.114. 
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Beardsworth’s Julia Kristeva, Psychoanalysis and Modernity.65 Theirs is the most systemic 
contextualisation of how Kristeva continuously re-invents and integrates her ‘semiotics’ into 
a psychoanalytical analysis of nihilism. Beardsworth and Oliver together give a 
comprehensive understanding of why Kristeva focuses on the ‘intra-psychic dynamics’ 
(Oliver), and relates them to the wider project of modernity and post-modernity 
(Beardsworth). The advantage of Kristeva’s ‘microfocal’ approach is that it reveals a striking 
contrast between the fragility and manipulability of the psyche and the aggression of 
nihilism which intrudes into the human interior. We can sum up her critique of culture in the 
objective to scrutinise and counteract nihilism. Her main conclusion is that the ‘speaking 
being’ is a permanent vulnerability and therefore needs a permanent support. The final 
question of her cultural critique as ethics is who gives this care?  
 
 
1.2.5 A Theological Link − The ‘Secularisation Debate’ 
 
Kristeva’s Arendtian ‘updates’ on the sub-psychic viewpoint resulted in a powerful 
synthesis of the Enlightenment tradition. Merging successfully the horizons of modernity 
with post-modernity produced one of the most penetrating critiques of both, if not the most 
complex available one. The significance of this synthesis is threefold.  
 
First, by drawing on the critical tools of modernity and post-modernity, Kristeva is able 
to offer a critical synopsis of the two periods. Because she aimed at a full understanding of 
the relationship between the psyche and nihilist culture, there unfolds from Kristeva’s project 
a complete ‘ontology of nihilism’. Secondly, because of the firm interrelatedness of the 
‘cultural’ and the ‘psychic’ space, the nihilism of culture is never an ‘external’ abstraction. It 
is always an internal event, ‘directly’ part of psychic history.  
 
Thirdly, this internalisation of the crisis prepares the way for a dialogue with theology. 
Kristeva’s specific critique of culture offers an important connection. Relating her to the so 
called ‘secularisation debate’ completes her initial situating in the secular tradition (her 
‘Habermasian background’). Making this reference to the ‘secularisation debate’ is important 
because it is a major theoretical background of the crisis of the subject, on which my study 
will focus. Though Kristeva is not a direct participant in this established discourse, seeing 
her against this background is her important ‘pre-context’ for theology. It is also a platform 
                                               
65 Kelly Oliver, Reading Kristeva: Unraveling the Double-Bind (Indiana University Press, 
Bloomington 1993), Sarah Beardsworth, Julia Kristeva, Psychoanalysis and Modernity, Sunny Press 
2004. 
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from which to engage critically with the ‘post-metaphysical position’, which excludes the 
‘ontological’ viewpoint.  
 
Her internal understanding of the crisis from within the ‘self’ makes Kristeva a unique 
source for a better understanding of secularisation. Her sub-psychic viewpoint helps to 
resolve the ‘apologetic deadlock’ as to whether secularisation led to a decline in belief in the 
supernatural and the loss of religion’s control over life, or not. 66 Unlike in classical theories 
of secularisation, Kristeva’s primary concern is not the ‘agents’ of secularisation, that is, 
who contribute to it, rather, how nihilism, and what she refers to as the uncertainties of 
secularisation,67 affect the subject. Though my study does not engage in the debate, it posits 
the ‘secularisation theory’ as an indirect, yet important context for my critique. In practice, 
Kristeva’s investigations take place against this wider background of ‘questioning 
transcendence’. Her project of renewing the symbols of love has to do with ‘rationalization’, 
the secularisation of life, and the scientific perspective which are all her major themes.68 It 
should be noted that Kristeva’s primary audience is secular. She makes her professional 
utterances in a secular culture, drawing on the experiences of this milieu. Her critique of 
culture undoubtedly confirms that secularisation exists and it affects all the narratives and 
cultural agents of European culture. The ability to ‘believe’ in values is raised by both 
Kristeva and theology. It puts them on a common platform in terms of pointing to the inner 
dimension of ‘secularisation’. 
 
 
1.3 The Problem of Kristeva’s Engagement with Christian Texts for Theology and the 
Problem of Kristeva’s Theological Reception 
 
Despite the numerous areas that Kristeva offers (the person, love, secularisation, 
religion), systematic theology struggles to gain access to the prolific oeuvre. This ‘cognitive 
dissonance’ has important structural causes. First of all, Kristeva writes outside the horizon 
of faith.69 More than that, Kristeva’s ‘trenchantly atheistic’70 relationship to religion is a 
commonplace in literature. In her own wording, she is ‘a non-believer for complex 
                                               
66 Shultz’s provides a long list of the different generations participating in the secularisation theory 
debate, pros and cons.  Kevin M. Schultz, ‘Secularisation: A Bibliographic Essay’ (pp.170-177), The 
Hedgehog Review nos. 1-2. (Spring and Summer 2006)  
67 Kristeva, This Incredible Need to Believe, p.32. 
68 See Julia Kristeva, The Crisis of the European Subject, edited by Samir Rayal, Other Press, New 
York 2000. 
69 Isaac Slater, ‘Mysticism Turned Inside Out: Julia Kristeva on Bernard of Clairvaux’ (pp.143-170), 
Cistercian Studies Quarterly, 2011, Vol.46. Issue 2, p. 143. 
70 Anne Smith, Julia Kristeva, Readings of Exile and Estrangement, St Martin’s Press, New York 
1996, p.14. 
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philosophical reasons’.71 This position hugely contributes to the two interrelated problems 
that a critique of Kristeva has first to face. Her use of Christian texts and the fact that there is 
no established response to her from systematic theology pose a real challenge. 
 
Kristeva’s ideological position hugely affects her psychoanalytical hermeneutics applied 
to Christian texts. The Cistercian theologian, Slater, recapitulates from a critical angle the 
standard obstacles Kristeva poses for systematic theology. This is creedal theology’s 
‘instinctual’ perception. For Kristeva, the believer’s creed expresses subjective fantasy. 
Psychoanalysis is superior to Christianity for unmasking and celebrating the transferential 
dynamics of love. Kristeva severs the moral perspective of the mystics from their texts.72 
Kristeva indeed regards both religious texts and dogmatic contents analysable from the 
psychoanalytical perspective. As Hanvey observes, she severs the texts of faith from the 
realm of faith in the service of her psychoanalytical demonstrations.73 Kristeva stresses this 
hermeneutical difference. As one of her recent reflections shows, she finds it important to 
reflect on the conflict with the approach of theology:  
 
‘I am only interested in the psychic reality that these events generate in the believer 
subject, in the representation of phantasms, leaving aside the question whether these 
events really happened or not.’74 
 
Theology has to see clearly the underlying historical motive of Kristeva’s opting for 
psychoanalysis. Oliver shows that it is Kristeva’s conviction that, with the break-up of 
religion in modern Western culture today, it is psychoanalysis that takes over the role of 
providing meaning, security and love.75 Oliver’s is an important understanding that 
Kristeva’s hermeneutic of Christian texts is primarily historical, and not ideological. Despite 
its reductive economy, it is a conservative approach in the sense of preserving them as 
resources for the discourse on love. This ‘conservative’ reduction, nevertheless, because of 
the underlying replacement of religion, sets up an apologetic tension with systematic 
theology. However, the two layers of Kristeva’s hermeneutics together, her interest in the 
psychic reality of religious events and the replacement of religion, make it possible to see her 
dealing with Christian texts as a positive hermeneutical challenge to theology. 
 
                                               
71 ‘From Jesus to Mozart (Christianity’s Difference)’ (pp.77-86), in Kristeva, This Incredible Need to 
Believe, p.79. 
72 Slater, ‘Mysticism Turned Inside Out’, pp.144.156.164.169. 
73 Hanvey, ‘Other than Stranger’ (pp.121-142), ch. pp.134-135. 
74 Kristeva, This Incredible Need to Believe, p.57. 
75 See Oliver’s recapitulation of these motives in chapter ‘Religion’ (pp.125-144), in Oliver, Reading 
Kristeva, p.125. 
 42 
As my study will engage with Kristeva’s reading of the sacrifice, the Passion, the image 
of the ‘Virgin Mother’ and the Resurrection, it suffices to say that she reads them in terms of 
their revealing essential internal processes of psychic formation. She embeds these religious 
texts mostly within her theories of idealisation in primary processes. In general, Kristeva 
understands the Christian narrative in terms of creating a symbolic space in which the 
integrity of the psychic space can be sustained. This policy shows the deployment of 
Kristeva’s post-structuralist linguistics and ‘semiotic’ ethics. Important individual works 
which show her psycho-linguistic hermeneutics of religion at work are In the Beginning Was 
Love: Psychoanalysis and Faith (1987), Tales of Love (1983), and Powers of Horror (1980). 
 
It is against this background that we see the puzzlement about Kristeva’s ‘Christianity’.  
From a Freudian regime, Kristeva’s is an unprecedented focusing on core Christian texts. 
Her interest in religion goes against the ideological limits of her atheistic subtexts. This 
unorthodox engagement, despite reducing the original religious meaning, raises the point that 
this relationship can be more than an extrinsic phenomenological description. Her critics 
respond to this riddle very differently. Apart from some responses from feminist theologians, 
we cannot speak of an established theological response to Kristeva. Moreover, the former 
mostly remain particular engagements through a specific topic (C. Schweitzer, T. Beattie, 
and K. O’Grady). In order to show the ‘hermeneutical gap’ that a systematic theological 
critique has to bridge, I highlight the diversity of attempts to decipher Kristeva’s intriguing 
relationship with Christian texts and religion. All of these approaches touch upon the 
dynamic of psychological reduction. 
 
John Lechte suggests reading Kristeva as one who reformulates the salvific relationship 
between ‘transcendence’ (re-conceived as language) and the subject.76 Arthur Bradley 
argues, in a parallel way, for seeing Kristeva as a contemporary version of a via negativa 
(‘negative theology’) where the place of God is taken by the subject. He touches upon the 
question as to how closed Kristeva’s hermeneutics is. Is her psychoanalytical project a break 
with what she criticises as the dogmatic mythologization of Christian theology, or a 
repetition of it in secularised form? 77 Bradley locates Kristeva’s position by quoting her: 
‘For me, the Some Thing is immanent to man. It’s the possibility of speaking, of creating, 
and of making meaning and putting meaning into question. Where does the need come from 
                                               
76 John Lechte, ‘Kristeva's "Soleil noir" and Postmodernity’, Cultural Critique, No. 18. (Spring, 
1991), pp. 97-121, http://www.jstor.org Tue Nov 27 07:28:51 2007 
77 Arthur Bradley, “‘Mystic Atheism’: Julia Kristeva’s Negative Theology”, in Theology and 
Sexuality, Volume 14 (3) 2008, p. 281. 
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to set up some authority beyond the human? That is what psychoanalysis asks.’78 Bradley’s 
is an important probing contextualisation as it raises the idea of opening up Kristeva’s 
atheism and relating it, as an ‘intertext’, to theology. Seeing Kristeva, the non-believer, as a 
‘mystical atheist’ within the mystical tradition is a rather daring image. Though as a concept 
it is more eye-catching than adequate, Bradley clarifies further Kristeva’s actual hermeneutic 
of faith. For Kristeva, Christian mysticism represents a key moment in the transition from 
theology to the psychoanalytic method. She sees the emergence of a ‘mystic atheism’ in the 
works of Teresa of Avila and Angela of Foligno as the anticipation of the paradigm shift 
brought about by the psychoanalytic method. These female mystics developed a notion of 
the Other within the self. Kristeva reads this as the first discovery that the ‘other’ is not a 
distant, external divine Otherness that lies outside the self.79 Realistically, what Bradley’s 
reading reveals is a consistently applied psychological hermeneutics. Locating Kristeva 
within the tradition of apophatic or ‘negative’ theology remains problematic. It is a rather 
abstract leap which in practice leaves Kristeva ‘external’ to theology.  
 
In a similar fashion, though in a different context, Boer, in reference to Zizek, also all 
too easily regards Kristeva as a ‘Christian writer’ coming from Marxism. In this 
oversimplification, her psychoanalysis is stated as a vivid, fresh realisation of Christianity.80 
There is a danger that these approaches are naïve in their desire to locate Kristeva within 
‘faith’. There is no direct continuity with theological discourse.  
 
Yet, there are voices that suggest that establishing continuity is possible in a more 
complex way. Bruijn offers a balanced approach when saying that there is an unmistakable 
umbilical attachment to Christianity in Kristeva’s writing. She suggests that Kristeva’s 
persistent return to Christianity and Christian constructs can be best understood in light of 
her theory of revolt. Her primary concern is not Christian nostalgia or apologetics but finding 
resources, drawing on Christianity, for a new critical revolt in culture. Bruijn raises the idea 
that Kristeva can be challenged by forms of religious belief which are capable of bringing 
about an ‘intimate revolt’.81 Mercer, drawing on actual textual engagements, arrives at the 
                                               
78 Bradley quoting Kristeva from her ‘Athée en éveil’, Actualite des religions 41 (2002), pp. 50-54 
(53). Bradley, ‘Mystic Atheism’, p. 282. 
79 Bradley gives a synopsis of Kristeva’s psychoanalytic account of Christian theology from Tales of 
Love (1983), and of the mystical tradition from Teresa of Avila to Angela of Foligno from works like 
The Feminne and the Sacred (2001) and the trilogy on The Feminine Genius ( Le génie Féminin, 
1999— 2002). Bradley, ‘Mystic Atheism’, pp.283-284. 
80 Ronald Boer, ‘The Search for Redemption: Julia Kristeva and Slavoj Zizek on Marx, 
Psychoanalysis and Religion’, (pp.153-176) (FILOZOFIJA I DRUŠTVO 1/2007), p.160. 
81Bonnie de Bruijn, Bonnie.‘Kristeva, Religion, and Revolt Culture’, unpublished conference 
presentation. It was presented on November 9th for the Psychology, Culture and Religion Group at the 
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striking conclusion that it is specifically Kristeva’s psychoanalytical reading of Christian 
texts that makes her an unexpected dialogue partner for theology.82 My study prioritises this 
approach. It would be a mistake to accept uncritically Slater’s total rejection of Kristeva on 
the grounds that she separates the sacred (‘meaning’) from religion/belief.83 Theology, my 
study argues, has to go beyond objecting apologetically that Kristeva fails to address the 
theological meaning of sin, or that it is God who is the ground of human love. The danger 
here is a theological reductionism which reclaims theological paradigms within the 
psychoanalytical discourse itself. This attitude misses the development of Kristeva’s 
relationship to religious texts. In her later works, Kristeva’s theory of subjectivity and 
language joins with a more developed examination of religious discourse. This includes a 
detailed examination of religious texts (Exodus, Deuteronomy, Leviticus, Song of Songs, and 
New Testament Writings), religious writers (Duns Scotus, St. Augustine, Bernard of 
Clairvaux, Thomas Aquinas), Christian concepts (sin, grace, faith, forgiveness), and 
religious figures (the Virgin Mary, the body of Christ).84 An overtly apologetic theology 
would overlook the fact that, at a later stage in Kristeva’s work, the images of Catholic 
theology become dominant. The task for a critique is to make the tension which her reading 
of Christian texts generates an essential part of her evaluation. We shall see that it will bring 
Kristeva’s Freudian orthodoxy to breaking point. Some of her secular criticism even speaks 
of the betrayal of her original Freudianism and of her conceding to Christian metaphysics.85 
On the other hand, the purely confessional reading from the outset overlooks the fact that 
Kristeva’s ‘reductive reading’ is always in the service of her wider ‘ethical’ demonstrations.  
 
Her Arendtian and ‘counter-Habermasian’ positions are sufficient reminders that 
engagement with Kristeva’s hermeneutic of Christian texts, besides exploring the theological 
conflict, has to explore the cultural motives of these readings. What we can record at this 
stage is that there is a conflict with Kristeva’s psychoanalytical hermeneutics. Also, the way 
this tension is resolved decides what type of reading of Kristeva theology ends up with, a 
polemical or a constructive one. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                     
American Academy of Religion (AAR) Annual Meeting, which was held in Montréal, QC, November 
7–10th 2009., pp. 9.10.11. 
82 Joyce Anne Mercer, ‘Psychoanalysis, Parents and God: Julia Kristeva on Subjectivity and the 
Imaginary Father’ (pp.243-258), Pastoral Psychology Vol. 50, No. 4, March 2002, p.253. 
83 Slater, ‘Mysticism Turned Inside Out’, p.150. 
84 Kathleen O’Grady, ‘The Tower and the Chalice: Julia Kristeva and the Story of Santa 
Barbara’(pp.40-60), Feminist Theology No. 29 (January 2002), pp.41-42. 
85 Ibid., p.43. 
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1.4 Conclusions 
 
Kristeva’s project is a historically complex narrative. The main difficulty is to develop a 
response which is non-apologetic in the sense that it does not ignore this complexity. 
Kristeva’s reading of religious texts refers to an underlying cultural synthesis. Situating 
Kristeva in mainstream secular discourse (‘Habermas’) and in her Arendtian ‘cultural-text’ 
suggests developing a historical approach to her. Kristeva’s reviewing of the Enlightenment 
project suggests an equally dynamic theological synthesis as a response.   
 
Finding this theological hermeneutic is all the more challenging as Kristeva fits all the 
boxes that make her discourses traditionally inconvenient for theology. These are, just to 
name the most important ones, her early Marxism, her Freudian critique of religion, her post-
structuralist linguistics, her psychoanalytic reading of texts, her feminism, and her 
‘postmodernism’. For theology to engage with her in these fields is still problematic. The 
cognitive, hermeneutical, and ideological dissonances posit a gap which is very difficult for 
systematic theology to bridge.  
 
This situation is a real hermeneutical impasse. Kristeva proposes exciting fresh insights 
concerning the human subject and culture. She extensively draws on Christian texts. Yet, her 
atheistic position leaves theology with many aporias. Kristeva regards religion and religious 
doctrines as subjects for analysis, but her autonomous Freudian regime is highly resistant to 
any theological analysis. One of the causes is that mainstream theology traditionally shows 
no interest in reading ‘Freud’. Moreover, on the theological side there is also a serious 
division between the representatives and the opponents of co-operating with secular 
humanities. 86 This disagreement leads my study to an important strategic conclusion. The 
ideological tension between ‘rivalling ontologies’, in an apologetic framework, cannot be 
resolved. From this impasse not even Charles Taylor’s effort to bring the secular humanities 
and theology into a synopsis offers a way out. Louis Dupré confirms a lasting conflict 
                                               
86 The two poles are the positive re-reading of the Enlightenment tradition and the ‘radical 
orthodoxies’ which condemn secular humanities as inherently dangerous to Christian identity. In 
ecclesial reflections both voices are present; however there seems to be a growing conservative trend 
in Catholic mainstream theological policy. The liturgical language of the Church inherently also 
implies a ‘conservative option’. As an example of polarisation of approaches consult Charles Taylor, 
A Catholic Modernity?, edited by James L. Heft, Oxford University Press, New York, Oxford 1999.; 
Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self, The Making of Modern Identity, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 1989.; and the neo-orthodox strategies of Tracey Rowland, Culture and the Thomist 
Tradition, After Vatican II, Routledge, New York, London 2003; and Gediminas T. Jankunas, The 
Dictatorship of Relativism, Pope Benedict XVI’s Response, St Pauls, New York 2011.  
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between the Enlightenment project and religious identity.87 This tension, as available 
‘mainstream’ literature shows, cannot be erased. Under these conditions two strategies 
suggest themselves. I find it desirable to avoid both. 
 
(1) It is tempting to construct a ‘negative critique’ of Kristeva, in a purely 
apologetic way. In this case, theology is repeating old convictions and 
prejudices against the Enlightenment project, secularisation, and Freud, etc. In a 
wider sense, there is zero chance to arrive at a ‘positive model of the secular’ so 
that theology can contribute positively to the debate on what is missing from 
secular discourse. In our narrow context, there is little chance to relate 
constructively Christian texts in their faith economy to Kristeva’s theories. The 
‘semiotic’ symbols of love that Kristeva develops are rejected together with 
their anthropological relevance in a ‘negative critique’.  
 
(2)  The second option, as a counter-reaction to the above, could be that a critique 
on Kristeva could end up in an optimistic, naïve, and equally superficial reading 
of Kristeva. The outcome would be an ‘a-historical’ merging of opposing 
positions. In fact, this concession to Kristeva would never lead to a real dialogue 
with her because it does not reach a structural understanding; Kristeva would 
remain external to theology. In the narrow sense, here the main danger is that 
Christian symbols remain unaddressed as there is ‘no conflict with Kristeva’. 
The difference between the psychological and the theological notions of 
redemption remain blurred. In the wider sense, avoiding the conflict with 
Kristeva’s Freudian regime leads to overlooking the acute problem: why does 
the Christian kerugma remain in a linguistic isolation from ‘present 
consciousness’? 88 For it is this wider concern which theology faces when 
dealing with Kristeva’s ‘minor histories of love’. 
 
Neither way offers a genuine critique because they do not take pains to engage 
systemically with a non-believer’s position. Kristeva’s regime, however, requires this 
approach as she gives an in-depth revision of the state of the subject by focusing on the 
problem of ‘beginnings’, psychic, ethical and historical. The response to this raises the 
possibility of theology once again making ‘ontological statements’ on the subject in the 
‘post-metaphysical age’.   
                                               
87 See, Louis Dupré, The Enlightenment and the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Culture, Yale 
University Press, London, New Haven, 2004.   
88 Roger Haight, S.J, Jesus: Symbol of God, Orbis Books, Maryknoll, New York 1999, p.241. 
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2 THE EXHAUSTED SUBJECT 
 
The task of the forthcoming analyses (I-III) is to resolve the dilemma of the previous 
chapter, namely, how can criticism avoid being either ‘apologetic’ or ‘naïve’ yet offer an in-
depth, non-polemic and critical engagement? The precondition of this is having full 
theological access to Kristeva’s work. This chapter offers the solution through which a 
comprehensive theological engagement becomes possible. It brings it into realisation by 
introducing the important thesis that the crisis of the ‘exhausted subject’ of modernity and 
post-modernity is the central problem of Kristeva’s work. It will form the basis of the 
exploration of the theological problems underlying this ‘exhaustion’. The focus on the crisis 
of the subject will make it possible for my critique to posit ‘ontological questions’ which 
post-metaphysical consciousness has to face.  
 
With this, my study takes up the suggestion from Chapter 1 that Kristeva’s focus on 
‘semiotic origins’ is a ‘quasi meta-physical’ correction of the rationalism of the 
Enlightenment. Introducing ‘heterogeneity’ into reason and gaining an objective distance 
from homogeneous discourses, as I argued, does create the possibility of making ‘ontological 
statements’. These, by virtue of their nature, are the ground of a critical stance on ‘present 
history’. Making a connection with this effort of Kristeva is an important link with the 
objective of this chapter. First, as we saw, it is not permitted in her ‘post-metaphysical’ 
environment (Habermas) to make ‘ontological statements’. Second, the motive of her 
‘semiotic’ revolt is the recognised need to develop a discourse which actually listens to the 
unlistened to anxieties and needs or desires of the subject of history.89 Making the ‘exhausted 
subject’ visible in Kristeva’s work creates this opportunity for both. Unlike her Habermasian 
‘opposition’, theology can accommodate both possibilities in Kristeva, her urge for a ‘meta-
horizon’ to control reason and her need to find effective strategies for listening to the subject. 
 
In view of this, this chapter analyses the ‘exhausted subject’. Exploring its different 
aspects will make it possible for theology to raise its own ‘ontological’ questions about the 
impasse of the subject. These will be observations which cannot be dismissed on the grounds 
that theological statements are unverifiable by reason (‘Habermas’). My purpose is to offer 
an alternative to Kristeva’s being locked up in the polemics with Habermas on ‘the 
trustworthy higher authority’ of reason.90 This debate cannot be brought to fruition despite 
                                               
89 ‘Secularism’ (pp.24-28), Kristeva, Hatred and Forgiveness, p.27. 
90 See the debate on the regulative authority of reason as a ‘normative conscience’ in section ‘A 
Radical Reformation of Human Existence is Underway’ (pp.25-30), in Kristeva, This Incredible Need 
to Believe, p.26. 
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McAfee’s attempt to mediate between the two positions.91 Instead, Kristeva can engage in a 
more fertile critical exchange if she accepts the invitation of theology to develop a new 
‘ontological description’ of subjective suffering. Kristeva herself initiated something akin to 
this when raising the need to transcend ‘normative reason’ by challenging it outside its 
authority. The ‘exhausted subject’, which reveals the fundamental woundedness of love, 
creates the opportunity for a critical dialogue about the ‘beginnings’ and ‘ends’ of human 
potential. It raises Kristeva’s critical objective in the context of a theological discourse.  
 
Exploring the ‘exhausted subject’ will direct our attention to a pivotal systemic element 
in Kristeva’s project, her materialism. In view of the above strategy, turning our attention to 
Kristeva’s materialist worldview is pivotal. Exploring the ‘ontological tension’ with this 
materialism is a connecting link to both her debate with rationalist humanism and the critical 
interest of my study. First, the ‘ontological critique’ of her refined materialism will bring to 
the surface why secular ‘reason’, which she herself criticises, cannot listen to and 
communicate with ‘psychic suffering’, and what lies behind it. Thus, this debate between 
theology and her system will help Kristeva to clarify a deficiency in mainstream secular 
humanism, which failure is also present in her project. This is the systemic exclusion of 
‘grace’. Second, the analysis of her materialism will help to clarify the consequence of this 
exclusion, the overlooked ‘ontic’ exhaustion of the subject. It provides a basis for a genuine 
dialogue with theology.  
 
My demonstration examines the ‘exhausted subject’ from two aspects. First, I examine 
historically how the problem emerges in the oeuvre. Secondly, I explore the connection 
between the problem of ‘exhaustion’ and the materialist resourcing of ‘psychic rebirth’ in 
Kristeva. The areas covered will be as follows. (1) The ‘exhausted subject’ as a historical 
problem. (2) The ontological (‘ideological’) narratives of the ‘exhausted subject’ (Kristeva’s 
reinterpretation of Transcendence: the materialist grounding of the ‘speaking being’). (3) 
The actual suffering of the ‘exhausted subject’, revealed in the ‘cultural mourning’ in 
Kristeva’s work. My critique will arrive at the ‘ontological’ questioning as to what extent 
intra-self resources are sufficient, and what are the limits of Kristeava’s ‘semiotic’ 
resourcing. 
 
 
                                               
91 Habermas clings to the vision of the fully autonomous subject transparent to itself, which can build 
up a universal public communication based on ‘reason’. Kristeva breaks with this Enlightenment idea 
to re-construct a universal discourse. She claims that split subjectivity needs an ethics and public 
discourse based upon the fundamental woundedness of reason and particularities, and difference. See 
McAfee, Habermas, Kristeva, and Citizenship, pp.37.133. 
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2.1 Analysis I. − The ‘Exhausted Subject’ as the Underlying Problem of the Oeuvre 
 
Kristeva’s work from the 1970s reveals an awareness of the increasing crisis of the 
subject of modernity. This ‘exhaustion’ is experienced as ongoing and continues in post-
modernity. We can follow the subject’s becoming inert from Revolution in Poetic Language 
(1974) to This Incredible Need to Believe (2009), and Hatred and Forgiveness (2010). 
Kristeva never uses the term ‘exhaustion’ or ‘exhausted subject’ concerning this shift, this is 
my hermeneutical concept. Literature on Kristeva, however, gives sufficient support for 
seeing the problem as the main organising principle of her oeuvre. Jones stresses that 
Kristeva, through her chosen disciplines, focuses on the dissolution of the subject.92 Kearney 
and Murdhadha relate Kristeva to religion through the problem of alienation. Both 
emphasise that Kristeva focuses on discourses − art, religion and psychoanalysis − which 
express our ‘fundamental experience of estrangement’.93 Estrangement and ‘loss’ grew to be 
her central focus. Major experts on Kristeva highlight this change but do not analyse it as a 
historical process. Neither have they raised the ‘exhausted subject’ as an independent 
problem. Presenting this is theology’s unique contribution. The concept can only be derived 
through a comprehensive reading of Kristeva’s work. My critique proposes two important 
phases in the emergence of the ‘exhausted subject’. These are Kristeva’s critique of the 
subject of modernity and her analysis of the condition of the subject in post-modernity.  
 
 
2.1.1 Transition From Modernity to Post-modernity: Exhausted Subject or Exhausted 
Narratives? 
 
Kristeva’s project on the ‘speaking being’ starts with her break with the subject of 
modernity. The two important works that record her critical observations belong to 
Kristeva’s post-structuralist linguistics, the doctoral thesis Revolution in Poetic Language 
(1974) and Desire in Language (1980). The two constitute a unified program, Kristeva’s 
‘revolutionary period’. In them, she initiates a paradigm shift, the de-construction and the 
                                               
92 Ann Rosalind Jones gives an excellent account of Kristeva’s development from her ‘semiotics’ until 
Tales of Love (1983), her turn to psychoanalysis. Jones emphasises the unity of Kristeva’s changing 
policies in dealing with the subject. The central interest always remains the liberation of the subject 
within the nihilist crisis. In Ann Rosalind Jones, ‘Julia Kristeva on Femininity: The Limits of a 
Semiotic Politics’, Feminist Review, No. 18, Cultural Politics (Winter, 1984), pp. 56-73, Published 
by: Palgrave Macmillan Journals, Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1394859 Accessed: 
28/08/2010 03:52, pp.56.61. 
93 Murdhadha takes over Kearney’s characterisation from his Strangers, Gods and Monsters, 
Interpreting Otherness (Routledge, New York London 2003, p.6.), in Felix O. Murdhadha, ‘Divinity 
and Alterity’ (pp.155-166), in After God and the Religious Turn in Continental Philosophy, edited by 
John Panteleimon Manoussakis, Fordham University Press, New York 2006 (first edition 2006), 
p.157. 
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transformation of the subject of modernity. As a ‘Marxist’ critique of history, her early 
linguistics unmasks modernity as a ‘homogeneous’ discourse. Kristeva proposes a ‘post-
structuralist’ counter-narrative to ‘resurrect’ the subject entrapped in ‘bourgeois’ modernity.  
 
Kristeva’s new ideal, ‘heterogeneous identity’, postulates the inherent ‘exhaustion’ of 
the person of modernity. This ultimate crisis is a historical experience, which claim she 
confirms through Arendt’s critique of twentieth century totalitarianisms.94 Kristeva, through 
Arendt, denounces the failed idols of a rationalist modernity: tribal nationalism, totalised 
capitalism, instrumental reason in the service of profit, racism, administration and the 
‘virtual’ new world order that characterised the end of the twentieth century.95  These are 
‘homogenising’ narratives which dissolve all particularity and uniqueness. Kristeva’s post-
structuralist program urges their critical de-construction and analysis: this is the way to 
renew ‘old’ identity. The way to this is her proposed counter-paradigm, recognising the 
‘speaking being’ as a ‘heterogeneous contradiction’.96 It is the realisation that the subject has 
no stable identity, contrary to modernity’s claim. Modernity denied the contextual view of 
identity which, Kristeva insinuates, is the ground of accountability.  Now, as the illusions of 
a firm identity are over, narratives can be made accountable.97 
 
Kristeva’s critics pay little attention to Kristeva’s early response to modernity, though, 
like Beardsworth, they refer to her analysis of the period in Revolution in Poetic Language 
(1974) but shift focus too swiftly to Kristeva’s more accessible psychoanalytical critique of 
modernity.98 My study highlights the importance of the early ‘linguistic’ critique of culture. It 
is the point of emergence of the complex problems associated with the ‘exhausted subject’.  
 
Kristeva’s early response to modernity is a clear-cut program of ‘substitution’. The 
previous erroneous mindset has to be replaced with the correct one. In a sense, Kristeva is 
repeating the program of modernity. The ‘exhausted subject’ of modernity has to rediscover 
his lost freedom which comes from comprehending his crisis. Kristeva offers specific ‘tools’ 
                                               
94 This is not an anachronism to illustrate Kristeva’s early post-structuralist program from her later 
engagement with Arendt. Kristeva’s crtitique of culture, developed from the mid 1980s is built upon 
the theoretical recognitions of her early linguistics. Jones confirms the unity of the oeuvre, see ‘Julia 
Kristeva on Femininity’. 
95 In her linguistic period, in Revolution in Poetic Language and Desire in Language we still do not 
find references to Arendt. In Kristeva’s major works Arendt appears from the mid 1990s when she 
develops her cultural critique. (See Intimate Revolt, Sense and Non-Sense of Revolt, and Julia Kristeva 
Interviews, Editor Ross Mitchell Guberman, Columbia University Press, New York 1996, and her first 
small piece on Arendt, Hannah Arendt, Life is a Narrative Kristeva, University of Toronto Press, 
Toronto, Buffalo, London 2001.). 
96 Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, p. 215.  
97 This recognition is the ground of what can be called Kristeva’s ‘post-structuralist ethic’ which her 
psychoanalysis and critique of culture integrate. 
98 Beardsworth, Julia Kristeva, p.39. cf.40-42. 
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to reveal the crisis. As Oliver highlights, these are narratives which call up a crisis of 
identity. Poetic language and, later on, the experience of motherhood are such discourses. In 
these experiences identity breaks down and is revealed as a ‘subject-in-process’, or ‘subject-
in-trial’. From the unquestioned ‘rationality’ of modernity, Kristeva shifts the centre of 
observation to the ‘sub-conscious’. Beyond the ‘unitary ego’ of modernity a whole ‘semiotic’ 
world of past memories, desires, dreams, etc., opens up. 99  
 
Here my critique makes an important distinction. This early post-structuralist criticism 
is not yet the recognition of the ‘full’ crisis of the subject. Kristeva attributes ‘ontic’ 
exhaustion only to the narrative of modernity. It is crucial to see that, despite her very 
intense criticism, the early works understand only the partial crisis of the subject. Though 
technically Kristeva has all the means for a post-modern deconstruction, her revolutionary 
‘post-structuralism’ is not yet a real post-modern program. Historically, Revolution in Poetic 
Language and Desire in Language belong to a transition period. It is a transition in the sense 
that divisions into periods do not necessarily reveal clear cultural dynamics and definite 
shifts of paradigm. Because of Kristeva’s revolutionary aspirations at the time, her post-
structuralism shows a salvific confidence very similar to that of modernity, which she is 
deconstructing.  Morris makes the important observation that Kristeva ‘remains within the 
long tradition of Western humanist individualism with its placing the human individual at the 
centre of its conception of reality.’100 Kristeva’s ‘renewed’ subject remains that ‘sovereign 
individual who is the intentional of her or his own words, thoughts, deeds and will.’101  
 
Kristeva’s early criticism indeed reveals a transition period. The first agenda of the 
emerging post-modern period was the deconstruction of the previous epoch. The changed 
condition of the subject is not yet in the fore. In this ‘pre-post-modernity’, the awareness that 
modernity left the subject wounded has not yet fully emerged and been reflected upon. At 
this point, it should also be noted, Kristeva’s early position is quite close to the 
‘Habermasian centre’. It is still a confident correction of the ‘old identity’ by self-reflective 
reason. What Kristeva postulates is a fully ‘renewable’ identity. The subject gets off without 
a scratch from an expired modernity. It arrives from an erroneous self-image to an authentic 
one, which corresponds with authentic existence.  
 
Kristeva shows this unproblematic ‘Exodus’ in the modern novel. The new self-image 
of the subject is in stark contrast with the ‘monologism’ of the old ‘epic’ novels. The old 
                                               
99 Oliver, Reading Kristeva, p. 48. 
100 Pam Morris, Literature and Feminism, Blackwell, Oxford 1993, p.136. 
101 Ibid., p.137. 
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epoch depended on ‘absolute entities’ such as God or community, the synonyms of 
modernity. In the polyphonic novels of the twentieth century, in the new epoch, 
 
‘Identity, substance, causality, and definition are transgressed so that others may be 
adopted: analogy, relation, opposition, and therefore dialogism.’ ‘…Dialogism may well 
become the basis of our time’s intellectual structure. [It] radically abolishes problems of 
causality, finality, et cetera, from our philosophical arena.’102 
 
Revolution in Poetic Language and Desire in Language show an unwavering hope in the 
self-narrating subject, in its ‘self-rescuing capacity’ to replace old grand-narratives with a 
new one. There is no sense that ‘something is missing’ in culture.  The ‘early’ Kristeva 
regards the new post-structuralist sensitivity as a ‘motion through which our culture forsakes 
itself in order to go beyond itself’.103  We can locate what Hanvey calls Kristeva’s 
‘soteriology’104 in this transition program. That is, ‘heterogeneous identity’, when realised, is 
redemptive. History, through the ‘revolutionary rebirths’ of the subject is fully 
transformable.  The ‘speaking being’ becomes active again by means of self-remembrance, 
writing and reading. This post-structuralism organically merges with Kristeva’s ‘reformed-
Marxism’: 
 
‘Since, as Marx notes, [liberation] lies outside the sphere of material production per 
se, the signifying process, as it is practiced by texts − those “truly free works” − 
transforms the opaque and impenetrable subject of social relations and struggles into a 
subject in process/on trial. Within this apparent associality, however, lies the social 
function of texts: the production of a different kind of subject, one capable of bringing 
about new social relations, and thus joining in the process of capitalism’s subversion.’105 
 
This early soteriology shows language as a fully potent medium and agent of 
‘redemption’. Expressing it in the other hermeneutical concept of my study, Kristeva’s 
position is not yet a full ‘cultural mourning’ over modernity’s paradigms. It is rather a rivalry 
between the soteriological programs of a fading modernity and a post-modernity (‘post-
structuralism’) on the rise. 
 
It should be noted here that this revolutionary post-structuralism forms Kristeva’s 
earliest critique of religion. Within this transition program, rather abstractly, Kristeva 
                                               
102 The novels of Rabelais, Swift, Sade, Lautréamont, Kafka. in ‘Word, Dialogue, and Novel’ (1969) 
(pp.64-91), in Julia Kristeva, Desire in Language, A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art, edited 
by Leon S. Roudiez, Columbia University Press, New York 1980. Eight of the ten essays were 
originally published in French in the author’s Polylogue 1977. Desire collects essays from the 1969-
75 period, pp.86-87. 
103 Ibid., p.89. 
104 Hanvey, ‘Other than Stranger’, p. 133. 
105 Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, p.105. (In the French original : Kristeva, La révolution 
du langage poétique, pp.99-100) 
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reduces religion to a sub-branch of modernity. Her linguistics is inherently also a critique of 
‘stable’ religious identity. Kristeva’s psychoanalytic replacement of religion is rooted in this 
first substitution of post-structuralism for ‘religion’/modernity. That this is a proper critique 
of religion in its own right is shown by the fact that her post-structuralism is intimately 
related to Kristeva’s most deep seated ‘atheistic subtexts’, Marx and Freud.106 Religion is a 
far cry from being a dialogue partner for her at the time; it is perceived through the lens of an 
absolute ideological distance. I underscore the implied ‘exhaustion’ of religion in the 
rejection of all ‘transcendent symbolics’: 
 
‘This means that if poetic economy has always born witness to crises and 
impossibilities of transcendent symbolics, in our time it is coupled with crises of social 
institutions (state, family, religion), and, more profoundly, a turning point in the 
relationship of man to meaning. Transcendental mastery over discourse is possible, but 
repressive; such a position is necessary, but only as a limit open to constant challenge; 
this relief with respect to repression ‒ establishing meaning ‒ is no longer possible under 
the incarnate appearance of a providential, historical, or even rationalist, humanist ego, 
but through a discordance in the symbolic function and consequently within the identity 
of the transcendental ego itself: this is what literary experience of our century intimates 
to theoretical reason, thereby taking its place with other phenomena of symbolic and 
social unrest (youth, drugs, women.)’107  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Partly, we have to do justice to Kristeva’s critique of a ‘homogenising’ Christianity. The 
object of her criticism coincides with a theism which understood God as the ‘highest Being’ 
or a Supreme Person, who is a self-existent subject of infinite goodness and power. This 
theism was concerned to argue the existence of such a Being as the creator and most 
satisfying explanation of the world.108 Kristeva’s ‘atheistic subtexts’ confirm her criticism of 
religion as a sub-branch of ‘modernity’. 
 
 
2.1.2 The Exhaustion of Kristeva’s Revolutionary Program 
 
A second major shift is Kristeva’s psychoanalytical period when she comprehends the 
ultimate exhaustion of the subject of modernity. That is, not only the narrative of modernity 
is in crisis but the human self itself. There is hardly a greater contrast in the oeuvre than the 
one between ‘revolution through poetic language’ and Kristeva’s ‘post-revolutionary’ 
psychoanalysis. In her revolutionary period, ‘exhaustion’ was understood rather on the 
collective level. The loss of meaning was not central. Nihilism appeared only in the sense 
                                               
106 ‘Freud’, ‘Marx’, and ‘historical materialism’ are extensive entries in the Indexes of Revolution in 
Poetic Language and Desire in Language. 
107 ‘From One Identity to an Other’ (1975), in Kristeva, Desire in Language, p.140. 
108 John A. T. Robinson, The New Reformation, SCM, London 1965 (First Edition), pp.48-49. 
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that the new self-consciousness outperforms the ‘nihilism’ of bourgeois modernity. This 
nihilism was conceived as the denial of particularities. There, as we saw, the ‘speaking 
being’ obeyed a simple dialectic: ‘exhausted culture’ vs. ‘enlightened subject’, or 
‘modernity’ vs. ‘pluralist’ identity. This program, as is shown in Kristeva’s study on Proust, 
echoes until the early mid-nineties: 
 
Proust ‘belongs everywhere. He belongs to plurality, to a multiplicity… Proust has 
all the identities of the world, and his identity is extremely malleable, which is very 
different from saying that he has no identity. Proust enjoys a polyvalence of experiences 
that renders him polymorphic… This experiential multiplicity is entirely different from 
the emptiness and destruction experienced in the loss of identity.’ 109  
 
Though Kristeva retains the ideal of the self’s fulfilment through particularities brought 
to realisation, the undisturbed freedom her post-structuralism envisaged is brought to a halt. 
This break is definitive. Her 1980s trilogy gradually turned to the theme of ‘psychic 
suffering’. In Powers of Horror, Black Sun, and Tales of Love, we can follow how the 
previous ‘revolutionary subject’ becomes a passive and vulnerable ‘speaking being’. 
‘Exhaustion’ is now dealt with in a wider sense. First, this is the loss of ‘idealising 
narratives’. It is closely connected with the loss of the source of these narratives, ‘authority’. 
Second, this loss takes place within the subject. These losses all point to the loss of the 
capacity to identify with the Other, which Kristeva stresses when speaking about the 
‘paternal function’. The underlying problem is the loss of the ultimate source of the capacity 
to ‘identify’ the Father. This authority will gradually come to be named as love following 
this recognition: 
 
‘Today, the state of the world poses a crucial question: Are we still living in a 
civilisation structured by authority and symbolic laws, or − like the patients suffering 
from the “new maladies of the soul” − have we lost our capacity to represent, to maintain 
a superego and a paternal function?’ 110 (Emphasis added.) 
 
 Kristeva realises that the subject of modernity has reached a new type of crisis, ‘the 
emptiness and destruction experienced in the loss of identity.’111 A major textual evidence is 
New Maladies of the Soul (1993). ‘Everyday experience points to a spectacular reduction of 
private life. These days, who still has a soul?’112 Now, in this ‘post-revolutionary’, 
psychoanalytical period, Kristeva turns to history’s internal dimensions, the crisis of psychic 
                                               
109 Julia Kristeva, Revolt, She Said, Semiotext(e) Foreign Agents Series, MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Cambridge and Mass, 2002. p.131. 
110 Ibid., p.129. 
111 Ibid., p. 131. 
112
Julia Kristeva, New Maladies of the Soul, (European Perspectives, A Series in Social Thought and 
Cultural Criticism) Columbia University Press, New York 1995, p. 7. 
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history. It should be noted that this is the very cross-road where her way of constructing 
subjectivity takes the opposite direction to that of Habermas. From the latter’s viewpoint, 
poststructuralist theories of subjectivity end up in relativism which make any expression of a 
shared ‘political’ or communal action impossible.113 Kristeva deliberately takes up the 
direction where the lack of authority, which the hyper-rationalism of Habermas overlooks,114 
is fully faced. Kristeva realises that the Enlightenment ideal of the subject, a ‘shared rational’ 
community, cannot be built up from above, but only from below, from the realised common 
fragmentation.  
 
In Kristeva’s new approach, nihilism is understood in its full meaning. The loss of 
meaning is not an external event in history. It takes place in individual history, also affecting 
deep layers of ‘individual pre-history’. In her writings, a systemic analysis of how this loss is 
connected with psychic suffering emerges. The ‘exhausted subject’ is described from within. 
In her trilogy, Kristeva examines how the undefined borders of the self lead to disorientation 
(Powers of Horror); how an unfinished mourning for the loss of the ‘mother’ in 
individuation can result in melancholia and depression, and the paralysis of language (Black 
Sun); and how a broken socialisation in love as the diminished ability to identify with the 
‘other’ results in the return of the ‘suffering’ Narcissus (Tales of Love). Not only is Narcissus 
the central metaphor of Kristeva’s psychoanalytic phase, but it is also an important 
psychological formulation of the ‘exhausted subject’. Kristeva understands it as the return of 
a wounded narcissism.115 This is a state when Narcissus, the fully emerged post-modern 
subject, cannot discover the real and is self-absorbed in illusionary images. Narcissus, as the 
‘extraterrestrial of love’, is forever bound up with the replicas of love.  
 
Developing this metaphor of loss clearly coincided with Kristeva’s becoming a 
practising psychoanalyst.  Compared with her extroverted revolutionary phase, this ‘retreat 
into the self’ concurs with the full bloom of a post-modern culture. Kristeva understood that, 
unlike the policy of reconstructing communities through a new ‘social’ investment into the 
Cartesian subject116, the subject has to be approached through a new linguistic modality, 
healing.  
 
                                               
113 McAfee, Habermas, Kristeva, and Citizenship, p.134. 
114 Ibid., p.36. 
115 in terms of an unfinished psychic formation 
116 See Kristeva’s difference from Habermas’ project on ‘communicative reason’ at the time (mid 
1980s) in McAfee’s analysis. Habermas proposed a new, non instrumental form of reason, which 
leads to ‘communicative action’. His attempt was to reform the Cartesian ‘monological’ subject who 
emerges as a new ‘intersubjectivity’. This reformed subject is capable of recovering the fading 
Enlightenment grounds of culture. However, as McAfee admits, this ideal only redressed the 
traditional ‘confident’ subject of modernity. McAfee, Habermas, Kristeva, and Citizenship, pp.26-27.  
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‘...Left without a sexual, subjective, or moral identity, this amphibian is a being of 
[lost] boundaries, a borderline, or a “false self” – a body that acts, often without the joys 
of such performative drunkenness. Modern man is losing his soul, but he does not know 
it.’117  
 
Kristeva’s significant recognition was that she made this new way of speaking to the 
subject an ‘imperative’. Indoctrination − ‘new Cartesian investments’ − cannot find a way to 
post-modern ‘exhaustion’. She confirms psychoanalysis as a method that has the capacity to 
access the changed subject. She implied that ‘indoctrination’ is a failed strategy for humanist 
discourses. In this changed context, after her transition period, Kristeva confirms for the 
second time the failure of religion. Religion still remained a modernist discourse as it 
overlooks the fundamental brokenness of the subject.  
 
‘If [religion] fails…, what else will inspire change, faced as we are with the glow of 
our silver high-rises, the implacable banality of banks, and the fact that destiny is being 
programmed into the genetic code itself?” ‘Therefore, I suggest that in the future, 
psychoanalysis may be one of the few remaining endeavours that will allow change and 
surprise, that is, that will allow life.’118  
 
 
2.1.3 The ‘Exhausted Subject’: ’Ontological’ Dialogue Through the Symbolic Needs of 
the Subject? 
 
My study highlights that it is the program of healing the ‘exhausted subject’ which 
makes Kristeva’s ‘post-modernity’ a potential dialogue partner for theology. This is the very 
context within which the proposed ‘ontological’ dialogue can be initiated. Kristeva opens up 
the need to provide the subject with new symbols of love to ‘guide’ identity. These symbolic 
stories ‘endow us with a greater capacity for signification.’119 It is crucial to highlight the 
direction which Kristeva opens up here. The crisis of the ‘exhausted subject’ can also be 
defined as a symbolic crisis. Addressing this symbolic crisis provides the ground for an 
‘ontological exchange’ in the sense that in Kristeva’s psychoanalytical ‘symbol building’ we 
find her ‘atheistic subtexts’ at work. While Kristeva presents her semiotic symbols of love, 
she engages with these humanist narratives. She borrows from them and also, if they are 
insufficient, corrects them. In this sense, Kristeva’s symbolic quest reveals an active ‘cultural 
mourning’. Re-telling the story of love to the post-modern self is a reflection on the 
relationship between the subject of modernity and the subject of post-modernity; in terms of 
how their ‘symbolic resources’ have changed. At this stage, my point is that Kristeva makes 
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it her agenda to revise the Christian discourse on love (with its symbols) in order to build it 
into her new resourcing of the subject. Looking back from postmodernity to modernity she 
states that the subject has run out of imagination.120  
 
Kristeva’s full turn in the direction of the ‘exhausted subject’ introduces a new dynamic 
into her relationship with Christian texts. She produces a ‘symbolic mourning’, which now 
should not be read exclusively in terms of reduction. It is a ‘mourning’ within a Freudian 
regime which, within its ‘ontological limits’, incorporates Christian symbolism as 
intrinsically as possible.  
 
‘For the driving force behind faith is the fantasy of returning to the mother”, even if 
Biblical faith wants specifically to distance us… By laying bare the splendours of the 
Virgin Mary, Christianity ...has unintentionally revealed what lies behind faith. In 
contrast to Freud, it could be maintained that the presence of the Virgin throughout 
Christianity is less a return to paganism than an acknowledgement of the hidden side of 
the sacred mechanism (of any sacred mechanism), which draws us into its soothing and 
grinding motion in order to leave us with a single path to salvation: having faith in the 
Father. [The father of idealisation in individual pre-history.]’121 (Emphasis added.) 
 
My point is that it is this secular synthesis which theology can complete from the 
hermeneutics of faith. It can be a constructive dialogue for the following reasons. Textual 
evidence shows that Kristeva’s opening up to Christian symbols is proportionate to her full 
perception of the ‘exhausted subject’. In other words, this was the breakdown of her 
revolutionary ‘semiotics’ where Kristeva’s ‘Christian’ mourning started.122  Oliver confirms 
the emergence of her post-revolutionary imagery in stating that Kristeva is a ‘melancholy 
atheist mourning the death of God.’123 It was indeed a mourning for the broken down 
symbols of modernity. It is in this context that many of her analysts regard Kristeva 
fundamentally as the postmodern thinker. According to Beardsworth, Kristeva does not 
construct a meta-narrative to answer the problem of nihilism in modernity. Instead, she 
becomes the writer of ‘minor histories’ of love and psychic suffering.124  
 
The good news for theological critique is that the ‘exhausted subject’ provides the 
ground for a non-polemic relationship at this very point. The common platform is the 
suffering of the ‘exhausted subject’. What is of importance for our further investigations is 
the fundamental symbolic conflict between modernity and post-modernity. A response to 
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Kristeva will have to give special attention to the mistrust of religious symbols in ‘post-
metaphysical consciousness’.  If modernity was characterised by confidence and the 
unlimited expansion of human power, by contrast, the postmodern shift can be defined as the 
failure and ultimate withdrawal of these projections. Crucial for my critique, included in it is 
the lack of trust in the inherited (religious) symbols of modernity. If this is the crisis of trust 
in modernity’s ‘authority’, then specific attention will have to be paid to the image of God, 
traditionally regarded as ‘paternal authority’. A critical analysis of where these authorities 
merged in an objectionable way will be necessary.  
 
 The symbolic conflict between modernity and postmodern sensitivity, for my critique, 
becomes important in other aspects too. The subject, giving up external grand-narratives and 
‘universal’ symbols, retreats into the self. It is a return to the ‘immediate’ existential 
symbols: language, the memories of the mother, and the desire for the father. Giving 
symbolic expression to these micro-narratives is the only way of avoiding becoming a 
‘deflated’ Beckettian subject, without symbols, without catharsis, without any functioning 
language.125 Kristeva recognises that the chance of ‘survival’ is rebirth through 
symbolisation. However, it can turn out that one-sided focusing on the ‘inner-narratives’ 
does not fully answer the subject’s symbolic needs. 
 
 
2.1.4 The Evaluation of Kristeva’s Turn to the ‘Exhausted Subject’ 
 
Kristeva’s objective to give a ‘symbolic’ support to the failed postmodern imagination 
reveals the paradoxical character of her ‘postmodernism.’ Indeed, Kristeva’s fragmentary 
essay-like style signals the breakdown of her previous revolutionary semiotics. Although 
Sarah Beardsworth is largely correct in stating Kristeva’s ‘post-modernity’ (as a writer of 
‘minor histories’ of love), she does not take fully into account Kristeva’s revaluation of the 
classic Enlightenment principles. Kristeva wants to attain a full understanding of psychic 
suffering. This intention transcends the post-modern agenda. The thematic and systemic 
coherence of her regime, the synthesis of the secular Enlightenment, and her confidence in 
the success of a psychoanalytical hermeneutic of culture, show the return of a corrected 
grand-narrative in her oeuvre. Kristeva remains an Enlightenment thinker. The proof is that 
all agents of culture are evaluated from the unified viewpoint of psychoanalysis. Kristeva 
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also retains the unfaltering commitment to universal meaning. She preserves the ‘universal’ 
of the Enlightenment by correcting its external conception of history, which led to fetishing 
the totality of reason.126  
 
Kristeva reconceived the compromised ‘universal’ by positing it as a shared universal 
‘from within’, which emerges as an intra-psychic reality. In this corrected program, language 
and psychic suffering constitute the common story of the self. This inwardness cannot be put 
again in the service of the ‘nightmares of modernity’ (T. Eagleton). With this, Kristeva offers 
a revaluation of the dignity of the human self outside the religious framework. The dynamic 
of ‘cultural mourning’ is clear. Beyond the profile of her ‘exhausted subject’ Kristeva is 
operating with the ‘whole’ of the European cultural canon. The linguistic turn for her is the 
very discourse of history. It is putting together a culture in pieces. 127 Kristeva’s latest piece, 
The Severed Head, Capital Visions (2012), from a humanist point of view, confirms the 
commitment to revise the canon of the Enlightenment and merge the secular and the 
religious heritage. She re-reads the European canon for the postmodern, exhausted subject, 
and constructs a new canon for this suffering subjectivity. Ives confirms this enigmatic 
continuity when he says that Kristeva follows a critical tradition which exalts postmodernism 
via modernism. She revisits and actualises the heritage of ‘classic’ modernists like Arendt, 
Proust, Joyce and Artaud.128 Thus, in the final outcome, Kristeva constructs a ‘meta-
narrative’: the subject is redeemable. The continuity between the programs of ‘revolution’ 
and ‘healing’ is manifest in her unwavering commitment to the historical subject.  
 
There is a very important outcome of Kristeva’s encounter with the ‘exhausted subject’. 
She has realised that the traditional resources and strategies of psychoanalysis alone are not 
sufficient to combat nihilism. In the Beginning Was Love, Psychoanalysis and Faith (1985) 
was the summit of Kristeva’s confident psychoanalysis. Even New Maladies of the Soul 
(1993) presented psychoanalysis as a totalising discourse. Since then, the ongoing or 
‘unstoppable’ exhaustion of the subject becomes the main object of Kristeva’s ‘symbolic 
mourning’. What structures this symbolic quest is her ultimate realisation of the failure of 
Marxian ‘metaphysics’. The Marxist argument about history’s self-transcending through 
dialectical materialism and the dialectics of nature seem to have utterly failed. Postulating 
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the revolutionary renewal of ‘nature’ (history, culture, the psyche) through the program of 
thesis → antithesis → synthesis is the starkest possible contrast to the increasing crisis of the 
post-revolutionary subject.129 The ‘unredeemed’ psychic suffering shows that the Marxian 
program of redemption has failed. Unlike her early ideological authorities, Marx and Freud, 
Kristeva recognised the need for an immanent criticism of her own regime. Her 
psychoanalytical turn to the subject culminates in a conclusion which is the ground of a new 
‘ontological’ description of subjective crisis. What post-metaphysical consciousness is most 
in need of is the search to interpret and reinvent ‘loving intelligence’.130  
 
 
2.1.5 Conclusions 
 
The conclusions of our first analysis are as follows. First and foremost, the problem of 
the crisis of the subject of modernity and post-modernity provides theology with a major 
access to Kristeva’s project. It can become the ground for a non-apologetic engagement 
because its object is the ‘suffering subject’, which raises the problem not only of the 
resources for tackling suffering but also of co-operation in resourcing.  
 
The ongoing ‘exhaustion’ of the subject is an open ended problem for Kristeva. From a 
confident idealisation of the subject’s potential to renew ‘history’, she arrived at the 
fundamental brokenness of the subject of modernity. As Dupré highlights, in terms of the 
consequences, Kristeva agrees with Habermas: ‘rationality has gone wild’, and that there is 
an objective need to return to the original emancipatory project of the Enlightenment.131 
However, contrary to this mainstream position, Kristeva arrives at a radical questioning of 
the policy which makes reason the exclusive resource of ‘liberation’. It is the experience of 
love through which a new enlightenment of the self can be achieved. The primary reference 
of the self is not ‘reason’ but healing through ‘loving intelligence’.  
 
The original claim of my study is further confirmed: the real dialogue is not between 
Kristeva and ‘rationalist humanism; it needs to be completed through a critical engagement 
with theology, which also makes the ‘suffering’ of the postmodern self a priority. This can 
lead to examining the ‘ontic’ exhaustion of the subject. If this is not a partial crisis (reason, 
narratives) as the Habermasian position claims, but the crisis of the whole self (the individual 
                                               
129 See, ‘dialectics of nature’ in A Dictionary of Marxist Thought, Second Edition, edited by Tom 
Bottomore, Laurence Harris, V.G. Kiernan and Ralph Miliband, Blackwell, Oxford 1991. (First 
Edition 1983), p.130 
130 Kristeva, This Incredible Need to Believe, p.98. 
131 Dupré, The Enlightenment and the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Culture, p.335. 
 61 
and the cultural ‘self’), then, the self’s very grounding needs to be revised. This is an 
‘ontological problem’ which requires making ‘ontological statements’ about the human 
being. A new understanding of the self’s place in the whole reality is needed.  
 
The problem of the ‘exhausted subject’ is also a challenge to Kristeva’s psychoanalysis 
which, in terms of its available resources, is suspended between modernity and post-
modernity. The ‘graced’ ontological question to her is: does the self define the whole reality, 
rather than being part of it, according to the classic Enlightenment principle?132  Or, is the 
self embedded in discourses ‘outside’ the self?  In other words, who guarantees the genuine 
otherness of the person?  
 
Two further steps of analysis suggest themselves. The first is the analysis of Kristeva’s 
reinterpretation of ‘Transcendence’. This is an ontological examination of the ‘speaking 
being’ in terms of exploring its ‘ideological’ heritage, that is, exploring the materialist 
ontological program underlying the construct. Examining this grounding will reveal those 
‘humanist subtexts’, engagement with which will be essential for the comprehensive 
response my critique develops. This analysis will also be helpful for Kristeva’s project itself. 
The conflict with her materialism, I expect, will demonstrate why the ‘postmetaphysical 
positon’ rejects an ‘ontological discourse’ with theology. My working hypothesis is that the 
rejection of making ontological statements about the human being coincides with the 
rejection of the use of Christian symbols. The emerging question will be: what is the reason 
that the central image of faith, the Father’s Love, does not penetrate the ‘firewalls’ of 
postmetaphysical consciousness? 
 
In addition we must analyse the actual suffering of the ‘exhausted subject’. In view of 
these two aspects (ontological narratives and the content of suffering), the problem of the 
‘exhausted subject’ in Kristeva can be fully evaluated. 
 
                                               
132 Dupré, The Enlightenment and the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Culture, p.46. 
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2.2 ANALYSIS II.  ‘TRANSCENDENCE’  
 
The problem of the ‘exhausted subject’ raises important further questions. What is the 
underlying ideological and philosophical ground of Kristeva’s ‘revolutionary’ and 
‘psychoanalytical’ programs? If there was a genuine shift from ‘revolution’ to healing, how 
are these strategies related to Kristeva’s materialist world view? 
  
This analysis aims at identifying the ‘ontological program’ upon which Kristeva’s 
project is based. Besides the problem of the ‘exhausted subject’, it is the second major 
contact point with theology. The forthcoming sections will examine how the systemic 
exclusion of ‘grace’ took place in Kristeva’s early project. My purpose is, however, to arrive 
from the ‘apologetic’ position, the active exclusion of grace, to seeing it as the problem of 
excluded grace. My critique is interested in the consequences of losing grace as the ground 
of the human self, rather than in the ideological conflict itself. I present Kristeva’s 
materialism, ignored by her critics as an integrative centre of her work. With this, my 
critique will identify a second way of comprehensively reading Kristeva’s work.  
 
In order to re-open an ‘ontological’ discourse on the crisis of the subject, exploring the 
conflict with Kristeva’s materialism is an important preparatory step. A critique has to see 
clearly the underlying tension with her ‘semiotic symbolism’. My study identifies its source 
in Kristeva’s two major ‘ontological subtexts’, Marx and Freud. On the one hand, my 
interest is to explore what, through these narratives, Kristeva shares with ‘post-metaphysical 
consciousnesses’. Behind the rejection of ‘ontological’ engagements we find a common 
materialism. As our previous analysis suggested, Kristeva’s materialism can reveal important 
motives beyond this rejection. If it is a parallel rejection of engagement with Christian 
symbols, then it is crucial to see what makes conversing with theology ‘unacceptable’ for the 
postmetaphysical mindset. A major objective of this analysis is to listen to this criticism. It is 
an important preparation for a new type of ‘ontological’ response which my study develops.  
 
My working hypothesis in this chapter is that Kristeva’s ‘materialism’, however strong 
the ideological conflict is, in the long run does not exclude a ‘symbolic cooperation’ with 
theology. The ground for this expectation is her strikingly short essay, ‘Atheism’, which 
nevertheless is an independent chapter (!) of Hatred and Forgiveness. 133 ‘Atheism’ is a 
pivotal reference for the evaluation of Kristeva’s materialism. She puts into context her own 
atheism in a revealing way. Kristeva contrasts ‘nihilist’ atheism, which is based on the denial 
                                               
133 Three and a half pages altogether. 
 63 
of the ‘divine’, with her version of atheism. The former is always a brutal denial of the 
human capacity for representation-symbolisation. Kristeva’s ‘atheism without nihilism’, 
contrary to the nihilist denial of the ‘divine’, states that the speaking being cannot be reduced 
to his biology. At the ‘endpoint’ of matter we always find a ‘beyond’, the ability to represent 
and symbolize.134  
 
It is against this background that I explore the ontological conflict in a non-polemic way. 
The primal objective is to relate this materialism to the crisis of the ‘exhausted subject’. 
Thus, my study presents the grounding of the ‘speaking being’ in immanence. It is a 
demonstration of Kristeva’s materialism as a complex ‘ontological program’. Kristeva re-
interprets Transcendence within language; and develops it into a complex semiotic 
‘soteriology’. The pivotal interest here is pointing out how this materialism imposes 
important limits upon her project. Kristeva’s ‘materialist soteriology’ is responsible for her 
not fully comprehending the ‘ontic’ exhaustion of the ‘exhausted subject’. Owing to the 
failure to recognise the religious dimension of the crisis, her regime ‘exhausts’ the subject. 
This analysis furnishes a basis for this theological criticism.  
 
2.2.1. The ‘Speaking Being’ Grounded in Immanence 
 
2.2.1.1 Overlapping of Kristeva’s ‘Marxist’ and Freudian Frameworks 
 
In the background of Kristeva’s materialism we find two major formative traditions. 
These are her ‘Marxist’135 historical materialism and her Freudianism. Though Kristeva’s 
critics frequently refer to her materialism from Revolution in Poetic Language, their 
emphasis is primarily on Kristeva’s political praxis. Her materialism as an ‘ontological 
program’ never occurs as a theme in its own right. 136 To my knowledge, in literature on 
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Kristeva there is no systemic examination of her materialist world view. Her historical 
materialism is treated as part of her transitional radical ‘leftism’, which has no pivotal role in 
her psychoanalytical ethics.137 My critique makes it a hinge of evaluation. From a theological 
point of view, it is the close co-operation between her ‘materialist subtexts’ which leads to 
the systemic exclusion of ‘grace’ from her model.  
 
In a very recent conversation with Sigrid Weigel, Kristeva still called the gap between 
the Freudian analytic point of view and the religious viewpoint ‘unbridgeable and 
problematic’.138 My critique points to an important ‘structural’ cause of this conflict. For 
theology, the precondition of a genuinely systematic engagement is a clear comprehension of 
Kristeva’s analytic viewpoint as a highly complex materialist narrative. Underlying this 
stance is an in-depth analysis of the language-self-history relationship. If this complexity is 
overlooked, the communication that theology attempts between faith and psychoanalysis will 
take place in a hermeneutical void. Theology cannot engage with individual psychoanalytic 
                                                                                                                                     
structuralist debate, raising the former’s materialism as an ontological problem seems to be an 
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137 In Kristeva’s works we find important, but mostly general references to Marx’s influence on her. In 
her texts I have not found any detailed analysis of Marx’s critique of religion. Kristeva’s 
comprehensive knowledge of Marx’s social critique, however, presupposes Marx’s ideological 
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reduction of religion to the immanence of man, as a source of Kristeva’s general critique of religion. 
The most detailed references to Marx and Feuerbach are Kristeva’s historical survey of ‘negativity’ in 
Revolution in Poetic Language. Her connecting the Marxist program of social transformation with the 
psychoanalytical and linguistic point of view to analyse ‘alienation’ shows a sound knowledge of 
Marxist ideology. Marxism links religious and social alienation. It has a rather negative view on the 
role of institutionalised religion in contributing to social alienation. The critique of the ‘God-image’, 
however ideological, is central to this criticism. 
I draw attention to Kristeva’s autobiographical recollections where she refers to these ‘leftist’ 
influences. First, in an interview with Philippe Petit, she talks of Marx as an important source of her 
understanding of the revolution of 1968. ‘First of all, there was Marx’s 18th Brumaire…Marx had seen 
both the signs of revolutionary movements and their failures very clearly, starting with the 
Revolution. As far as I am concerned, this book is still up to date.’ (In: Kristeva, Revolt, She Said, 
p.15.) Kristeva also highlights her participation in the leftist Tel Quel group. Owing to her fresh 
impulses from this literary movement (Freud, French post-structuralism), she broke away from the 
Maoist spell of Marxism owing to her negative experiences in China. ‘I made an institutional and 
personal criticism of leftist movements after my trip to China, for I had begun to feel alienated from 
leftist ideology.’ (In: Kristeva Interviews, p.7.) We can detect an apologetic stance in Kristeva’s 
critique of ‘religion as transcendence’. Underlying it is an inherited ‘ideological’ mistrust. In the 
interview, Kristeva confirms her position that a religious notion of transcendence and fetishizing 
reason are structurally the same. See Julia Kristeva Interviews, p.15.  
138 A public discussion which followed her inaugural lecture as Honorary Member of the Centre for 
Literary and Cultural research, Berlin (8 March 2011, ‘The Need to Believe and the Force of 
Monotheism’). The conversation is available from the institute’s homepage (Haus der Kulturen der 
Velt, Berlin), 
http://www.hkw.de/en/programm/2011/wortwelten_2011/veranstaltungen_53783/Veranstaltungsdetail
_54964.php Web accessed 23 March 2011. 
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statements if it does not realise that, while speaking about ‘God’ and the ‘person’, it needs to 
communicate with Kristeva’s underlying complex ‘ground’. My point is that despite the 
conflict with her materialism, becoming aware of the underlying composite discourses139 in 
itself is a way out from the hermeneutical impasse. That is why I lay bare this conflict. It is 
the only guarantee that theology will develop a response which actually communicates with 
Kristeva’s materialistic position. These complex narratives, which theology has to address, 
are Kristeva’s re-conception of ‘Transcendence’ within language (‘the program of the self-
transcending subject’) and the materialist grounding of the ‘speaking being’, in focus with 
the concept of the chora-thetic.   
 
I focus on Revolution in Poetic Language because it is Kristeva’s only work where the 
materialist grounding of the ‘speaking being’ is systematically exposed. It reveals a 
structural intertwining of her ‘Marxist’ ideology and her Freudian framework.140 This results 
in a highly confident materialist narrative, which especially characterises Kristeva’s post-
stucturalist program from the Tel Quel period141 and her early psychoanalysis. This 
‘Marxism’ is in the background of Kristeva’s atheism as an active ideological subtext: 
Marxism as a ‘loyal child of Enlightenment has always maintained an implacable hostility to 
irrationalism.’142 This ideological impact should be seen as a major cause of the fact that 
Kristeva, while searching for new resources for a post-Marxist critique of culture, from the 
onset excluded religious redemption.  
 
Kristeva names two major influences in the formation of her humanist narrative, the 
events of 1968 and the influence of ‘French atheism’.  
 
’68 meant ‘putting God himself (i.e. Meaning fixed as Value) into question… In 
short, questioning a model of humanity that had absorbed into itself the transcendent 
ideal (God) and which, from this immanence, was in hot pursuit of “values” and 
“objects”. The enragé of ’68 bore the possibility of a mutation in metaphysics, a sort of 
change of religion or civilisation that like all upheavals takes time to reach people’s 
ears.’143  
 
                                               
139 as a complex ‘cultural mourning’ 
140 The linguist Kristeva by 1979 was a practicing psychoanalyst. Revolution in Poetic Language 
(1974) already reflects her professional interest in psychoanalysis. In Buhle, Feminism and Its 
Discontents, p. 333.   
141 See the excellent linking of the works and motives of three Tel Quel associates in reference to their 
texts, by Caws. (Reviews of the books Semiotiké, Recherches pour une semanalyse  by Julia Kristeva;  
L'Enseignement de la Peinture by Marcelin Pleynet;  Logiques  by Philippe Sollers. Kristeva is shown 
as an influential, dominant figure of the group. Caws, ‘Tel Quel: Text & Revolution’ (pp.2-8) 
142 Eagleton, ‘Marxism, Structuralism, Post-Structuralism’, p.9. 
143 Kristeva, Revolt, She Said, pp.26.28. 
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Kristeva very soon developed her preference for what she calls ‘French atheism’. This 
atheism paid attention to the subject, which was lacking in classic Marxism.  
 
‘What is specific about French thought is that it is written with immediacy 
(following from Descartes and Pascal and then Voltaire, Diderot and Rousseau), and it is 
also corporal, sexualized. (…) This way of taking into account sexual experience and its 
co-presence with thought is unique to France. Here we are at the source of French 
atheism: a strange valorization of a very particular psychic life, inasmuch as it is 
sustained by sexual desire and rooted in bodily needs; it exhausts transcendence though 
in no way denies it, instead it brings such incarnate transcendence back into meaning.’144 
 
These quotations point to a less visible dimension of her Marxism, the dismissed image 
of God. The above motives of Kristeva’s atheism show important aspects of why the ‘old’ 
God-image (as the theological hermeneutics of the person and history) was regarded as 
‘irrelevant’. Kristeva saw ’68 as the ‘murder’ of traditional ‘paternal authority’. It was a 
protest against what was perceived as an inhibiting power. The Father-image of religion was 
seen within this ideological framework of abusive power. This underlying criticism together 
with the implied lack of a proper anthropology in religion will have to be addressed by 
theology. My critique points to the ‘God-question’ as a hidden ideological dimension of 
Kristeva’s early ‘Marxism’, as one which should be observed in the background of her 
linguistic re-conception of ‘transcendence’.  
 
Kristeva’s critique of Maoism in Chinese Women (1974) already signals how the Marxist 
desire for a means of redemption, though in a transformed form, is transposed into her 
psychoanalysis. 145 Boer also states this move as a systemic continuity in the oeuvre, though 
in a somewhat superficial way. He sees it as a straightforward ‘linear’ development. 
According to him, with the redemptive possibilities of socialism exhausted, Kristeva was in 
search of an alternative political and social redemption that may overcome the rampages of 
capitalism. For Boer, this explains Kristeva’s move to Freudian psychoanalysis and her 
interest in the psychoanalytical reading of Christian texts. The danger is that without an in-
depth analysis of her materialism Kristeva is too quickly turned into a ‘Christian writer’. In 
Boer’s reductive scheme, her psychoanalytical turn to Christianity is a substitute for a 
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145 I highlighted in the text the concept of revolt and the psychological dynamics of ‘desire’ as her 
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sidelined Marxism, which she cannot excise completely. What Kristeva seeks, Boer 
concludes, is a new form of social, political and psychological remedies.146 I find 
problematic this simplified image of Kristeva’s ‘Christian turn’. Hers is a redemptive 
project, but she takes over the redemptive telos not from the Christian narrative but from her 
seminal Marxism. 
 
Boer emphasises Kristeva’s departure from Marx. Kristeva trumps Marx by identifying 
a more original cause, the dream work which lies beneath Marx’s categories of work and 
production. 147 Or else, Kristeva replaces Marxism by psychoanalysis because it provides the 
answers that Marx left hanging.148 It is true on a general level. But there is a more complex 
relationship with her formative tradition. It is true that this move can be understood as one 
from a collective focus to an individual one, from social and political questions to those of 
the individual psyche.149 Yet, what is missed in the caesura-approach is the significance of 
Kristeva’s materialism as the unifying element of the oeuvre. Her psychoanalysis is not 
simply an alternative materialism to Marxism. Her original Marxist and Freudian economies 
are perfectly integrated into a unified ‘ontological program’. It is indeed true that we can 
speak of a striking abundance in Christian images in Kristeva but, against the background of 
her early ‘Marxism’, we also have to speak of their suppressed original, ‘ontological’ 
meaning.   
 
 
2.2.1.2 The ‘Chora-thetic’:  Kristeva’s Reconception of ‘Transcendence’ in Language   
 
The concept of the ‘chora-thetic’, a central element of her linguistic theory, is the core of 
Kristeva’s materialism for several reasons. It can be seen as Kristeva’s reinterpretation of 
Transcendence ‘within the self’. In it, the overlapping of the ‘Marxist’ and the Freudian 
frameworks is also best shown. It is the pivotal moment of excluding ‘grace’ from Kristeva’s 
model. Also, her program of the ‘self-transcending self’ is a major point where the conflict 
with the Christian notion of the ‘self’ is manifest. I present the three levels of ‘self-
transcendence’ through language. The recapitulation of this program will be followed by 
exploring the materialist grounding of this program. This demonstration is the heart of my 
study, in the sense that it shows on what ground my study suggested an ‘ontological critique’ 
of Kristeva. 
 
                                               
146 Boer, ‘The Search for Redemption’, pp.154. 174. 
147 Ibid., p.159. 
148 Ibid., p.155. 
149 Ibid., p.155. 
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The basis of the program of the ‘self-transcending subject’ is the chora-thetic. Because 
of its significance, unlike Kristeva’s critics, I give a full overview of the image. Originally, 
the ‘chora-thetic’ is an ‘ontological’ concept from Plato’s cosmological myth, Timaeus, 
which Kristeva took over as a central image for her linguistics. In Plato’s myth, the ‘chora’ 
plays a primary role in the creation of the universe. It is a sort of pre-cosmos, a formless state 
in which we find the basic constituents of the cosmos, the four elements: fire, air, water, and 
earth only in formation. This pre-matter, and all the other constituents of the cosmos to be, 
are moved randomly, churning about in ‘the wet-nurse of becoming’ (52d 4-5). It is the 
erratic movement of this receptacle (‘chora’) that causes and preserves a state of non-
uniformity. 150  
 
‘This above all: it is a receptacle of all becoming—its wetnurse, as it were.’ (49b)151 
 
‘…we shouldn’t call the mother or receptacle of what has come to be, of what is 
visible or perceivable in every other way, either earth or air, fire, or water, or any of their 
compounds or their constituents. But if we speak of it as an invisible and characterless 
sort of thing, one that receives all b things and shares in a most perplexing way in what 
is intelligible, a thing extremely difficult to comprehend…’ (51a/b)152 
 
‘That is how at that time the four kinds [elements, ‘pre- fire, air, water, and earth’] 
were being shaken by the receiver, which was itself agitating like a shaking machine, 
separating the kinds most unlike each other furthest apart and pushing those most like 
each other closest together into the same region. This, of course, explains how these 
different kinds came to occupy different regions of space, even before the universe was 
set in order and constituted from them. Indeed, it is a fact that before this took place the 
four kinds all lacked proportion and measure, and at the time the ordering of the universe 
was b undertaken, fire, water, earth, and air initially possessed certain traces of what they 
are now. They were indeed in the condition one would expect thoroughly god-forsaken 
things to be in. So, finding them in this natural condition, the first thing the god then did 
was to give them their distinctive shapes, using forms and numbers.’ (53a/b)153 
 
The demiurge (‘creator-god’) brings order into this chaos, pre-ordered already by the 
‘chora’/mother: ‘The god fashioned these four kinds to be as perfect and excellent as 
possible, when they were not so before.’ (53b) 154 
 
It is deeply emblematic that Kristeva builds her ‘anti-metaphysical’ project on a Platonic 
‘metaphysical’ concept. It is a symbolic confirmation that she can indeed be approached as 
an ‘ontological discourse’. The original associations of the concept clearly show why 
Kristeva took over this symbol. The ‘semiotic-maternal’, the ‘pre-symbolic’ in her linguistics 
                                               
150 Plato, Timaeus, Transl. Donald J. Zeyl, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis 2000, p. xxxv. 
151 Ibid., p.38. 
152 Ibid., p.40. 
153 Ibid., p.43. 
154 Ibid., p.43. 
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correspond in Plato’s myth to the ‘chora’ (mother, receptacle), and the disordered state of 
the world, which disorder is the absence of the nous (‘Meaning’). The Symbolic Order (of 
the Father) corresponds to the nous and the creative act of the demiurge (‘creator’). Referring 
to the qualities of the chora’s kinetic rhythm, Kristeva says in her linguistics that the ‘chora’ 
is a ‘modality of significance in which the linguistic sign is not yet articulated as the absence 
of an object and as the distinction between real and symbolic.’155  In this way, she identifies 
the ‘chora’ as the process of signification, the ‘space’ between the sign and the signified, and 
stresses that the ‘chora’ is ‘an essentially mobile and extremely provisional articulation 
constituted by movements and their ephemeral stases’156 Added to this function, Kristeva 
calls the threshold of the symbolic the ‘thetic’ phase, which emerges out of Lacan’s mirror 
stage, the first ‘place’ or observation of the Other.157 That is why I refer to the full linguistic 
function of the ‘chora’ as the ‘chora-thetic’. The ‘thetic’ expresses rather the presence of the 
‘nous’ or the Symbolic, an early inscription of the death-drive, or the semiotic chaos, into 
language. 
 
In Kristeva’s model, the function of the ‘chora-thetic’ is to nourish and renew meaning. 
It is from this discovery that Kristeva’s project develops into a complex ‘semiotics’. As 
stated earlier, Kristeva’s focusing on linguistic origins always has to be seen against her 
Arendtian background, the quest for a new ethical beginning in history. The program she 
builds upon the regenerative function of the ‘chora-thetic’ complements and completes this 
Arendtian intention. The ‘chora-thetic’ cannot be restricted exclusively to Kristeva’s 
linguistics. It also animates her Freudian psychoanalysis, which is in the service of renewing 
the person as the moral agent of ‘external’ and internal history. Language is never a neutral 
medium in Kristeva. It is also (and always) a medium of ethics, of ethical self-transcending. 
Psychotherapy is indirectly in the service of recovering ethical reflection in culture.  
 
Kristeva literally re-grounds Freud’s project by giving a structural analysis of language 
itself. Language is not a passive ‘technical device’ of therapy. It actively bears the full story 
of the subject. For Kristeva, language is also a healing medium, from within. This worked- 
out ‘ontological complexity’ of language makes it possible for her to draw on those intra-
linguistic and psychic resources, which were available neither to Freud nor to Lacan. Within 
the Freudian method a far more nuanced operation becomes possible. In contrast to Freud’s 
                                               
155 ‘Insistons sur cette réglementation: nous sommes ici dans une modalité de la significance où le 
signe linguistique n’est pas encore articulé comme distinction entre reel et symbolique.’ (Kristeva, La 
révolution du langage poétique, p.25.) Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, p.26. 
156 ‘Une articulation toute provisoire, essentiellement mobile, constituée de mouvements et de leurs 
stases éphémères.’ (Kristeva, La révolution du langage poétique, p .23.) Ibid., p.25. 
157 Ibid., pp.48-49 
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technical approach, Kristeva gives a complete ‘worldview’ through language. She is obliged 
to, because language, in reference to Arendt, is the meeting point between history (as ‘ethics’ 
or moral accountability) and the individual. Language is that event through which an 
‘ethical’ self-transcending takes place. Kristeva expresses the dynamics of self-
transcendence on different levels, which levels merge and follow her Arendtian telos from 
the ‘individual’ to the ‘collective’.   
 
The first level of transcendence is the very genesis of language. It is the strictly 
understood linguistic function of the ‘chora-thetic’ ‘to prepare meaning’, which Kristeva 
describes in chapters 1-10 in Revolution in Poetic Language. The first transcendent ‘leap’ is 
between the ‘chora’ and the ‘thetic’. The semiotic ‘chora’ is the precondition of the ‘thetic’ 
phase.158 The ‘thetic’ phase, in close connection with the semiotic ‘chora’, ‘marks a 
threshold between two heterogeneous realms: the semiotic and the symbolic. The second 
includes part of the first, and their scission is thereafter marked by the break between 
signifier and signified.’159 
 
 ‘We shall distinguish the semiotic (drives and their articulations) from the realm of 
signification, which is always that of proposition and judgement, in other words, a realm 
of positions. …We shall call this break, which produces the positing of signification, a 
thetic phase. All enunciation, whether of a word or of a sentence, is thetic. It requires an 
identification; in other words, the subject must separate from and through his image, 
from and through his objects.’160  
 
(‘The regulation of the semiotic in the symbolic through the thetic break; which is 
inherent in the operation of language, is also found on the various levels of a society’s 
signifying edifice. In all known archaic societies, this founding break of the symbolic 
order is represented by murder − the killing of a man, a slave, a prisoner, an animal. 
Freud reveals this founding break and generalizes from it when he emphasizes that 
society is founded on a complicity in the common crime.’161) ‘We indicated earlier how 
language, already as a semiotic chora but above all as a symbolic system, is at the 
service of the death drive, diverts it, and confines it as if within an isolated pocket of 
narcissism [within the emerging borders of the nascent self].’ Identity and society are 
grounded on ‘this founding break of the symbolic order’.162 The Other (the Father of 
                                               
158 Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, p.50 
159 ‘Elle marque un seuil entre deux domaines héterogènes : le sémiotique et le symbolique. Le second 
comprend une partie du premier, et leur scission se marque désormais par la coupure signifiant/ 
signifié.’ (Kristeva, La révolution du langage poétique, p.46.), Ibid., pp.48-49. 
160 ‘Nous distinguerons le sémiotique (les pulsions et leurs articulations) du domaine de la 
signification ; qui est toujours celui d’une proposition ou d’un jugement ; c’est-à-dire un domaine de 
positions. Nous appellerons cette coupure produisant la position de la signification, une phase 
thétique. Toute énonciation est thétique ; qu’elle soit énonciation de mot ou de phrase: toute 
énonciation exige une identification, c’est-à-dire une séparation du sujet de et dans son image, en 
même temps que de et dans ses objets.’ (Kristeva, La révolution du langage poétique, pp.41-42); Ibid., 
p.43. 
161 Ibid., p.70 
162 ‘Nous avons indiqué plus haut comment le langage, déjà en tant que chora sémiotique, mais 
surtout en tant que système symbolique, est au service de la pulsion de mort, la fait dériver et la 
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individual pre-history or Loving Third) is ‘the regulator between semiotic chora’163 and 
culture. ‘…There can be no signifying practice without a thetic phase’.164 
 
We can see that the ‘speaking being’ from the very beginning lives with a notion of 
transcendence. He comes into being by transcending the loss of the mother when this loss 
becomes named and accepted through the event (‘act’) of language. This is the beginning of 
a permanent ‘transcending’ since, in Kristeva’s model, language is a progressive act of ‘self-
transcending’. In this sense, the self is a self-redemptive subject. Through naming external 
reality and internal psychic events, the sense of reality is maintained. The subject is raised 
above himself by his own signification. If language fails, the subject falls back into the 
‘maternal void’. In this state, the world and one’s own story becomes unrepresented again: 
contact with the ‘Real’ is lost. The working of the ‘thetic-chora’ is the sign that the subject is 
on its way to ‘become’ and remain a ‘speaking being’. 
 
The adult psyche also needs to undergo subsequent resurrections. This is the second 
level of self-transcendence. It is prompted by the subject’s subsequent crises of identity. 
Kristeva highlights as the climax of crisis when the person has to be reborn in another 
language/culture. The self, almost in a Beckettian fashion, has no other option but the 
constant reinvention of itself by being reborn into another narrative, another identity. This 
rebirth is mirrored in the analyst’s role; he/she helps the subject to bring to realisation their 
awaiting self-transcendence: 
 
‘Counter-transference love is my ability to put myself in their place; looking, 
dreaming, suffering as if I were she, as if I were he. Fleeting moments of identification. 
Temporary and yet effective meanings. Fruitful sparks of understanding.’165    
 
Psychoanalysis also draws upon the ‘redemptive’ dynamic which the ‘chora-thetic’ 
offers as the earliest birth-point of language. Language, having become lifeless, needs to be 
‘re-sexualised’. In order to ‘recharge’ language, the energies of the pre-lingual drives need to 
be returned to it. This re-activation takes place from the pre-lingual resource which Kristeva 
associates with the maternal. The reintegration of this ‘nocturnal law’, the ‘semiotic’, into 
language is an important event in the process of healing. In order to nourish this ‘ascension’ 
through language, Kristeva resorts to the diversity of psychic representatives: thing-
                                                                                                                                     
localise comme dans une poche narcissique.’ La société est fondée sur ‘cette coupure instauratrice de 
l’‘ordre symbolique.’ (Kristeva, La révolution du langage poétique, p. 69.) Ibid., p.70. 
163 Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, p.67. 
164 ‘‘…il n’y a pas de pratique signifiante possible sans moment thétique. (Kristeva, La révolution du 
langage poétique, p .63 .), Ibid., p.64. 
165 Kristeva, Tales of Love, p.11. (In the French original, Julia Kristeva, Histoires d’amour, Denoël, 
Paris 1983, p.22.) 
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representation, word-presentation, and the drive representative, affect presentation. 
Psychoanalysis, in one sense, restores the balance between these economies. The recovery 
and resourcing of the interior space ground both the ‘functioning’ self and the analysis which 
seeks access to it.166 The healing of the other in need is also a healing process for the analyst. 
 
The third level of self-transcendence is ‘culture’. ‘Healing’ and the restoration of 
meaning emerge at this higher level, too. The functioning ‘psychic interior’ of the individual 
is the ground for the self-reflection of culture. As the first step, this interior, as the ‘cell’ of 
culture, provides room for the imaginary and the symbolic where the drama of the 
individuation process can be played out. This functioning interior is the ‘microcosm’ of 
Arendt’s polis, where life becomes narrated life. Kristeva’s ‘self-transcendence’ complies 
with the idea of Arendt, that culture is the place where identity can be told and listened to. 
This ‘communal psychic space’ is the precondition for expressing ‘who I am, which is 
always more than what I am’, it is the living human interior.167 Thus, ethics is rooted in its 
sub-psychic, ‘semiotic’ origins of language. The plurality of the political space intertwines 
with freedom (Arendt’s bios) and the heterogeneity of identity (constituted always by the 
‘semiotic’ – Symbolic split). The life of a culture is a continuous oscillation between the 
intra-psychic and the social. Kristeva emphasises the psychic economy of the subject as the 
obverse of political economy. 168 It is in this sense that life is a transcendent narrative: it 
needs to be grounded.  
 
In this way, the dynamic of the ‘chora-thetic’ becomes an important element of 
Kristeva’s concept of history. Through the series of self-transcendence grounded upon it, the 
connection between nature and culture takes place. The atomic element of Kristeva’s model, 
the inscription of bodily drive eruptions into language, is also an internal event of history. 
This program of self-transcendence gives an intrinsic view of history. This insight grounds 
Kristeva’s ‘new’, internal analysis of culture. In this way, her program corrects the 
Enlightenment meta-narrative of history when the subject is seen ‘instrumentally’, ‘from 
above’. By linking human nature and culture (external history) in this intrinsic way, Kristeva 
particularly corrects her primary context, Marx’s extraverted view of history. As a fair 
appreciation, Kristeva successfully challenges the homogeneous view of history from within 
the same materialist tradition.  
                                               
166 This recapitulation of ‘resexualising’ language from the ‘semiotic’ resource is an extract from 
Kristeva’s demonstration, in Kristeva, New Maladies of the Soul, pp.24-25.36. 
167 See the ‘political dimension’ of language in Kristeva’s Hannah Arendt, Life Is a Narrative. On the 
distinction between the ‘who’ and the ‘what’, who we are as opposed to what we are, see Ch.4 ‘Who 
and the Body’ (pp. 53-72), especially pp. 56-58, and p. 27 from Chapter 2 ‘Arendt and Aristotle: An 
Apologia for Narration’.  
168 Kristeva, The Crisis of the European Subject, pp. 4-5. 7.  
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Having a connection with the above three levels of self-transcendence, theology makes 
two general critical observations.  
 
(1) This re-conception of transcendence is a replacement of the ‘Christian’ ontological 
horizon. On the one hand, theology agrees that ‘transcendence’ is a necessary dynamic for 
the self. The human being is never a given: it is becoming through being raised above itself 
in the Augustinian sense, with which Kristeva agrees.  
 
‘St. Augustine was the first novelist of the subject, because he was the first to 
articulate the two fundamental principles of his transfiguration: Quaestio mihi factus (“I 
have been made a question to myself”) and In via, in patria (“The homeland is the 
journey”). This seems to me to be the metaphysical agenda of a speaker in a novel 
(…).’169   
 
This ‘transfiguration’ grounds the human self and also, Kristeva rightly recognises, 
culture itself. The latter, by joining in this dynamic, accommodates reflective consciousness 
and itself is a generator of values of humaneness.  
 
Where this program becomes problematic for theology is the ‘systemic’ exclusion of 
grace. Lechte’s recapitulation of Kristeva’s transcendental program succinctly demonstrates 
why it is a materialist re-conception of transcendence.170 He reads Kristeva’s Black Sun, 
which deals with the emerged melancholia in culture, as a response ‘to the impending crisis 
of the symbolic owing to the disappearance of all forms of transcendence from Western 
cultural life and from art in particular.’171 He presents Kristeva’s program as an alternative 
‘linguistic transcendence’ when language is reconceived as ‘Transcendence’. Kristeva re-
formulates the salvific relationship between the classic Transcendent and the subject. This 
‘salvific’ relationship is defined negatively, as a failure to have faith, in language and 
through language, in the other. ‘Transcendence’, when negatively defined, is an absence of 
signs, a lack of language. Without a functioning language, the self is unable to describe the 
‘other’. The other cannot be named. In Kristeva’s negative description of transcendence, this 
loss consists in the evacuation of affect from language and signs. It is the affective, 
‘semiotic’ dimension that Kristeva posits as something beyond signs, beyond the symbolic. 
                                               
169 ‘Murder in Byzantium, Or Why I “Ship Myself on a Voyage in a Novel”’ (pp.273-305), Kristeva, 
Hatred and Forgiveness, p.276. 
170 A careful extracting of Lechte clearly demonstrates Kristeva’s linguistic reconception of 
Transcendence. I used for this recapitulation Lechte, ‘Kristeva's "Soleil noir" and Postmodernity’ 
(pp.97-121) 
171 Ibid., p.98. 
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This belief in the beyond turns out to be the poetic, material aspect of language.172 Positively, 
it is Transcendence reconceived as language that connects the subject with the Real (reality). 
In practice, ‘Resurrection’ is only possible within the language of the speaking being, within 
the written form of imagination and subjective anamnesis which we call art.173  
 
Margaroni goes as far as to see Kristeva’s language-related strategies as initiating a 
series of attempts to rewrite the familiar Johannine narrative.174 She explicitly situates 
Kristeva in the Western metaphysical tradition as one who attempts to reconfigure the 
philosophical problem of ‘the Beginning’ in linguistics and psychoanalysis.175 The ‘chora’, 
as the capacity for representation-symbolisation, paraphrases the Christian conviction that 
‘In the beginning was the Word’.176 Margaroni explicitly states the replacement of religious 
Transcendence. The ‘chora’, as the principle of self-ordering, follows a materialist economy 
of the Beginning that permits Kristeva to displace all transcendental forms of origin (the 
Word, the divine nous)177. This ‘chora’- based project seeks to establish the grounds for a 
materialist psychoanalysis based on a materialist understanding of the origins of language 
and the subject.178  
 
In Kristeva’s ‘linguistic ontology’, it is a self-transcending material dynamic that marks 
out the borders between the inside and the outside, between the self and the other. This 
‘transcendence’ is always the site of crisis, it is always the crisis of signification. But also, 
language as a narrative is always the resolution of the crisis of identity. This re-conception of 
Transcendence preserves faith in the ‘Other’ in two ways. First, it is the ‘Other’ towards 
which we transcend. The Other – self relationship is the stabilisation of identity. Second, 
Kristeva’s program of transcendence preserves the importance of reflecting on ‘lost 
foundations’. The subject needs to be concerned with his ‘beginnings’: this anamnesis is the 
very ground of ethics. In this regard, Kristeva attributes a positive transcendental quality to 
the ‘chora-thetic’. Margaroni confirms it when she characterises the ‘chora’ as an essential 
openness.179 It stands over against the rigidity of the social order or the rigidly, erroneously 
conceived ‘Other’; the ‘chora-thetic’ permanently prompts one to become open.  
 
                                               
172 Lechte, ‘Kristeva's "Soleil noir" and Postmodernity’, p.98. 
173 John Lechte, Maria Margaroni, Julia Kristeva, Live Theory, Continuum, London, New York 2004, 
p.81. 
174 Maria Margaroni, ‘“The Lost Foundation”: Kristeva’s Semiotic Chora and Its Ambiguous Legacy’ 
(pp.78-98), Hypatia, Vol. 20. No. 1 (Winter, 2005), p.80 
175 Ibid., p.80. 
176 ‘Atheism’, in Kristeva, Hatred and Forgiveness, p.210 
177 Margaroni, ‘The Lost Foundation’, p.85. 
178 Ibid., p.89. 
179 Ibid., p.96. 
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To sum up the general stance of theology, if ‘Transcendence’ is exclusively reduced to 
this otherwise vital event of ‘permanent naming’, theology rightly regards it as a reduction. 
The religious dynamic of Transcendence is a genuine offer to the self to transcend its 
permanent woundedness. In Kristeva, this is an ‘exile’ into signification, and this self-
transcending is the ‘eternal destiny of the speaking being’.180 Theology claims that there is a 
promise of a genuine rest, a caesura, in the permanent naming of the ‘pain’. In other words, 
there is another dynamic which can serve as a bridge to the ‘real’ other than the immanent 
and perpetuated crisis of the self. God’s literally transcendent Love is a genuine completion 
of the ‘exodus’ or naming of the crisis of identity. Language is more than an empty mask, a 
constant shift of identities,181 it reveals a ground of human identity. There is a promise of 
arrival. The Transcendent dynamic of the self, in the sense that it is never alone in naming its 
crisis, is cut off from Kristeva’s immanent narrative. 
 
(2) However, it is also important to see a crucial point of co-operation between 
Kristeva’s immanentism and theology. Lechte and others highlight that Kristeva’s program 
of transcendence opposes post-modern nihilism.182 The self, by transcending towards 
meaning through permanent renewals, counteracts the loss of meaning. Thus, to the program 
of the ‘chora-thetic’, in order to renew meaning, a ‘soteriological’ function can be attached 
in the positive sense. My point is that Kristeva is not in an absolute break with the Christian 
narrative. The telos of the ‘thetic-chora’, that the subject is redeemable, is a positive 
connection. By presenting the self as one which is always striving towards meaning, Kristeva 
exposes the woundedness of the post-modern self. She is laying bare the post-modern self as 
it is, with its limited linguistic resources over against nihilism.  
 
The program of ‘self-transcendence’ unambiguously points to the ‘exhausted subject’. 
Kristeva clearly links the need for ‘self-transcendence’ to the structural impasses of 
‘productive freedom’, following her Arendtian program. The failure of signification, when 
the self is unable to ‘transcend’, is always an ethical failure. In The Crisis of the European 
Subject, Kristeva collects the symptoms of ‘failed transcendence’. Accordingly, in a culture 
where ‘transcendence’ breaks down, reason becomes instrumental, the ability to judge 
disintegrates. Individuals allow the judgement of a leader or the consensus of a group to be 
imposed on them instead of making these judgements themselves. The ‘interior forum’ is 
threatened; many are in the process of losing the capacity to elaborate inner life and 
                                               
180 Miglena Nikolchina, ‘The Lost Territory: Parables of Exile in Julia Kristeva’ (pp.158-172), in The 
Kristeva Critical Reader, edited by John Lechte and Mary Zournazi, Edinburgh University Press, 
Edinburgh 2003. p. 162. 
181 Ibid., pp.164-165 
182 Lechte, ‘Kristeva's "Soleil noir" and Postmodernity’, p.117. 
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communicate it. ‘False selves’ emerge and, in the final outcome, the deterioration of value- 
based communication undermines democracies. 183 This failure needs to be counteracted by a 
critical reflection which reinvigorates the ‘self-transcending’ of culture. Kristeva believes in 
the capacity for ‘self-renewal’. Theology raises the question of whether this self-
transcendence is not totalised in Kristeva. 
 
My conclusion is that Kristeva’s program by no means confirms the characterisation 
which regards her as a ‘Christian writer’, and that there is an explicit theological component 
in her writings. On the contrary, Kristeva’s definition of ‘belief in the other’ is wide enough 
to include many of the ostensibly secular or materialist positions.184 We can sum up the 
fundamental difference with Kristeva’s self-transcending in Bradley’s words: ‘If Christianity 
seeks to transcendentalise immanent drives, Kristeva’s work relocates the transcendent 
firmly back within the body.’185 It is against this background that theology will need to 
present God as the regenerative ‘chora’.  
 
 
2.2.1.3 The Materialist Grounding of the ‘Chora-thetic’  
 
My study emphasises the materialist grounding of the ‘chora-thetic’ because it reveals 
the motives of Kristeva’s humanism which it is crucial to address. The ‘chora-thetic’ 
discloses a complex dynamic to which the question of the God-image can be linked in 
important ways. That Kristeva’s materialism can be addressed from the Christian discourse  
of love is confirmed by Nikolchina who also envisions the ‘chora’ in a wider, symbolic 
horizon. ‘In the beginning, therefore, is not the Word, not the Logos; in the beginning is 
Love, the generative chora.’186 The ‘ontological discourse’ which theology wishes to re-open 
has indeed to be an ‘ontology of love’. The dialogue will necessarily have to attempt 
‘opening up’ Kristeva’s ideologically closed materialism from this direction. In order to 
achieve this, a theological critique must internalise the most essential elements of Kristeva’s 
‘ontological narrative’. 
  
Revolution in Poetic Language lays a particular stress on the continuity between the 
‘Marxist’ program of social transformation, Kristeva’s linguistics, and the evolving Freudian 
economy of her regime. Kristeva asserts that Freud was a ‘second overturning’ of Hegelian 
                                               
183 ‘Europe Divided: Politics, Ethics, Religion’, in Kristeva, The Crisis of the European Subject, pp. 
111-162, p.121. 
184 Bradley, ‘Mystic Atheism’, pp.286-287. 
185 Ibid., p. 280.  
186 Nikolchina, ‘The Lost Territory’ in The Kristeva Critical Reader, p.163. 
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negativity, ‘fundamentally [just as] radical as the Marxist overturning, if not more so.’187 
This deep-grounding of language is a very important difference with Lacan whose concept of 
history many regard as one which did not go deep enough.188 Kristeva gives an ‘ontological’ 
grounding of history, seeing language as a much wider narrative than Lacan did. The motive 
of this in-depth investigation is to find a categorical imperative which would serve as the 
bases for a universal ethics. Finding this universalism is Kristeva’s life-long concern, and 
here we see its earliest version. Kristeva submits the dialectic of matter, derived from Marx, 
as the ‘ontological root’ of the ethical imperative. This ‘ethical ground’ remains present in 
her later psychoanalytical ethics: 
 
‘If history is made up of modes of production, the subject is a contradiction that 
brings about practice because practice is always both signified and semiotic...’ 189  
 
Kristeva’s central tenet, the subject-in-process or the person as ‘heterogeneous 
contradiction’, is also derived from this ontological core. The final ground of personhood is 
clearly the dialectic of matter. Kristeva’s psychoanalysis deliberately developed further the 
historical dialectics of Marx. Boer confirms the symbolic authority of Marx when quoting 
her from a 1996 interview, ‘we may need to be slightly Marxist’ (Julia Kristeva 
Interviews).190 My point is that the examination of Kristeva’s later themes centred upon 
‘love’ should not lose sight of this founding materialism: 
 
 ‘The logic exposed above [the ‘second overturning of Hegelian dialectic’] will 
become materialist, when, with the help of Freud’s discovery, one dares think negativity 
as the very movement of heterogeneous matter, inseparable from its differentiation’s 
symbolic function.’ 191 
 
To revise the ontological statements of her Freudianism and transcendent linguistics has 
never occurred to Kristeva as a real problem. ‘Matter’ remains a totalised, never questioned 
narrative. Kristeva consistently applies the ‘negativity-dialectic’ scheme, as the universal law 
of history, to language. Thus, the subject is the product of a process, an intersection, an 
impossible unity of the semiotic-symbolic workings in the signifying process.192 Kristeva’s 
materialist worldview in Revolution in Poetic Language is clear-cut. The subject is ‘created’ 
by the innate dialectical tension in language (the semiotic-symbolic interplay). The speaking 
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subject, being constituted by this very same dialectical tension, continues creating his 
language and, consequently, his self. Revolution in Poetic Language reveals a closed system. 
There is no other origin of human consciousness than the materialistically conceived 
signifying process. This repeats in a more subtle way the basic tenet of Marx’s ‘historical 
materialism’. Consciousness is a reflection of matter; matter awakened to self-reflection. 
Based on this, Kristeva says that she believes that the individual, despite his particular death, 
survives in the human species through his contribution to ‘human thought’. 
 
‘I had the physical sensation that thought was not my own in any way, that, on the 
contrary, it went beyond or transcended me, and that it was indestructible. Not “my” 
thought: no, an apperception had permeated me with the discontinuous thought of the 
species, if I can formulate that inclusion of the finite in that way. Eternity was quite 
simply that infinite discontinuity beyond individual death, that is, the thought of the 
species − so long as men survive − clashing on the border of every body or thought of 
one’s own.’193 
 
 In general, there is a certain determinism attached to matter. The ‘speaking being’ is 
driven by the movements of material contradictions. It is this inner law that incites his 
emergence into language in order to ‘survive’. 
 
This early materialism, from theological point of view, is self-referential, self-
explanatory, and totalising. The postulated objective law in nature, history and language, as 
the totality of matter, replaces and denies (‘un-necessitates’) any extra-self Transcendence. 
Here we can add an important element to Kristeva’s notion of language as a ‘transcendent 
function’. Her redefinition of transcendence ideologically is not neutral. Lechte saw in it 
only a technical substitution of language for religion’s Transcendence. This early 
materialism is more than a passive retreat into language. It is not only the affective 
dimension which Kristeva posits as something beyond signs.  Kristeva wants to counteract 
the ‘evacuation of affect from language’ from a ‘new’ regenerative horizon. The core of her 
linguistic soteriology lies outside the technically understood redemptive devices (artworks, 
therapeutic listening, reading and writing, etc.) These are rooted in a materialist ‘chora’ as a 
meta-resource of ‘meaning’ and ‘life’. It is this ideologically charged relocation of 
transcendence which is in explicit conflict with the religious concept of the self: 
 
‘The sole function of our use of the term ‘negativity’ is to designate the process that 
exceeds the signifying subject, binding him to the laws of objective struggles in nature 
and society.’ 194 (Italics are Kristeva’s!) 
                                               
193 In Catherine Clément, Julia Kristeva, The Feminine and the Sacred, Columbia University Press, 
New York 2001, p.47. 
194 Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, p.119. (Kristeva, La révolution du langage poétique, 
p.110.) 
 79 
 
It should be noted that this same ‘law’ operates also in Kristeva’s narcissistic structure. 
Kristeva’s early formulation on the subject’s separation from the ‘maternal container’ is 
governed by the same logic of materialist dialectic. Other key concepts of the oeuvre also 
draw on the dialectical vision of matter, the dialectics of ‘contradiction’. There is a 
dialectical tension between the mother and the ‘imaginary father’ in the separation process; 
between the semiotic and the symbolic registers of language; and between the subject in 
search of identifying with values and a culture to be permanently scrutinised.  
 
Kristeva’s early framework explicitly states that ‘meaning’ and language are pre-
programmed biologically. Matter is always tending towards signification. History manifests 
the same dialectical contradictions that are inscribed in matter; and this dialectic is also at 
work in the case of love, identity, or revolt. Language, just like history, is teleological. 
Language, from its ‘genotext’ form (language’s semiotic underlying foundation) to its 
‘phenotext’ form (language that serves to communicate)195, is a process of unfolding. 
Already in its earliest ‘semiotic’ moment, ‘it is…already put in place by a biological setup 
and is always already social and therefore historical.’196 There is a destination to have arrived 
at: ‘The text is a practice that could be compared to political revolution: the one brings about 
in the subject what the other introduces into society.’ 197  
 
We have seen how the program of self-transcendence is ‘continued’ at the sub-psychic, 
even sub-biological levels. This self-transcending dynamic, which Kristeva attributes to 
matter, serves as the basis of a ‘materialist soteriology’. My point is that the oeuvre evolved 
concentrically from the ‘salvific function’ of the ‘chora-thetic’. The dynamic of renewal and 
‘self-transcending’ resurfaces in Kristeva’s other semiotic agents, the therapist, the reader of 
‘artworks’, or the creative artist. I suggest reconnecting Kristeva’s early ‘Marxist’ position 
(‘social revolution through poetic language’) and psychoanalysis through the regenerative 
function of the ‘chora-thetic’. In this sense the ‘thetic-chora’, Kristeva’s earliest concept, is 
the unifying element of the oeuvre.  
 
My critique highlights Kristeva’s program of ‘revolt’. The two forms of revolt are 
‘revolutionary transformation’ (reflection and transformation through texts) and ‘intimate’ 
revolt (transformation through psychoanalysis). Both draw upon the ‘chora-thetic’, the 
‘semiotic production’ of meaning. I single out three themes in connection with ‘revolt’ 
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which will be central for the theological response in Part Two. These are the role of ‘desire’ 
to identify with the Other, the subject’s transformation, and freedom from the nihilist 
economy of culture.  
 
Capitalist society eliminates the free, reflexive subject. It no longer demands a 
‘creative’ worker but rather a manipulator.198 The subject becomes one with this system, 
subjugated to its ‘Laws’. Consequently, the ‘speaking being’ becomes totally passive, unable 
to speak either as an individual or as a representative of the core-values of his community. 
Kristeva’s criticism of culture has developed in an uninterrupted way up to the present. The 
symptoms of crisis that her most recent reflections describe only complete the early ones 
with their ‘post-modern shadow’.199 The question remains the same: how to re-ignite desire 
for an authentic existence. Obviously, the solutions which Kristeva offers after a full 
understanding of the ‘exhausted subject’ are very different from the early ones.  But the 
basic logic to re-introduce the subject into its genuine historicity is the same. To unlock this 
mutism, Kristeva draws on ‘the second overturning’ of the Hegelian ‘negativity’, the 
Freudian desire. She develops further Marx’s ‘dialectical materialism’. Kristeva makes more 
concrete the ‘dialectic law’ built into matter. It is Freud’s desire that ‘makes history move’ 
(psychic and collective alike). ‘Desire’ is the ground of a meaningful history for the subject:   
 
‘Desire is the desire of the Other – which includes the subject as divided and always 
in movement. Because the subject is desiring, he is the subject of a practice… Both, 
desire and practice exist solely on the basis of language: desire is produced… by an 
animal at the mercy of language.” 200  
 
For Kristeva, historical freedom is guaranteed in so far as the subject is capable of 
desiring. Desire, as the mobilisation of drives, grounds functioning language and social 
practice. Kristeva re-articulates social alienation in terms of a dysfunctional ‘chora-thetic’. 
Her psychoanalysis, by shifting emphasis from ‘historical alienation’ to ‘psychic alienation’, 
retains the continuity with her early critique of modernity. As we saw at the end of her 
‘transition period’, Kristeva defined the ‘exhausted subject’ as an inert (but re-activatable) 
history-maker. Since then, she increasingly focused on the dissolving individual who is in 
need of a healing therapy, a new desire for history. It is a desire for subjective orientation in 
a ‘plural, non-homogeneous history, an era in which each person lives in his own time.’201 
The problem of nihilism connects Kristeva’s ‘revolutionary’ and the psychoanalytical phases 
                                               
198 Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, p. 129. 
199 ‘Murder in Byzantium’, in Kristeva, Hatred and Forgiveness, pp.273-275. 
200 Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, p. 131. (Kristeva, La révolution du langage poétique, 
p.120.) 
201 Kristeva Interviews, p.69. 
 81 
in an important way. The premise of both is that a ‘meaningful’ culture is regenerative for 
the subject. The values that a culture offers are necessary supports to the ‘speaking being’.  
 
Revolution in Poetic Language detected an extreme repression of ‘drives’. This 
‘delirium’ is ‘the culmination of the subjugation under the Law of the Signifier in which the 
living person himself becomes a sign and signifying activity stops.’202 What is of theological 
importance is the recognised need for interruption. Kristeva is in search of an interruptive 
narrative. Following this objective, she develops the early abstract notion of the ‘chora-
thetic’ into ‘textual’ and psychoanalytical practices which awaken the subject. ‘Delirium’ 
denotes both the different forms of alienation in a bourgeois society and the state of psychic 
suffering when the subject needs to resort to therapy. The early Kristeva proposes ‘poetic 
language’ or textual practices as a resource to overcome the failures of the signifying 
processes. ‘Texts’ have a social function: the production of a new type of subject, one 
capable of bringing about social transformation. This revolutionary subject renews his own 
language, that is, the consciousness of the subject is redeemed first. Then, through this inner 
transformation, capitalist and consumer society can be actively transformed.203  This is a 
clear deployment of a mingled ‘Marxian-Freudian’ dialectic. It is Kristeva’s alternative 
transcendence. She insinuates a centre of interruption which is ‘eschatological’, outside 
present culture: 
 
‘The productive process of the text thus belongs not to this established society, but 
to the social change that is inseparable from instinctual and linguistic change’. 204  
(Emphasis added.) 
 
It is this ‘eschatology’ with which theology can enter into a creative dialogue. 
Kristeva’s later psychoanalytical project seems to have given up this focusing on a general 
subversion of culture. I highlight this element from her early project as one which remained 
valid and can be refashioned in the post-modern context. My critique holds in readiness this 
early ‘eschatology’ as one of the central themes which has to be addressed by a new type of 
‘ontological discourse’. Theology can only agree with this early ‘Marxism’, that a disruption 
of present history is timelier in the post-modern situation than ever before. Kristeva’s 
‘semiotic’ eschatology related the subject to a future which produces ‘a different kind of 
subject, one capable of bringing about new social relations, and thus joining in the process of 
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capitalism’s subversion.’205 My study, when criticising the ‘passivity’ of the 
psychoanalytical horizon, will point back to this early materialist ‘eschatology’ as an 
unfinished business. It will be raised as part of ‘what is missing’ from secular discourse.  
 
The problem of the ‘redemptive fellowship’ can also be raised in connection with this 
early materialism. It was Kristeva’s leftist period, which implicitly raised the need for a 
collective support for the subject. The problem that critics of Kristeva’s psychoanalytical 
ethic raise, namely that it remains an ethical ideal without any genuine fellowship, can be 
traced back to this early materialist vision. The ‘redemptive fellowship’ was an unfinished 
business already at this level. The vision of the person in ‘struggle’ and ‘contradiction’ 
against the background of matter leaves the subject abandoned. The totalisation of matter, 
when its dialectic becomes a universal law, does not provide the contemporary atomised 
subject with sufficient ‘companionship’. In this sense, the attempt of Revolution in Poetic 
Language to develop further the original Marxist dialectics of ‘social negativity’ from the 
outset is incomplete. For Marx, the proletarian as a man of desire and lack is always in 
struggle and contradiction with his social reality. Through praxis he has to realise the ‘total 
man’, mastered and un-conflicted. According to Marx, man is above all ‘mastery’, a 
‘solution to the conflict.’ 206 Kristeva’s psychoanalytic worldview is deeply embedded in this 
dialectic. The person (the psychic space itself) is a product of conflicts. At the same time, it 
should be noted, Kristeva is critical of this dialectic inasmuch as she is not satisfied with 
Marx’s ‘unitary subject’. Nevertheless the problem of loneliness, the lack of companionship, 
as a problem for the ‘exhausted subject’, remains: 
 
‘It remains an untouchable unity, in conflict with others but never in conflict with 
‘himself’; he remains, in a sense, neutral. He is either an oppressing or oppressed 
subject, a boss or an exploited worker or the boss of exploited workers, but never a 
subject in process/on trial who is related to a process – itself brought to light by 
dialectical materialism – in nature and society.’ 207  
 
My last critical objection here is that the contemporary subject cannot be addressed by 
the abstract agency of matter. A more personal narrative is required, which responds to the 
need of genuine community. My critique holds this also in readiness for Part Two. The 
above connections show that Kristeva’s materialism as an ‘ontological program’ is by no 
means an ideological archaism. Making this materialism a central focus for my critique is 
indeed an essential strategy. 
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2.2.3 Conclusions 
 
Examining Kristeva’s concept of the self-transcending subject has shown that Kristeva’s 
materialism is not a closed ideological narrative. The thematic development that followed 
Revolution in Poetic Language shows that this heavy ‘material dialectic’ was transformed 
when love became the dominant theme. Because of the integration of the early materialist 
world-view, it can be rightly stated that Kristeva’s founding materialism is a complex 
‘ontological program’. It is upon this that the program of the self-transcending subject is 
based. In the final outcome, the ‘chora-thetic’ emerges as a complex historical narrative. 
‘Marx’ and ‘Freud’ are those speakers whom theological critique needs to make interlocutors 
when evaluating Kristeva. Owing to the ontological suppression of ‘grace’, Kristeva’s 
program remains in a dialectical tension with religion. Being the ground of Kristeva’s 
projects, and because of the retained critical link with religion, we can indeed speak of her 
materialism as a unifying element of the oeuvre.   
 
My focus on Kristeva’s early materialism was deliberate. This materialism was 
developed in her revolutionary period, her confident post-structuralist critique of modernity. 
The analysis of her ‘founding materialism’ shows a stark contrast with our preceding 
analysis on the ‘exhausted subject’. The latter showed the expiry of those methods which 
were closely attached to Kristeva’s ‘confident materialism’.  
 
My working hypothesis for the forthcoming analysis is as follows.  The conflict between 
the ethical purpose of the examined ‘historical narratives’ (‘to redeem the subject’) and their 
‘expiry’ in the present (the ‘exhausted subject’) necessarily lead to ‘a cultural mourning’. At 
the first level of this ‘mourning’ it will be interesting to see how Kristeva sees the post-
modern ‘exhaustion’. What support can her ‘ontological subtexts’ give in understanding the 
subject in a ‘post-religious’ and ‘post-revolutionary’ milieu? Besides, part of my working 
hypothesis is that in this ‘cultural mourning’ the subject itself needs to be questioned and 
listened to. What is his account of his own ‘exhaustion’? As we saw in Analysis I, ‘The 
Exhausted subject’, the failed ‘revolutionary narratives’ left the person abandoned. How has 
the subject of modernity emerged from the ruins of his ‘expired’ narratives? Is there a 
connection between the ‘materialism’ of Kristeva’s regime and this ‘mourning’? What is the 
prime object of the subject’s ‘mourning’ for his past? Can it be summarized in a central 
image or symbol?  
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2.3 ANALYSIS III − ‘MOURNING’  
 
My study has analyzed the ‘exhausted subject’ from two aspects. The first analysis 
showed the historical ‘exhaustion’ of the subject of modernity and post-modernity. The 
second analysis pointed to the founding ontological narrative beyond Kristeva’s project, of 
‘dialectical materialism’. My study highlighted this as an important ideological narrative of 
‘post-metaphysical consciousness’ and pointed to its ‘expiry’. The ‘exhausted subject’ was 
left in a vacuum. This forthcoming analysis identifies a specific historical element of the 
suffering of the ‘exhausted subject’. It turns out that the ‘speaking being’, as a consequence 
of failed redemption, is mourning for its lost religious past. 
 
As already argued, Kristeva’s psychoanalytical shift made ‘psychic suffering’ and the 
healing of the subject central. However, in Kristeva’s theories, the loss of the Christian past 
is never regarded as a structural cause of the subjective crisis. My study presents the self’s 
lost Christian past as a loss which has resulted in an unanswered existential mourning. If this 
suggestion is correct, then Kristeva’s relationship with Christian texts is given a fuller 
context. It can reveal that the ‘ontological mourning’ of the post-modern subject underlies 
her extensive use of Christian imagery. McAfee notes that Kristeva writes her autobiography 
as a collective odyssey.208 It is equally true, against her Arendtian background, that in her 
theories this collective odyssey is also surfacing.   
 
My work presents the underlying ‘ontic’ exhaustion of the subject as an objective 
content in Kristeva’s novels. Are we not witnessing a new claim upon ‘grace’ which was 
excluded from her materialism by the post-modern subject? Comprehending the full scope of 
‘psychic suffering’ is a crucial strategic aim for my critique. I expect it can help to resolve 
the apologetic deadlock which the ‘head on collision’ with Kristeva’s materialism created. It 
will allow discussion to be raised onto a more ‘symbolic’ level. If this step is indeed 
possible, this will allow a move from the classic ‘ontological tension’ to a renewed 
‘ontological discourse’ centred on the symbols of Love.  
 
2.3.1 The Significance of Kristeva’s Novels: Mourned and Un-mourned Dimensions of 
the Post-modern Self 
 
Kristeva’s novels are paid little or no attention. My critique deliberately turns to her 
fictional writings. In this writer’s view, they provide a critique with a fuller understanding of 
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the exhaustion of the subject. The specific data that they reveal for a theological critique 
cannot be derived from Kristeva’s theories. On the one hand, a theological reading reveals an 
objective ‘mourning’ for the Christian past by the post-modern self. On the other hand, this 
‘melancholic mourning’ (melancholic because it is not conscious, it is unfinished and 
unaided) shows a significant contrast to the claim that psychoanalysis gives a full description 
of the subjective crisis. This discrepancy is true despite the fact that Kristeva indeed gives a 
penetrating analysis of ‘psychic suffering’.  
 
In order to highlight the novels as historical records of an overlooked ‘religious crisis’, I 
emphasise this discrepancy. Kristeva makes the ambitious claim that psychoanalysis is the 
ultimate response to the impasses of modernity. My study disputes the standpoint of 
Kołoszyc that the oeuvre is based on the conviction that the crisis of meaning is not curable, 
even by psychoanalysis.209  For Kristeva, it is psychoanalysis through which meaning can be 
recovered, though ‘meaning’ has to be understood in a dynamic and not a static way. She 
presents psychoanalysis as the best systemic understanding of ‘violent’ nihilism in culture. 
The ideal of a universally valid value-horizon has never been given up by her project. 
Psychoanalysis, Kristeva claims, produces a renewed, non-repressive ethics. It reformulates 
the moral imperative by unmasking how violence is inherent in human desire which needs to 
be counteracted.210 Furthermore, psychoanalysis is a more successful response to ‘otherness’, 
as it offers a more inclusive approach than religion which welcomes the other only on 
condition of accepting its moral code.211 Psychoanalysis can synthesise better the pluralisms 
of the age because it recognises the heterogeneous divisions in the person and challenges 
metaphysical dichotomies between the body and the spirit.212 It is also more responsive to the 
problem of cultural uprootedness, or the loss of traditions, than other discourses.213 Kristeva 
also posits psychoanalysis as a ‘discourse that is not closed’. It can integrate the living 
discourses on the subject, it is a continuous communication with a person’s existential 
questions.214 This shows that Kristeva regards psychoanalysis as the master discourse of the 
‘exhausted subject’ who has lost ‘meaning’. The reason my critique focuses on the novels is 
that they unearth crucial data about the ‘exhausted’ subject which remain overlooked despite 
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the above objectives.  Paying attention to the historical experience of Kristeva’s protagonists 
will lead attention to the problem of how the self itself is ‘grounded’. 
 
Kristeva’s novels, The Samurai (1990), The Old Man and the Wolves (1991), 
Possessions (1996), and Murder in Byzantium (2004) are not merely novelistic variations of 
the concerns of the theoretical works of the same period. They provide my critique with an 
aspect of the ‘speaking being’ which remains hidden on the theoretical level. It puts 
O’Grady’s observation, namely that Kristeva takes over religious texts, phenomenon and 
concepts primarily from the Catholic tradition, into a fresh context. 215 The presence of 
‘theological’ imagery in her novels is still ignored in literature on Kristeva. My critique 
attributes a central significance to these fictional writings in view of intensifying Kristeva’s 
theories at crucial points of the oeuvre. 216  
 
Kristeva’s understanding of ‘exhaustion’ stays strictly at the level of psychic suffering. 
My critique insists on going beyond this level and stresses the underlying ‘religious’ 
dimension of this subjective crisis, which is a ‘full’ or ‘ontic’ crisis of the modern self. I 
support this claim by the intriguing surfacing of a ‘personal mourning’ in Kristeva’s novels. 
Her father’s lost religious world becomes the centre of her general demonstration of the 
crisis. In the novels the ‘speaking being’ emerges as a genuine cultural symbol, and this 
symbolism says something more, beyond its Freudian references.  
 
 It is crucial to see that Kristeva’s protagonists live in a post-Christian world. The 
themes, to which the novels devote special attention, can all be linked to the problem of the 
Christian past. First, I highlight, as the dominant themes of her novels, psychic suffering and 
the counter-economy with which Kristeva confronts psychic alienation, revolt. As Keltner 
points out, the search of the ‘detective’, or the autobiographical ‘I’, confronts what the 
spectacle of society represses, transforming its ‘spectators’ into seekers of truth.217 The 
integrity of the psychic space and the ‘society of the spectacle’218 are in stark contrast. We 
can summarize the main critical directions of the novels as follows. Kristeva describes a 
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complex passion-drama of the speaking being. The overall cause of this suffering is that the 
individual is deprived of any means of voicing his pain within an inter-subjective space 
(Chanter, Ziarek).219 Events in the novels unfold in this general medium of suffering. The 
Old Man and the Wolves describes psychic destruction, anxieties and defencelessness. 
Murder in Byzantium shows how compulsory aggression, corruption and ‘serial killers’ 
control public history. These two novels expound in great detail how the ‘Symbolic Order’ is 
emptied by the forces of a violent nihilism. Kristeva’s first novel, The Samurai, started an 
internal analysis of the ‘society of the spectacle’. This work is still relatively close to 
Kristeva’s ‘revolutionary period’. The ‘exhausted subject’, in its full impasse, culminates in 
The Old Man and the Wolves and Murder in Byzantium. The description of the passion of the 
human self becomes most ‘internal’ in Kristeva’s latest novel, Possessions. In it, the question 
of the broken self – language – world (reality) relationship is raised most intensely. 
Possessions shows the subject in an almost ultimate defencelessness.  
 
Underlying the revolt against the ‘homogenising’ nihilism of ‘Santa Varvara’, the 
symbolic space of the nihilist crisis, there is a desperate struggle for a language to name 
violence, and a call for the counter-economy of love. If the subject cannot tell his passion 
story, he is absorbed into the death drives of culture. Keltner highlights that the residents of 
the ‘spectacular city’ become virtual, spectacular subjects, submerged in the destructive 
manipulations of ‘Santa Varvara’. With Keltner, we can identify their ‘exhaustion’ as the 
deterioration of the goal of personal and social life. ‘Life’ in this city becomes an uncritical 
imitation of competing images for the sake of social power, gained by whatever means, 
deception, violence, crime.220 ‘What might one do in such a city? Nothing but buy and sell 
goods and images, which amounts to the same thing, since both are dull, shallow 
symbols.’221 The struggling ‘speaking being’ is engulfed by an all pervasive ‘violence’. 222 It 
is only a matter of time before he becomes a ‘false self’. 
 
‘Santa Varvara’ also touches upon the theme of the lack of the regenerative dynamic of 
human communities. Individual suffering shows up the capitalist, spectacle-induced societies 
of the West. Margaroni draws attention to the fact that, in these individual passions, Kristeva 
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Theory’, (pp. 793-808), Signs, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Spring 2007), Published byThe University of Chicago 
Press, Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/510339. Accessed: 30/04/2012 04:23, p.801. 
220 Keltner, Kristeva, Thresholds, p.134. 
221 Kristeva, New Maladies of the Soul, p.27. 
222 In Possessions, everyone is capable of having murdered the decapitated Gloria Hanson. In Murder 
in Byzantium, Sebastian Chrest-Jones, a secret Byzantine scholar violently in search of his own roots, 
murders his mistress and disappears. Serial killer Number 8 is purifying the city of the members of the 
New Pantheon, a corrupt religious mafia. In The Old Man and the Wolves is a mass metamorphosis of 
its residents into actual and potential, virtual criminals. In Keltner, Kristeva, Thresholds, p.134. 
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points to the key ethical challenges we confront today: immigration, terrorism, the increase 
of violence, and the political tension between ‘clashing civilisations’.223 This is the objective 
situation when, on the one hand, Arendt’s ideal of the bios, the free space for self-expression 
and life, acted out as an authentic narrative, has totally deteriorated, while at the same time, 
it remains a valid program.  
 
‘In the meantime, Santa Varvara expands in all directions. Everywhere? But where 
exactly? You want to locate Santa Varvara on a map? But it’s impossible, you know. 
How can one locate a global village? Santa Varvara is in Paris, New York, Moscow, 
Sofia, London, Plovdiv, and in Santa Varvara, too, of course − it’s everywhere, I tell 
you, everywhere where foreigners like you and I try to survive, we the inauthentic 
wanderers searching for who knows what truth, against all the money-soaked mafias 
peddling the easy way of life in this crime novel run wild, this spectacle still called for 
now − but who knows for how much longer − a “society.” The nonstop exhibition of 
intimacy, televising of values, and execution of our passions. ’224 
 
My point is that it is insufficient to read these novels solely as the critique of consumer 
society. Underneath the mourning of the loss of a genuine humane fellowship, the 
relationship of the self to its Christian past emerges as a central problem. The ‘detective 
story’ of Possessions and Murder in Byzantium can be read as a meticulous search for this 
lost support. 
 
 
2.3.2 Mourning the Father’s Religious World and the Ontological Anxiety of the Post-
modern Self 
 
In her theoretical writings, Kristeva already offers a version of ‘mourning’ for the 
Christian past. It is combined with her reflections on the loss of her early grand narrative, 
revolutionary Marxism. This level of mourning, both in the theories and in the novels, is 
successfully completed. Kristeva’s intellectual ‘mourning’ for religion is manifest in her 
critique of modernity. Speaking of the ‘crisis of religion’ is always part of her attempt to 
draw attention to the failure of secularism in Western culture which, together with 
metaphysical thought, attempts to fix language and meaning within one Truth.225 Kristeva 
mourns the disappearance only of this old conception of religious meaning, meaning as 
fixed, ultimate truth. 
 
                                               
223 Margaroni, ‘Recent Work on and by Julia Kristeva’, p.795. 
224 Julia Kristeva, Murder in Byzantium, Columbia University Press, New York 2006 (Originally 
published in French in 2004, Meurtre à Byzance, Librairie Arthème, Fayard), p.64. 
225 Kołoszyc, Religion, Atheism, p.399-400. 
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However, the ‘autobiographical I’ tells a different story. Especially Kristeva’s Old Man 
and the Wolves raises the idea that the loss of religion is something more than the 
intellectually ‘mournable loss’ of a previously effective cultural discourse. It is here that the 
novels radically depart from the intellectual mourning of the theories. On the one hand, the 
fictions complement the integration of the Christian discourse on love as the origin of 
psychoanalytical thought into Kristeva’s project. On the other hand, however, the novels 
show that this ‘intellectual’ mourning for the Christian past remains problematic and 
unfinished. In the early novels the problem of ‘expired’ religion is already present. It reaches 
its peak in Murder in Byzantium. This latter, through the story of Sebastian Chrest-Jones, a 
Byzantine scholar, shows most palpably the personal pain of being uprooted from, and 
yearning for, reconnection with his Christian family past. My interpretation of the novels 
here goes contrary to Kristeva’s. She offers the genre of the ‘detective novel’ as a deliberate 
narrative of revolt. She regards it as a metaphysical voyage which is the counterpoint of the 
virtual, the explosion of death drives. Kristeva believes in the full unmasking of ‘Santa 
Varvara’ by the reader’s initiation into the ‘unknown time of others’, and the ‘acceleration of 
the narrative’. She believes in the novel as a genre for disrupting the linear monologues of 
culture.226 My point is that, underneath these ‘Socratic’ attempts to stimulate critical 
thinking, another type of ‘dispossession of the self’ is taking place. While the ‘voice of the 
psychoanalyst’ gives expression to the objective loss of a cultural discourse (‘the humanism 
of Christianity’) and its psychological consequences, an independent ‘meta-narrative’ 
emerges within this conscious program. This level shows both the protagonists and the 
readers with an unredeemed and un-reflected story. 
 
The novels show a hidden symbolism as they are rewriting Christ’s passion without 
Christ. This is a lonely suffering, when the ‘speaking being’ is engulfed in an unnameable 
passion. My reading stresses the hidden ‘story of the Cross’ in Kristeva as the lost identity 
narrative of the subject. The suffering of the post-modern self, Kristeva’s autobiographical 
mourning for her father, and the crisis of community coincide with such an intensity that 
they cannot be confined to Kristeva’s conscious intention as a writer. Underlying the crisis of 
European identity which, according to Keltner, is at the forefront of Kristeva’s work,227 we 
find the sufferings of the post-Christian self. This ‘cultural mourning’ cannot be described by 
means of psychoanalysis. No wonder that this is the point where Kristeva’s ‘personal 
mourning’ overwrites the conscious levels. It is a hidden ‘theological’ dialogue between the 
self and its ‘unfinished’ (unexplored) Christian past. My study posits it as the ‘ontic’ 
dimension of post-modern alienation. 
                                               
226 ‘Murder in Byzantium’, in Kristeva, Hatred and Forgiveness, , pp.279-281 
227 Keltner, Kristeva, Thresholds, p.133. 
 90 
 
For this unnamed suffering Christ is the missing reference. Kristeva brings the symbolic 
allusions but never makes the connection. In The Old Man and the Wolves, the lead 
protagonist, Septicus Clarus, “the Old Man” (the persona is Kristeva’s tribute to her father) 
confronts the ‘spectacle’ and, in a Christ-like way, is killed in this rebellion. It is of deep 
significance that Kristeva draws a symbolic parallel between his suffering and the ‘Man of 
Sorrows’: 
 
‘And though he never spoke of it, he made himself sick and silent with an 
otherworldly suffering completely beyond the ken of the wolves. I find myself 
wondering if he didn’t share that suffering with God. People lost no time in offering him 
the usual gift proposed to orphans, the pride of those in distress: the proposition that 
“God is love”. But he didn’t bite. He was more at home with Ovid in exile and the 
morbid songs of Tibullus, lover of Delia: a world of change and metamorphosis in which 
a new Messiah was scarcely credible. He loved to read the books written in that period 
of transition, and to discuss its ideas, myths, and morals. Yet he didn’t reject the God 
who was his one and only inheritance. He even, unobtrusively, turned Him into his 
secret home: for he had no other, apart from his Latin books.’228 (Emphasis added.) 
 
 The ‘Professor’ or ‘the Scholasticus’ is a deeply ‘Christian’ figure. Kristeva’s personal 
‘cultural mourning’ over the lost past reaches its peak in his person. He was the last one who, 
through his erudition and faith, could name Him. This naming would have been the last 
chance of a culture which lives with the loss of ‘God’ without the chance to name this loss, 
as culture had lost God before it could have named Him. This is the theological 
understanding of the tragic melancholy upon which post-modernity is erected. A seemingly 
playful culture lives with the suppressed (‘never born’) memory of the ‘Father’.  
 
With the Professor’s death, ‘God’ is indeed dead and available only through nostalgic 
fragments. In The Old Man and the Wolves, Kristeva projects her personal story onto the 
father figure of the ‘Professor of Latin’. In the ‘Old Man’s’ faith, Kristeva’s unbelief mingles 
with her father’s free (Christian) mind. This is a genuine ‘toccata for the forever Foreigner-
Christ’229 , through the image of the autobiographical father. It is worth placing side by side 
the ‘fiction’ and the ‘autobiographical’, they are closely interwoven: 
 
‘The whole range of artifices was henceforth available to me. Father had passed on 
to me his God, the same as the Professor’s, in the logical form of an infinity of 
languages. He opened up that galaxy to me as if foreign words were going to play the 
                                               
228 Kristeva, Julia. The Old Man and the Wolves, Columbia University Press, New York 1994. (French 
edition, Le vieil home et les loups, Librarie Arthème Fayard, 1991.), p.148. 
229 My symbolic reference to Kristeva’s ‘Toccata and Fugue for the Foreigner, the opening meditation 
of  Strangers to Ourselves, Translated by Leon S. Roudiez, Columbia University Press, New York 
1991 (pp.1-41).   
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part of seraphim for me, flocks of angels helping me soar through secret skies. Did he 
ever suspect this celestial teaching of his would drive me away for good, from him and 
the Professor and all the rest from places, bodies, and roots? Perhaps not.’230 (The Old 
Man and the Wolves) 
 
‘My father, a faithful man whose beautiful voice added to the Saint Nedelia church 
choir, would bring me to the cathedral before dawn so that I could take communion 
without being spotted.’231 (Julia Kristeva Interviews) 
 
The ‘Father-less’ self, just as its extension, the borderless city of Santa Varbara, becomes 
ungrounded. In the novel only the Old Man noticed the existence of the ‘wolves’ and dared 
speak out about the spreading evil. With the death of the Professor, with the loss of the world 
of faith, a means of resistance and rebellion is lost. Kristeva, at important points, confirms 
the power of resistance in the orthodox world of her father.232 
 
‘My father, though, would linger with the Professor amid old churches and Roman 
ruins dating back to the first century B.C., perhaps even to the third or fourth…In the 
early days of the invasion those secret places served as places of refuge. Until the wolves 
found their way there.’233 (The Old Man and the Wolves) 
 
‘I grew up in the shadow of icons and for a long time observed the faith of my 
father, an Orthodox Christian and seminarian; he cultivated faith, it seemed to me, as an 
intimate revolt against Communist atheism and as an aesthetic religion’.234 
(Autobiographical recollection from Hatred and Forgiveness) 
 
This father-symbolism intensifies the governing thesis of my work. The thesis that the 
‘exhausted subject’ is the underlying problem of Kristeva’s theoretical writings at the level 
of the novels occurs as follows. It is the ‘exhausted’ Christian self, uprooted from its 
Christian past, that emerges as the underlying problem of the ‘speaking being’. This 
suffering becomes visible in the voiceless pain of the characters, which is often mistaken for 
Kristeva’s pessimism. Though she objected to her novels being described as pessimistic,235 
this pessimism, for the outside observer, is nevertheless there. While agreeing with 
Kristeva’s rejection of the charge of a cultural pessimism, to do justice to her readers, I 
explain this tone of the novels differently. As a historical observation, the novels also give 
voice to the pain of ‘ontological’ or religious mourning which the ‘exhausted subject’ 
suffers. This is the very point where the autobiographical ‘I’ can be read as a collective 
                                               
230 Kristeva, The Old Man and the Wolves, p.166. 
231 Julia Kristeva Interviews, p.138. 
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history. Its ground is our universal relatedness to the ‘father’. Kristeva herself allows this 
more ‘open reading’ of The Old Man and the Wolves.  
 
‘In contrast to The Samurai, my second novel is anchored in a pain to which allegory 
aims to give significance without fixing it, instead irradiating it, having it vibrate, in an 
oneiric way, according to each reader’s framework of ordeals and choices.’236 (Emphasis 
added.) 
 
If pain is a universal metaphor, it allows one to connect the deep personal mourning for 
the loss of the father’s world of faith with the collective significance of this ‘mourning’. 
Murder in Byzantium continues the personal mourning of The Old Man and the Wolves, 237  
now reporting Sebastian Chrest’s search for his family past. As a meta-connection between 
the two, ‘Byzantium’, with its external and internal landscapes, is a further historical 
description of the Old Man’s lost world. The buried memories of Christianity by now form a 
completed ‘ontological past’. In my reading, this detailed mourning of Byzantine history 
makes the figure of the Professor the symbol of the Christian self which underlies ‘post-
metaphysical consciousness’. This ongoing mourning is clearly confirmed by an interview 
from Kristeva’s recent work, This Incredible Need to Believe: 
 
 ‘At times it seems that certain parts of your text could have been written by a 
Christian. How do you feel about such a remark? Why does Christ’s suffering touch you 
so? 
Your comment would have pleased my father immensely. A member of the 
Orthodox faith, he studied theology before he studied medicine. And the proper noun 
Kristev means “of the cross”.’238 
 
This time and again surfacing of the ‘personal loss’ confirms that the symbolic centre of 
this ‘mourning’ is the Cross. Is Kristeva struggling with naming her ‘name’, as the above 
quote shows? My point is that in the novels the Cross (‘Kristev’) emerges as a ‘meta-theme’ 
of the oeuvre. My critique identifies it as the genuine object of Kristeva’s ‘metaphysical’ and 
meta-historical quest. ‘Actually, Murder in Byzantium is at once a metaphysical detective 
novel, a historical novel, a lyrical narrative, and a social satire: the ego is broken down into 
multiple facets.’239 In the following chapter, my study will examine whether Kristeva’s 
relationship to religion confirms that the ‘Cross’ is indeed an emerging symbol for naming 
post-modern suffering. In the novels, on a ‘meta-level’, the recognition is being formed, that 
the Christian Cross is our universal symbol to name our lost ability to believe in the ‘loving 
Third party’, the ground of our ability to love.  
                                               
236 Kristeva Interviews, p.164. 
237 See Ibid., pp.138-139. 
238 Kristeva, This Incredible Need to Believe, p.84. 
239 ‘Murder in Byzantium’, in Julia Kristeva, Hatred and Forgiveness, p.275. 
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The image of the self in Possessions, Kristeva’s latest fiction, ‘speaks’ of this underlying 
uprootedness. The description of post-modern loneliness and isolation becomes the symbol 
of the post-Christian migrant: 
 
‘It’s as though I were inhabited by another person, vague but impossible to get rid 
of, whom I’d rather ignore but who in fact possesses me; someone who likes these dirty 
streets, the painfully slow pedestrians jostling one another to give themselves the 
impression they’re in a hurry to get somewhere, the skyscrapers reflecting only 
emptiness.’240 
 
The economy of the novels insinuates a possible new turn in Kristeva’s theories, when 
the re-integration of the religious sacred excluded by her materialism will be attempted, at 
least symbolically. In her theories we are kept reminded that ‘Christian amorous discourse’ 
is the historical origin of the humanism of the Enlightenment, particularly that of the 
humanism of psychoanalysis. My critique claims that to the ‘cultural mourning’ of 
Kristeva’s Freudianism the dimension of the ‘un-mourned relationship to grace’ is to be 
added. One of her major critics, Kelly Oliver, also senses an ambiguity in Kristeva’s 
theories, and touches upon the possibility of ‘mourning the religious Sacred’. ‘Could 
Kristeva be nostalgic for the power of the old sacred?’241 Not only her critics (e.g., Anna 
Smith), but Kristeva herself answers that her ‘materialist politics of radical negativity’ 
(Sjöholm)242 do not allow any nostalgia about ‘grace’. Just the opposite, Tales of Love (1983) 
was still a confident reaffirming of the need for a post-Christian orientation to question ‘the 
discourse that can take the place of this religious discourse which is cracking now.’243 Yet, 
Oliver herself retains a degree of suspicion, as if in a side-remark: ‘In her best moments, 
Kristeva suggests that it means that psychoanalysis fills the cracks of religion. In her worst 
moments…she is nostalgic, mourning the death of God.’244 My point is that what Kristeva’s 
feminist criticism misreads as her ‘worst nostalgic moments’ actually manifests a collective 
level of mourning, the post-Christian trauma of our culture. Kristeva is ‘the melancholy 
mourner’ of the lost ‘effective’ religious symbolism in Europe. Murder in Byzantium is the 
collective history of the ‘post-Christian subject’, that of post-metaphysical consciousness 
itself. Sebastian Chrest-Jones, the ‘post-modern Narcissus’, is the extraterrestrial of 
‘Byzantium’, the lost place of origin: 
 
                                               
240 Julia Kristeva, Possessions, Columbia University Press, New York 1998 (Originally published in 
French, Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1996), p.15. 
241 Oliver, Reading Kristeva, p.132. 
242 See, the section ‘Materialism and Marxism’ (pp.6-11) on Kristeva’s radical materialist politics, in 
in Cecilia Sjöholm, Kristeva and the Political, Routledge, London and New York 2005, p.2. 
243 Rosalind Coward’s interview with Kristeva, in Oliver, Reading Kristeva, 132. 
244 Ibid., p.132. 
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‘You properly are if − and only if − you have a home that awaits you at the end of 
your voyage. But now? Who is he, Sebastian C/J, where is he if Santa Varvara is now 
everywhere − and what if he is a homeless person lost in Time?’245 
 
 The theological reading goes even further on ‘homelessness in Time’ by stating that it is 
an ontological wound, which is not listened to in the Freudian framework. My point is that 
the theme of the self’s yearning for a stable identity serves as a basis for addressing together 
Kristeva’s materialism and her relation to the Christian tradition. 
 
In the novels, the ‘ontological loss’ of the self, Christ /‘Tradition’ as the real other of the 
self, is an ultimate loss. It is this which results in the nostalgia of the self seeking to 
rediscover its origins. The latter, however seminally, is the underlying theme of Kristeva’s 
fictional writings from the first novel, The Samurai, onwards. From the perpetuated nostalgic 
yearning, which is a product of ‘post-metaphysical consciousness’, there is no possible 
reconnection of the ‘speaking being’ with his loss. This nostalgia has to be seen as a 
‘semiotic’ counter-claim underneath the ‘symbolic’ surface of a confident materialism: 
 
‘I also remember the heavy rose scents you find only in Florence, steeped in the 
burning but ever noble sun that warms up the sap like a skilful perfumer. Rosalba would 
pick huge bunches of roses, sometimes creamy white, sometimes crimson or scarlet, and 
we’d go and place them before the Virgin Mary. You must know about that – the magic 
of icons, the blissful little girl lighting her candle and waiting for the Madonna’s eyelids 
to open and the Mother of God look at her. But perhaps, not – you’ve probably always 
been super-rational.  
 
(…)The roses laid before the Virgin Mary – so diaphanous, so sad, so regal too – 
were my resurrection. But only a temporary one… (…) I haven’t gone back to the 
church. Not yet. But I have looked through the Sermons of Saint Bernard, and in them I 
seemed to find my Fiesole again, my Rosalba, and the delicious faintness that used to 
overtake me when I imagined myself suffering the Passion in my own flesh – I hadn’t 
got an ounce of humility in my whole body! Anyhow, theology still strikes me as the 
only thing worth reading.’246 
 
In Thérèse Mon Amour (2008), an indefinable genre between fiction, autobiography and 
academic work, Kristeva gives voice to a collective loss which connects generations in the 
‘shadow of icons’:  
 
 
                                               
245 Kristeva, Murder in Byzantium, p.175. 
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‘Autant vous le dire tout de suite, je n’ai pas la foi. Comme tout le monde, j’ai été 
baptisée, mais je n’ai jamais entendu parler de Jésus à table… une famille laïque 
classique comme il y en a beaucoup en France.’247 
 
Kristeva’s ‘mourning’ for the Christian past of the subject is complemented by her 
monographs on women genii (Arendt, Klein and Colette). These studies constitute an 
intermediary genre between her theories and novels. I refer to them as supports from within 
Kristeva’s project that the ‘ontological mourning’ of the self should be taken seriously. 
Kristeva’s two main intellectual heroines, Hannah Arendt and Melanie Klein, are both 
presented in the monographs as ‘mourners’ of the Judeo-Christian past. Whereas in the 
novels we encounter an anonymous story-telling, in Kristeva’s trilogy the ontological pain of 
the self is named by her heroines, and is a historical one. Melanie Klein reveals that the 
prime-object of psychoanalysis is the identity crisis of the historical self: 
 
‘Human beings are less “identities” than journeys, as they are always in transit 
between a memory that is repressed to varying degrees and a conscience that dominates 
to varying degrees, as Freud was patient enough to explain to us. Freud developed what 
some have called his personal novels when he proposed that, ever since the glaciation 
that stacked psychoses onto neuroses, homo religiosus has survived in the modern 
people that we are by journeying surreptitiously into our psychic structures, dreams, and 
symptoms.’248  
 
Kristeva’s ‘Kleinian-novel’ especially asserts that, beyond the psychoanalytical interest 
in the self as the uprooted migrant of history, we find the quest for the ‘lost face of the 
Father’. This is a quest for the ‘Loving Third’ on a collective level, as the lost epicentre of 
culture: 
 
‘The Freudian vision has been influenced by the renewed loss of a settled way of life 
that humanity experienced during the twentieth century. Technology and politics have 
increasingly detached us from our natural habitats and have turned us into nomads once 
again. To persecuted political exiles are added the migrants of the global economy and 
the navigators who use satellite television or the Internet. Along with the questioning of 
authority, the law, and values − which has been interpreted as an attack on the role of the 
father − the loss of habitat that characterises our fate undermines the original place, 
assaults maternal support, and threatens to destroy identity itself.’249 
 
It is worth bearing in mind that Arendt and Klein, in the context of modernity, also made 
central the problem of mourning for the lost religious past. I point to them in this connection 
                                               
247 ‘I might as well tell you straight away, I do not have any faith.  Like everybody else I was baptised 
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248 Julia Kristeva, Melanie Klein, Columbia University Press, New York 2001 (Originally published in 
French, Le Génie Féminin, Melanie Klein, Librarie Arthème Fayard, 2000), p.195. 
249 Ibid., p.195. 
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as Kristeva’s ‘religious-subtexts’. If we re-actualise their agenda in the post-modern context, 
the ‘mourning’ for religion by Arendt and Klein can be seen as a timely issue. They realised 
that coming to terms with their ‘Jewishness’ was essential, and attempted to integrate this 
loss. This integration was partly successful, partly unfinished. Arendt and Klein witness to 
the fact that the self’s lost religious past is a trauma which needs to be mourned. Their 
historical solution showed that the subject, when uprooted from its religious tradition, 
responds with the re-construction of its identity. In the case of Arendt and Klein, the 
response is internalising the ‘absent god’, the lost reference of their generation. 250 The point 
is that they confirm the presence of ‘expired’ religion as a hidden ground of the self. 
 
‘It is entirely inaccurate to assert, as some have done, that psychoanalysis took the 
place of this absent god to whom Melanie was “converted” as were so many other 
secular Jews before her. On the contrary, it was by accompanying the catastrophe of 
meaning as reflected in psychoanalytic experience that Melanie Klein, like some others 
[Arendt], was able to articulate the fundamentals of nihilism and of religious belief and 
depression as well as reparation in an effort to deconstruct them all.’251 
 
For our study, their historical reflection is important as they confirm that there is 
continuity between the self and the ‘God-question’. That is another matter, if Arendt’s and 
Klein’s intellectual mourning, similar to that of Kristeva, is a repression of the loss of God as 
an ontological-trauma. For Arendt’s generation, on the one hand, it was a time for coming to 
terms with the ‘loss of religion’, on the other hand, when developing their answers, they 
were distracted by the confidence of their discourses. Neither Arendt nor Klein experienced 
the ‘exhaustion’ of modernity’s critical narratives which they articulated. Their agenda to 
understand their changed relationship with religion is continued symbolically in Kristeva’s 
novels. Their originating problem, ‘homelessness’ in culture and in their parent’s religion, 
reaches a new climax in the post-modern condition. 
 
* 
 
To come to a conclusion, the novels reveal, closely connected with the ‘mourned’ 
Christian past, the ontological anxieties of the post-modern subject. It is a suffering in its 
own right which was not there in modernity nor in early post-modernity. As an objective 
suffering, in its particularity, it challenges both the syntheses that Kristeva and theology 
achieved regarding these past epochs.  
 
                                               
250 See Chapter 1, ‘Jewish Families, European Stories’, in Kristeva, Melanie Klein, p.19. 
251 Ibid., p.19. 
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This non-assessed suffering, with its novelty, can bring Kristeva and theology onto a 
common platform. The challenge for Kristeva’s ‘closed’ materialism is as follows. In order 
to have access to the ‘ontological trauma’ of the post-Christian self,252 Kristevan 
psychoanalysis should revise its methodological principle. This founding principle says that 
‘psychoanalysis needs to traverse religious experience and not remain within the original 
dynamics of faith’. My study argues that there is a new type of ‘God’ question and God-
language emerging when sufficient attention is paid to the anxieties of the ‘post-religious 
subject’. This situation requires a genuine translation between the psychoanalytic 
‘knowledge’ of psychic suffering and the ‘ontological-passion’ of the subject argued by 
theology. Psychoanalysis needs to make the effort to understand the reality of the self’s 
‘ontic’ suffering, that there is a genuine metaphysical hunger for ‘remembering’ ‘graced 
origins’. The same applies to the religious position. That the self, uprooted from its Christian 
past, is a traumatised self has to be translated for the psychoanalytical position. However, on 
the side of theology, there has to be a parallel listening to the ‘post-Christian story’ (or ‘post-
Christendom’ story) of the self, told by psychoanalysis. It is through this interdisciplinary 
listening that systematic theology is elevated from ‘theological monologism’ and transcends 
its ‘classic’ metaphysical discourses. 
 
My suggestion is to make central the problem of the ungrounded post-modern self, 
which both ‘classic’ theological metaphysics and its Kristevan replacement have ignored, but 
both can share. In this way, theology will meet Kristeva’s ideal when ‘religion goes beyond 
religion without emptying out the “positive” content of the Judeo-Christian tradition’.253 But 
it should be true in reverse. A way needs to be found where psychoanalysis operates within 
the dynamics of faith, too. My conclusion is that it can lead to a dialectic exchange, when 
what Kristeva says of the ‘loss of the father’ in the psychoanalytical sense can also be raised 
as the loss of the ‘graced’ grounding of the self. This can lead to a theologically animated 
discourse when theology expounds its own discourse on the crisis: the loss of the post-
modern self is not only that of the psychological father, but of the Father of religion, too. The 
novels suggest articulating this shared discourse through the metaphor of the ‘loving Third 
party’. It can be the common denominator between the different ‘ideological’ paradigms. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
252 It is expressed brilliantly in the parallel Kristeva draws in Murder in Byzantium between the 
cultural ‘uprootedness’ of the crusaders and the terrorists of 9/11. All identities have already entered 
the new era of a cultural migrant. 
253 Kołoszyc, Religion, Atheism, and the Crisis of Meaning, p.274. 
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2.3.3 ‘Mourning the Father’s Hope’ − The Loss of the ‘Graced’ Loving Third 
 
It is possible to relate Kristeva’s ‘personal mourning’ to her early reflection on faith, the 
analysis of Holbein’s Dead Christ in Black Sun (1989). In a sense, this was Kristeva’s 
intellectual response to the loss of the religious horizon, supported by her early confident 
materialism. What was answered there by the adult mind, as Kristeva’s autobiographical 
reflections show, is the ‘loss of faith’ in the experience of the teenage self, and the loss of her 
father’s religious world. 
 
‘My father, a faithful man whose beautiful voice added to the Saint Nedelia church 
choir, would bring me to the cathedral before dawn so that I could take communion 
without being spotted. I eventually rebelled, not because I was bothered by the 
dissidence of the act but because of universal reason, which is, I still find, harder to 
understand and to embody than faith is.’254 
 
‘I knelt before the icon of the Virgin that sat enthroned above my bed and attempted 
to gain access to a faith that my secular education did not combat as treat ironically or 
simply ignore. I tried to imagine myself in that enigmatic other world, full of gentle 
suffering and mysterious grace, revealed to me by Byzantine iconography.’255  
 
My point is that in the meditation in Black Sun it is not only the death of the individual 
that is faced. The novels shed light on the fact that Holbein’s Dead Christ is not only about 
making death approachable, but is also an attempt to mourn the (autobiographical) ‘father’s 
lost Hope’. Kristeva’s Dead Christ, in terms of an intense intellectual mourning, is an honest 
facing of the ‘ontological anxiety’ of the modern self. It shows ‘the other side of matter’, 
death. Here Kristeva is facing what was not reflected in her early ‘materialist’ linguistics, the 
subject’s radical exhaustion, death. Death for her ‘Marxist’ and Freudian regimes is the 
ultimate limit of all things. ‘The subject is prey to death.’ 256 There is no transcendental hope 
for the ‘speaking subject’, neither is it available for Kristeva.  In Black Sun, underlying 
Kristeva’s analysis of depression, one can sense the continuous threat of ‘death’, unanswered 
by her ‘revolutionary’ materialism. She attempts to develop an answer in her new Freudian 
framework, which she regards as more secure than the mere ‘dialectic of matter’. Strangely, 
death in Kristeva’s solution also remains totalised, though in a different way. 
 
On the one hand, Kristeva’s Freudianism, when facing these ultimate questions, states 
the failure of the symbolism of the classic ‘materialist imagery’. Atheist humanism does not 
offer the language in which the subject’s final losses can be told. Feuerbach and Marx have 
no language of ‘mourning’ at all. Lash points out the absence in Marxist theory of serious 
                                               
254 ‘Memories of Sophia’, a 1992 interview (pp.137-140), in Julia Kristeva Interviews, p.138. 
255 Kristeva, In the Beginning Was Love, p.23. 
256 'The Old Man and the World', in Julia Kristeva Interviews, p. 175. 
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consideration of the implications of the fact of individual and social mortality. 257 Putting it in 
our context, the ‘materialist grand narrative’ cannot speak of the ultimate crisis of love. An 
example of the ‘great silences’ is Marx’s Paris Manuscripts where he ends up with the 
general statement that man can never arrive at a ‘genuine resolution of the conflict between 
man and nature, and between man and man, the true resolution of the conflict between 
existence and being…between freedom and necessity, between individual and species.’258 
Marx does not pay much attention to the personal anxiety of the subject. Rather, the promise 
of the transformation of history is a ‘denial’ of the problem. 
 
This looming of the potential death and final silence of the subject is not fully answered 
in Kristeva’s Freudianism either. Her materialism excludes any account of ‘transcendence’ 
in explaining alienation. ‘Death’ is reduced to the victory of the Freudian ‘death drives’. 
Kristeva’s Freudian framework, as her Holbein interpretation shows, totalises death in the 
sense that there is no ‘graced’ alternative to the death drives. This early framework clearly 
echoes Freud’s premise: ‘religion is an illusion’. As an ontological statement, it deprives the 
speaking subject of his freedom for Transcendence. To put it bluntly, the early Kristeva 
condemns the ‘speaking being’ to being forever introvert, operating within his own psychic 
space, and creating ‘psychological symbols’. As there is no flight to Transcendence, the only 
option is within ‘linguistic transcendence’, the individual’s ‘aesthetical’ 
 
‘embracing Death, absorbing it into his very being, integrating it not as a condition 
for glory or a consequence of a sinful nature but as the ultimate essence of his de-
sacralized reality, which is the foundation of a new dignity. For that very reason the 
picture of Christly and human death with Holbein is in intimate partnership with In 
Praise of Folly (1511) by Desiderius Erasmus, whose friend, illustrator, and portrayer 
[Holbein] became in 1523. Because he acknowledges his folly and looks death in the 
face – but perhaps also because he faces mental risks, the risk of psychic death – man 
achieves a new dimension. Not necessarily that of atheism but definitely that of a 
disillusioned, serene, and dignified stance. Like the picture by Holbein.’259  
 
The only way out is accepting the ultimate finitude of individual life. Psychoanalysis, at 
this point, compared with the incompetence of the failed Marxist revolution in the post-
modern context, attempts to provide orientation for the subject. However, it provides only a 
‘technique’ for accepting death. The offered immanent horizon is manifest most in the stoic 
‘consolation’ which ‘post-metaphysical consciousness’ can find in Holbein’s Dead Christ. 
                                               
257 Nicholas Lash, A Matter of Hope, A Theologian’s Reflections on the Thought of Karl Marx, 
Darton, Longman and Todd, London 1981 (First publication), p.192. 
258 Ibid., pp.191-192 
259 Julia Kristeva, Black Sun, Columbia University Press, New York, Oxford 1989 (original French 
edition 1987), pp. 118-119. 
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‘Holbein …invites us to change Christ’s tomb into a living tomb to participate in the painted 
death and thus include it in our own life, in order to live with it and make it alive.’ 260  
 
Kristeva’s psychoanalysis goes to the limits of her system. Though it never raises the 
‘ontological anxiety’ of the self openly, nor does it admit that the modern person in therapy 
is also struggling with his ‘religious crisis’ (often in the form of a post-generational trauma), 
it encourages the subject not to give up ‘symbolisation’. As a useful illustration of Kristeva’s 
‘atheism without nihilism’, it is worth comparing her ‘speaking being’ with that of Samuel 
Beckett. His answer to anxiety is keeping the subject speaking. If they stopped speaking 
(‘symbolising’), the subject would die. What can be seen as a stoic act of resurrection 
through ‘writing’ and ‘self-analysis’ in Kristeva, in Beckett becomes a compulsory, 
perpetuated speaking. What renders Beckett nihilistic, compared with her, is the protest 
against how Beckett pessimistically fully exhausts the subject. Though Kristeva’s 
materialism by virtue of its nature does not allow the counter-narrative of after life, it offers a 
symbolisation of one’s own death. The person, compared with Beckett’s empty offer, can 
seek to identify himself with Christ as a silenced fellow ‘speaking being’. Technically, this 
act of ‘self-transcending’ is a substitute for the Christian doctrine of redemption. This world, 
as we saw it in the Old Man and the Wolves, is not accessible any longer for Kristeva. The 
‘speaking being’, in the Holbein-scheme, is deprived of (not offered) identification with 
Christ’s Resurrection. To sum up, Kristeva’s Holbein-narrative, in a wider sense, speaks of 
the loss of the Father’s Hope, and also reveals the un-soothed existential anxiety of the 
subject.  
 
In the years following the essay, ‘Dead Christ’, Kristeva moves to a characteristically 
new direction in answering the anxiety of the subject. She increasingly focused on the crisis 
of love. In a sense, it develops further the original Holbein-image and is a correction of the 
solution she had offered there. The discourse Kristeva develops focuses on identifying with 
‘love alive’, when the psyche comes alive through the temporary resurrections that ‘amorous 
discourse’ offers. It is a focusing on the life-giving potential of the ‘Symbolic Father’, the 
‘Loving Third’. This ‘speaker’ is the self’s ultimate support. Its disappearance would bring 
her Holbein project to a halt. Without the ‘Father’s’ presence, there is no expressive 
language, there is no narrative, there is no linguistic rebirth, the ‘dead Christ’ (the above 
program) becomes unnameable. Kristeva expresses the ‘ontological anxiety’ of the 
contemporary subject in terms of the ‘grave crisis of the oedipal ‘Father’’ in Europe..261 It is 
not only ‘motherhood’ or the feminine dimension of the ‘sacred’ (meaning) that is difficult 
                                               
260 Kristeva, Black Sun, p. 113. 
261 Kristeva, The Crisis of the European Subject, p.127. 
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to speak of.  Representing the father’s love as the ‘loving Third party’ has become the utmost 
challenge. The loss of the ‘Symbolic’ centre of language or the unavailability of the ‘loving 
Third’, both in the religious and psychological sense, is the utmost burden for the post-
modern subject. I present the desire in Kristeva to resuscitate the lost father as the ‘meta-
text’ of her Holbein analysis. ‘God’ is dead, there is no other side of language, but there is a 
deep desire to see the Father’s love alive.  
 
The problem of the ‘exhausted subject’ reveals how Kristeva is in search of a double 
centre of meaning. Her interest in the ‘existential’ exhaustion of the subject, however 
immanent this interpretation is, explains why in Kristeva’s theories the ‘semiotic’ or 
feminine sacred dominates whereas, in the novels, the missing ‘Father’ is the central theme. 
Both are re-constructions of the lost ‘transcendent dynamic’. Is it too daring to propose that 
the above meta-scenario, the loss of the ‘transcendent Father’, accounts for Kristeva’s 
ongoing retreat into the material body? If this is the case, her ‘semiotic resourcing’ can be 
seen as a substitution for the excluded ‘Father of grace’. Oliver highlights Kristeva’s 
ongoing retreat into the body: ‘Kristeva’s texts take us deeper and deeper within the maternal 
function, and thereby take us deeper and deeper into the maternal body.’ 262 Oliver’s 
characterisation of Kristeva as ‘the melancholy mourner of the death of God’ can be 
intrinsically related to the evolution of her semiotics. If Oliver is right, Kristeva’s movement 
‘towards the inside’, that is, back in time in language and body, is prompted by the need to 
find a counter-movement to ‘death’. Kristeva’s intense turn to ‘semiotic’ resources, however, 
leaves the subject with the lack of the ‘Father’. The problem of the death of ‘God’, which 
underlies Kristeva’s work since Revolution in Poetic Language, is responded to by a 
powerful, but rather impersonal, ‘semiotic ontology’. If Kristeva’s materialism indeed 
betrays a semiotic ‘introversion’, then the ‘mourning for the father’, which I pointed out in 
the novels, offers a counter-balance. A new personalism emerges in the Kristevan narrative. 
The novels show an implicit openness to recover the Father’s love for the subject. 
 
 
2.3.4 The Need to Counteract the Violence of Culture 
 
The ‘cultural mourning’ of the novels connects the themes of atheism, violence, 
suffering and nihilism, and the theological approach. It is from the outset the underlying 
conviction of my study that Kristeva’s ‘speaking being’ is a complex cultural symbol. It is 
more than a psychoanalytical and linguistic construct that is ‘valid’ only within her Freudian 
                                               
262 Oliver, Reading Kristeva, p.3. 
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regime. The novels confirm this symbolic level more openly than the theoretical writings. 
The unfinished mourning of the post-modern self is an important contact with ‘theological 
symbolism’. The novels defined violence as the lack of love, a lack of bonding. The 
aggression which harms the self is nihilism, directed against love itself. It is love, the 
reflexivity it creates, which alone can resuscitate the dissolving life of ‘Santa Varvara’. 
Kristeva’s theoretical writings, since Tales of Love, permanently confirm that the other side 
of perpetuated violence in culture is the ‘functioning’ ‘loving Third’, which is the most 
important support to the ‘psychic space’.  The novels confirm the need to renew the symbols 
of love, ‘amorous discourse’ itself.  
 
A moving symbolic expression of this need is the closing scene of Possessions. It is not 
a happy ending at all. But as a powerful cultural parable, it points to the economy of love 
from which the self and culture can be restored. In the novel, Gloria, the mother of a disabled 
child, seeks to find refuge in her son’s language. Her entire being is absorbed into the love of 
her son. But Jerry’s ‘handicapped’ speech is only a mirror, a parroting of set phrases and 
clichés. ‘Jerry never told his mother anything she hadn’t told him, anything she hadn’t 
expected, foreseen, programmed. Every word, phrase, or story was merely a kind of 
prothesis…’263 There is no way out from the mother-child dyad. With no third party, the 
relationship between Gloria and Jerry can only be a destructive, devouring assimilation.264 
The successful ‘translation of identity’ takes place between the handicapped son and Pauline 
who is Jerry’s speech therapist. What Kristeva presents is the psychological Passion of the 
‘speaking being’.  Its loneliness, its dependence on the other is emphasised in a moving way. 
As Nooy interprets it, Pauline provides a ‘loving third party’ to the relationship between 
Gloria and her son. Jerry is also a ‘loving third’ for Pauline. For Jerry is a means for Pauline 
to recover symbolically her lost son-like brother, Aimeric. Through her love for Jerry and 
through Jerry’s speech, the speech therapist, Pauline, is finally able to name her loss, as a 
rebirth, as a ‘resurrection’.265 The ‘loving Third party’ emerges as a cultural symbol about 
the need of the community to re-relate once again to the ‘Other’ in spoken love. 
 
As a cultural metaphor it confirms that new symbols are needed which name ‘violence’ 
and tell the needs of our wounded subjectivity. In the intimate drama in Possessions the 
violence of a nihilist culture is reflected. This culture prevents people from becoming a 
proper ‘loving third party’ for each other. It is this theme, the self living under the threat of a 
‘violent culture’, through which theology is directly addressed and invited into a dialogue. 
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What are the possible sources for experiencing again the Father’s love, the ‘loving Third 
party’?  The joint task is to posit a discourse of healing, which responds to the struggle of the 
‘speaking subject’ with cultural melancholy and depression. Kristeva confirms that ‘we are 
basically dealing with the image of a depression that integrates aggression but under the 
ruinous guise of an erasure of meaning.’266  Theology states that it is the Father’s love that 
cultural depression hides aggressively as the replacement of the lost object of mourning.267 
Without recovering the support of the Father’s ‘compassionate love’, ‘we are [indeed] 
exiting the era of the subject’.268  
 
Kołoszyc gives an important theoretical support to the idea that co-operation in 
recovering the symbols of love is possible. When Kristeva states the joint crisis of modernity 
and religion, it is also a positive attempt on her part to relate secular humanism with religion. 
With this, Kristeva attempts to overcome their dualistic opposition. 269 A theological reading 
of the novels, with the ‘ontological suffering’ which my study has pointed out, finds it a 
realistic prospect to start a dialogue on counteracting nihilism as an ‘ontological question’. 
 
 
2.3.5 Summary and Conclusions 
 
Against the above background, my critique concludes that the novels suggest that a 
dialogue about the ‘lost Father’ and the relationship between the self and its religious past is 
possible. A further agreement with Kristeva is that the ‘ontological mourning’ of the post-
modern self raises the need to gain distance from the violent economy of culture. The source 
of this critical distance is the ‘Father’s love’ (as a supporting ‘loving third party’). This 
recognition addresses theology directly. When it presents the image of God to culture, it has 
to show an image of Love which is sufficiently counter-cultural and independent of the 
violent narratives of culture.  
 
                                               
266 Keltner quotes Kristeva, in Keltner, Kristeva, Thresholds, p.136. 
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In view of the materialist grounding of the ‘speaking being’ and the ‘Christian’ 
mourning of the post-modern self, we can identify the following dynamic. The ‘exclusion of 
grace’ from post-metaphysical consciousness generates an ‘unconscious’ and unfinished 
mourning in the subject.  (1) The exclusion of the religious ‘Sacred’ from Kristeva’s early 
model goes together with the desire for the ‘Father’. God is dead, there is no other side of 
language, but there is a deep desire to see the Father’s (lost) love alive. This ‘mourning’ 
underlies the development of Kristeva’s ‘semiotic symbols’. We could identify a twofold 
movement in this symbol building. The dominance of the ‘semiotic’ maternal imagery 
becomes balanced with the emergence of the meta-narrative of the ‘autobiographical father’ 
in the novels. Without paying attention to the ‘personal mourning’ in Kristeva’s fictional 
writings, it becomes easily overlooked that the symbolism of the father is just as important as 
the ‘maternal sacred’. It is this desire for the ‘Father’ to which theology can respond by 
offering a re-engagement with the ‘religious’ image of the Father.  
 
(2) The dynamic of the mourning for the father potentially corrects Kristeva’s ‘semiotic 
retreat’ into the body and ‘matter’, which we saw in her ‘semiotic’ linguistics. Her ‘atheist 
mourning of the loss of God’ in the novels is a genuine attempt to relate the self to a real 
extra-self ‘Other’. Kristeva’s theoretical writings elaborate this new ‘extrovert’ orientation in 
terms of the theme of love; and also in the attempt to embed the subject into an ethic of 
compassionate love. Against the background of the points (1)-(2), theology needs to develop 
that narrative framework from which both forms of imagery can be addressed theologically: 
Kristeva’s ‘maternal’ and ‘paternal’ symbols of love, that is, the ‘feminine sacred’ and her 
personal anamnesis of the ‘Christian Father’.  
  
My study stated that the self is in an unfinished ‘mourning’ over its lost Christian past. 
This inner mourning for the ‘lost thing’270 raises ‘ontological’ questions in a new way. How 
does a generation of lost faith relate to the religious discourse of the previous generation? Put 
differently, can we restore a dialogue with the religious Symbols of the past generation? 
Kristeva attempts it in her intellectual mourning. What mourning can theology articulate in 
response? What symbolic elements of faith should theology propose as a common reference? 
Kristeva’s novels prompt this dialogue. The closing sections of Part One will have to give an 
answer as to whether the general development of Kristeva’s project allows this engagement. 
                                               
270 In Black Sun, analysing an excessive state of depression (‘melancholy mourning’), Kristeva 
identifies the cause of depressed speech in the inability to accept the loss of the original unity with the 
mother (the denial of losing of the ‘maternal thing’). 
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3. APORIAS AND RESOLUTIONS 
 
The task of this chapter is to ruminate over the challenges which have arisen from 
situating Kristeva in relation to systematic theology. As a form of evaluation of Kristeva’s 
materialist horizon and of what my critique has achieved so far, I set in dialogue the aporias 
and their possible resolutions. It will be followed by an examination of the development of 
Kristeva’s relationship with religion, with a particular focus on her recent dialogical position 
regarding religion. The latter will open up the prospect for resolving the apologetic situation 
which the conflict with Kristeva’s materialism entails. 
 
 
  3.1 ‘Ontological’ Critique Justified 
 
The points of contact already set out justify my suggestion to develop an ‘ontological 
critique’ of Kristeva. I regarded her semiotics as a discourse of ontological depth. The 
opening suggestion of my study, that Kristeva relates to mainstream secular humanism as 
making ‘ontological statements’ about the human being, I also feel to have been verified. 
Kristeva recognised that the identity crisis of the subject of modernity prompted a new 
elaboration of ‘origins’. She herself called the theoretical stance of ‘new post-Freudian 
rationality’ metaphysical.271 The psychoanalytical and linguistic resourcing of the self which  
Kristeva offered was based on the conviction that the subject has sufficient resources to live 
with a permanent crisis of meaning and identity. My critique pointed to the ongoing 
exhaustion of the subject, which makes it necessary to re-examine this self sufficiency.  
 
Our analyses showed that Kristeva explored only the psychological dimension of the 
‘ontic’ crisis of the self, the ‘loss’ of the ‘Loving third party’. My study argued, with the help 
of her novels, that there is a ‘theological’ dimension of this exhaustion which should not be 
overlooked. There is an obvious difference between the hermeneutical positions. However, 
prompting discourse to listen to the ‘ontological anxieties’ of the post-modern self as a 
suffering in its own right can lead to a dialogue about the reasons why the crisis of the 
‘European self’ is unstoppable.  
 
For a theological critique, it is most natural to situate this discussion in the classic 
problem of nature and grace. The self needs to be re-grounded in what theology traditionally 
calls ‘grace’. However, it is obvious that this engagement with Kristeva cannot be carried out 
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in a traditional way. The problem that has been identified of the ‘exhausted subject’ can be 
that medium in which the ‘nature-grace’ relationship can be refashioned. Both the thematic 
development of Kristeva’s work272 and theological discourse on Love allow the making of 
statements about the ‘beginnings’. In this context, theological ‘ontology’ opens up the 
prospect of a genuine critical dialogue with Kristeva’s humanist and atheistic subtexts. On 
the theological side, the stake of reopening the nature – grace ‘debate’ in a new way is 
preserving ‘the ontology of the human person in relationship to the free, always surprising 
gift of God’s presence to the world of creatures’. This is a witness to theology’s perennial 
principle, namely that “grace” qualifies all divine/human relationship.’273  
 
It is true, that the nature-grace relationship, for obvious reasons, never occurs in 
Kristeva’s model. The systemic exclusion of ‘grace’ by her materialism prevents this 
revision. However, to her focus on linguistic origins theology can reply by suggesting a 
language – ‘grace’ relationship in which the metaphor of the ‘Loving Third’ is made central. 
In this way, Kristeva’s main objection to theology, that it remained an ‘onto-theological 
monologism’274, a discourse forever trapped in modernity, can be responded to creatively.  
 
Kristeva’s ‘semiotic’ synthesis indeed interrupts inward-looking, metaphysically or 
linguistically, ‘closed’ theologies in which there is no attempt to relate (the Father’s!) ‘grace’ 
with the anthropological reality of the person. Theology faces here a genuine soteriological 
dilemma. How can it come out of these ‘monologisms’, which is tantamount to a practical 
retreat from secular culture and its discourses, without giving up its unique reference, the 
‘grace’ of the Cross? A refashioned nature/language – grace relationship raises questions to 
both ontological positions. To Kristeva: is language a sufficient internal support to the 
‘psychic space’?  To theology: can ‘grace’ (the Cross) be salvific if it does not speak directly 
to the person, particularly to its present state of ‘exhaustion’? In the same way, can theology 
make utterances on the self’s ‘mourning’ for lost religion, if at the same time it does not 
address the ‘atheistic’ narratives of modernity which, up until now, ground ‘post-
metaphysical consciousness’?  Kristeva has created the opportunity for developing a 
dialogue about the ‘Father’s love’. It is theology’s task to develop a ‘graced’ notion of the 
‘loving Third’ and integrate the ‘ontological discourses’ of the two sides.  
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3.2 Addressing Kristeva’s ‘Atheistic Subtexts’  
 
In this new ‘hermeneutical’ situation, Kristeva’s ‘atheistic subtexts’ are challenged in 
complex ways. Their ‘ontological’ validity is never questioned in Kristeva’s later project. 
‘Feuerbach’, ‘Marx’, and ‘Freud’ remain fundamental references for her atheistic position. 
On the other hand, as the integration of the ‘Marxist’ and Freudian frameworks showed, 
Kristeva’s psychoanalysis also relates to her ideological subtexts as a ‘cultural mourning’. 
Kristevan psychoanalysis mourns important aspects of these atheisms. While developing her 
‘semiotics’ as the critique of dichotomising tendencies in ‘Cartesian reason’, Kristeva also 
corrects the heavy dualisms of her ‘ideological subtexts’. In the classic atheist programs, 
‘man’ and God are set in a strong dualistic opposition. It is striking how ‘mechanistically’ 
they state the God-man relationship as a rivalry. Secular humanism seems to have taken over 
in an unquestioned way Feuerbach’s ‘founding myth’, which can be seen as an early variant 
of Freud’s murder-myth. ‘Even if it could be proved by mathematics that God exists, I do not 
want him to exist, because he would set a limit to my greatness.’275 What Kristeva is 
dissatisfied most with in her ‘atheistic-subtexts’ is not so much their ‘external’ view of 
‘God’, but so much more their view of the human person from without. Kristeva’s 
psychoanalytic viewpoint corrects the external view of history in ‘historical materialism’. In 
the latter, the particularity of the person was completely ignored and mechanistically 
subjugated to the ‘grand narrative’ of History. Dupré calls it a “historicist objectivism” or a 
“psycho-mathematical model”. They are the direct outcome of the subject conceived as the 
culminating point of nature.276 Kristeva’s ‘cultural mourning’ has made this extrinsic view of 
history ‘visible’ for theology. Theology evaluates this ‘extrinsicism’ as the source of 
reductive statements in Marx’s and Freud’s critique of religion.  
 
These ‘atheistic subtexts’ are not only about the antagonistic ‘ontological’ conflict with 
theology. They remain important witnesses to ‘history’ and the historicity of the subject. 
They serve as a critical guide. The tension between the particularity of the ‘speaking being’ 
and the ‘abstractness’ or ‘ahistoricity’ of the theological concept of the person is not 
unrelated to the ‘anthropological criticisms’ of Feuerbach, Marx, and Freud. Theology, when 
responding to Kristeva’s anthropological program, necessarily has to engage with the 
motives of these ‘counter-ontologies’. A theological response to Kristeva needs to point out 
where her ‘atheistic subtexts’ expired. In other words, which are those areas in their critique 
of religion which need to be properly revised in secular humanism itself. Conversely, the 
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relevance of ‘supernatural love’ is to be shown also within those historical dimensions of the 
self which Kristeva’s humanist resources confirmed.  
  
 
3.3 The Problem with Kristeva’s ‘Semiotic’ Agents (The Evaluation of Kristeva’s 
Materialism) 
 
This section refers back to the analysis of the materialist grounding of the ‘speaking 
being’. No critique can sweep under the carpet the conflict with the materialist resourcing of 
the self. However, by transforming the points of conflict into questioning about a sufficient 
resourcing of the self, they can take discussion further. Thus, theology’s main ‘ontological’ 
objections are as follows.  
 
Kristeva’ resourcing of the self from within the self, from a theological point of view, is 
not convincing. The subject still remains confined to his own nature. In terms of the self’s 
grounding, her psychoanalysis does not offer a new paradigm: continuity with the Marxist 
philosophical view of man remains. The Kristevan self is self-redemptive. Kristeva retains 
the emphasis of dialectical materialism from Feuerbach, that ‘the essence of man is 
contained in community, in the unity of man with man.’277 The conflict with theology’s 
‘classic’ Kierkegaardian model,278 which always speaks of the self’s transcendent grounding, 
is obvious:  
 
‘The self is not established by itself but “has been established by an Other” 
[God].279 
 
‘The self is the conscious synthesis of infinitude and finitude that relates itself to 
itself, whose task is to become itself, which can be done only through the relationship to 
God. To become oneself is to become concrete….Consequently, the progress of the 
becoming must be an infinitive moving away from itself in the infinitizing of the 
self…”280 
 
While the theological notion of the person emphasises the real distance between the self 
and God, Kristeva’s extends the ‘sameness’ of matter to the socio-psychological realm. That 
is, the essence of the subject is contained within the ‘social’ self. Culture, since ‘what the 
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other side of language as metaphysics thinks of as origin is not a real origin’281, in the final 
outcome, is still the extension of the ‘dialectic of matter’. Owing to the ‘ideological’ 
continuity with Kristeva’s early materialism, a constraint is imposed on the ‘speaking being’ 
when he attempts ‘mourning’ for the lost ‘religious’ origins. The lost ‘Father’ cannot be 
mourned from within the materialist tradition. Dialectical tension, if it is the only force in the 
self, is also entrapping and exhaustive. As there is no alternative ‘way out’ from the self, in 
terms of opening up to Transcendence, Kristeva seems to fixate the subject in a permanent 
crisis: 
 
‘This duality [of Freud’s life drives and death drives] allows us to account for a 
heterogeneous conflictual process... To preserve this duality is to obey a materialist 
methodological requirement that Freud always stressed... But Freudian theory is more 
than a theory of dualism, it is a theory of contradiction and of struggle: “These 
speculations seek to solve the riddle of life by supposing that these two drives [the life 
drive and death drive] were struggling with each other from the very first.”’282 
 
I also drew attention to the fact that the strong dualisms in Kristeva’s concepts (the 
dualisms of matter) later become more balanced, with love becoming her dominant theme. 
From the early rather bipolar relationship between the ‘semiotic’ and the ‘Symbolic’ in 
Revolution in Poetic Language, Kristeva arrives at their more organic relationship, and they 
attain a ‘ternary structure’.283 The concept of the ‘loving Third’ best shows this integration, 
where ‘maternal’ and ‘paternal love’ co-operate. Moreover, with the increasing emphasis on 
‘maternal love’ it becomes a genuinely personal narrative. Since Tales of Love, the relational 
nature corrects Kristeva’s early, overtly abstract dialectic. 
 
However, as a further major objection, the agents of renewal which Kristeva proposes 
even in this mature phase remain rather hypothetical and elusive. The ‘semiotic’ stories of 
love do not produce a ‘personal’ and universal imperative for her psychoanalytical ethic. 
Hanvey rightly raised in Kristeva the problem of the ‘semiotic isolation’ of the self. ‘We 
never escape from our woundedness. Indeed one of its principal effects is to prevent any 
                                               
281 Griselda Pollock, ‘Dialogue With Julia Kristeva’, Parallax, Jul98, Vol. 4 Issue 3. (pp.5-16). A 
panel-discussion with Julia Kristeva, questioners Griselda Pollock, Susan Siegfried, Kathleen 
O’Grady, Jonathan Freedberg, Omayra Cruz, Aaron Koerner, David Bate /, p.9 
282 Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, pp. 169-170.  
283 de Nooy confirms my observation when comparing Kristeva’s two notions of language. In 
Revolution in Poetic Language, their relation, in Kristeva’s own words, is one of ‘permanent 
struggle’. As a contrast, later in Sense and Non-Sense of Revolt (1996) and in her novel Possessions 
(1996), the relation of the ’semiotic’ to the ‘Symbolic’ is a more reconciliatory ‘co-presence’. In 
Juliana de Nooy, ‘How to keep your head when all about you are losing theirs: Translating possession 
into revolt in Kristeva’, in The Kristeva Critical Reader, edited by John Lechte and Mary Zournazi, 
Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 2003. (pp.113-129), p.118. 
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‘flight to transcendence’ or denial [of its own ‘semiotic’ dialectics].284 The ‘speaking being’, 
in the final outcome, is trapped in a continuous flux between the semiotic and the Symbolic. 
In the context of the ‘ontological mourning’ of the post-modern subject, it means that the self 
is left without sufficient support. It cannot name its failed, or lost, or desired relationship 
with Transcendence. This subject, confined to the dialectic of matter, becomes a migrant 
without a promise of a real arrival. There is no arrival to the other side of language; the 
subject in his mourning cannot see further than the ‘thetic’ origins. This ‘thetic 
wanderer/migrant’, without rediscovering a ‘personal outside’ to the self,285 to use Kristeva’s 
idiom, indeed remains an ‘extraterrestrial, suffering for want of love.’286 Without a real 
companion, when the self’s ‘mourning’ is mirrored only by itself, the ‘speaking being’ 
cannot attain a stable identity. It is in this sense that my critique understands that Kristeva 
‘exhausts’ the subject. By making the ‘dialectics of negativity’ the ultimate ontological 
reference, her ‘speaking being’ becomes a restless doubter in any metaphysical constant.287 
In other words, in his ‘religious mourning’ he is left without support.   
 
In the final outcome, it is Kristeva’s materialism with its ontological limits that 
‘exhausts’ the subject. Is not this a sort of Beckettian ‘Endgame’? An illusion that we can 
keep the subject speaking and resurrecting for ever? Is the person capable alone of bearing 
the full weight of its psychic and collective history? Or, what happens if the ‘semiotic’ 
resources of language, the ‘chora’, language itself, get exhausted? Beckett, as a radical 
‘inner’ doubter of the Enlightenment project, envisions this final, linguistic exhaustion of the 
‘autonomous self’. In this case, is our ‘material origin’, as an impersonal law, a sufficient 
interlocutor to ourselves? Will there follow something of an equivalent of ‘re-centering’ the 
dialectics of matter later in Kristeva? It is against the background of these questions that the 
function of the ‘chora-thetic’, as a general program to renew meaning, needs to be evaluated.  
 
 
3.4 The Problem of the Isolated Self 
 
The problem of the ‘isolated self’ in relation to Kristeva’s model can be raised in a 
complex way. It refers to both the self’s insufficient resources for self-recovery and the way 
a self-referential psychoanalytical discourse overlooks this ‘isolation’. 
 
                                               
284 Hanvey, ‘Other than Stranger’, p. 133. 
285 Such as personal relationship, community, history, religious past. 
286 Oliver, Reading Kristeva, p. 122.  
287 Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, p. 143. 
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It is true that Kristeva’s project at the level of therapy has never promised more than 
temporary psychic rebirths. However, there is a stark contrast between this and her ambitious 
objectives when her psychoanalysis is presented as the critique of culture. Theology warns 
that psychoanalysis is not a ‘full’ support to the human interior. Especially Kristeva’s early 
linguistics and psychoanalysis seem to be overconfident in this role. As a replacement of 
religion, Kristeva envisioned psychoanalysis as a ‘universally’ accepted ‘master narrative’ of 
culture. In practice, however, psychoanalysis does not have the desired ‘universal’ 
symbolism, nor does it enjoy a universal status. It does not occupy a central place in the 
secular canon of culture.288  
 
My study fully agrees with Kristeva in that the psychoanalytic critique of culture, 
because of its critical synthesis of the Enlightenment project, offers a genuine analytical 
viewpoint. Yet, the disruption it aims at needs a widening of Kristeva’s resources. The 
reason is that language, through which the psychoanalytical critique of culture could reach 
the contemporary subject, is still fragmentary. It responds well to the subject’s yearning for 
love, but it cannot fully access the ‘religious mourning’ of the subject. Kristeva herself 
comes close to admitting the fragility of psychoanalytic symbolism in her monograph on 
Melanie Klein. She calls the psychic realm ‘our latest myth, eventually our last myth’.289 My 
point is that it is in the interest of Kristeva’s project to co-operate with religion. ‘Theological 
discourse’, even with its retreat amidst secularisation, is still more deep-seated in culture 
than psychoanalysis. This difference can be reflected apologetically. However, as the 
emerging points of contact with Kristeva’s ‘cultural mourning’ show, it raises the possibility 
of co-operation.  
 
 Kristeva rightly argues that psychoanalysis, as a critique of culture, at important points 
outperforms its theological counterpart. The psychoanalytical critique of culture, compared 
with culturally closed metaphysical discourses, is indeed in the position of a genuine 
analysis. What she seems to exclude is that the experience of faith, as a creedal system, is 
capable of a similar in-depth analysis (or ‘cultural mourning’). My study has addressed this 
position by forming the theological criticism that, despite the analytic potentials of her 
project, Kristeva overlooked the ‘exhaustion’ of the self as an ontological problem. I 
highlight two ‘direct’ aspects of this ‘ontic exhaustion’. These are the relationship of the self 
to the community and the need for a genuine extra-self Other. If the subject is not given 
support at these crucial points, Kristeva’s project ‘exhausts’ the subject. Theology’s claim is 
                                               
288 For one account of this fragmentation, see Stephen Frosh, For and Against Psychoanalysis, 
Routledge, London and New York 2006 (2nd Edition, first published 1997). 
289 Kristeva, Melanie Klein, p.198. 
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that these problems cannot be resolved outside ‘grace’. This theological term (the dynamic 
of grace) needs to be re-introduced as a genuine cultural and existential metaphor. 
 
 A generally raised objection against Kristeva’s ‘psychoanalytical ethic’ is that neither 
her early linguistic project nor her psychoanalytic healing allow for any effective ethical 
agent (Oliver290). Theological criticism makes the point that it has not provided the subject 
with the experience of fellowship either (Hanvey291). It is the support of the ethical 
community that can put the balance right: nihilism cannot be counteracted by the individual 
on his own. It entails that the communal dimension of the human self also needs to be 
worked out. Conjoined with the problem of ethical fellowship is the uncertain ‘universal’ 
imperative that Kristeva suggests for her ethic. The problem with her psychoanalytical ethic 
is never its objectives. It identifies crucial directions in the postmodern context. The problem 
is the elusiveness of Kristeva’s agencies. ‘Language’, the psychological image of the other in 
us, the ‘feminine sacred’ with the real experience of motherhood, and the universal ‘psychic’ 
relation to the ‘Loving Third’ are important aspects of the aimed at universal imperative. 
However, it is difficult to see how they function as a compelling categorical imperative and 
transcend the level of a Socratian ‘gnosis’.  
 
It is true that the responsibility of the analyst to find ways to alleviate the suffering of 
his patients is inherently ethical, and the critical distance from the governing narratives is a 
major precondition of ethics.292 It is also true that psychoanalysis raises the possibility of 
widening the traditional resources and ‘methods’ of an ethics.  It is also a pioneering 
recognition of Kristeva’s that, in view of the fundamental brokenness of the postmodern 
subject, psychoanalysis rightly proposes a non-normative ethics, that is, when its course is 
helping others and promoting life in a way that does not rely on laws and punishments.293 
However, theology’s claim is also true; namely that a functioning ethics is always the radical 
interruption of the ‘Symbolic Order’. It always comes from a radically different Other, who 
fully shares human suffering, but at the same time transcends our existing ethical patterns. It 
still needs to be a compelling ‘authority’.  
 
                                               
290 Oliver makes this criticism by drawing on the conclusions of Andrea Nye, Nancy Fraser, and 
Eléanor Kuykendall. (Nye: Kristeva does not allow for any relation between adults and lacks any 
account of interpersonal relationship. Fraser: Kristeva’s ‘split’ subject is insufficient in producing a 
feminist ‘political agent’. Kuykendall: Kristeva’s ethics does not allow for a ‘female agency’.) Oliver, 
Reading Kristeva, p.186. 
291 An excellent exposition of how the fellowship is grounded in Trinitarian relations is in Hanvey, 
‘Other than Stranger’, pp.138-139. 
292 Kristeva, Desire in Language, p. ix. 
293 Oliver, Reading Kristeva, p.123. 
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The two strategic directions generate a tension which requires a creative solution. On 
the one hand, Kristeva challenges traditional notions of ethics that presuppose a unified 
subject who affirms only the ‘self-same’.294 Kristeva sets up the criteria for doing ethics in a 
globalised context in which pluralisms have to be tackled: ethics should be all-inclusive. It 
should speak also to those who are not ‘self-same’ and are on the margins of the ‘host 
culture’. This makes Kristeva the most timely engagement for theology and religious 
symbolism itself: how should they re-present the imago Dei as inclusive Love? 
 
The ‘missing fellowship’ raises most directly our second concern, the problem of the 
‘isolated self’, when ‘isolation’ is understood in the theological sense. Theology’s criticism 
is that grounding language in ‘matter’ deprives the self of vital ‘extra-self’ resources. The 
‘melancholia’ of the ‘speaking being’ (as shown in Kristeva’s novels) confirms that the 
isolation of the self deserves prime attention. As a critical direction and resource, I refer in 
brief to Robert Keller’s analysis of the ‘existential mourning’ of the self which is deprived of 
the ‘Loving Third party’. His is an experimental psychoanalytical case study, but my critique 
presents it as a useful model of ‘ontological mourning’. Keller analyses ‘Beckett’s infantile 
subtexts’. My point is that the struggles of Beckett’s characters ‘to be properly born’ reveal a 
suffering analogous to that of the postmodern self when the ‘religious past’ is unmourned. 
This model shows the motives of the theological mindset; on what grounds it reclaims the 
‘Transcendent’ grounding of the self. The analogy I suggest is between the relationship of 
the self and the mother, when the experience of love is prematurely interrupted, and the 
relationship between the self and lost religion, when God is never properly known. From 
Keller we can derive an excellent theological model for seeing the loss of the ground of the 
self (‘grace’) in terms of its consequences. The ‘self’ is to be understood also in a wider 
sense, as ‘culture’. An important theological support for drawing this analogy is Dupré’s 
Transcendental Selfhood. Dupré convincingly demonstrates, in a dialogue with 
psychoanalysis, that the soul itself rests on a divine basis. 295  
 
Keller reveals the vulnerability of the postmodern self at a ‘psycho-ontological’ level. 
He shows how vital a proper grounding in unconditional (maternal) Love is, which 
relationship is the seminal form of the ‘fellowship’ of love.296 The symptoms Keller 
describes show how the ‘speaking being’ is deprived of a proper future and is trapped in a 
                                               
294 Oliver, Reading Kristeva, p.188. 
295 Dupré gives an excellent theological account of when ‘transcendental selfhood’ is seen as fully 
‘functional’, the way it expands beyond its ordinary empirical restrictions. The ‘mystical experience’ 
of ordinary life is based upon a healthy self – genuine Other encounter, which Keller argues from a 
purely psychoanalytical point of view. Dupré, Transcendent Selfhood, pp.93-104. 
296 John Robert Keller, Samuel Beckett and the Primacy of Love, Manchester University Press, 
Manchester and New York 2002. 
 114 
past-oriented nostalgia. I present these psychological symptoms as analogous to the ‘ontic’ 
or religious suffering of the postmodern subject when it is not properly ‘grounded’. These 
symptoms also show how a culture enclosed in ‘matter’ cannot produce the genuine Other 
for whom the self is yearning in a paralysing mourning. Keller’s model of the ‘exhausted 
self’ is also helpful in understanding the vulnerability of this ‘unborn (transcendent) 
selfhood’ in the context of consumerism. This is an important link with Kristeva’s criticism 
of the ‘society of the spectacle’, in which she also focuses on contemporary suffering. The 
symptoms of depressed speech are very similar to that of Keller’s description.297 
 
‘The depressive speech is… repetitive, monotonous, or empty of meaning, 
…meaning appears to be arbitrary, evasive, uncertain, deficient, quasi 
mutistic…The denial (Verneinung) of negation [the necessary step of abandoning the 
original unity with the mother in order to enter into language] would thus be the exercise 
of an impossible mourning, the setting up of a fundamental sadness and an artificial, 
unbelievable language, cut out of the painful background that is not accessible to any 
signifier and that intonation alone, intermittently, succeeds in inflecting.’298 (Emphasis 
added.) 
 
This mutism is an acute description of the trauma of the postmodern self, uprooted from 
his previous cultural embedding. It is indeed true, as Kristeva recognises, that the last 
possession of the subject is his language. It is the ultimate means upon which he can rely. 
Theology also agrees with psychoanalysis in that the self is traumatised by a past loss. 
Religious experience claims, however, that this loss is more deeply seated than the 
traumatized language itself. There is an ‘ontic’ exhaustion beyond our postmodern language.  
 
It is also agreed with Kristeva that this loss has to be mourned in order to become 
capable again of identifying with and trusting the other. What theology claims as a plus is to 
recognise that it is the unmourned loss of ‘grace’/God which does not allow the subject to 
                                               
297 The symptoms revealed by Beckett’s ‘infantile subtext’, according to Keller, are as follows. The 
entire bonding period is bypassed between mother and child. There is an ongoing yearning for 
connection in the subject. A feeling of primary disconnection manifests an alienation from other 
persons. The primary maternal object serves as a foundation of a vital, coherent psychic life. The 
feverish fantasy activity in the subject reveals the absence of a good maternal object. The subject’s 
belief that life is futile is a direct consequence of his difficulty in connecting to good and real external 
objects. ‘Watt’, the [postmodern] subject is delivered prematurely into the world, without love. As a 
consequence of primary rapture, the infant’s whole world is ‘pre-emptied’, for he is merged with the 
mother only too briefly before separation. Being deprived of maternal love, he is forced prematurely 
into what he experiences as world of loveless exile. The result of this loveless, darkened internal exile 
is withdrawn passivity, an acceptance of submission. The subject is satisfied with existing in peace on 
the periphery of society [exiled into consumption]. It constitutes an enduring disruption in the ability 
to be with others in a meaningful way. There is an intense search for an emotional connection that the 
person has never known. As a consequence, the subject withdraws into an internal world and lives in a 
closed intrapsychic space in which words run on obsessively. Words are used as ‘autistic objects’, 
actual objects used by a child to soothe himself, replacing real interactions with persons. In Keller, 
Samuel Beckett and the Primacy of Love, pp.93-100. 
298 Kristeva, Black Sun, pp. 43-44. 
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transcend his entrapment. The ‘ontological’ critique of Kristeva also adds that the self-
referential, ‘autonomous subject’ of the Enlightenment is in mourning for an unnamed loss, 
the loss of the Father as he truly is. This loss can even be regarded as a trans-generational 
trauma. God is lost for the postmodern subject before he could have known him, and he has 
been mourning him, unnoticed. Because this mourning is either suppressed by nihilism or 
hindered by inherited and unrevised ideological statements in culture, it is unfinished. As a 
consequence, the ‘late’ subject of the Enlightenment cannot ‘produce’ his missing Other. 
The postmodern subject, the melancholic mourner of the ‘death’ of God (and of his own 
self), is locked in the chain of symptoms described by Keller. The above can be applied to 
culture, too. 
 
My point is that the dynamic of this ‘exhaustion’ should be paid more attention by ‘post-
metaphysical consciousness’. One of the reasons is the inadequacy of the classic materialist 
narrative (Feuerbach, Marx) to name the present historical alienation, particularly the 
subject’s inner suffering. In view of the Beckettian symptoms of ‘narcissistic mourning’, 
Kristeva and theology both face the challenge to liberate the subject from fixation on his 
narcissistic wound. Without a genuine ‘transcendent’ interruption to culture/nihilism, the 
subject is engulfed in this, in a sense self-imposed, narcissism. The ‘monologues’ of the self , 
as can be seen in Beckett, serve as fake companions; they become the subject’s only, though 
illusory and self-destructive, refuge.299 The postmodern subject bears the full woundedness 
of the ‘ungrounded self’ (Kierkegaard). Its trauma cannot be shared because there is no real 
listener. This subjectivity, in the absence of an authentic ethical example, is unable to listen 
to the co-sufferer either. The narcissistic self, doubled in the mirror of its own traumas, can 
speak only of his suffering, but not of that of the other (that of God included!).  
 
It seems that traditional interruptions of the situation are not enough. Psychoanalysis is 
too passive to produce this disruption. Theology’s eschatological ‘Sermon on the Mount’ 
often sounds too distant when it loses sight of the ‘historicity’ of the subject. Actually, the 
postmodern self is in a more acute crisis than ‘mainstream’ theological and secular 
humanisms think. Moreover, by now, the self is deprived not only of its religious heritage, 
but also of its ‘Enlightenment past’. My point is that the ‘exhausted subject’ needs to be re-
introduced again into both patrimonies. That is to say, it should undergo a twofold, ideally 
joint, cultural mourning. The stake is high. The postmodern self colonises the Kristevan 
image (‘Holbein’s Dead Christ’), or its original religious version, the theological image of 
                                               
299 Michael Robinson, The Long Sonata of the Dead: A Study of Samuel Beckett, Grove Press, New 
York 1969, Questia, Web, accessed 20 Nov. 2008 
<http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=96950793>., p.25. 
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the Cross. The ‘exhausted subject’, without proper guidance, projects his narcissistically 
conceived suffering and devours the liberating message of what Kristeva’s stoic materialism 
or religion offers. There is a postmodern denial that there is a beyond to one’s own suffering. 
As a consequence, the ‘exhausted subject’, as an uprooted ‘ontological migrant’ (suspended 
between opposing ontologies), is trapped permanently in melancholy.  
 
While Kristeva’s humanism was given support from a still structured cultural 
community,300 the postmodern self has no one to hold it. This subjectivity is not remembered 
by the isolated other; that is why he cannot trust the other. Kristeva’s ‘sceptical-subtext’, 
Beckett, does not comment on the causes but states the pain overlooked in ‘Enlightenment 
consolations’. In the changed context, ‘looking death in the face’ does not lead to a stable 
‘new dignity’ such as Kristeva expects.301 The subject, underneath the Enlightenment 
narrative, remains inconsolable. Its inertness is only proportionate to the denial that he has 
no possession outside his wounded language. How can this deeply lost self be symbolised? 
What is that ‘passion-narrative’ which awakens the self and which the ‘exhausted subject’ 
identifies as his? Which tradition will mourn the subject? Who is the self’s ultimate 
interlocutor? 
 
 
3.5 ‘Kristeva and Religion’: Kristeva’s New Dialogical Position 
 
Solutions to the emerged aporias come from Kristeva’s work itself. In her relationship 
with religion Kristeva has recently arrived at a dialogical position. My study suggests this 
active dialogue with the ‘wisdom of religion’ as the third unifying element of the oeuvre.302 
This new stance helps to solve the apologetic impasse which a critique of Kristeva faces. 
Kristeva’s approaches to religion, seen in a developmental pattern, confirm that the tension 
with her materialism can be responded to constructively. These criticisms underlie her 
dialogical position. The theological response to Kristeva’s work needs to be aware of them 
and has to address the problems they raise.  
 
Kristeva’s relationship with religion constitutes the final aspect of situating her for 
theology. We can speak of Kristeva’s four approaches to religion: (1) her critique of 
religious fundamentalism or the political critique, (2) the semiotic critique of the male 
                                               
300 See her post-structuralist resources, the ‘classic’ or modernist heritage of Arendt and Klein. 
301 Kristeva, Black Sun, p. 119. 
302 In our argument the first two were the problem of the ‘exhausted subject’ and the materialist 
grounding of the ‘speaking being’.  
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imagination, (3) her ‘intellectual’ mourning of the Christian past in her theories and in her 
novels, and (4) Kristeva’s recent dialogue with religion.  
 
 
3.5.1 Kristeva’s Critique of Religious Fundamentalism 
 
The first layer of Kristeva’s critique of religion is the critique of religious 
fundamentalism. This can be called the political dimension of her criticism. This remains an 
active interest from her ‘revolutionary linguistics’ up to the present. This criticism is closely 
related to her linguistic period when Kristeva treated the disappearance of religion as 
inevitable and associated all religious discourse with the ‘monological’ or homogeneous 
model of language and knowledge.303 The context of rejecting religious fundamentalism is 
nihilism in culture. According to Kristeva, fundamentalism belongs to those erroneous 
responses which ‘shaken’ homogeneous identities give to the nihilist crisis. Kristeva’s 
recurring fear is to take refuge from the challenges of a globalised culture into ‘our most 
regressive common denominators: national origins and the faith of our forefathers.’304 This 
critique is a permanent warning that Christianity can act against its original mission to 
‘metabolise’ fears and hatred in culture. She criticises Christianity’s aptitude to return to 
dogma, instead of facing the historical crisis and offering a proper analysis of it. From the 
mid-eighties up to the very present Kristeva refuses any revisionist understanding of the 
crisis. She wants to show an alternative to those who claim that ‘a return to [a dogmatic] 
faith is the last chance, our one and only possibility, face to face with the perils of liberty, of 
creating some sort of stability.’ 305  
 
Kristeva’s concerns were given a fresh confirmation in the mid-nineties. She saw a 
similar danger in the return to dogma after the collapse of communism in central European 
countries.306 Most recently, she suspects a similar dogmatic turn when the need of a new 
‘normative conscience’ was raised by Habermas and Ratzinger. What connects them, 
according to Kristeva, is the danger of becoming apologetic with culture at the cost of 
ignoring the complexity of the cultural situation and the actual state of the subject. My point 
is that Kristeva’s criticism from the outset is primarily ethically motivated, not ideologically. 
Seen in this context, her critique of religious fundamentalism sets up an important criterion 
for theology becoming a relevant discourse. Instead of an overtly defensive position, it has to 
                                               
303 Kołoszyc, Religion, Atheism, and the Crisis of Meaning, p.401. 
304 See, Julia Kristeva, Nations Without Nationalism, Columbia University Press, New York 1993 
(Original French Edition 1990.), pp.2-4.; and Kristeva, The Crisis of the European Subject 
305 Kristeva, This Incredible Need to Believe, p.26.  
306 Julia Kristeva Interviews, p.223-224. 
 118 
respond to the complexity of the changed conditions of culture and of the subject with a 
genuine analysis. In other words, theology needs to show that orthodoxy can present a 
genuine analysis of the crisis and the discourses it objects to.
 
 
 Despite the conflict with her materialism, there are significant changes within 
Kristeva’s critical position. My critique agrees with Kołoszyc on the important alteration: 
Kristeva increasingly became aware of some impasses in her early literary critique of 
religion, which excluded religious experience. She acknowledges that the religious 
dimension of the self and certain forms of religious experience, because of their 
psychological relevance, cannot be excluded from the question of psychic ‘origins’. 
Kristeva, within the limits of her materialism, makes an important correction to her original 
‘ideological’ stance. She admits that the subject remains inherently a religious subject.307 
Christ, ‘the absolute subject’, manifests the essential psychic dramas of the process of 
individuation. Though this is a non-religious reading of the self and of religious experience, 
this development is a vital step. With it, Kristeva, in theory, opens up the prospect of getting 
into contact with a theological vision of the self, inasmuch as the latter has something 
relevant to offer. It is a ‘structural’ openness of her analytical position, even if co-operation 
with theology in practice was not expected on her part. 
 
 
3.5.2 Kristeva’s Psychoanalytical Critique of Religion 
 
The themes of Kristeva’s ‘psychoanalytical critique’ of religion are all important areas 
for theological engagement. If they are read separately from the problem of the ‘exhausted 
subject’, theology can easily take them as a confirmation of an apologetic approach. These 
criticisms, when ‘listened’ to and integrated, can intensify the complex engagement which 
the response to Kristeva requires. They are (1) Kristeva’s linguistic reading of the Cross, (2) 
her critique of the image of the ‘Virgin Mother’ as a product of the masculine imagination, 
(3) and her psychoanalytical reading of sacrifice.  
 
Underlying these criticisms is Kristeva’s conviction that psychoanalysis offers a more 
comprehensive response to the nihilist crisis than religion. Because of this competence, it 
‘replaces’ religion. Psychoanalysis proposes a new concept of reason, love and ethics, which 
responds better to the pluralistic situation of a culture which is governed by instrumental 
                                               
307 Kołoszyc, Religion, Atheism, and the Crisis of Meaning, p.402. 
 119 
reason, the market, and consumption.308  For Kristeva, this substitution takes place not only 
because of a better responsiveness to a ‘plural, non-homogeneous history’.309 First of all, in 
her opinion, psychoanalysis is more advanced in terms of exploring the complex internal 
structures of the psychic life which underlies this cultural topography. Objectively, critique 
needs to recognise that Kristeva operates in those ‘lower regions’ of ‘grace’, where theology 
with its ‘Platonic’ concepts is far less operative. These regions are where the transition 
between ‘biology’ and ‘culture’ takes place. 
 
Kristeva’s linguistic reading of the Passion. In this writer’s view, the most significant 
direction that Kristeva takes is her psychoanalytical articulation of the homo-religiosus. In 
this context, crucial for my critique is her linguistic reading of the Passion. As a theme it 
occurred quite early in Kristeva’s works and its full elaboration took place soon after.310 I am 
restricted only to the essentials of her notion of Christ as ‘the absolute subject’. It is a 
‘linguistic reading’ of the person of Christ. He is an archetypal figure who sums up the 
human person’s linguistic story. Language is seen by Kristeva as a kind of ‘proto-passion’. 
In Christ, the separations that build up psychic life are all symbolically enacted.311 My study 
will return to this concept in Part Two, when I engage with Kristeva’s recent reading of the 
Passion. What is implied in her ‘psychoanalytic image’ of Christ is that psychoanalysis 
offers a ‘fuller’ image of the human person, whereas in contrast, the person in theology’s 
presentation shows an anthropological shortcoming. The underlying ‘ontological rivalry’ in 
this position should not be overlooked. The other important aspect of homo religiosus that 
Kristeva elaborates is her correction of Freud when she states that ‘belief’ in the other is a 
perennial ‘pre-religious’ dynamic of the person, which is shared with religious discourse. 
 
Kristeva’s critique of the masculine theological imagination. I single out a second major 
theme of Kristeva’s critique of religion. This is her ‘semiotic’ or ‘feminist’ critique of the 
masculine theological imagination. This constitutes a complex narrative itself, drawing on 
Kristeva’s linguistics, psychoanalysis, and materialism. This indirect critique of masculine 
theological symbol building is especially important for my critique. It will be an essential 
                                               
308 See this historical responsiveness to the new situation of culture in Kristeva, Melanie Klein, 
pp.233-236. 
309 Julia Kristeva Interviews, p.69. 
310 Kristeva’s interest in the psychoanalytic conditions underlying language structures became 
dominant already in Deisire In Language, where the themes of the ‘the work of the negative’, birth, 
weaning, separation, and the frustration attached to the severance from the mother are fully 
articulated. Chronologically, this ‘passion’ will be combined with the symbol of Christ sacrifice, the 
Cross in Tales of Love (see chapter, ‘God is Love’ /pp.137-150/), Powers of Horror, and Black Sun. 
The full exposition of ‘Christ’ as an archetypal image of human language can be found in the chapter 
‘Credo in Unum Deum’ (pp.36-44) in In the Beginning Was Love: Psychoanalysis and Faith.  
311 More details in Appendix IV. 
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resource to produce a renewed imagery of God’s love. The incorporation of this criticism 
will serve as a basis for a common ‘symbol building’ with Kristeva. This is a criticism of the 
‘male narrative’ of motherhood, in the image of Mary as the Virgin Mother. In fact, 
Kristeva’s deconstruction of the image is an ‘ontological criticism’ of the classic imago Dei. 
Whereas its direct object is the mechanisms or the psychological motives of how the 
masculine imagination constructs motherhood, it can be read as a parallel criticism of the 
‘paternal metaphor’ through which traditionally God is conceived. For my critique, the 
‘maternal metaphor’ which feminist theology has developed will also be an important 
reference. Here, my study highlights what Kristeva potentially adds to the ‘maternal 
metaphor’ of God and the points of engagement she offers.  
 
Kristeva’s ‘aesthetical’ or ‘feminist’ criticism was initiated in the essay ‘Stabat Mater’ 
(Tales of Love). We can recapitulate it as follows. The ‘Virgin Mother’ is a male construct. 
The dynamic of a ‘controlling Father’ is present in ‘masculine’ theological consciousness in 
terms of its fear of the female body. The masculine imagination cannot access either the 
biological or the psychological aspects of motherhood. The ‘masculine God’, in a ‘totemic’ 
fear of the feminine ‘body’, sidelines crucial aspects of maternal experience. Masculine 
theology, governed by a ‘masculine Father’, de-constructs the true historicity of childbirth 
and early care. The function of the images of ‘virginity’ and ‘virgin motherhood’, says 
Kristeva, is to control the fears of ‘maternal origins’. As a subtle theological construct, the 
image of the Virgin Mother has a complex social function. It calms the social anxiety 
surrounding the subject’s birth. It satisfies a male anxious about femininity. It also satisfies 
women anxious about their own femininity. The image of ‘sacred motherhood’ compensates 
women symbolically for their exclusion from the male canon. The image of ‘virgin 
motherhood’ – Mary as Queen of Heaven, satisfies ‘female paranoia’, the female desire for 
power.312 (See Kristeva’s recapitulation of the critical thrusts of ‘Stabat Mater’ from her The 
Feminine and the Sacred in Appendix II.)  
 
This ‘semiotic criticism’ of the image, however indirectly, reveals a hidden polemic with 
a theology which speaks from within a ‘constructed’ Father-hermeneutics. The link is 
obvious, Kristeva’s analysis also points to the ‘centre’ from which this image is constructed, 
the inherently ‘Platonic’ masculine (and in the Roman Catholic context, celibate) theological 
imagination. The latter produces a similarly biased hermeneutics of the ‘feminine self’ 
                                               
312 The above recapitulation of Kristeva’s criticism is from Kristeva, The Feminine and the Sacred, 
p.75. 
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comparable to the Cartesian autonomous, disembodied rational self.313 The existential 
experience of motherhood, which Kristeva’s ‘Stabat Mater’ explores,314 can be an important 
correction of the ‘masculine’ perspective on God. Also, Kristeva’s ‘semiotic’ ‘counter-
narrative’ offers a critical dynamic through which the overtly abstract concept of the 
theological person can be further corrected.  
 
Kristeva’s central thesis is that in our culture a proper discourse on motherhood is still 
missing. The last coherent narrative offered to our civilisation was the Christian ideal of the 
‘Virgin Motherhood’. Today, when Christian imagery (ethical, theological) becomes 
marginalised, culture faces a painful void. The lack of discourse on motherhood, in this 
situation, fundamentally contributes to the nihilist crisis. With the inability to name the 
‘mother’ (and the ‘Father’), the ‘exhausted subject’ cannot find a proper orientation to come 
out from his or her crisis. By making the image of the ‘life giving mother’ central, in terms 
of this symbolic deficit, Kristeva addresses theology. What does it say about reinstating the 
feminine dimension of the ‘Sacred’? How can an authentic presentation of the ‘Father’ 
incorporate Kristeva’s problem and speak to the ‘maternal experience’ more directly through 
the God-image?  
 
This dialogue with Kristeva’s ‘feminist’ critique of religion, I argue, becomes possible 
on a shared ground. Kristeva,, as a practising psychoanalyst, observes that the postmodern 
subject deeply yearns for an all-inclusive ‘maternal’ love in terms of the experience of being 
unconditionally accepted. The experience of ‘being loved’ is witnessed to in both theological 
discourse and the psychoanalytical transference. The symbolic co-operation lies in the 
working hypothesis that addressing the problem of the ‘feminine sacred’ can be made central 
to theological discourse. It is quite possible that the way back to the ‘Father’ of the 
‘exhausted subject’ is through remembering the qualities of maternal love, that is, through 
the re-discovery of the ‘mother’. 
 
Kristeva’s reformed Freudianism reinstated the ‘feminine’ or ‘maternal’ dimension into 
the sacred (‘meaning’) in her own regime, too. It is an important correction of the one-sided 
emphasis of Freud on the ‘Father’. It is through this correction that theology can respond to 
Kristeva’s Freudianism. Her position remains strictly ‘Freudian’ in the sense also that 
                                               
313 I connect the objective of Kristeva’s ideological critique of ‘patriarchy’ with our theological 
context. Dan R. Stiver, The Philosophy of Religious Language, Sign, Symbol and Story, Blackwell, 
Oxford 2001. p.187. 
314 In two vertical columns on the page, she sets next to each other her academic text and her personal 
account of pregnancy and childbirth. 
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Kristeva retains the ontological meaning of Freud’s statement that ‘religion is an illusion’.315 
The original ‘ideological’ position of Freud needs to be addressed because Kristeva implies 
that the ‘masculine’ theological imagination has no resources to correct the image of the 
‘Father’. Also implied in this position is that God, as an ontological reality, remains ‘dead’ in 
the sense that the concept does not respond to the anthropological and gender complexity of 
the ‘speaking being’. Kristeva here joins the general criticism of feminist theology that 
mainstream theology cannot internalise the excluded ‘maternal’ aspect of the self. This 
objection in her essays is not stated openly, but definitely underlies her critique of religion. 
Indirectly we can confirm it through feminist theologians like Beattie and Mercer.  
 
Especially Beattie’s radical Catholic feminism urges an internalisation of ‘feminine’ 
and maternal experience into theological concepts. She urges a structural modifying of 
masculine theological symbolism. Beattie states that an unacceptable discrimination of these 
experiences takes place when sin and destruction are associated with feminine chaos, 
darkness and destructiveness. 316 Mercer, in a way more open to dialogue with ‘masculine 
theology’, also confirms the relevance of Kristeva’s criticism. She posits her feminist 
approach as an unexpected contribution to theological dialogue.317 Mercer confirms that 
Kristeva’s ‘semiotic’ perspectives contain ‘surprising’ resources for feminist theologians 
concerned about the gender-inclusive language on God.318  It is indeed possible to relate 
Kristeva’s ‘aesthetical criticism’ to praxis if we regard her program in ‘Stabat Mater’ as a 
specific critique of religious fundamentalism. The ‘return to dogma’ coincides with a 
nostalgic re-construction of God as an ‘external’ and ‘patriarchal’ authority of power. 
Indirectly, on a theoretical level, Kristeva proposes dealing with otherness in lived maternal 
experience as the correction of the ‘homogenising’ and oppressive cultural super-ego into 
which the idea of ‘God’ can deteriorate.  
 
Kristeva’s symbolic reading of the Christian sacrifice. Another major thrust of 
Kristeva’s critique of religion is her evaluation of Christian sacrifice. Despite that it is a 
reductive reading of the original religious economy, Kristeva’s appreciation of the Christian 
sacrifice should not be overlooked. Though strictly in a psychoanalytical frame, she makes 
central ‘Christianity’s difference’. Jesus represents the apex of the inner development of 
religion, as he makes ‘sin’ and ‘abjection’ spoken. Kristeva emphasises that Jesus’ sacrifice 
is a bloodless one and the Christian sacrifice is predominantly verbal. The Son creates a new 
                                               
315 The ontological meaning of the statement is retained despite correcting this premise and presenting 
the ‘speaking being’ as a homo religiosus.  
316 Tina Beattie, New Catholic Feminism, Routledge, New York, London 2006, pp.150-151. 
317 See, Mercer, ‘Psychoanalysis, Parents and God’, p.253. 
318 Ibid., p.244. 
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symbolic space. This space of love, ‘which counterbalances murder, becomes the place 
where all our crises [historical and individual] can be exploded and assimilated.’ 319 The 
symbolic space created by the ‘Cross’ makes it possible for us to tell, in a psychologically 
relevant way, our deepest existential experiences. We can assimilate our unspeakable 
sufferings into His, and thus the human passion becomes ‘narratable’, named.  
 
Kristeva’s reading of the sacrifice is a specific opportunity for developing a shared 
reflection on ‘violence’ in culture. Kristeva gives a psychological reading of the sacrifice, 
drawing on Freud’s premise that various forms of sacrifice enunciate murder as a condition 
of meaning.320 ‘You must be separated from your mother so that you do not kill anyone... 
You will displace your hatred into thought’. 321 It is a clear-cut Freudian ‘faith hermeneutics’. 
Drawing on Freud’s genesis story of culture, the murder of the primordial father of the 
horde, Kristeva highlights the transformation of the aggression underlying the ‘bloody’ 
sacrifice. Powers of Horror states a displacement of murder into more sublime systems of 
meaning, from language to morality and culture. The appreciation of the Eucharist as a 
community which welcomes otherness should not be overlooked in Kristeva. The Christian 
celebration of the Eucharist continues the creation of the human interior. Kristeva says that, 
through identifying with Jesus’ death and resurrection, the person overcomes or 
‘internalises’ the death drives. By eating the Son’s body, we identify ourselves with the 
Father who is the father of the Logos, meaning and Law, and not with the ‘chaotic’ libidal 
forces of chaos. In this way, we avoid the destructive forces of the death drive, the social 
manifestation of which is the refusal of the ‘Foreigner’. Narcissism (as the withdrawal from 
the other) is overcome by shifting ‘the death of the other’ onto Christ, and so it ceases to be 
narcissism. The ekklesia is a ‘community of foreigners’, an ‘ideal community’, a messianism 
that includes all of humankind. This community of verbal sacrifice is a transformed 
society.322  
 
Needless to emphasise how this appreciation of the Christian discourse on love can serve 
as further ground for dialogue. The ethical potential which Kristeva attributes to the 
Christian ‘interior’ is an important way out from the conflict with her materialism (‘the 
exclusion of grace’). That is why engagement at the ethical level, based on Kristeva’s 
appreciation of the ‘ekklesia of the foreigner’, is vital. Theology will have the opportunity to 
spell out the relevance of ‘grace’ in terms of being the source of this inclusiveness.  
                                               
319 Kristeva, New Maladies of the Soul, p. 120. 
320 Ibid., pp.119-120.  
321 Ibid., p. 120.  
322 This summary of the Pauline church is from Boer’s overview of Kristeva’s Powers of Horror, in 
Ronald Boer, ‘The Search for Redemption’, p.168. 
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3.5.3 Kristeva’s Recent Dialogue with Religion 
  
Kristeva’s recent dialogue with religion gives the ultimate confirmation that a critique, 
not only at a theoretical level but also in practice, can take a non-apologetic direction. This 
development is an important caesura in her ‘ontological program’, which emerged with the 
work This Incredible Need to Believe (2009). My study submits it as the most important 
paradigm shift in the oeuvre. The change in Kristeva’s relation to religion is a paradigm shift 
not only in her hermeneutics of religion, but in her Freudian narrative, too. My critique 
submits her dialogical position as an important unifying element of her humanism. I limit 
myself to presenting the most essential elements of the change from This Incredible Need to 
Believe and Hatred and Forgiveness (2011), which comprise a unit. In these works, on the 
one hand, Kristeva integrates the special interests of her critique of religion. On the other 
hand, her traditional standpoint that ‘religion is an analysable given’323 is complemented with 
an explicit interest in the ‘wisdom of religion’. This new co-ordinate relation far exceeds the 
ideological subordination of religion to her chosen discourses, Marxism and Freudianism, in 
Revolution in Poetic Language (1974). The two main problems of the oeuvre, the 
‘exhaustion of the subject’ and the ‘cultural mourning’ of modernity and post-modernity, 
culminate in this new dialogical position. 
 
This change was anticipated by some of her feminist critics, but somewhat as a sudden 
surprise. O’Grady highlights the discomfort with the emerged ‘theological content’ in 
Kristeva. There is an embarrassment about her ‘endorsing God.’324 These voices are 
obviously exaggerating in stating that Kristeva attempts a psychoanalytic explanation for the 
possibility of religious experience and ‘accepting the real existence of God’ (Cynthia Chase). 
There are others who go even as far as declaring that Kristeva offers a ‘Christian orthodoxy’ 
in place of psychoanalysis (Janice Doane and Devon Hodges). Others speak of her ‘veering’ 
towards metaphysics and risking ‘toppling over’ (Miglena Nikolchina), others go as far as 
emphasizing the ‘neo-religious dimension’ (Edith Kurzweil) in Kristeva’s writings.325 These 
protests against what they see as a theological component, however, show that there is 
indeed a genuine caesura which needs to be explained. The feminist commentaries to which I 
have referred observed a new direction in Kristeva’s ‘cultural mourning’. What they reacted 
to with ‘confusion, shame, or hostility’ (O’Grady) as early as 2002 has burst to the surface in 
                                               
323 Kristeva, This Incredible Need to Believe, p.70.  
324 O’Grady refers to Brennan’s History After Lacan. In Kathleen O’Grady, ‘The Tower and the 
Chalice’, p.43. 
325 Ibid., p.43. 
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This Incredible Need to Believe (2009). Kristeva’s ‘dialogical feminism’, for the second 
time, is at loggerheads with ‘exclusive’ feminism for divinity, associated with patriarchal 
power in any form, is anathema to the feminist agenda. 
 
The essays of This Incredible Need to Believe concurrently show Kristeva’s renewed 
interest in religion, the sudden correction of Freud, and the confirmation of previous 
materialist presuppositions. To do justice to her critics, the ideological correction of Freud 
that religion is not an illusion, while leaving Kristeva’s immanent references intact, creates a 
puzzling tension. If Kristeva’s project was a synthesis of the Enlightenment, then it is also 
true that, with this shift, she has created a tension with those secular traditions that her 
project gathered into a synthesis. Kristeva, although she never uses the expression ‘cultural 
mourning’, speaks of ‘psychoanalysis’s uniqueness in becoming a new model for thinking 
about social relations’, history, and culture.326  In the wider sense, the object of this ‘cultural 
mourning’ is the changing condition of the subject and culture in modernity and post-
modernity.  In the narrower sense, this ‘mourning’ manifests itself as a reflection on the 
crisis of Symbols, religious and secular alike, from these periods. Kristeva’s proposed new 
humanism is a ‘symbolic mourning’ in terms of proposing the renewal of the symbols of 
Love. My study in Part Two will take up the evaluation of Kristeva’s ‘ontological program’ 
in the context of this proposed new ‘symbol building’. Kristeva’s ‘semiotic’ narratives will 
be responded to from a mutual re-reading of the Passion. My point is that Kristeva’s 
dialogical turn and the inner development of her work naturally suggests taking up this 
direction.  
 
Kristeva’s hermeneutics of culture shows an important symbolic development. The first 
phase of the oeuvre formulated a self-referential materialist ‘ontology’ of the person. This 
materialism, indirectly, implied a critique of religious symbols. Kristeva’s new ‘semiotic 
symbolism’ was a mode of critique of religion. Its materialism was a response to the 
‘ahistoricity’ of Christian metaphysics. Kristeva’s ‘semiotic’ images of the ‘heterogeneous 
subject’ organically developed into ‘a psychoanalytic ontology of love’. Kristeva’s new 
position literally shows an ‘ontological openness’: her ‘new humanism’ invites all relevant 
observations on the subject. Metaphorically, this stance is an ontological discourse in the 
sense that it urges a revision of the ‘available’ symbolic narratives. It deliberately prompts a 
critical revision of ‘Tradition’, metaphysical and post-metaphysical, religion and the heritage 
of the Enlightenment.327  
                                               
326 Kristeva, Melanie Klein, p. 231. 
327 Kristeva emphasised this program in her public lecture at the British Academy, ‘Is there such a 
thing as European culture? In conversation with Julia Kristeva’, 24 May 2010. This lecture is 
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The pivotal emphasis of This Incredible Need to Believe and Hatred and Forgiveness is 
the realisation of a shared crisis. The position of the ‘third’ Kristeva328, in the essays ‘From 
Mozart to Jesus’ and ‘Suffering’, despite the critical tone, shows an explicit and positive co-
operation with theology. 329 In the latter essay, we see the author in an immediate dialogue 
with the Christian experience of ‘exhaustion’ and ‘rebirth’ when she gives a 
psychoanalytical-ethical account of Christ’s Passion. This dialogical shift is supported by 
Kristeva’s new hermeneutical viewpoint on the crisis. Of paramount importance with her 
corrections on Freud, Kristeva expresses the need for a change of the ‘secular viewpoint’. 
She claims a more inclusive Aufklärung by widening its resources. This is her response to 
Habermas’ observation that ‘something is missing’ in secular discourse. For her part, 
Kristeva urges a ‘theoretical risk-taking’, a co-operation among discourses previously 
unrelated or being in an explicit tension. Envisioning a ‘laboratory of new forms of 
humanism’330  is an admittance that the Enlightenment humanism is in a borderline situation 
now where previous answers are not sufficient. It is in this context that Kristeva proposes a 
mutual dialogue on ‘Christianity’s difference’: 
 
  ‘Would I dare to think aloud that Christianity, and Catholicism in particular, is not 
necessarily what one thinks it is? Because within ‘what one believes’ – about suffering, 
for example – astonishing progress has been made that might resonate in harmony with 
present preoccupations? And vice versa, the modern fields of knowledge may be able to 
interpret in a new way the wisdom that underlies traditional dogma.’331 
 
 
The other animating core of the shared reflection to which she invites theology is 
Kristeva’s ‘psychoanalytical’ correction of Freud. Religion is not illusion; the ‘speaking 
being’ is homo religiosus. In this new scheme, faith in the other, the capacity to identify with 
‘love’, is a ‘primary constituent of identity’.332 ‘Unlike Freud, I don’t say that religion is 
merely an illusion or source of neurosis.’333 
 
                                                                                                                                     
available online in audio format from the media library of the British Academy, 
http://www.britac.ac.uk/events/2010/kristeva/index.cfm. Also, see her public lecture ‘The forces of 
monotheism’, at Queen Mary College, 25 May 2010 (A version under the same title is available on 
professor Kristeva’s official home page, ‘The forces of monotheism confronting the need to believe’, 
http://www.kristeva.fr/the_forces.html).     
328 As a reminder, the chronological reading of her works showed revolutionary psychoanalysis as 
Kristeva’s ‘first’ phase, then psychoanalysis as her ‘second phase’.   
329 The major essays of This Incredible Need to Believe. 
330 Kristeva, This Incredible Need to Believe, p.28. 
331 Ibid., p.78. 
332 Ibid., pp.10-11. 
333 ‘From Jesus to Mozart (Christianity’s Difference)’, Ibid. p.83. 
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This Incredible Need to Believe is a caesura and a new initiative also in the sense that it 
can be seen as a deliberate correction of the ontological closedness of her early materialism. 
This is tantamount to breaking the Habermasian prohibition: Kristeva now makes ontological 
statements on the human ‘being’. This norm-breaking is intrinsically addressing the 
symbolism of the Christian faith, the Passion, and makes it a real dialogue partner. This 
move is necessary as the early Freudianism of Revolution in Poetic Language cannot provide 
an adequate response to the ‘exhausted subject’. A critical exchange with religion, because 
of her engagement with Christian texts, was always there as a possibility in Kristeva. Yet, it 
was never realised as a dialogue because of the ‘materialist strait-jacket’ of her system. Now, 
with the ‘religious’ correction of Freud, despite remaining on the materialist horizon, new 
possibilities open up.  
 
First of all, regarding the tension between the psychoanalytical and the theological points 
of view, a shared reflection on their historical ‘split’ becomes possible. This is that 
dimension of ‘cultural mourning’ in which my study is most interested. The first level of 
‘cultural mourning’ was the historical reflection which took place in Kristeva’s 
psychoanalysis as a response to the changes that modernity and then post-modernity brought 
about in European culture. Kristeva’s ‘dialogical position’ reveals a level on which the 
previously separate reflections of psychoanalysis and theology can be brought into dialogue.  
It is a completion of the unfinished reflection on the intrinsic relationship between ‘declining 
theological images of person and society’ ‘and their displacement by predominantly 
psychological images’, which close connection Peter Homans states as a pivotal one.334 This 
second level of ‘cultural mourning’ stands for the reflection which can take place between 
Kristeva’s Freudianism and theology about the paradigmatic changes, which resulted in the 
‘exhausted subject’.  
 
My working hypothesis is that it is particularly a potential joint ‘symbolic reflection’ on 
the Passion which makes it possible to reflect on the ‘split’ between secular and religious 
humanisms. Of course, there is a lot to be ‘mourned’ as Kristeva does not hide her mistrust 
of having recourse to the irrational.’335 Here, ‘irrational’ refers to the theological attitude 
which is closed in upon itself and operates from within an exclusive faith-hermeneutics. 
Here Kristeva poses a genuine challenge for theology. It has to decide if it remains a 
marginalised discourse, in the sense that it does not contribute to the collective 
                                               
334 Peter Homans, Theology After Freud, an Interpretive Inquiry, The Bobbs-Merill Company, Inc, 
Indianapolis, New York 1970, pp. ix. xi 
335 Kristeva, This Incredible Need to Believe, p.26. 
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understanding of the crisis.336 If theology undertakes this task and offers an ‘inclusive’ re-
actualisation of Christian ontology, my working hypothesis goes further, it gets into the 
position of interrogating with relevance, in the context of a shared discourse, Kristeva’s 
atheistic subtexts. Another important new possibility is revisiting Kristeva’s ‘feminist 
critique’ of religion. The latter can be prompted to revise its previous premise: what if 
theology can integrate the ‘maternal metaphor’ within the image of the ‘Father’? 
 
A further connection is that This Incredible Need to Believe makes central the image of 
the ‘Loving Third Party’. Trust in the ‘loving Third Party’ offers an exit from the self’s 
isolation. ‘Faith’ and ‘belief’ offer a dynamism through which it is possible to come out from 
the state of the ‘exhausted subject’. 
 
‘….There is the primal identification with the father of individual pre-history 
whose loving authority quiets primal anxiety and provides me with the conviction that 
“I am”. The “I” does not cease to seek out the primary constituents of its identity in its 
incredible need to believe.’337   
 
Kristeva’s dialogical position creates the possibility of spelling out the theological 
dynamic of the ‘Father’. Kristeva herself draws a parallel between the psychoanalytical and 
the theological readings of the ‘Loving Third’ in This Incredible Need to Believe. This is an 
important ground for dialogue which can be exploited, regardless of the ‘ontological 
difference’.  
 
To finish, Kristeva’s dialogical position needs to be seen realistically. Theology has to 
be aware that, for a renewed critique of nihilism, she retains the leading role for 
psychoanalysis on the grounds that it has sufficiently internalised the ‘complexity of the 
Enlightenment humanism’, whereas this complexity has remained insufficiently perceived 
by theology.338 In other words, psychoanalysis is ahead of theological language in terms of a 
more advanced ‘cultural mourning’. In a sense, there is no change in the previous position 
that ‘psychoanalysis, and no longer faith, provides the optimal path toward self-
                                               
336 See these apologetic orthodoxies, exemplified in the theology of Tracey Rowland, Culture and the 
Thomist Tradition, and John Milbank’s program of the Radical Orthodoxy movement. Hanvey gives 
an excellent critique of the limits and strategic errors of Milbank’s apologetic program as an 
‘exclusive’ re-actualisation of Christian ontology. See: John Milbank, ‘The Program of Radical 
Orthodoxy’ Ch.3 (pp.33-45), and James Hanvey, ‘Conclusion: Continuing the Conversation’, in 
Radical Orthodoxy. 
337 Julia Kristeva, ‘Freudian approach, The religious need to believe’, a short essay from her official 
homepage, http://www.kristeva.fr/believe.html, p.1. (accessed 5/10/2010) 
338 Kristeva, This Incredible Need to Believe, p.26. 
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knowledge.’339 The significant ‘concession’ is that Kristeva admits that psychoanalysis does 
not at present have an unquestionable solution. All in all, it is worth accepting the challenge 
of responding to the underlying conviction of her critique of religion, that mainstream 
theology exhibits an ‘anthropological deficit’ when presenting the classic images of faith. 
This ‘anthropological deficit’, first of all, should be understood in terms of lagging behind in 
its ‘symbolic mourning’, that is, in incorporating and transforming leading discourses and 
key images associated with the ‘anthropological shift’ in culture. The ‘Catholica’ as a 
cultural dynamic is challenged by Kristeva’s dialogical position, which, realistically, sees 
theology still on the margins of contemporary discourses. 
                                               
339 See the closing chapter of the Klein-monograph, ‘The Politics of Kleinianism’, in Kristeva, 
Melanie Klein, p.246. 
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3.6 THE WAY FORWARD 
 
3.6.1 A Thematic Overview of the Oeuvre (Areas for Theological Engagement) 
 
Having identified the problem of the ‘exhausted subject’ as a hermeneutical bridge, a 
thematic overview of Kristeva’s work can serve as an objective support for the claim that the 
systemic engagement that my critique aimed at is possible. This overview is also a helpful 
‘map’ for engaging in Part Two. 
 
If theology takes pains to explore the ‘systemic’ reasons for what separates Kristeva’s 
hermeneutical position from that of theology, a challenging field opens up for reflection. We 
can collect the following theologically ‘sensitisable’ areas from Kristeva’s work, which may 
be potential fields of engagement and which theology needs to be familiar with. They are 
especially important for systematic theology to internalise and make part of its responses. 
They follow in the chronological order of their emergence and give an overview of the 
unfolding of Kristeva’s project.  
 
(1) Kristeva’s post-structuralism, which grounded her concept of the ‘subject in process’. 
It states that the stable ‘ego’ of modernity is an illusion. The homogeneity of the subject is 
always challenged from its ‘semiotic’ ground by the sub-conscious level of language, 
memories, past, desires. (2) The dialectic between the ‘semiotic’ and the ‘symbolic’ 
constituents of language. (3) The integration of Kristeva’s ‘semiotic’ theories into an ethic. 
Their connection with Kristeva’s ‘historical materialism’. (4) The ‘semiotic’ as a 
regenerative source to renew Symbolic meaning (in poetic language, in therapy). (5) The 
‘alchemy of love’ in individual pre-history, with special focus on the concept of ‘the loving 
Third’. (6) The psychological deconstruction of the threatening image of the Stranger. The 
premise of Kristeva’s psychoanalytical ethics is that ‘the stranger is within us’. Fear of the 
Stranger can be removed by pure self-reflection on the part of the self. The person must only 
revise his or her projections which lead to the exclusion of the foreigner. Theology can 
engage critically with this psychologically derived categorical imperative. God as the true 
Other to the self is theology’s alternative and can make Kristeva’s ethical ideal genuinely 
real.  (7) A mother’s experience with her child. This is the ‘feminine sacred’, a specific 
knowledge of dealing with otherness. (8) Kristeva’s commitment to the psychic rebirth of the 
‘wounded’ subject as a psychotherapist. It raises the need to compare the dynamic of psychic 
rebirths on the psychological horizon and the dynamic of rebirth that ‘grace’ offers. How do 
the two methods relate to each other when theology presents God as the narrative and the 
narrator of the self? (9) Kristeva’s critique of culture in defence of the subject’s particularity 
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over against a homogenising nihilism. (10) Kristeva’s critique(s) of religion. Here, a critique 
can highlight the following areas: Kristeva’s substitution of psychoanalysis for religion; the 
psychoanalytical account of ‘violence’ in religious fundamentalism; Kristeva’s critique of 
sidelined maternal experience in religion; ‘the Virgin Mother’ as a construct of the masculine 
theological imagination; Kristeva’s ‘semiotic’ reading of the Cross; and her most recent 
ethical reading of the Passion. (11) Kristeva’s recent proposal of renewed humanism to 
combat nihilism in order to preserve European cultural identity. (12) Her inviting the 
‘wisdom of religion’ to participate in this alliance. (13) Kristeva’s professional revision of 
Freud’s premise that ‘religion is an illusion’. The way she departs from Freud towards a 
shared ‘symbol building’ with Christians, while keeping her materialist presuppositions 
intact. This correction raises the need to evaluate Kristeva’s humanist and atheistic ‘subtext’ 
critically and in a non-polemical way.  
 
 
3.6.2 Strategic Conclusions 
 
The major areas of analysis such as the ‘exhausted subject’, Kristeva’s materialism as 
an ‘ontological program’, the ‘ontic’ exhaustion of the subject (the unfinished mourning for 
the self’s Christian past’), and Kristeva’s critique of religion were necessary for situating her 
for theology. Part One explored the major points of contact which ground a sound 
theological access to a diverse corpus.  
 
The central thesis Part One argued was that the ‘exhausted subject’ is the underlying 
problem of the oeuvre. We learnt that ‘the exhausted subject’ is about more than the 
‘subjective crisis’ understood strictly in psychological terms. This was theology’s finding. 
My critique arrived at this recognition by pointing to the consequences of the materialist 
grounding of the ‘speaking being’. The subject’s ‘exhaustion’ revealed two characteristically 
different models of the self, that of theology and that of Kristevan psychoanalysis. To put the 
ontological conflict simply, it was a tension between the ‘Kierkegaardian’ and the 
‘Feuerbachian’ models of the self. In the first case, the self’s ground is God, in the second, 
the self (also as history) is self-grounding. The task of situating Kristeva for theology was 
also a task of re-situating this ontological conflict. That is why my study suggested de-
constructing the static apologetic situation by relating Kristeva and theology through Peter 
Homans’ concept of ‘cultural mourning’. This is an objective situation which the ‘exhausted 
subject’ of modernity and post-modernity, as a new historical reference for discourse, has 
created.  
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Approaching Kristeva’s project as an ontological narrative brought into focus the 
underlying humanist ‘narratives’ of her ‘speaking being’. These ‘subtexts’, predominantly 
‘Marx’ and ‘Freud’, are important references for developing a ‘cultural mourning’ through 
which theology and Kristevan psychoanalysis can be linked in an organic way. The analyses 
showed that their conflict is not antagonistic but dialectic. Kristeva’s non-believer’s position 
is not an absolute break with the Christian narrative. A major conclusion of Part One is that 
there is sufficient ground for a shared reflection when the needs of the postmodern subject 
can be responded to. The ‘exhausted subject’ provides a ground on which to operate with the 
notion of a shared historical crisis. This can lead to a shared symbolisation in support of the 
wounded subject of post-modernity. The contextualisation of Kristeva for systematic 
theology can be brought to realisation best within this shared ‘symbolic mourning’.   
 
The ongoing crisis of the subject has revealed the failure of secular humanism and the 
failure of religion to deal with the nihilist crisis. This situation makes it necessary to reopen 
an ‘ontological discourse’ on the ‘beginnings’ and on historical recommencements. My 
study emphasised that Kristeva’s criticism of rationalist humanism poses a genuine challenge 
to ‘post-metaphysical consciousness’. Challenging Cartesian rationality from within the 
discourse on love showed a conflict with the ‘Habermasian position’. Kristeva’s immanent 
criticism of the humanist tradition prompts an ‘ontological discussion’ on the ‘origins’ in a 
new way. She confirms that an in-depth revision of the relationship between the subject and 
culture is inevitable. One of the major conclusions of Part One is that, paradoxically, there is 
more chance of reopening this ‘ontological dialogue’ with theology than with ‘mainstream’ 
rationalist revisions of the Enlightenment. That is why I suggested exploring the possibilities 
of a new way of speaking on ‘origins’. The crisis of the ‘exhausted subject’ makes it possible 
to revisit the classic ‘ontological interest’ of theology. The question of the self’s grounding 
in ‘grace’ can be integrated into the discourse on the crisis of the ‘speaking being’ and 
history. It offers a creative encounter with Kristeva’s ‘semiotic ontology of love’ as the 
program of the self-transcending subject.  
 
The analyses of Part One have shown that Kristeva’s psychoanalysis, as an ‘ontological 
program’, needs to be listened to and also challenged. Though the psychoanalytical 
viewpoint is necessary, yet it cannot be made exclusive. The intriguing paradox for 
psychoanalysis is to realise that it is just as much a discourse marginalised by a nihilist 
culture as is ‘Theologia’, the discussion of divine matters. As a form of cultural critique and 
healing it does not enjoy that canonical state which Kristeva attributes to it. In a sense, 
Kristevan psychoanalysis is more dependent on ‘theology’ than it accepts. However, as a 
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discourse, it is in a genuine position of analysis in areas where theology is not. These justify 
a closer co-operation. 
 
  My study identified as a central challenge for both discourses the problem of the 
resourcing of the person. I arranged the ontological conflict with Kristeva’s materialism 
around this problem. The theological evaluation showed how the materialist grounding of the 
self leads to a systemic exclusion of ‘grace’ from Kristeva’s model. My study raised a 
connection between the loss of a ‘Transcendent selfhood’ and the problem of the ‘exhausted 
subject’. With the help of Kristeva’s novels, I drew attention to the ‘ontological mourning’ 
of the ‘speaking being’. Kristeva’s founding materialism leaves the trauma of uprootedness 
from the Christian past unaddressed. This lack can be overcome only if psychoanalysis, 
when analysing religious experience, makes an attempt to remain within the original 
dynamics of faith. The dynamic of the ‘exhausted subject’ makes this unorthodox ‘leap’ 
necessary. Kołoszyc demonstrated that Kristeva’s methodology, by virtue of its nature, 
excludes this twofold operation.340 Urging psychoanalysis onto this ‘ontological mourning’ 
is the task of theology. To put it in a non-apologetic fashion, it is theology’s service to 
psychoanalysis, as it cannot make this leap by itself or only at the cost of violating its own 
methodological principles. That is why I suggest a co-operation in the medium of ‘cultural 
mourning’. ‘Cultural mourning’, in our specific context, denotes the objective need for a 
shared reflection on the paradigmatic changes in culture which have resulted in the 
‘exhausted subject’.  
 
This objective needs to put an end to the Habermasian prohibition of ‘ontological 
discourse’. The very fact that Kristeva articulates a semiotic ‘semi-ontology’ means that she 
can contribute to a ‘shared cultural mourning’ with her in-depth observations on the 
subjective crisis.  The main conclusion of my study is that co-operation is necessary. 
Kristeva’s dialogical position was the final justification of this non-polemic direction for my 
critique. This claim is supported by Kołoszyc who convincingly argued that there is a far 
deeper structural connection between Kristeva’s immanent criticism of the secular tradition 
and religious discourse than academic research observes.341 My study stresses that within the 
psychoanalytical framework, Kristeva has a critical ideal of religious discourse itself. She 
assigns to it the task of overcoming ‘theological monologism’. That is, theology has to be 
able to present itself as a borderline or interdisciplinary discourse. In our context it means the 
capacity for participating in an ‘inter-symbolic’ encounter. This is a way of doing theology 
                                               
340 Kołoszyc, Religion, Atheism, and the Crisis of Meaning, p.187. 
341 See Chapter 3.1 ‘The Sense of the Other’, or The Sense and Nonsense of Religious Discourse’, 
Ibid., cf. pp.187-191 
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when ‘Theologia’ itself attains an analytical position, when it goes beyond the unitary view 
of the world by acting as an uninterrupted metaphysics. The challenge is to revise the 
relationship between the self, religious language and orthodoxy in this dialogue. 
 
The analyses of the ‘exhausted subject’ showed the need for the ideological horizon of 
the ‘exhausted subject’ to be examined. The humanist and atheistic subtexts of the ‘speaking 
being’ in this context attain a new significance. The relationship of the self to its religious 
past self necessitates a revaluation of the efficiency of these founding narratives. It can be 
rightly supposed that some of their answers have expired in the present situation. The 
historical examination of the problem in Kristeva’s works confirmed this critical direction. 
However, the ‘exhaustion’ of the postmodern self needs to be reflected upon in a new way. It 
means that the changed potential of Kristeva’s ‘ideological subtexts’ and the resources of 
theology have to be evaluated together. The same applies to previous strategies of 
theological modernity dealing with the crisis. Part Two brings them into dialogue with 
Kristeva’s ‘modernist resources’ (Marx, Freud, Arendt.) 
 
I conclude with what my study regards as the most important strategic recognition. The 
direct ontological critique of Kristeva’s materialism is not possible. Any direct exchange 
between her Freudianism and theology would necessarily perpetuate an apologetic 
relationship. This is an objective impasse. That is why developing a critique also on a 
‘symbolic’ level was necessary. Reading the novels in terms of the unfinished ‘mourning’ 
for the Christian origins of the self made this ‘transcending’ possible. The ‘loss of the 
Father’, both in a religious and psychological sense, allows a more flexible, ‘symbolic’ 
discussion than the theoretical discourse of the ontological conflict. The good news is that 
the conflict with Kristeva’s materialism can be revisited on a different level. In this case, the 
direct object of critique is not the conflict with Kristeva’s immanent horizon, but the crisis of 
the subject which makes this immanence visible. The historical needs of the subject make 
possible a genuine transcending of the apologetic situation.  
 
My study identified the two most important needs of the subject. (1) The self needs to 
be grounded on love, which is the only sufficient counter-economy over against nihilism. (2) 
The inherited ideological narratives of the self, religious and secular, have to be ‘mourned’, 
that is, updated. The two together can lead to a new responsiveness of the subject (Kristeva’s 
‘intimate revolt’). The comprehensive theological response to Kristeva has to accomplish 
both of these tasks.  
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The overview of Kristeva’s critique of religion confirmed that the crisis of the ‘speaking 
being’ situates secular and theological humanisms in a ‘Good Friday’ dialogue. The ultimate 
confirmation that raising the nature–‘grace’–‘language’ relationship is possible was 
Kristeva’s recently proposed new humanist coalition to combat nihilism, in which ‘religious 
wisdom’ is also included. For theology the time has come when tackling the challenges of 
secular culture (‘nihilism’ in focus) a new re-presentation of divine Love cannot be 
postponed. In an age which needs a ‘second’, post-Freudian criticism, theology has to offer 
an in-depth analysis of the relationship between God and the subject. The subtlety of 
Kristeva’s theories prompts critique on her to expound the complexity of ‘the amorous 
discourse’ of theology. That is, it should offer an alternative to the banal images of God with 
which culture operates. This complex language on God, indirectly, will have to show that the 
Kristevan horizon is not complete on its own. The ‘personalism’ that Kristeva exhibits, needs 
to be completed and challenged by the personalism that theology can spell out. That is, if 
theology wants to be relevant, it needs to offer a narrative which is capable of critically 
integrating Kristeva’s emphasis on the particularity or historicity of psychic suffering. It is a 
witness to the ‘intimate revolt’ of theology.  
 
Situating Kristeva for theology in Part One suggests developing a response to the 
‘passion’ of the ‘speaking being’ from the historical Passion of the ‘absolute subject’, Christ. 
My study in Part Two will take up the evaluation of Kristeva’s ontological program in the 
context of the proposed new ‘symbol building’. Her ‘semiotic’ narratives will be responded 
to from a mutual ‘symbolic’ reading of Passion. My point is that the inner development of 
Kristeva’s work, in view of her dialogical turn, naturally suggests taking up this direction.  
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Aniko Boros, ‘It Still Lies in the Womb of Time: Nature, Rebirth’, 1997 /coloured ink/ 
(an illustration for the Semiotic Passion) 
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PART TWO: THE ‘SEMIOTIC PASSION’: A RESPONSE FROM THE THEOLOGY 
OF THE CROSS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Part One and Part Two relate to each other as exposition and conversation. Part One 
situated Kristeva as a potential dialogue partner for theology. The task of Part Two is to bring 
to realisation this dialogue. Its purpose is to show the relevance of developing a 
comprehensive response from within the specific theological genre, the theologia crucis.  
 
Part Two initiates a critical conversation on the ‘ontic exhaustion’ of the subject, which 
Kristeva does not fully answer. Part Two completes the thesis Part One argued. The 
underlying problem of the ‘speaking being’ is the subject’s historical or ontic ‘exhaustion’ 
(Part One), and this ‘exhausted subject’ can be responded to best from the theology of the 
cross (Part Two). By now the meaning of ‘ontic exhaustion’ is clearly defined. It stands for 
the critical exhaustion of the resources of the self. The impasse of the subject of culture is so 
acute that theology makes the claim that in order to resolve this impasse it is necessary to 
speak again of the consequences of the loss of the ‘Transcendent’ resources of the self. 
Against this background, Part Two metaphorically can be seen as a ‘Good Friday dialogue’, 
as it invites Kristeva’s Freudianism to make ‘ontological’ statements on the self’s grounding 
together with theology.   
 
That the theology of the cross can be seen as a synthesis of doctrine, analogous to 
Kristeva’s synthesis of the Enlightenment tradition, on its own, is not a sufficient reason for 
developing the response from the theologia crucis. Nor is it a sufficient explanation that 
Kristeva shows a genuine interest in the theme of the cross, or that her early apologetic view 
of religion ‘as repressive dogma’ is completely missing from her recent works. As Mercer 
said of her non-apologetic turn, the absence of apologetics hardly represents a 
conversation.342 This conversation needs to be built. Naming the ideological and 
‘ontological’ differences, by themselves is not sufficient. Moreover, if discourse stops at this 
level, it generates only a sleeping apologetics, which easily gets reactivated. That is why my 
purpose is to integrate the tension with Kristeva’s materialism into a shared ‘symbolic 
mourning’. It aims at a new symbolic resourcing of the postmodern subject. 
 
                                               
342 Mercer, ‘Psychoanalysis, Parents and God’, p.253. 
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The argument of Part Two is as follows. (1) The ‘exhausted subject’ lives with the 
situation of the loss of the Father. The primary task is that this loss needs to be ‘mourned’. 
(2) This situation, my study argues, necessitates a specific form of ‘cultural mourning’. It is a 
common re-reading of the Passion with the Freudian tradition. This is an objective and 
necessary form of response to the situation of the ‘lost Father’. (3) Theology and 
psychoanalysis are both affected by the loss of the Father. Both approaches have to face the 
new cultural situation where love remains unrepresented. 
 
(4) My study presents the ‘Semiotic Passion’ as the shared ‘symbolic’ mourning for the 
‘loss of the Father’. I shall be concerned with the ‘updates’ both theology and Kristevan 
psychoanalysis have to make in order to recover the Father’s love. We find both traditions in 
a state of ‘unfinished mourning’ in terms of a fuller comprehension of the subject’s present 
state. My critique’s prime interest is where Kristeva’s response to the ‘exhausted subject’ 
remains incomplete. As Part One demonstrated, it is the ‘religious dimension’ of the 
subjective crisis. Theology argues that, in recovering the ‘Father’, it is necessary to ‘re-
ground’ the subject in his religious past, which is ‘unmourned’. However, when theology 
submits this argument, it faces an incomplete ‘linguistic renewal’ in theological modernity. 
That is why, instead of presenting a one-sided critique, my argument necessarily takes the 
shape of a bilateral conversation.  
 
(5) From this unfinished ‘cultural mourning’ my study singles out the problem of the 
Father-image of the theology of the cross, which theological modernity has inherited. The 
reason for it is straightforward. When critique challenges Kristeva’s immanentism by arguing 
that re-grounding the self in ‘grace’ is necessary for recovering the ‘Father’s love’, then, a 
critical revision of the Father-image at the heart of the Passion, which theology intends to 
present, is also necessary. My study ‘purifies’ the image of the Father by presenting the 
concept of the ‘Loving Third party’ as a theological image. This move is directly linked to 
Kristeva’s sophisticated ‘atheistic’ subtext, Freud’s criticism of the ‘Christian Father’. 
Resolving the underlying ‘ideological’ tension will pave the way for the ‘exhausted subject’ 
to return to the ‘Father’s love’. It will also ground a successful ‘mourning’ with Kristeva for 
the ‘ontological split’, explored in Part One.  
 
(6) The second major area upon which Part Two focuses is the successful or completed 
elements of the ‘cultural mourning’ of theological modernity. My study argues that the 
theologia crucis has sufficient resources for a comprehensive response to Kristeva. This 
response addresses her psychoanalytic project in general, the ‘ontic’ or ‘unmourned’ needs 
of the postmodern subject, her ‘critiques of religion’, and particularly her dialogical turn with 
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her recent re-reading of the Passion. It will be a critical dialogue with her ‘atheistic’ and 
other humanistic resources. This dialogue, metaphorically, is a ‘Semiotic Passion’. We speak 
here of the ‘semiotic’ Passion because its language incorporates both Kristeva’s 
methodology and Christian doctrine. 
 
(7) Having explored the potentials and limits of modernity’s theology of the cross, my 
study presents a ‘concrete’ version of the ‘Semiotic Passion’. This is a necessary theoretical 
proposal, as the situation of the ‘exhausted subject’ is far from being resolved in a reassuring 
way, either by her discourse or, in the Catholic context,  by ‘mainstream’ ‘Magisterial’ 
theology. The Semiotic Passion, however sketchily, will signal those directions which my 
critique regards as necessary for presenting the Cross as a generative cultural symbol. This 
strictly theoretical proposal aims at revealing theology’s cultural mourning in relationship to 
the postmodern subject. 
 
In terms of the thematic structure, Part Two presents three types of ‘cultural mourning’ 
related to the symbol of the cross. These readings of the ‘Passion’ are that of Freud, that of 
Kristeva in dialogue with religion, and that of the theology of the cross. They are three 
interrelated readings of the ‘Father’s love’. What is common in them is that the true object is 
the contemporary self or the ‘exhausted subject’ of culture. These analyses will examine 
systematically the underlying cause of the ‘exhaustion’: the loss of the Father’s love. In this 
way, my study relates the ‘exhausted subject’ with the ‘lost father’. As a comprehensive 
response to Kristeva, Part Two spells out the task of recovering this relationship as the 
theological dimension of the self in theology’s solution.  
 
The three readings of the Passion will show three strategies to recover the Father’s love. 
At the endpoint of these strategies, in order to give a symbolic support to the ‘exhausted 
subject’, I argue, arriving at the Semiotic Passion is a natural outcome. My study presents it 
as the only logical resolution of the ‘ontological’ and ideological conflict with Kristeva. The 
Semiotic Passion as a theoretical proposal integrates not only the original Freudian and the 
Kristevan reading of the cross, but, in a wider sense, Kristeva’s atheistic and humanist 
subtexts. Thus, my study ends with a ‘post-Freudian reading’ of the Passion. It serves as a 
theological ‘bridge’ or model from which ground it becomes possible for theology to engage 
those forms of contemporary humanism which have or seek contact with religious discourse. 
In this sense, the Semiotic Passion is a ‘model of the secular’. It is a narrative framework 
which puts the non-apologetic stance, that my critique develops, into practice. As a real 
dialogue, it confirms the program of ‘gracing the secular’ (J. Hanvey). This confirmation is 
all the more important as, with the rise of aggressive secularism, there is a parallel rise of 
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neo-foundationalism both in theology and ecclesial policies, but also in some forms of 
secular humanism. Mark C. Taylor confirms that neo-foundationalism is a distinctively 
postmodern phenomenon and itself is part of post-modernity.343 Taylor, in his own context, 
also confirms that the program of Vatican II, to ‘grace the secular’ through dialogue with 
secular humanism is an endangered program. ‘Unquestioned religiosity and moralism are 
actually more dangerous than the beliefs and practices they are designed to resist.’344 That is 
why it is necessary for theology to separate itself from the obsession with condemning post-
modernity and its discourses. The engagement with Kristeva, and particularly the Semiotic 
Passion, offers a discourse in which theology can operate outside the hermeneutical wounds 
caused by post-modernity.  
 
‘The very counterculture charged with leading society down the slippery slope of 
relativism and nihilism is actually a spiritual or even religious phenomenon, and the 
moral zealots who attack relativism in the name of absolutism are nihilists who reject 
the present world for the sake of a future kingdom they believe is coming.’345 
 
 This warning of Taylor is an important guide for my Semiotic Passion. It is against this 
background that I suggest a view of the postmodern situation and the postmodern subject, 
non-apologetically, ‘from within’; from within ‘grace’. 
 
 
                                               
343 Mark C. Taylor, After God, (Religion and Postmodernism, a series edited by Mark C. Taylor and 
Thomas A. Carlson), The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London 2007, p.132. 
344 Ibid., p.xvii. 
345 Ibid., p.xvii 
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4 THE NEW SITUATION IN CULTURE: THE LOST FATHER  
 
4.1 Why Develop A Response From The Theology of The Cross?   
 
Part One started by situating Kristeva against her secular background. My study follows 
the same strategy when it situates the response it develops against the wider background of 
‘mainstream’ theological discourses. Much of modern theology thinks it is responding to the 
crisis of the subject and is convinced that it has sufficient resources for understanding the 
‘person’ in the nihilist crisis. In reality, it knows very little of the situation in the sense that it 
has no direct contact with the postmodern subject. We can distinguish two major strategies.  
 
The ontological tradition, either in its theological or philosophical forms, seeks what is 
persistent in time and history, what is the ground of a constant ‘identity’.346 ‘Onto-
theology’347 in general argues that personal and cultural identity should be defined from an 
‘objectivity’ of a future, the eschatological world of God. We can call its different forms an 
‘eschatological ontology’348 ‘Onto-theology’, when intensified as the Christian critique of 
culture, says that the answer to the crisis is a return ‘ad fontes’ or to the sources of faith. In 
other words, we need to return to the ‘clean spring of Christian metaphysics’. By reinstating 
these classic ontological principles, onto-theology expects Transcendence, doctrinal and 
liturgical orthodoxy will also be recovered. The crisis of modernity is cured by ‘going before 
the crisis’. In these ‘neo-orthodox’ approaches,349 the underlying universal crisis of culture is 
denied. In the ‘restoration model’, the crisis is not a general crisis of culture; instead, it is 
attributed only to the ‘Secular’ side. ‘Secularity’ becomes accountable, being identified as 
the cause of alienation from Transcendence. In this writer’s view, this is the very moment 
when the chance for a genuine analysis of culture is lost. 
 
The second strategy is that of ‘postmodern theology’. This model recognises the need to 
engage with the secular structures of culture. Postmodern theology engages the linguistic 
structures of the subject. In this endeavour, the risk is that theology can go too close to the 
contemporary subject and lose sight of orthodoxy. Kristeva challenges both of these 
strategies. In a figurative sense, to neo-orthodox models she says, ‘your revisionist return to 
                                               
346 Grenz, Franke, Beyond Foundationalism, p.267. 
347 This is an extremely difficult umbrella term, which is widely used but never unanimously defined. 
For an overview of this theological tradition see Beyond Foundationalism, pp.266-273. 
348 See the process philosophy of Alfred Whitehead, the eschatological ontology of Wolfhart 
Pannenberg, or its philosophical version, or the linking of the future to the self in Martin Heidegger.  
Grenz, John R. Franke, Beyond Foundationalism, pp.269. 272. 
349 The examples are virtually unlimited. This denial is exemplified by David Torevell’s Losing the 
Sacred, Ritual, Modernity and Liturgical Reform, T&Clark, Edinburgh 2000. 
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metaphysics is an illusion because you are implicated in the crisis of the subject as well. You 
cannot talk of God with relevance if your discourse is disconnected from a common history’. 
Kristeva also challenges postmodern theologies by saying that though they see the problem 
of the postmodern subject, yet, they can never fully ‘mourn’ its sufferings while staying 
outside this suffering and the actual ‘language’ of the subject. A ‘soft’ understanding of the 
subject, in terms of engaging only with the linguistic playfulness of the subject, is only a 
superficial response, and is a kind of patronising attitude to post-modernity. This is 
‘postmodern theology’ at its worst. Instead, warns Kristeva, it is necessary to go underneath 
the language of this subject and understand the psychic roots of the crisis. The implied 
criticism is this: neither form of theology takes seriously the historicity of the subject. The 
postmodern subject, paradoxically, remains ‘abstract’ for ‘mainstream’ theologies operating 
in the postmodern period. They postulate postmodern experiences of faith, and attribute 
‘religious’ anxieties to this subject, but actually never analyse ‘psychic suffering’. 350 Part 
One argued that it is through this particular passion that the religious content of this ‘ontic’ 
suffering is revealed. 
 
Thence it follows that the ‘extrinsic’ view of the postmodern subject and culture has to 
be transcended. As for ‘onto-theology’, its classic narrative to re-ground the self in God is 
not sufficient any longer. It is the postmodern self, postmodern history, and not the self and 
history in general which need to be re-grounded. Theology needs to realise that the 
‘theological subject’ or the subject of faith is also involved in the postmodern drama. The 
theology of the cross, understood in its original function, is a borderline discourse within 
Tradition, because it is always a borderline discourse with culture, being Tradition’s most 
exposed surface to the ‘Secular’. My study opts for the theologia crucis in view of its 
meaning recovered by Moltmann. That is, the theology of the cross is the very core of the 
‘immanent’ criticism of Tradition. Its function is to prompt Christian reflection to interrogate 
the relationship between faith, orthodoxy, subject and culture. As a borderline discourse, it is 
always the avant-garde language of the Church which prompts the renewal of Christian 
                                               
350 I refer to two forms of doing ‘postmodern theology’. The first is theologising in the modernist 
fashion, exemplified by the dialogical approach of Roger Haight. The second is postmodern theology 
in a narrow sense, when it internalises the linguistic sensitivity of the postmodern period. My example 
is Richard Kearney’s playful compassion for the postmodern subject. Haight, in order to make sense 
of traditional doctrine for ‘present consciousness’ ends up with inflating orthodoxy while talking to an 
imagined (theologically constructed) postmodern audience. Kearney engages this new listener through 
an intense theological playfulness, and shows a genuine interest in postmodern critical strategies, but 
he also does not let ‘postmodern suffering’ speak for itself. However, in stark contrast to neo-orthodox 
approaches and Haight, Kearney gives a genuine account of how postmodern suffering can be seen 
with empathy from within classic theology. See, Haight, Jesus: Symbol of God, and Kearney’s 
Levinasian reinterpretation of the persona, section ‘Persona as eschaton’, in Richard Kearney, 
‘Transfiguring God’ (pp.369-393), in The Blackwell Companion to Postmodern Theology, edited by 
Graham Ward, Blackwell, Oxford 2005. (First edition 2001) 
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identity and incites a fresh commitment to serve the suffering Christ in the world. Christ’s 
cross is a crisis of Christian identity, and this self-interrogation connects with the crisis of 
the alienated world.351 Thus, the theology of the cross is the deepest connection with the 
‘exhausted’ subject and ‘exhausted’ history.352 A theology of the cross, conceived in this way, 
has the potential to integrate the values of the above ‘mainstream’ theological approaches 
and overcome their limitations. The theologia crucis, as a borderline discourse, as the crisis-
narrative of the believer and the ‘exhausted subject’, can also internalise Kristeva’s agendas.  
 
The two protagonists of the Cross are the Father and the Son. In Jesus, as ‘absolute 
subject’ (Kristeva’s ‘speaking being’), the ‘exhausted subject’ is also present. It is this 
common ground that makes the ‘exhausted subject’ and the ‘Father’s love’ the focal points 
for a shared ‘symbolisation’. The content of Kristeva’s ‘psychic passion’ shows the theology 
of the cross as the most immediate ‘intertext’ of her ‘speaking being’. The following themes 
present the reasons why the ‘Cross’ as the passion of Love proves to be a comprehensive 
response to Kristeva in terms of overlapping with her themes.  
 
(1) Kristeva emphasises the historicity of the subject, its historical uniqueness. 
(2) The core of Kristeva’s linguistic model is the theme of love. Love as meaning is 
offered by the ‘loving Third party’: as parental love, or as love in psychoanalytical 
transference.  Kristeva states that love, as the transcendent dynamic of the self, is alone 
redemptive.  
(3) Kristeva exposes the ‘vulnerability’ of love. Meaning is always fragile. Love as a 
communication is always in a precarious state, human love is ‘exhaustible’. Her focus is 
psychic suffering. 
(4) Kristeva’s psycho-linguistic soteriology relies on the resources of a renewed 
humanism. Her speaking subject in need of ‘healing’ reveals particular forms of ‘loss’. The 
‘Stranger’, the culturally uprooted ‘Migrant/Foreigner’, and ‘unlistened to motherhood’ 
articulate important aspects of the ‘exhausted subject’. All these losses call for the counter-
economy of love and genuine listening.  
(5) To the ‘exhausted subject’ Kristeva offers linguistic rebirth: the renewal of identity in 
a foreign language, in another narrative, or in a new culture. In the background, there is the 
                                               
351 Jürgen Moltmann, The Crucified God, The Cross of Christ as the Foundation and Criticism of 
Christian Theology, SCM Press Ltd, London 1982, fifth English edition (original German edition 
1973), p. 25. 
352 For the overview of Moltmann’s formulation of this program of renewal for the theologia crucis of 
modernity see, Ch.1 ‘The Identity and Relevance of Faith’ (pp-7-31), in Moltmann, The Crucified 
God. 
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need to respond to ‘global uprootedness’. Kristeva clearly envisions the subject in the 
process of a complex ‘cultural mourning’, the aim of which is accommodation to ‘change’.  
(6) Kristeva is mourning for the subject ‘exhausted’ by nihilism. Her project attempts to 
recover the Father’s Love through the ‘feminine Sacred’, which latter is spelled out as an 
alternative authority of love. Yet, this authority always refers to the Father and also is in 
need of support from it. This way, figuratively speaking, Kristeva sets up a ‘Trinitarian 
dynamic’, a narrative of mutual support. 
(7) The ethics of solidarity which Kristeva is in search of turns towards the abandoned 
sufferer (abandoned by culture). Kristeva’s recent drawing on the Christian Passion as a 
source for a secular ethics explores further the meaning of ‘exhaustion’: handicapped people, 
identity conflict in the communities of second generation migrants (‘Muslim radicalisation’ 
against a host culture), and other forms of un-listened to identities.  
(8) In order to reach a fuller understanding of the subject, Kristeva enters into dialogue 
with religion. She corrected Freud’s controversial premise. Religion is not an illusion. To 
believe in the other is our innermost psychic need. The archetype of the ‘speaking being’ is 
homo religiosus. Though this is not an ontological correction of Freud, Kristeva opens the 
door for religion to give its own view on ‘exhaustion’ and the Freudian narrative itself.  
 
These points show that Kristeva attempts to mourn the postmodern subject in its full 
vulnerability. In theology’s idiom, the implied claim is that ‘psychic suffering’ needs to be 
incorporated into the ‘economy of the Cross’. Through the analyses of Part One, my study 
presents the ‘exhausted subject’ as a passion-narrative in its own right. Both theology and 
psychoanalysis are invited to listen to this wounded subjectivity. This postmodern passion as 
psychic and ‘ontological’ suffering is a crucial ‘bridge’ to Kristeva’s renewed Freudianism. 
If ‘exhaustion’ is ongoing, unstopped, then, psychoanalytic strategies which adhere to a 
‘closed’ post-metaphysical consciousness need to be revised. The response to the ‘world of 
fragile things, fragile selves, fragile psyches and fragile love’353 can no longer exclude the 
religious contribution as Ruti, Kristeva’s follower, does. The ‘Habermasian position’, within 
psychoanalysis, must be revised. It is striking how ideologically unrevised Freudianisms can 
deny the ‘ideological’ limits of their regime: ‘I [Ruti] consequently suggest that we 
undermine our chances for happiness when we envision it in terms of …ascending to a 
transcendent realm beyond our daily lives.’354 My study takes the view that with her 
dialogical turn, Kristeva has realised the ‘unstoppable’ crisis of the subject and has started an 
ideologically open ‘mourning’. One can objectively speak of a genuine ‘Good Friday-
                                               
353 Mari Ruti, A World of Fragile Things, Psychoanalysis and the Art of Living, Suny Series in 
Psychoanalysis and Culture, Editor Henry Sussmann, State University of New York Press, New York 
2009, p.1. 
354 Ibid, p.12. 
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situation’, not only the ‘exhausted subject’, but also of his ‘accompanying narratives’. In this 
‘borderline situation’ Kristeva and the theology of the cross find themselves in the position 
of an ‘ontological’ dialogue about the nature of the crisis. 
 
 
4.2 A New Situation in Culture: The Lost Father 
 
This dialogue is given a definite confirmation in the ‘loss of the Father’. Coming to 
terms with this cultural condition sets up the major directions for my critique. The ‘loss of 
the Father’ is that objective cultural situation through which we can relate Kristeva’s 
Freudianism and theology most immediately. The ‘loss of the Father’ is not only a 
psychological situation but a sum of complex losses. Kristeva approaches this loss in terms 
of its consequences. Human beings have become ‘less “identities” than journeys’, transitory 
beings.355 Her psychoanalysis insists on overturning Marx’s notion of the ‘Heimat’ (authentic 
‘homeland’ with un-alienated social relationship) by redefining this program in the present 
phase of nihilism.356 The term occurs in Kristeva’s own text.357 ‘Homeland’ in all its 
traditional sense is lost: ‘Technology and politics have increasingly detached us from our 
natural habitats and have turned us into nomads once again.’358 Kristeva states a drastic 
change in the state of the subject, which renders unviable all previous solutions of modernity 
to attain a ‘Heimat’. This contact with Kristeva’s ‘Marxian subtext’ is important for my study 
because theology faces a similar challenge. There is no direct return to modernity’s 
‘redemptive’ ideals. The medium of history has been radically altered. Now it is collective, 
unreflected ‘Passion’, a history of the ‘migrants of the global economy and the navigators 
                                               
355 Kristeva, Melanie Klein, p.195. 
356 The term in Kristeva’s use has a connotation with its original Marxist meaning. At its historical 
roots we find Marx’s political reflections to redefine German national identity. He sought a political 
solution to attain an ideal social transformation, overcoming social alienation. Later Marxist literature 
uses Marx’s Heimat ideal in a more general sense, as a summary of the ideal state or social space, 
when the proletariat (‘exhausted subject’) returns to his authentic existence, ‘homeland’. Kristeva’s 
Nations without Nationalism and her projects dealing with the otherness/foreigner can be linked to 
this originally Marxian agenda. It is worth drawing a parallel with the original historical problem to 
which the ‘Heimat’ referred. The ‘nation-state’, according to the Marxist criticism, hindered bringing 
to realisation the authentic existence of the citizens. I refer to this orginal problem because Kristeva 
takes it up in the context of globalisation and cultural pluralism, and also in the context of the ‘loss of 
the Father’. In the Marxist social critique of culture, ‘Heimat represents intimate and immediate 
spaces and relationships and is closely connected to the everyday life of ordinary people. As such, the 
idea of Heimat is the antithesis of the idea of the nation, the abstract idea that has organised life and 
thought in the modern world… Heimat and nation [as a homogenising identity] are contradictory 
terms…because the idea of nation is associated with conflict, that of Heimat is associated with 
Harmony; while the nation is a conglomeration of diverse and opposing groups, Heimat stands for 
tightly knit community, while perceiving the nation requires a process of generalisations and 
stereotypisation, the Heimat embodies face-to-face human relations.’ In Alon Cafino, Germany as a 
Culture of Remembrance, Promises and Limits of Writing History, UNC Press 2006, p. 62.  
357 Kristeva, Hannah Arendt, p.135. 
358 Ibid., p.195. 
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who use satellite television or the Internet’.359 It is highly significant that Kristeva diagnoses 
at the heart of the crisis the disappearance of the Father as an all permeating cultural loss. 
 
‘Along with the questioning of authority, the law, and values – which has been 
interpreted as an attack on the role of the father – the loss of habitat that characterises 
our fate undermines the original place, assaults maternal support, and threatens to 
destroy identity itself.’360 (Emphasis added.) 
 
It should be noted that Kristeva speaks of the Father as the ‘Loving Third party’, in 
which the ‘feminine’ dimension of the sacred (‘meaning’) is also included.  The erosion of 
this ground of the ‘historical self’ is also succinctly demonstrated in her important section on 
Arendt, ‘Superfluous Humanity’.361 This is the most detailed description of ‘exhausted 
history’. Here Kristeva makes the relationship between the self and history central, by 
relating the self/culture to the corruption of paternal authority. In the new cultural situation, 
one also has to see this crisis in terms of the perversion of the ‘Father’s love’.  Consumerism 
deliberately presents the ‘Father’ in a corrupted form, in which its inerasable appeal from 
human consciousness, ‘the yearning for the Father’, is exploited. It is highly significant that 
Kristeva connects modernity and post-modernity as epochs which manifest the deterioration 
of the ‘Father’. Totalitarianism, by corrupting the ‘Father’s love’ (Nazism, communism), 
produced the fatal inability to trust in the historical ‘Other’. There is historical continuity 
between modernity and post-modernity, they manifest the destruction of psychic space. This 
‘madness’, the loss of the genuine Father’s genuine love, has been passed on to our present 
‘totalitarian massification’. The loss of the meaning of the Father runs in parallel with the 
‘exhaustion’ of the subject. The Father’s love is evacuated from history, leaving the subject 
in the state of utmost disorientation:  
 
‘Arendt creates a veritable anthropology, even a political psychology, of totalitarian 
massification by describing the destruction of the psychic space of humans under 
totalitarian regimes, proof of which may be found in the fact that when movements lose 
their power, their formerly fanatical supporters immediately stop believing in the dogma 
and throw themselves instead into the quest for another promising fiction.’362  
 
This situation manifests the ‘death of God’ in the sense that the ‘love of the Father’ 
cannot be reconstructed from a social memory which has been undergoing the most 
devastating ‘cultural forgetting’. The central question for religious and secular humanism is 
from which source can the ‘Father’s love’ be brought back to cultural memory?  The concern 
is shared with Kristeva. However, in answering the challenge, the ‘ontological’ difference 
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 147 
arises. Theology claims that the ‘exhaustion’ of historical consciousness has reached a point 
(or realistically, can reach), when from within the available social and political patterns of 
‘human love’, the culture of Love cannot be recovered. It is in this situation, theology claims, 
that we realise that Love is revealed. With the corruption of love’s immanent grounds, 
reinstating the Transcendent ‘ground’ of love becomes necessary. Theology claims that it is 
the sole ‘archetype’ from which ‘love’ and the ‘human interior’ based on it can be recovered. 
Apart from the ideological difference, Kristeva agrees with the objective need to recover and 
re-learn the Father’s universal love.  
 
This need to recover the lost universalism of the ‘Father’ is the moment for the 
theologia crucis. The Cross preserves the full ‘meaning’ of the Father. The story of love 
which the Cross reveals, theology claims, can be presented as the ‘Heimat’ or Homeland. 
There is a new spatial re-articulation of ‘home’ in terms of the Kingdom of God, which is the 
Father’s active presence in human history. Presenting this program is theology’s ‘cultural 
mourning’ or attempt to renew its core-symbols for the postmodern age. My study examines 
this unique potential of theology, while at the same time points out where this symbolic 
renewal is unfinished. As for Kristeva’s humanism, this revision of the theologia crucis 
reveals a conflict with her ‘atheistic subtexts’, Marx and Freud. My critique needs to reply to 
the claim they insinuate, namely that theology cannot produce a relevant ‘cultural mourning’ 
for the lost Father (‘home’).  
 
In her analysis of Klein, Kristeva clearly distinguishes the psychoanalytic solution. 
Traditional ‘teleological’ narratives, including theology, in Kristeva’s view, attempt returning  
 
‘to the origin, the ecology of the habitat, and the protection of the homeland. All of 
these seek to preserve the possibility of entering into a stable abode, a reliable 
arrangement, and a primordial religious meditation on the human experience that is 
contingent on a space that knows how to space itself out.’363 
 
The difference of the psychoanalytic approach lies in the strategy that instead of return, 
Kristeva states, we have to  
 
‘familiarise [ourselves] with the locus of pain itself, that is, with the original 
uprooting – not to repress it in an effort to hastily rebuild [our] original habitat, but to 
“inhabit” the dehabitation and the primordial separation – provided the verb to inhabit is 
not too placid to describe the auscultation of the original wound.’364 (Emphasis added.) 
 
                                               
363 Kristeva, Melanie Klein, pp.195-196. 
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Theology can fully agree with this policy of naming the pain in a situation in which the 
loss of the ‘Loving Third party’ implies the loss not only of cultural symbols, but primarily 
the loss of those communities that would generate functioning cultural symbols. Without 
these supports the being is a ‘catastrophic being’.365 Kristeva does not hide the fact that in 
this situation for the postmodern subject every language, every new identity is a ‘foreign 
language’ and a foreign identity. The radical novelty of the situation, as Kristeva emphasises, 
is that the ‘speaking being’ in all its temporary abodes recognises ‘the non-place where he 
situated himself’. In every rebirth and ‘cultural symbol’ ‘there is a foreign aspect to what is 
familiar, a maternal uncanniness that lurks beneath’, a ‘there’ where there is ‘nothing but 
sensory chaos, overload, dismantling.’366  
 
It is in this state that Kristeva pronounces the need to develop a symbolism through 
which we can face the loss of the self and return to the habitat of the ‘loving Third party’. 
With her program, to explore the ‘inside’ of the ‘speaking being’ in order to reground his 
‘wounded’ identity, theology can fully agree. There is only one way out from the crisis, if the 
ability to identify with the loving ‘Other’ is recovered.  
 
 
4.3 The Loss of the Father’s Love: A New ‘Symbolic Mourning’ 
 
There is a wider ‘symbolic’ context which confirms that Kristeva’s theological critique 
should take the form of a shared symbolic reflection on love. The loss of ‘the Loving Third 
party’ as the genuine Other to the self is an objective situation of ‘cultural mourning’. More 
than that, if Kristeva’s critique of the present cultural state is correct, the underlying image of 
the ‘wounded’ Father indeed has to be made the centre of ‘cultural mourning’. This is the 
point where I would like to introduce a further element of Homans’ theory of ‘symbolic 
mourning’ and apply it to the situation of the ‘lost Father’. According to Homans,  
 
‘Symbolic loss refers to the loss of an attachment to a political ideology or 
religious creed, or to some aspect or fragment of one, and to the inner work of coming 
to terms with this kind of loss. In this sense it resembles mourning. However, in the case 
of symbolic loss the object that is lost is, ordinarily, sociohistorical, cognitive, and 
collective. The lost object is a symbol or rather a system of symbols.’367 (Emphasis 
added.) 
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The dynamic this loss generates fits perfectly in our context. The loss of a central 
symbol, the ‘Father’, to which the whole web of symbols of love is attached, incites a new 
symbolic quest in culture. Homans identifies the phases of the process. At its starting point, a 
‘fantasy eruption’ in culture emerges in the wake of the symbolic crisis. This is an initial 
instability, a state of disorientation. New images and discourses arise without any symbolic 
coherence. With time, a gradual evaluation of these symbolic narratives takes place. Often 
these ‘fantasies’ become competing images. Within ‘cultural mourning’, we witness the 
following stages: cultural loss→fantasy eruptions→interpretation of these fantasies/ 
mourning→new structure building.368 Homans originally developed this theory as an 
explanation of the Freudian shift. The psychoanalytical discourse was the feverish fantasy 
activity, a counter-reaction to an excessive rationalist turn in European culture (Cartesian 
rationalism). The symbols Freudianism created gave a new coherent view of the shaken self 
– culture – Transcendence − immanence relationship, with a special focus on the split 
between ‘love’ and ‘reason/authority’. 369 
  
We can apply the scheme in the following way. The loss of the ‘Father’ was the ultimate 
loss of our culture which, as a process, took place overarching modernity and post-
modernity.  Critical reflection focused on the Father’s ‘authority’ in this loss. However, my 
point is that losing the Father’s love is the central event of the period. My study, in 
agreement with Kristeva, highlights that the loss of love underlies the loss of the authority of 
reason. Kristevan psychoanalysis and theology posit this ‘second loss’ as the big event of 
culture. The response to this loss is an unfinished business, dangerously unfinished. The loss 
of the ‘Father’s love’ necessitates a ‘second symbolic mourning’, analogous to the ‘Freudian 
turn’ which Homans analysed.370 This situation is an occasion for a new (symbolic) ‘structure 
building’. It is new in the sense too, that the split between the Freudian and Post-
Christendom responses, with their opposing solutions to the crisis of culture, has to be 
incorporated into this shared symbol building and ‘mourned’ in this way.  
 
In the postmodern context, the ‘loss of the Father’ is such a paradigmatic change that it 
necessarily creates a borderline state in culture’s symbolic imagination. It is a feverish 
transition period with many possible endings. At the first level, nihilism has created a void 
which is filled by ‘replicas’ or replacements of the Father. Consumerist culture manipulates 
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the images of love and ‘meaning’. On the level of critical reflection, a search has already 
started to ‘defend’ the images of love and make the loving ‘Father’ return. Kristeva’s 
mapping out a general crisis with the help of Arendt, Klein and her Freudian ‘semiotics’ has 
reached an openness which aims at building this defence around the subject as wide as 
possible. This objective need to keep discourse on love alive links the theological and the 
psychoanalytical critique of culture, in terms of their relevance and not in ‘competition’.   
 
The cultural situation of the ‘silenced Father’ posits the following challenges for 
theology. They clarify further the questions already raised. How can theology address the 
new historical consciousness? Can it offer its visions of the Father (ethical, theological) to a 
subject who is deprived of any coherent symbolism of fatherhood? How can it translate the 
complex dynamics of faith, the hinge of which is the Father’s love, to a subjectivity which is 
uprooted from the religious narrative itself? What concept of history can theology offer to a 
self caught up in the constant flux of instant gratification? For the loss of the Father’s love is 
the loss of the sense of history itself. Furthermore, how can the present Father-language of 
faith address the speaking subject? In other words, how can theology reach the subject 
through its linguistic horizon? What ‘semiotic’ symbols can it offer? 
 
The situation of the ‘lost Father’ challenges Kristeva’s project, too. What is the 
revolutionary ‘poetic text’ which would interrupt that ‘Symbolic Order’ the core of which, 
the ‘Father’, is removed? Can the Freudian narrative articulate a revolutionary ‘mourning’ of 
this loss? Also, is it possible to carry out this revolt without addressing the ‘religious’ 
exhaustion of the subject, as is the claim of theology? If the outcome of historical exhaustion 
is the atomised subject, what experience of the community (lost together with the Father as a 
unifying centre) can Freudianism offer? Is Kristeva’s Freudian-linguistic anthropology 
sufficient when attempting to hold a mirror to the ‘Fatherless subject’ for him to see his 
exhaustion? 
 
In order to answer these questions, for critique it is unavoidable to re-contextualise the 
central conflict with Kristeva’s ‘atheistic subtext’, Freud. Homans confirmed this conflict at 
the heart of modernity. Part One examined the ‘ontological’ dimension of this conflict. Now 
my study returns to this disaccord by examining what Freud actually objected to in Christian 
symbolism, before reading anew the Passion.  
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4.4 Freud’s Unfinished Cultural Mourning: The Need for Revising His Reading of the 
Christian Father 
 
Kristeva rewrites Freud’s classic works on religion from the integrative perspective of 
her psychoanalytical and post-structuralist sub-discourses. 371 That is why the recovery of the 
‘Father’ has to start with revisiting Freud’s classic polemic about the Christian ‘Father’.  
Freud reveals a crucial dimension of what theology has to ‘mourn’ in its language on God. 
Kristeva’s critique of culture showed how the nihilism of culture is acted out as aggression 
against the ‘person’, which leads to psychic suffering. The whole business of recovering the 
‘Father-symbolism’ is offering a counterweight to this suffering.372 The original Freudian 
narrative questions this ability of Christians because they fail to present their ‘Father’, claims 
Freud, as a source of universal acceptance and inclusion. This section looks straight in the 
face of the charge that the Christian Father is an ‘oedipal authority’.  
 
I put Freud’s critique into a historical context in a twofold sense. I refer briefly to the 
actual historical situation in which he developed his critique of the Christian Father. I also 
relate his reading to a specific form of representing the Father, namely, the ‘bloody cross’ 
with the underlying images of atonement-theology. In view of these two aspects I re-situate 
the original debate in the present postmodern context. Responding constructively to Freud is 
the major precondition for resolving the apologetic deadlock with Kristeva’s materialism. 
Freud’s criticism will bring the traditional language on the Cross to the fore. Correcting the 
‘bloody imagery’ is the gateway to entering into dialogue with Kristeva’s refined ‘semiotic’ 
symbols. This engagement with Freud will liberate theology to re-present the Father as a 
loving ‘Abba’. The theologia crucis needs to show that the image of God does not coincide 
with Freud’s reductive vision.  
 
 
4.4.1 Freud as the Interlocutor of the Images of Atonement Theology 
 
Freud’s critique of religion makes more sense if we identify the imagery with which he 
was in a historical dialogue. My point is that the underlying object of his criticism was 
atonement theology understood in terms of penal substitution. Freud’s hermeneutic of the 
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Christian Cross was restricted to and determined by the images of the Father which we find 
in this heritage. This historical context is generally overlooked on account of the theological 
aversion for Freud, but also on the side of secular humanism. We can say, in general, that the 
classic atheist critique since Feuerbach was in debate with the Father-image of atonement 
theology. Recent forms of secular criticism, not mentioning ‘aggressive secularists’ like 
Richard Dawkins, operate with banal images of God, which are derivatives of the ‘bloody 
cross’. As my response to Kristeva from within religious experience communicates through 
these central images, a critical distance from the underlying distorted message is crucial. 
  
The necessary correction is widely raised in order to make sense of God’s love. Lorraine 
Cavanagh names the very source of why the atonement narrative lost direction. Christ’s 
atonement was severed from his resurrection, which is the prime interpretive centre of his 
sacrifice.373 The Christian idea of atonement makes God’s reconciliation with human history 
central. The theology of the ‘atonement’ understood in terms of penal substitution was the 
earliest understanding of Christ’s sacrifice. In a predominantly juridical mindset, it gave a 
coherent account of redemption from ‘fall to reparation’ with a special focus on the Father. 
One might say that this early ‘master narrative’ dominated pre-Enlightenment consciousness 
and the Enlightenment period itself, as this model culminated in both the renewed theologies 
of the Reformation and the Catholic theology of the counter-Reformation. This soteriological 
model, as an archetype, underlies theological language and concepts up to the present, 
regardless of denomination. It relates to the present language of faith as their ‘ground’. As 
today these archaic theological images are mostly hidden, one can also see it as an 
‘unconscious’ language. My point is that everyday spirituality and ‘public’ theological 
imagination are still controlled by the archaic image of the Godhead of ‘atonement’.374 
 
Roger Haight gives an excellent critical overview of the development of atonement 
concepts in the Eastern and Western Christological and soteriological traditions from 
Irenaeus, Athanasius, Augustine, and Anselm to Luther and Calvin.375  (See Appendix III.) 
Revised or not, the atonement profile is part of God’s theological and historical persona. 
Whenever God is read from the outside, by other religions, secular humanism, or atheism, 
the ‘Father’ is ‘mediated’ primarily by the atonement narrative. Fortunate or not, the 
hermeneutics of penal substitution re-emerge time and time again. It is a strong, vigorous 
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narrative on the Father. For some reason it still dominates over other more subtle images of 
God. Atonement theology, in brief, sets up a dualistic scheme. The God of history, because of 
the offence caused by human sin, has to be appeased. Mankind deserves punishment for sin 
on the grounds of divine justice. Christ offered the Father his death as an expiatory sacrifice. 
God accepted it and, instead of acting out his righteous vengeance on mankind, he accepted 
the suffering of the Son instead of and on behalf of mankind. 
 
It is important to highlight that originally the Christian idea of ‘atonement’ was a 
revolutionary concept. It is far from being a concept to be demonised and thrown out 
altogether as Haight does. 376 There are contemporary renewed readings which recover the 
original revolutionary potential of the tradition. Like L. Cavanagh, they emphasise the action 
of God’s redemptive grace as the agent, it is God’s compassionate nature which brings 
humans home from alienation to reconciliation. In reconciliation, the emphasis is shifted 
from ‘juridical rigidity’ to reconciling human beings with their true selves and with one 
another. Seen in these terms, Christians can recognise God (the active agent of salvation) as 
an internal need. Cavanagh rightly argues that redemption in these terms is comprehended as 
God who is intrinsic to history, who in Christ suffers with us. In accepting suffering, Christ 
as the image of the Father, is taking responsibility for the whole of the human race.377 In 
order to arrive at this more personalist reading, however, the language of ‘penal substitution’ 
has to be systematically revised, and changed.  
 
Freud makes us realise that an unrevised atonement language is not an innocent, still 
less a harmless narrative. I am just raising the problem, but it would be worth examining 
whether the excessively juridical ‘penal substitution’ language played a role in the 
emergence of the overtly abstract theological concept of the person, and the associated 
problem of a ‘High Transcendent’ God. This latter, as Homans showed, led to a stark 
opposition between God and human nature, and God and history. My study admits a close 
connection.  
 
4.4.2 The Image of the Father: A Historical Problem 
 
Freud is not only an ‘ideological’ but also a historical subtext of Kristeva, mostly 
through his so called cultural texts.378 As such, Freud represents those historical and cultural 
objections which critique on Kristeva simply cannot ignore. Two aspects need to be 
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highlighted from Freud’s criticism, keeping to the fore Wahl’s thesis that the reception of 
Freud’s critique of religion is still an unfinished business in theology and in the life of the 
Church.379 These are (1) his criticism of the ‘God-image’ as the critique of culture (‘Christian 
history’), (2) and his understanding of the Father as an external authority to the community.  
 
The first point to be made is that it is best to situate Freud as the prime interlocutor of 
the ‘bloody language’ of the Cross. My further point is that Freud is the internal discourse of 
early theological modernity. In the latter, the expression of faith culminated in a retrograde 
fashion (‘post-Vatican I period’). The radical distance between the God of ‘grace’ and the 
‘profane’ world (Homans) was the basis of the refusal of a non-Christian, hostile culture. 
Freud has to be read within this ecclesial hermeneutics of ‘fear’. This apologetic attitude 
produced what Homans calls the ‘lower reading’ of Freud: when he is ‘a secularist or atheist, 
and his therapeutic work is an idolatrous substitute for the kind of self-understanding that 
comes only through revelation.’380 In the ‘higher’ reading, Freud can be seen as the analyst 
of Christianity’s historical failure to unmask the perversion of the ‘Father-narrative’. He is a 
cultural critique of Nazism, refusing as he did its corrupted worship of ‘paternal authority’. It 
is Freud’s late historical environment, Viennese, predominantly Catholic society, becoming 
increasingly anti-Semitic, which shaped most of his critique of religion.381 This was the 
historical finishing touch to his ‘general’ critique of the ‘Father-religions’, Judaism and 
Christianity. To this ‘second criticism’, which is the real milieu of his cultural texts, is 
closely attached his psychoanalytical critique of the ‘Father’. His cultural criticism of 
Christianity (responding to ‘Nazism’) and his psychoanalytical criticism (‘the repressive 
Father’) merge in his sentence that God is an external authority for Christians.  
 
Historically, Freud’s vision of the Father (of the ‘Cross’) corresponds with the repressive 
authority, religious and familial, which his patients experienced in Christianity or Judaism. 
The religious horizon of his contemporaries was the traditional ‘bloody Cross’ of the 
atonement. The ‘Father’ as the inflictor of the Cross coincided with their paternal image. 
Freud’s patients, with their neurosis, lived in the shadow of this ‘oedipal’ authority. My point 
is that the image of the killed Son easily confirms in culture the emphasis on ‘guilt’ that 
Freud observed. Freud’s patients, as far as religion was concerned, spoke an ‘atonement 
language’. It is not accidental that Freud first became popular among women in Viennese 
                                               
379 See, Heribert Wahl, ‘Tétova önkiigazítás: a modern pszichoanalízis kérdései a teológiához’ 
(pp.109-121), Mérleg, 44 [2008] 1-2). [‘A Hesitating Self-correction, The Questions of Modern 
Pyschoanalysis to Theology’. The title in my translation from the reprinted original in Hungarian from 
„Herder Korrespondenz” (2006/6) pp.281-285.], p.121.  
380 Homans, Theology after Freud, p. 13. 
381 Homans, The Ability to Mourn, pp. 202-204.  
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society who suffered most from the authority of a ‘masculine’ (cultural) superego. The 
remnants of this ‘patriarchal’ narrative are still retained in Christian spirituality. Even recent 
theologies, such as the Catholic charismatic Cantalamessa382, repeat the ‘guilt pattern’ by 
reminding us that ‘we killed Jesus’, ‘my sin killed him’. ‘My sin was also present at 
Gethsemane and it weighed on the heart of Jesus.’383 On the part of theology, there is no 
point in denying a latent continuity with the ‘traditional’ language of the cross. Freud, 
intuitively touched upon primary words like ‘killing the Son’, ‘appeasing the Father’, ‘our 
guilt against God’, and ‘bloody sacrifice’. They are mirrored in the fear of the ‘omnipotent’ 
father in his case-studies.384 The Cross became the meta-image of the Father.  
 
Freud’s critique of ‘Christian’ civilisation (of the 1930s) 385 came to the conclusion that 
the ‘Father’ (of the ‘Cross’) is an external authority to Christians. The criticism he 
developed, if seen in Homans’ historical pattern of fantasy-activity, can be regarded as ‘re-
ordering’ and explaining the emerging chaos in culture.386 In this context, Freud’s working 
hypothesis, the murder-myth, is an explanatory scheme rather than a genuine historical 
concept. It points to trends in culture that can be interpreted and ‘predicted’. Our present 
theological program of restoring the universal love of the Father is facing a serious 
‘historical’ opposition from Freud. His criticism of the Christian community in Group 
Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921) objected to the lack of this universality. 
Freud described Christianity as an artificial group held together by the external power of the 
Father which welcomes and discriminates:  
 
‘He loves all the individuals in the group with equal love. Everything depends upon 
this illusion; if it were to be dropped, then [the] Church would be dissolved, so far as the 
external force permitted them to. ….[Christ] stands to the individual members of the 
                                               
382 He can be regarded as a ‘mainstream’ theologian who speaks close to the Pope. Cantalamessa gave 
spiritual retreats several times to the Papal household.   
383 Raniero Cantalamessa, Life in Christ, A Spiritual Commentary on the Letter to the Romans, The 
Liturgical Press, Collegeville, Minnesota 1990. (original published in1997), p.61. 
384 See Freud’s famous case-study, the ‘Wolf Man’. In the centre of the neurosis Freud identified his 
patient’s fear of his father; the case-study of the ‘Rat-Man’ also could be mentioned. These reflections 
on his patients’ ruminations on religion were the base of Freud’s preoccupation with psychoanalysing 
religion. In ‘Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices’ (pp.429-436), ’The Freud Reader, edited by 
Peter Gay, Vintage, London 1995 (First published by Vintage in 1989), p.429. For the Case studies, 
Rat-Man’s case /1907-08/ (pp.309-350), Wolf-Man case /1910-14/ (pp.400-426) 
385 Freud in Totem and Taboo (1913) laid down his theory on the origin and function of the sense of 
guilt. He regards religion as an expression of this archaic cultural function. This later writing, 
Civilisation and Discontents (1930), revisits the function of conscience and the theme of ‘external 
authority’. Freud examines the struggle between life and death drives in the historical context of 
arising Nazism. His third cultural text, The Future of an Illusion (1927) also needs to be read against 
this historical background. The ontological weight he attaches to the premise that ‘religious ideas are 
illusions’ to a large extent stemmed from his pessimistic view of European history. Though religion 
had contributed much to the preserving of civilisation over the centuries, in modernity, it has lost its 
authority. According to Freud, ‘death drives’ in civilisation can be less and less resisted. 
386 Homans, The Ability to Mourn, pp. 337-338. 
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group of believers in the relation of a kind of elder brother; he is their substitute father. 
All the demands that are made upon the individual are derived from this love of 
Christ.’387  
 
His essay, ‘Artificial Groups: The Church and the Army’, conceives the cohesive force 
among the members of the Church as ‘intense emotional’ or ‘libidinal ties’. Freud envisioned 
only an externally structured Church with the following group dynamic. Authority is external 
to the individual. Love is mechanistically understood; as a form of trust, it is subjugated to 
the authority of the father-figure. When this trust disappears, the community collapses in 
‘panic.’ We can do justice to Freud in two aspects. First, he touches upon the key 
phenomenon that secularisation theory observes, the rapid decline in religious observance. 
Freud seems to have a point when pointing to the particular crisis of ‘oedipal’ bonding with 
God as the root cause of ‘suddenly’ giving up the Christian ‘Father’. Second, however 
mechanistically, he aptly describes the distorted economy of love in religious 
fundamentalisms. My point is that this type of identity easily reproduces the meta-narratives 
of ‘atonement’. Preventing this return is the greatest challenge for the Church in the 
postmodern context. A nostalgic desire for the powerful ‘Father’, whose authority is 
manifest on the ‘bloody Cross’, is a tempting way to stabilise ‘shaken’ religious identity.  
 
In what Freud observes, the dynamic of exclusion is clear. This is that inward-looking, 
painfully polemic attitude to which the aggiornamento of Vatican Council II responded with 
a radical correction in Catholicism. The economy of ‘exclusion’ is a timely issue again in our 
present context, when the genuine love of the Father is lost in culture. With this loss how can 
the mechanisms of ‘exclusion’ be counteracted? Or critically, to what extent can the 
mentality of ‘exclusion’ among Christians emerge from ‘external’ readings of the 
Father/Cross? Freud makes an important observation in this context. What happens when the 
authority of the ‘Father’/Leader is lost?  If the leader of the soldier dies, fear spreads 
epidemically and the army easily disintegrates. Freud applies this observation to doctrine, 
community, and individual relationship. External authority, when it ‘disappears’, results in a 
weakening of religious observance. The dynamic he perceives corresponds to the apologetic 
Church of pre-Vatican II. These are important questions about the borders of a cultural 
community and its ‘inclusive’ or ‘exclusive’ attitude:  
 
                                               
387 ‘Two Artificial Groups: The Church and the Army’ (pp.93-99) in Group Psychology and the 
Analysis of the Ego (1921), The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund 
Freud, Vol XVIII (1920-1922), Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Group Psychology and Other Works, 
translated from the German under the General Editorship of James Strachey in collaboration with 
Anna Freud (1th Edition), The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis, London 1955, p.94. 
 157 
‘The phenomenon which accompanies the dissolution that is here supposed to 
overtake a religious group is not fear… Instead of it ruthless and hostile impulses 
towards other people make their appearance, which owing to the equal love of Christ, 
they had previously been unable to do. But even during the kingdom of Christ those 
people who do not belong to the community of believers, who do not love him, and 
whom he does not love, stand outside this tie. Therefore a religion, even if it calls itself 
the religion of love, must be hard and unloving to those who do not belong to it. 
Fundamentally indeed every religion is in this same way a religion of love for all those 
whom it embraces; while cruelty and intolerance towards those who do not belong to it 
are natural to every religion…. If to-day that intolerance no longer shows itself so 
violent and cruel as in former centuries, we can scarcely conclude that there has been a 
softening in human manners. The cause is rather to be found in the undeniable 
weakening of religious feelings and the libidinal [emotional] ties which depend upon 
them.’388 (Emphasis added.) 
 
On a more general level, Freud warns of degenerating into a ‘totemistic’ community 
which, as a response to the ‘loss of the Father’, attempts a recovery through ‘re-enacting’ the 
Father’s ‘lost power’ in terms of showing aggression to the ‘outside’. Instead of re-creating 
the Father’s love through the act of universal solidarity with the sufferer, a new ‘regulative 
authority’ can be canonised, and a yearning for it can be perpetuated. We can see Freud also 
as one who anticipates  and unmasks the vulnerability of a post-modernity which 
accommodates itself to both technological power and, through these technological 
innovations, to the real powers and interests that instrumentally generate the new 
‘industrial/technological revolution’ of consumption. ‘The Two Artificial Groups’ can be 
seen as a general cultural metaphor. Freud’s cultural mourning is continuous with our 
present time: a culture of post-religion, full of mistrust, has replaced Christianity.  
 
Paradoxically, and that is why Freud’s texts on civilisation do not lose their power, 
‘exhausted’ post-metaphysical consciousness and consumer culture have not been able to 
produce new cultural symbols. Only the ‘emptied’ Christian (and humanist) symbols of 
modernity are floating on the surface of culture. Their meaning, because of the loss of their 
original ‘ontological’ content, can easily be hijacked and re-assembled into new forms of a 
‘Father-cult’. This specific form of nihilism is manifest in the ultimate faith in entertainment, 
in scientific advances severed from morality, or in the instant gratification offered by the 
‘internet’, etc. In a post-religious post-modernity, new totemic communities of exclusion are 
constructed and sold shamelessly. In this context, Freud’s murder-myth can be read as an 
ethical interruption. His urging to return to the internalisation of love makes Freud a 
successful cultural mourner of the distorted forms of religion.  
 
                                               
388 Freud, ‘Two Artificial Groups: The Church and the Army’ (pp.93-99) in Group Psychology and 
the Analysis of the Ego (1921), p.98. 
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Freud observed a Christianity which operated with ‘closed’ borders where love was not 
extended to the ‘outside’: 
  
‘Every Christian loves Christ as his ideal and feels himself united with all other 
Christians by identification. But the Church requires more of him. He has also to identify 
himself with Christ and love all other Christians as Christ loved them.’389  
 
However, despite Freud’s general criticism, the intensity of love he observed reveals a 
genuine power of cohesion. That is why my point is that restoring the universalism of 
Christ’s sacrifice can extend this cohesion to the ‘outside’ and give a genuine orientation to 
culture. This is the significance of correcting the ‘totemic’ reading of the Cross. If Christ 
died for the whole world, Christians have to identify with those who are outside the visible 
community. The stake of witnessing to this universalism is very high. It is the only way to 
reverse that general mistrust which a culture which relies on external authorities necessarily 
generates. It is important to read the theological symptoms which Cavanagh observes as 
‘cultural parables’. When the Father is seen as an external authority to the self, God is 
experienced as an external judgement, and with judgement the sense of guilt and 
condemnation appears. Fear of punishment, denial, or avoiding responsibility may occur. 
Avoiding responsibility may result in adopting the position of victim and an ethical 
passivity. It is close to its reverse, making others responsible and scape-goating the other. 
Fear can become the source of retribution, from God as well as from people [in the name of 
God, ‘democracy’, ‘our values’]. A culture of fear in conflict situations often applies to 
retributive punishment which is a major hindrance in promoting examples of peace-making. 
When the ‘Father’ is dead his ‘strength’ is celebrated instead of his ability to love. In the 
wake of melancholic mourning for the ‘dead Father’, which cannot let his ‘power’ go (our 
narcissistic image of him), the ethos of submission and obedience can become dominant. 
Religion can turn into its ‘exhausted form’ when it reinforces a rigid distance between God 
and his people. God’s holiness may become untouchable and ‘unknowable’. God becomes a 
distant God despite all the noble promises of his Revelation. According to Cavanagh, these 
are the ‘attributes’ of a spirituality which is based on unrevised atonement imagery.390 
 
To sum up the moral of Freud’s criticism of tribal Christianity, he assigns the following 
areas to be ‘mourned’ in theological language. When this correction is completed, then 
theology can communicate its own experience of being healed by ‘the father’s love’. It can 
witness to the fact that the Father, contrary to what Freud attributes to the Christian God, is 
                                               
389 Freud, ‘Postcript’ (pp.134-144) in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921), p.134. 
390 I extracted the above symptoms and put them into our context from Cavanagh, Making Sense of 
God’s Love, cf. pp. 7-10.34. 
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all inclusive love. Thus, Freud’s major statements for a contemporary theology of the cross 
are as follows: 
 
(1) The ‘we’– ‘they’, ‘native’ – ‘foreigner’ oppositions emerge when the Cross is seen as 
a ‘Father substitute’. On this cross, the powerful and authoritarian Father is ‘resurrected’. 
The cross, read in this way, is the cross of division. When the Cross is read as an ‘identity-
totem’, the Father’s power is totalised: he is the restorer of lost Christendom’s confidence. 
As the double of our hunger for identity, ‘He’ marks out exclusive and definite borders for 
the community. The ‘blood’ on the Cross, as a hidden meaning, denotes our ambition to 
‘restore the authority of the Father’ and reinvent a Christian cultural superego.  
 
(2) Freud on behalf of secular humanism objects that this love fails to be universal. If 
love is not universal, it necessarily remains ‘tribal’ and, contrary to its nature, persecuting. 
To apply Charles Taylor’s idiom, ‘exclusive humanism’, we can also speak of an exclusive 
Christian ‘agape’. Representing its universalism is the greatest challenge to Christianity.  
 
 (3) ‘Artificial Groups’ concluded that the love of the Father is only a socio-cultural 
construct. It cannot become all-inclusive, as it is based on subjugation to a feared paternal 
(‘High-Transcendent’) authority. Christianity, in Freud’s judgement, cannot produce a notion 
of Transcendence that is not grounded in fear. Also implied is that ‘Transcendence’, as the 
extension of the fear of the father, is in denial of human freedom. Freud implies that 
demonising the outsider, the ‘other’, in a closed army-like fellowship’ is necessary to 
preserve the sense of freedom.  
  
Freud’s historical hard talk radically challenges theology when it speaks of God and 
love. This criticism cannot be answered in the traditional apologetic way. My point is that 
Kristeva’s ‘Freudian subtext’ initiates a new ‘symbolic mourning’ in the present situation of 
lost ‘Paternal love’.  
 
Freud’s critique of religion is more than an atheistic denial. My point is that he should be 
regarded as a permanent critical reference for theology. In a sense, Freud is the spokesman of 
the ‘exhausted subject’. He articulates its unbelief and mistrust. Jonte-Pace situated Freud’s 
writings as the anticipation of a psychoanalytical theory of the loss of religion and the 
absence of God.391 The significance of making Freud a central reference for the ‘Semiotic 
Passion’ is his anticipation of the ‘ontic’ suffering of the subject and the present cultural 
                                               
391 Diane Jonte-Pace, Speaking The Unspeakable, Religion, Mysogony, And The Uncunny Mother in 
Freud’s Cultural Texts, University of California Press, Berkeley, London 2001., p.4. 
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conditions. Freud initiated ‘an analysis of religion in absentia, of Jewishness in the context of 
secularisation, and modernity’.392 It is this ‘absence of Transcendence’ which becomes a 
positive link with Freud, in the sense that his cultural mourning for this absence has 
remained unfinished. His ‘symbolic mourning’ can be completed only in our post-modernity.  
 
As Marthe Robert suggests, it is possible to read Freud’s concept of the ‘oedipal father’ 
as a revolt against his father’s generation. This image, Robert points to Kafka’s observation, 
was an expression of the religious crisis of assimilated Jews who could not provide Freud’s 
generation with a satisfying orientation.393 The absolute break with the religion of his father 
is very different from that of Kristeva. In The Old Man and the Wolves, Kristeva expressed a 
gratitude and respect for her father’s faith and could appreciate it as a site of cultural revolt. 
Obviously, Kristeva is in a much better position of synthesis than Freud’s original model. 
Freud’s questions raised in modernity remain valid a cultural epoch later. Freud, according to 
Homans, directed his criticism against a politics and religion which was unable to mourn the 
lost past and produced the fantasy of denial.
 394  Kristeva shares these concerns.  Homans 
argues that Freud’s historical criticism stated the failure of Christianity (and culture!) to 
accommodate itself to a new cultural situation. The reaction of Nazism was a denial of the 
painful psychological consequences of the social and historical changes. In Homans’ 
evaluation, Freud’s psychoanalytical movement, contrary to Nazism, developed the ‘ability 
to mourn’, that is, to respond to the changes in culture with self-questioning and a new 
inwardness.
395
   
 
The postmodern situation of the ‘exhausted subject’ is a similarly dramatic historical 
change. What is to be mourned is a similar experience of precipitous uprootedness from a 
religiously informed common culture and from the moral and psychological supports which 
such a culture confers.396 Today, we witness the failed symbol building of post-modernity, an 
analogous failure to that of Freud’s historical environment. Our culture, however surprising 
it sounds, is just as intolerant of the actual chaos of culture (and of other cultures and 
civilisations) as German Nazism was. Our ‘financial civilisation’, analogously, also seeks to 
reinvent with great rapidity and astonishing creativity a ‘total common culture’ (of progress, 
of an engineered future) which denies the actual changes underlying the ‘postmodern 
spectacle’. Postmodern consumerism or ‘economical growth’ as the telos of culture with the 
                                               
392 Diane Jonte-Pace, Speaking The Unspeakable, p.4. 
393 Marthe Robert, From Oedipus to Moses, Freud’s Jewish Identity, Anchor Press/Double Day, 
Garden City, New York 1976 (originally published as D’Oedipe à Moise: Freud et la conscience juive 
by Calmann-Lévy, Paris 1974), pp.8-9. 
394 Homans, The Ability to Mourn, pp. 337-338. 
395 Ibid., pp. 337-338. 
396 Ibid., pp. 337. 
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same force denies finitude, individual fragility, and death, its own transience. Our post-
Freudian culture has created a hyperactive superficial symbolism though, in practice, it only 
distracts its ‘exhausted subjects’ from their ‘ontological’ pain. Freud’s historical criticism of 
the crisis of culture runs as a counter-thesis to the strategies of denial which the postmodern 
subject and its ideologists accommodate.397 It is in this sense that Jonte-Pace presents Freud 
as the emerging ‘meta-discourse’ of post-modernity through his criticism of the religious 
crisis of modernity. Freud developed a discourse on the ‘absence of religion and the absence 
of God’. With the emergence of the ‘exhausted subject’, a primary form of speaking of love 
is indeed in the ‘negative’, we speak of love in its ‘absentia’. My point is that it is possible to 
mourn for the Freudian ‘mourning’ itself (his speaking of God in ‘absentia’). The theologia 
crucis, in a shared symbol building with Kristeva, can elucidate a positive religious 
symbolisation, which will speak of God in ‘praesentia’, as a new presence of God as a 
‘loving Father’. The forthcoming discussions will incorporate Freud’s criticism into this 
symbolic dialogue.  
 
 
4.5 Why Develop a ‘Semiotic Passion’? The Theological Program of Our Response 
 
Freud challenges the theology of the cross with the task of deconstructing the ‘oedipal 
image’ of God. The challenge from Kristeva is to incorporate the historicity of the subject 
                                               
397 As an illustration of this, I refer to Anthony Giddens’ position, which can be seen as a postmodern 
model of culture. Giddens reasserts the secular utopia of the ‘self-sufficient’ postmodern self. As an 
‘ideologist’ of the postmodern milieu he is a representative of the denial of the ontological or ‘ontic’ 
crisis of the self. He offers a ‘rivalling’ model to the Freudian, the Kristevan, and the theological 
evaluations of the crisis. The ‘exhaustion’ of the subject is not a real issue for the ideologies of 
accommodation. The freedom of the subject is in the service of economical growth, though this 
‘metascenario’ is never told. What my study argues as the dangerous ‘exhaustion’ of the subject, for 
Giddens is an opportunity for ‘a new awareness of the self’. The self is merely to be re-discovered 
with its creative and inexhaustible potentials. The self discovers his own body and regenerates its 
freedom in his life-style choices. Giddens makes the claim, a Hudini-like escape, that the body itself 
becomes the site of identity. Giddens is an important example of how postmodernity, which ignores 
the task of ‘mourning’ for the self’s religious past, ends up with a shallow description of the crisis. 
The situation of ‘risk society’ where cultural identities and authorities are not fixed and stable any 
longer brings about the dynamic accommodation, a ‘new sense of the self’. Giddens calls this response 
a ‘reflexive mobilising of self-identity’ or the ‘reflexive project of the self.’ We need an ‘unhappy 
Freud’ who is not satisfied with the way these solutions erase the self – religious past relationship with 
ease. See, Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity, Self and Society in the Late Modern Age, 
Polity Press, Blackwell, Cambridge 1991, p.33. 
The above model reinstates the ‘invincible’ subject of the Enlightenment. This is a reaffirmation 
of the ‘split’ between the self’s immanent and transcendent resources. Gidden’s main motive with this 
is to reactivate the subject over against the nihilism of culture by encouraging the self’s ‘innate’ 
potentials. This strategy is in a critical tension with Kristeva’s more realistic view of the subject, 
which is ‘exhausted’ and in need of psychic healing. It is worth noting that this reinstating of the self-
redemptive potential of the subject resembles the position of the early ‘revolutionary Kristeva’, which 
position was about sidelining religion as an ineffective discourse. The point is, whereas in Kristeva an 
effective ‘cultural mourning’ of the subject took place, in postmodern ideologies, which abandoned 
the engagement with religion, it did not.  
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into theological language. The two together pose the challenge to bring the ‘exhausted 
subject’ and the image of God into an intrinsic dialogue. In order to meet the above 
challenge, my study attaches a specific theological program to the ‘Semiotic Passion’. Why 
is this particular strategy needed? The crisis of the postmodern subject is affecting deep 
layers of ‘individual pre-history’ in which the whole of the ‘psychic structure’ is involved. At 
the heart of the nihilist crisis Kristeva highlights our relationship with the ‘loving Third’. To 
this crisis of homo religiosus398 only a form of the theology of the cross can respond which is 
aware of both levels of the crisis of the self, that is, when attention is paid to Kristeva’s 
‘psychic suffering’ and to the ‘religious’ crisis of the post-Christian self. The ‘Semiotic 
Passion’ shows an interest in understanding the linguistic crisis of the postmodern subject 
and connects it with the theological message of the Passion.  
 
With the help of Tamsin Lorraine, I sum up the theological objectives which the 
‘Semiotic Passion’ aims to achieve. My study has already expressed the conflict with 
Kristeva’s ‘materialist ontology’ in terms of two different ways of grounding the self. My 
reference was Kierkegaard’s Sickness unto Death, when the ground of the self is God. 
Lorraine developed a model in which Kristeva and Kierkegaard are in a positive dialogue. 
This model is a naïve reading of Kristeva in the sense that Lorraine envisaged her as if 
operating in the economy of faith (well before Kristeva’s dialogical turn). I revisit Lorraine’s 
program in brief in order to highlight the dialectical tension of agreements and disagreements 
between Kristeva and the faith based reading of the Passion. Lorraine’s synoptic reading is 
an important confirmation that re-opening ‘ontological dialogue’ with post-metaphysical 
consciousness is a genuine demand of our time. This overview is laying out the theological 
dynamic of the ‘Semiotic Passion’. These objectives of a ‘graced’ anthropology have to be 
implemented in response to Kristeva. This program serves also as the ground for the 
evaluation of the shared symbol building to which my critique arrives. If it brings these 
theological dynamics to realisation, it will justify ‘The Semiotic Passion’ as a ‘valid’ 
theoretical proposal.  
 
The co-operation Lorraine envisages has very important insights. My critique follows 
this program when it argues for widening the Freudian ‘oedipal’ and Kristeva’s ‘semiotic’ 
frameworks in order to arrive at a fuller expression of the Father’s love. I focus on the 
contents of a shared symbolic mourning.399 
                                               
398 Kristeva’s metaphor of the ‘speaking being’:  the speaking subject is grounded in ‘belief’ in the 
Other. 
399 In this recapitulation I extracted and used Lorraine’s contextualisation of Kristeva for theology 
from Tamsin Lorraine, ‘Amatory Cures for Material Dis-ease, A Kristevan Reading of The Sickness 
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(1) Despite the singularity of the relationship between the individual and God, in 
God we embrace an Otherness who listens to all the particularities of everyone. 
God accepts the diversity of the fragmented human realm, and thus he responds 
to postmodern fragmentation with all-inclusive love. God’s response is always a 
synthesis: we should not deny the various and contradictory aspects of our lives, 
nor despair of becoming more deeply ourselves. Faith in such an infinite Other 
leads to responding positively to the contemporary fragmentation of the 
subject.400 In short, Christians should not fear the postmodern condition or the 
‘exhausted subject’. They have to show a genuine interest in this subjectivity, 
because it is not external any longer to religious identity. Love in this sense is 
our unbroken grand-narrative, which unites and enables us to recognise 
ourselves in the other. Christians have to learn to ‘project’ their own story on the 
secular subject without colonising it. Christians need to see ‘Christ’ in the 
‘other’ in a genuine way. It is not only suffering which is common, as a 
consequence of the self’s becoming ‘ungrounded’, but Love is also shared, 
which gives rebirth. Love is indeed solely redemptive. This latter is the claim of 
Kristeva’s ‘ecce-ness’ program.401 ‘Love is the time and space in which ‘I’ 
assumes the right to be extraordinary… I am, in love, at the zenith of 
subjectivity.’402 
 
(2) To the psychoanalytic appeal to attend to and incorporate the corporeal origins 
of psychic life, a transcendental understanding of the subject can be added. The 
religious appeal to the Father would facilitate the notion that we belong to a 
universal, ‘shared’ ethical community. Kristeva operates with a widened 
Freudian framework, the hinges of which are the ‘Loving Third’ and the 
‘feminine sacred’. This hermeneutics of the narcissistic structure (the world of 
primary identifications) puts an emphasis on personal biography, which I termed 
‘the historicity of the subject’. As Lorraine highlights, ‘Kierkegaard’s religious 
notion of a God-relationship can take us beyond this oedipal framework and 
                                                                                                                                     
unto Death’ (pp.98-109), Kierkegaard in Post/Modernity, edited by Martin J. Matustík and Merold 
Westphal, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Indianapolis 1995. 
400 Ibid., pp.106-107. 
401 Kristeva’s reference to the ‘haecceitas’ of Duns Scotus is a symbolic recapitulation of her genral 
objective to defend the subject’s particularity and uniqueness. For a detailed summary of this program, 
with the emphasis on the ‘genius of Christianity’ of which discourse on love first discovered the 
uniqueness and vulnerability of the person, see ‘This Incredible Need to Believe’ in Kristeva, This 
Incredible Need to Believe, p.30. 
402 Kristeva, Tales of Love, p.5. 
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shift emphasis to a self-in-world witnessed by an infinite Other without losing 
the historical impetus of Kristeva’s work.’403 To the historicity of the subject 
theology’s response should be presenting ‘grace’ as historical. Kristeva’s 
insinuated ‘theological’ claim in this dialogue has to be responded to, namely 
that ‘psychic passion’ needs to be incorporated into the economy of the Cross.  
 
(3) The ‘Semiotic Passion’ has to answer Kierkegaard’s fundamental claim that the 
‘self’ has to overcome despair (‘exhaustion’). The self, according to 
Kierkegaard, ends up in ‘despair’ if it is not becoming a proper self, ‘itself.’ I 
also refer here to Beckett whose speaking subjects, figuratively speaking, are the 
‘nocturnal side’ of Kristeva’s ‘speaking being’. Beckett ‘totalises despair’. In 
Beckett, in the relationship between the self and God, despair is all penetrating 
and is expressed as an incurable loneliness. To this applies Kierkegaard’s 
observation: human beings who become finite lose their selves.404 In Beckett, 
this finitude is expressed in the endless speech of his characters. It is not 
accidental that his dramatic personae follow Kierkegaard’s negative scenario: 
‘To lack infinitude is despairing, reductionism, narrowness.’405 The Christian 
reading of the Passion and the Father needs to offer a lasting companionship to 
the ‘speaking being.’ Theology also has to argue that this loneliness is genuinely 
interrupted by the Father’s love. If Kristeva’s ‘ecce-ness’ claim to take psychic 
particularity seriously is listened to, this interruption needs to be spelled out as 
close as possible to the human self. 
 
(4) In Kierkegaard’s (theology’s) model, the self does not collapse because it is 
related to God. It is in this sense that Kierkegaard speaks of the ‘moral self.’ The 
moral self does not collapse as long as it relates itself to God. This perennial 
principle of theology compels the response to Kristeva to demonstrate a moral 
relatedness between God and the ‘speaking being’. This moral relationship 
emerges as an ‘ontic’ relationship. The ‘Semiotic Passion’, as a constructive 
response to Kristeva’s reading of the Passion and her correction of Freud’s 
premise (religion is not an illusion), needs to show how the ‘self’ and God can 
become ‘transparent’ to each other in compassionate love. 
 
                                               
403 Lorraine, ‘Amatory Cures for Material Dis-ease’, in Kierkegaard in Post/Modernity, pp.106-107. 
404 Ibid., p.99. 
405 Ibid., pp.99-100. 
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(5) Both Kierkegaard and Kristeva follow a similar program in terms of the 
importance of the ‘loving Third’. One can become oneself only through relating 
the opposing aspects of oneself to a third party, to God as irreducible other, as 
we see it in Kierkegaard. In this sense, the self always exists before God.406 In 
Kristeva, the psychologically conceived ‘loving Third’ is also constitutive of 
personal existence. In her idiom, the self always exists inasmuch as it preserves 
its capacity to believe in the other. The self is always homo religiosus. Theology 
needs to show, transcending the strictly understood program of psychoanalytical 
rebirth, how God as ‘Father’ can be trusted, and how he enhances our trust in 
Himself. This implies a demonstration of how the horizon of faith differs from 
the psychoanalytic method. That is, theology needs to argue the relevance of 
connecting the ‘loving Third’ with the economy of Easter.  
 
Kristeva, with her new dialogical stance on religion, has become open to discussing the 
above theological agendas in the specific context of the ongoing ‘exhaustion’ of the 
postmodern subject.  
 
                                               
406 Lorraine, ‘Amatory Cures for Material Dis-ease’, in Kierkegaard in Post/Modernity., p.100. 
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5 KRISTEVA’S ‘SEMIOTIC PASSION’: REINSTATING THE ‘FATHER’ OF RELIGION 
 
Kristeva’s dialogue with religion was realised in a series of pivotal essays in This 
Incredible Need to Believe.407 In them, she responds to the new cultural condition, ‘the loss 
of the Father’s love’, with a new synthesis of her ‘semiotic’ project. Kristeva recollects her 
previous agendas and relates them to the Christian Passion-narrative. This is a realisation 
that the nihilist crisis requires re-situating psychoanalysis in order to enhance its analytical 
capacity. It coincides with a cautious recognition of the analytical potentials of theology: 
‘The questioning of any and all entities, including belief and its objects, is one of 
Christianity’s most impressive legacies; and humanism, its rebellious child, must not be 
prevented from developing this legacy.’408 This new openness reveals a deep seated ‘cultural 
mourning’. I present the three levels where Kristeva’s reading of the Passion enters into 
dialogue with ‘religious consciousnesses’ about the ‘lost Father’. These are her linguistic, 
ethical, and ‘feminist’ readings of the Passion. 
 
 
5.1 Kristeva’s ‘Symbolic’ Correction of Freud 
 
Kristeva’s correction of Freud did not stop with the reinstating of homo religiosus into 
psychoanalytical discourse.409 The recognition that faith in the other is our innermost pre-
religious need initiated a ‘cultural mourning’ in the Freudian tradition, which culminates in 
Kristeva’s re-reading of the Passion. The recognition of homo religiosus as a ‘pre-religious 
category’410 radically alters the Freudian imagination. Kristeva goes beyond its prohibiting 
religious imagery and reintroduces a direct engagement with Christian symbols.  
 
With Mercer, we can clarify that, in contrast to Freud’s negative understanding of 
illusion, Kristeva values ‘illusions’ as a place of play and imagination. Religious illusions 
can function positively. The person can learn to express his suffering and death by inscribing 
them into Christ’s Passion. Kristeva understands religion as the locus of constructing the 
much needed imaginary father. 411 Whereas for Freud the Cross and the Father were external 
authorities, Kristeva envisions the ‘loving Third party’ within the very fabric of Christian 
                                               
407 ‘The Big Questionmark’, ‘This Incredible Need to Believe’, ‘From Jesus to Mozart: Christianity’s 
Difference’, ‘Suffering: Lenten Lectures’, ‘The Genius of Catholicism’, and ‘Don’t Be Afraid of 
European Culture’. 
408 ‘‘The Big Questionmark’ (pp.vii-xvi), in This Incredible Need to Believe,  p, ix 
409 ‘Religion is not an illusion; belief in the other is our innermost pre-religious need’. 
410 Kristeva, This Incredible Need to Believe, p.1. 
411 See Kristeva’s symbolic departure from Freud in Mercer, ‘Psychoanalysis, Parents and God’, 
pp.252-253 
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imagery. As she states, for the person of faith the desire for the ‘ideal Father’, in terms of 
identifying with a ‘listening’ loving Third, is much the same. Kristeva’s widening of the 
Freudian symbolic canon started as early as Tales of Love. That is why we can refer to 
Kristeva’s recent dialogue with religion in terms of a deep-seated ‘cultural mourning’: 
 
‘Overcoming the notion of irremediable separation…Western man re-establishes a 
continuity or fusion with an Other who is no longer substantial or maternal but symbolic 
and paternal…This is perhaps what Christianity celebrates in divine love. God was the 
first to love, God is love…This fusion with God, which, to repeat myself, is more 
semiotic than symbolic, repairs the wounds of Narcissus.’412 
 
 
5.2 Kristeva’s Linguistic Reading of the Passion 
 
 Kristeva’s ‘symbolic’ correction of Freud goes as far as representing homo religiosus at 
the heart of Christian symbolism, the Cross. Imagining the ‘loving Third party’ in the very 
place of the Christian Father was unimaginable for her ‘atheistic’ sub-texts. With this, 
Kristeva’s departure from Freud’s one-sided hermeneutics of religion based on the ‘oedipal 
structure’ culminates. This started with her shifting emphasis from Freud’s ‘murderous 
desires’ centred on the father to the sub-psychic: 
 
 ‘The crucifixion of God-made-man reveals to the analyst, always attentive to the 
murderous desires with regard to the father, that representation of Christ’s Passion 
signifies a guilt that is visited upon the son, who is himself put to death. 
 
Freud interprets this expiation as an avowal of the oedipal murder that every 
human being unconsciously desires. But Christ’s Passion brings into play even more 
primitive layers of the psyche; it thus reveals a fundamental depression (a narcissistic 
wound or reversed hatred) that conditions access to human language... language begins 
in mourning…’413  
 
Kristeva gradually worked out the ‘psychological’ aspects of the cross as a universal 
narrative.414 Kristeva sees in the Creed the embodiment of ‘basic human fantasies’.415 (See 
                                               
412 From Kristeva’s In the Beginning Was Love, quoted by Mercer, ‘Psychoanalysis, Parents and God’, 
pp.252-253 
413 Kristeva, In the Beginning Was Love,, cf. p.40-41.pp.40-41. 
414 See the chapter ‘God is Love’ (pp.137-150), cf. pp.144-145 in Tales of Love. Here Kristeva 
examines the psychological dynamic of identification in the Christian sacrifice. Also, her emphasis is 
on a psychoanalytical understanding of sacrifice through the lens of her interest ‘abjection’. See the 
chapters ‘Semiotics of Biblical Abomination’ (pp.90-112) and ‘Qui Tollis Peccata Mundi’ (pp.113-
132) in Powers of Horror, An Essay on Abjection (French publication 1980). The theme of the 
linguistic Passion is already raised in Kristeva’s ‘Holbein’s Dead Christ’ (pp.106-141) in Black Sun, 
Depression and Melancholia (1989, French publication 1987). In it, Christ is shown as the ‘absolute 
subject’ in whom the many separations that build up the psychic life of individuals are enacted. The 
chief emphasis among them is the phenomenon of psychic depression, which is a result of the 
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Appendix IV.) The most detailed elaboration of the analogy between the passion of the 
‘speaking being’ and the drama of the Cross can be found in a chapter devoted to the theme, 
‘Credo in Deo Unum’, in In the Beginning Was Love: Psychoanalysis and Faith (1987).416 
The essay, ‘Suffering’, brings Kristeva’s linguistic reading to full maturity. Though she 
repeats her previous statements, we can regard her ‘sub-psychic passion’ as an important 
anthropological and ideological purification of Freud’s ‘murder myth’. The human being is 
seen in the Son, just as the Son in the Father, not in terms of rivalry, but in common 
suffering. It is a final breaking away from Freud’s ‘meta-thesis’ that ‘religion is an 
obsessional neurosis’. As he put it, the Christian remembrance of the Passion ‘is essentially a 
fresh elimination of the father, an [obsessive] repetition of the guilty deed.’417 Kristeva 
transformed this ‘oedipal reduction’ into a genuine linguistic quest for subjective origins. 
This hermeneutical shift liberates Freudian discourse once and for all for a co-operation with 
theology.  
 
Kristeva’s new reading of the Passion comes quite close to its theological meaning in a 
way which Freud’s Totem and Taboo ab ovo made impossible. The added new element to the 
‘negativity scheme’ of the early linguistics is that now Kristeva tells the ‘linguistic passion’ 
to a Christian audience. ‘Suffering’ was delivered as a Lenten talk at the Paris Notre-
Dame.418 It is Kristeva’s effort to translate her psychoanalytical hermeneutics for the 
religious mindset. It is particularly psychic suffering which Kristeva stresses. The Father 
dying together with the Son is a summary of all psychic loss: ‘every one of us is the result of 
a long “work on the negative”: birth, weaning, separation, frustration.’419  
 
There is an implied anthropological claim in this translation. The narcissistic structure 
can be seen as part of the imago Dei! Kristeva demonstrates for theological sensitivity that 
the narcissistic structure is constitutive of our humaneness. The ‘linguistic passion’, she 
claims, is our deepest existential image. The whole of our psychic structure ‘anticipates’, 
metaphorically, what happens on the Cross. The pain of losing the original unity with the 
                                                                                                                                     
separation from any ‘lost object’, but also is the precondition for the linguistic representation of this 
loss. In a more general level, Kristeva says, our acquiescence of language is a ‘symbolic response’ to 
the experience of a hiatus: lost maternal unity. 
415 Kristeva, This Incredible Need to Believe, p.39. 
416 See the chapter ‘Credo in Unum Deum’ (pp.36-44), Julia Kristeva, In the Beginning Was Love, cf. 
p.40-41. 
417 Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo, Some Points of Agreement between the Mental Lives of Savages 
and Neurotics, Translated by James Strachey, W.W. Norton & Company, New York 1950, pp.154-
155 
418 The text is the fruit of a lecture given at the Notre-Dame de Paris within the framework of a 
dialogue between faith and contemporary thought in which Julia Kristeva and Anne-Marie Pelletier 
discussed the theme of ‘Suffering’. This text was first published in the collection Voici l’homme 
(Paris: Parole et Silence, 2006). Kristeva, This Incredible Need to Believe, p.87.p.108. 
419 ‘Suffering’, Ibid., p.94. 
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mother pushes the subject towards the language of the Father. Jesus’ loss of the Father is a 
symbolic reminder that language is suspended above the ‘void’ created by the loss of the 
mother. Kristeva’s emphasis, and offer to theology, is that the death of the Son manifests the 
fragility of ‘Meaning’ over against nihilism. Language expressive of Love is permanently 
threatened: the ‘human logos’ can fall back into an entrapping ‘semiotic’ chaos. ‘Christianity 
brings to consciousness the essential internal dramas of each person’s becoming. It thus 
gives itself an immense…unconscious…cathartic power.’’420  
 
My point is that the re-connection of the sub-psychic proto-passion with the Cross can 
be made a source to narrow the gap between the psychological and the theological concepts 
of the person. This is an important missing link. In Homans, it was only a theoretical 
dialogue with Freud to correct the distant ‘High Transcendence’ of God.  The common 
‘anthropology’ proposed in ‘Suffering’ and ‘This Incredible Need to Believe’ was 
unimaginable in Freud. For him, Christian doctrine (dogma) was one-sidedly downgraded to 
the deepest desires of mankind.421 Here Kristeva more intrinsically relates the psyche with 
doctrine. There is a common history between the speaking being and Christ the ‘absolute 
subject’.  
 
The other crucial contact Kristeva makes is with the theme of the Resurrection. In terms 
of content, there is no novelty compared with her previous views. ‘Resurrection’ stands for 
psychic rebirth. The continuity with the program of the self-transcending subject is obvious. 
What makes Kristeva’s linguistic passion significant is that the emphasis is not so much on 
the self’s capacity to transcend, as on the means through which it takes place. She confirms 
the need for creating symbols which express subjective suffering. ‘Resurrection’, through 
telling the story of the self, is a universal need which unites human beings. This confirmation 
of homo religiosus is highly significant for our dialogue. 
 
‘Jesus assumes human nature up to its most extreme physical (flagellation, the 
putting to death of the body) and moral (abandonment by God the Father, the loss of the 
Spirit) limits, the better to raise it up again in the divine, to reconcile human nature with 
the divine. Transposing this acceptance of his onto the anthropological plane, I would 
say that Jesus, suffering because desiring and thinking beyond the possible and the 
finite, offers an experience in which we recognise our own desires and thoughts, by 
definition without any possibility of satisfaction: forever unfulfilled, forever doubled by 
anguish, constituted in the process of incomplete maturation of the human by a series of 
separations, of prohibitions and renunciations, of modulation of the drives and of 
sublimation of the pleasures. Each of us suffers if and because we think “beyond”. 
Christ’s message seems to say, and I shall be more specific, through the “body”; which 
                                               
420 ‘Suffering’, in Kristeva, This Incredible Need to Believe., p.95. 
421 Sigmund Freud, The Future of an Illusion, Translated and edited by James Strachey, W.W. Norton 
& Company, New York 1961, p.30.    
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implies that thought is an accompaniment and a traversal of the anguish. … Thought [is] 
co-present with pleasure, all the way to suffering. (…)  ’422 (Emphasis added.) 
 
This recalls the stoic accepting of human finitude from Kristeva’s early reading of 
Holbein’s Dead Christ. Here, however, an active drama is emphasised, the ‘symbolic’ 
struggle to speak. The shift is palpably there: the Son’s becoming one with the Father is ‘life-
giving’, whereas in Powers of Horror identifying with one’s own death was central. 423 The 
present reading is much closer to the Christian dynamic of resurrection when the emphasis is 
on one’s rebirth. Though in Kristeva’s reading of Passion the fundamental difference 
becomes visible, yet it takes place in view of a common dialogue. It is Resurrection not in 
the religious sense, but in terms of psychic rebirth. However the dynamic is shared:  
  
‘Hence I say that, for having emphasised, as never before, com-passion and kénose 
as doubles inseparable form “amorous intelligence”, the genius of Christianity promoted 
a formidable counterweight to suffering that is none other than its sublimation or its 
working through by psychic and verbal activity. “I”, suffering being because 
desiring/thinking, loving/loved, am able to represent my passion to myself, and this 
representation is my resurrection. My spirit, in love with the passion, recreates it in the 
creations of the loving intellect: thoughts, stories, paintings, music come out of this.’424 
  
Though Kristeva’s reading stops at the psychological level, theology has a clear point 
from which to address the relationship between the self and the ‘Loving Third’. Kristeva 
conceives the union with the Father in terms of a temporary one. The self relates only to the 
‘symbols’ that the Father passes on, language. Whereas Kristeva stops here, theology does 
not. The Cross (as our new language) is not a separation from the Father in terms of 
becoming ‘free’ again through re-possessed language. The Father is not a temporary ‘Loving 
Third’. Faith states the Cross as the highpoint of the union with the Father. Paraphrasing 
Heidegger, the subject is not Sein-zum-Tode or a ‘being toward death’, thrown back upon his 
own symbols. Neither is the human being facing an unknown, unnameable totality in the 
original Heideggerian sense.425 For theology, the Cross is also the moment of a permanent 
hope, life, and rebirth, which are inexhaustible. Rebirth is not only sublimation of one’s 
suffering. The ‘loving intellect’ is created not by the self, all the more because it is primarily 
the Father, who is the source, which needs to be represented. This representation is coming 
from the Father, through the Son who alone can represent him. The Christian notion of 
rebirth is not about acquiring self-expression. In the dialectic of faith, it is through telling the 
                                               
422 ‘Suffering (Lenten Lectures, March 19, 2006)’, in Kristeva, This Incredible Need to Believe, pp.92-
93 
423 See section 2.3.3 ‘Mourning The Father’s Hope’ in Part One, pp. 98-100. Textual reference: 
Kristeva, Black Sun, p. 113. 
424 ‘Suffering’, in Kristeva, This Incredible Need to Believe, p.96. 
425 The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1993 (First 
publication 1993), p.197. (See also pp.196-198) 
 171 
Son’s resurrection that the human self resurrects and becomes represented. 
 
As a response to Kristeva’s linguistic reading of the Passion, the following points of 
agreement need to be highlighted for our dialogue. Representing resurrection (‘one’s desired 
rebirth’) is the prerequisite of the living ‘psychic space’. Kristeva’s says that the subject 
becomes sensitive to symbols through its own suffering. She confirms that the ‘exhaustion’ 
of the postmodern self can be mourned through Christian symbols. They are intrinsic to the 
self not only as a cultural memory, but also as the self’s psychological dynamic which they 
express. There is an innate desire for ‘rebirth’ which marks the postmodern self. In this 
sense, the primary narrative of homo religiosus is ‘Resurrection’. There is a fundamental 
‘pre-religious’ desire to acquire sufficient language through which the self can be embedded 
in love. This language gives a name to Heidegger’s name-less and story-less ‘Dasein’.426 
From a theological point of view, however, it also should be noted that despite this desire, the 
‘exhausted subject’ has no proper symbols for fulfilling this need. The subject needs a 
symbolic support from culture, but the most active agent of this ‘symbol building’ has to be 
the contemporary subject itself. 
 
 
5.3 Kristeva’s Ethical Reading of the Passion 
 
It is Kristeva’s ‘ethical’ reading of the Passion that offers the most fertile connections 
for theology. It makes the ‘Loving Father’ central as the source of compassionate love. 
Kristeva addresses Freud in terms of radically deconstructing his ‘autocrat’ God-image. The 
‘ethical’ re-imaging of the Father is also an important interrogation of the problem of ‘what 
is missing’ from secular discourse. Kristeva’s revision of the Christian Father is a radical 
leap similar to her ‘dialogical feminism’. Kristeva continues the correction of gender-
dualisms in a theological context. This also is an important correction of her own feminist 
critique of the God-image from ‘Stabat Mater’. With this, her one-sided criticism of 
masculine theological imagination gets a right balance. This Father-centred reading of the 
Passion is a new peak in Kristeva’s engagement with Christian texts. It offers crucial ‘data’ 
for a common symbol building.  
                                               
426 ‘Dasein’, Germ. ‘Being’. It is a central concept of Heidegger’s ontology of discovering man’s 
authentic existence in Being and Time. Dasein means man’s given state in the world, the everyday 
way of Being in which Dasein (Being) is not authentically who it is. This non-reflective mode of 
existence is expressed also in the term Das Man, the ‘They’. In Heidegger’s ontology, the person 
becomes a genuine Self by confronting and accepting existence in its finitude, as Being-unto-death. 
Jacques Tamniaux, ‘Heidegger’ (pp.32-60), in Twentieth-Century Continental Philosophy, Routledge 
History of Philosophy Volume VIII, edited by Richard Kearney, Routledge, London and New York 
1994 (First publication 1994), p.37. 
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5.3.1 The Father: The Sender to Love  
 
The Father is shown as a regenerating source of ethics in terms of re-orientating human 
love. Kristeva’s interpretation of the Father’s love here has a twofold motive. Its immediate 
context is her dialogue with Christians. The other motive comes from within her project. 
Kristeva already made the critical observation in Tales of Love that ‘secularism’ does not 
produce a sufficient discourse on motherhood. The new emphasis, as a completion of this 
criticism, is that ‘secular humanism’ continues this erring by not paying sufficient attention 
to those marginalised in culture, especially the disabled. Kristeva repeatedly remarks that 
Christianity offers a compelling narrative of solidarity, while ‘secularisation’ does not. Work 
with suffering people in practice is more effective among Christians. She brings a concrete 
example by drawing on her experience as the president of the National Council for the 
Disabled (France): 427  
 
‘…I am in the process of verifying that the discourse of Christian compassion, 
however infantilising and miserabilist it may be, is the most frequent and effective basis 
of the still-too-rare solidarity I am looking for in France along with disabled citizens. 
(…) Secularism will not withstand the impact of religions without this more complex 
humanism, capable of recognising suffering and giving people the chance for a better 
life, a life plan, a direction. Support for the disabled is part of this and perhaps offers a 
new, unprecedented opportunity itself. The sciences augment knowledge, but will we let 
them respond in a suitably ethical way? This, it seems to me, is the main concern of the 
secularism in place, well beyond political battles and the vagaries of geopolitics.’428  
 
Solidarity with suffering clarifies concretely ‘what is missing’ (Habermas) from secular 
discourse. Kristeva urges a ‘cultural revolution’ within secular society to change the way the 
disabled are viewed.429 In Hatred and Forgiveness, Kristeva points to the central trauma of 
‘secularity’, the fear of the disabled person, the ‘disfigured other’. The disabled 
person/sufferer  
 
‘opens a narcissistic identity wound in the person who is not disabled; he inflicts 
a threat of physical or psychical death, fear of collapse… And so the disabled person 
is inevitably exposed to a discrimination that cannot be shared.’430 (Italics mine.) 
 
                                               
427 Autobiographical detail from the essay, ‘From Jesus to Mozart, Christianity’s Difference’, in 
Kristeva, This Incredible Need to Believe, p.77. 
428 ‘Secularism’, in Kristeva, Hatred and Forgiveness, pp.27-28. 
429 See the essay, crucial in this aspect, ‘Liberty, Equality, Fraternity and ….Vulnerability’ (pp.29-
45.), Kristeva, Hatred and Forgiveness. 
430 Ibid., p.29. 
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Kristeva proposes psychoanalytic listening to suffering as a mode of removing ‘the abyss 
that separates the world of disability from the world of the able’.431 This essay, ‘Liberty, 
Equality, Fraternity and…Vulnerability’ is an important background to Kristeva’s reading of 
the Passion in ‘Suffering’. The two are in a structural dialogue with one another, and their 
interplay is crucial for a theological evaluation. Their underlying question is: what is the 
source of being sent to the suffering other? What dynamics, what discourse? What 
‘categorical imperative’? What community? What ‘symbolism’?  In This Incredible Need to 
Believe, the theological image of the Father is invited into the discourse, as this image has 
much to say to the exclusion of disabled people.432 Kristeva’s ‘theological turn’ is in dialogue 
not only with Christians, but also touches upon some uncertainties in her own regime.  
 
Kristeva presents the Christian God as the sender to love the suffering other. Though the 
Father is presented only as a symbolic archetype for ethics, the theological dynamic is real. 
The Father of the Passion as ‘exemplary love’ makes the fellow human being visible and real 
for us in and through the Son. The coherence of the Christian narrative is unquestioned and 
shown as unprecedented. Kristeva presents specifically its loving Father as the one who 
sends to the suffering other with whom he identifies.433 It is the Father’s example that moves 
me out of my self to the other. Kristeva clearly shares the dynamics: the Father removes our 
fear of the otherness of the wounded. It is the loving Abba, who is reflected in Christ ‘the 
absolute person’, who makes the ‘narcissistic identity wound’ in us visible. He puts Himself 
in place of our wounds and in this way he redefines the previously impenetrable borders 
between us and the ‘wounded’. The Father who invites us to an imitatio Patris (imitation of 
the Father) restores solidarity with the ‘world of disability’.  
  
The Christian God in ‘Suffering’ emerges as the real Other to the self. The Father-Son 
relationship empowers the subject to act in some way which, by himself, he is incapable of. 
This act of sending, or showing compassion, restores and generates a genuine selfhood. In 
compassionate love, the other is reflected as the one to whom the person can now relate in 
love. Both are active: the Father who sends by responding to the Son’s innocent suffering 
with compassion, and the Son, in his innocent suffering, by taking upon himself all human 
                                               
431 ‘Liberty, Equality, Fraternity and …Vulnerability’, in Kristeva, Hatred and Forgiveness, p.39. 
432 The essay ‘Liberty, Equality, Fraternity and… Vulnerability’ recapitulates her reflections on 
disability in France. Kristeva contributed to the report by the National Council on Disability 
(November 2002) to the French president (Open letter to the president of the Republic on citizens with 
disabilities, for the use of those who are disabled and those who are not.) 
433 Theology can refer here to a series of healings in Mark, which marks the beginning of Jesus’ public 
ministry: Mk 1:21-27 /driving out evil spirits/, Mk 1:35-39 /healing many sick with various diseases/, 
Mk 1:40-45 /healing the man with leprosy/, and especially Mk 2:1-12 /healing the paralytic/. The 
latter introduces Jesus’ apology of the Father’s universal will to heal all, regardless of the Sabbath 
day. 
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suffering. But the Father-Son can only universalise his suffering because of serving. In this 
way, theology argues, Jesus is more than symbolic or representative. It is literally his com-
passion that restores the full capacity of the self in us. Kristeva reads the innocence of 
Christ’s suffering as the assertion that suffering is inherent in the reconciliation of the human 
with the divine; and it is also inherent in the life of the speaking being. 434 
 
‘Innocent, absolved of guilt, flesh bruised and spiritually wanting (“Eli, Eli, lama 
sabachthani?” [Which means, ‘My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?’435] Mark 
15:34) – what solitude has not been haunted by this cry and this silence! – Christian 
suffering is shareable: this is the first way in which Christianity has effected a revolution 
in the approach to suffering. Shareable, first of all, between humans and Christ, who, in 
assuming it, confers upon it extraordinary dignity, at the interface of the human and the 
divine; shareable next, and consequently, among human beings themselves, who only 
allow themselves to look for a way to relieve it on the condition that they can look it in 
the face, give it a name, and interpret it.’436 
 
This is Kristeva’s elucidation of the transcendent dynamic of the self on the level of 
ethics. We can refer back to her program of the self-transcending subject. This reading of the 
Passion is a completion of the program, and here Kristeva offers a genuine point of contact 
with theology. The self opens up and rises above himself when the suffering of the other is 
named. It is not the representation of ‘my’ suffering, but that of the other, who is genuinely 
outside of the self. With the thought of giving representation to the passion of the fellow 
human being, Kristeva’s program of self-transcending, the temporary resurrection through 
self-representation, reaches a genuine peak. This ‘transcendent selfhood’, the dynamic of 
which de-centres the self, is absolutely shareable with humanism. Here we can attach an 
ethical meaning to Kristeva’s ‘semiotic’. Kristeva’s ‘speaking being’ comes out of its inertia 
when listening to the silent suffering of the other. This silence of ethical charge is a 
borderline state of language, a genuine ‘beyond’. Theology witnesses to this silence: when 
human beings have no name for the suffering Other, God’s epiphany takes place. This 
historical ‘silence’ is an important and very precise common formulation with Kristeva of 
what the ‘exhausted subject’ means. ‘Exhaustion’ stands for the inability to name the 
suffering Other. 
 
This muteness of the ‘isolated self’ becomes manifest in ‘an impasse that threatens all 
countries’, when ‘secularisation [is] supplanting the compassion of our world’, when ‘there 
                                               
434 ‘From Jesus to Mozart (Christianity’s Difference)’, in Kristeva, This Incredible Need to Believe, 
p.80. 
435 Translation from the Compact NIV Study Bible, Hodder &Stoughton, London, Sydney, Auckland 
1998 (First published 1987 by International Bible Society), p.1499. If not stated otherwise in my work 
this translation is used. King James Version is referred separately. 
436 ‘Suffering (Lenten Lectures, March 19, 2006)’, in Kristeva, This Incredible Need to Belive, pp.90-
91. 
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is no place for vulnerability’.437 Theology argues that it is not we who name vulnerability, 
but He, who presents his own wound as ours. This can lead to a common ‘naming’ with 
secular humanism, because we recognise in the Son a ‘universal wound’ on behalf of all 
unnamed sufferers. What Kristeva raises in the final outcome is the need to express this 
universality. She confirms, that this ‘symbol’ comes from a historical dialogue with the 
‘father’s love’.  
 
‘There is no act of love susceptible of consoling suffering if it is not preceded by 
speech, by imagination, by transference/counter-transference between consoled and 
consoler. This is what Christianity tries to do when it recognises the desperate 
orientation (this version) toward the ideal Father of psychic suffering, which 
aggravates all other kinds of suffering; this is what Christianity tries to do especially 
when it transforms this père-version into creativity, into sublimation, into the art of 
living.’438 (Emphasis mine.) 
 
However much reduced to transferential love this dialogue is in the psychoanalytic 
encounter, Kristeva confirms history as the medium of the epiphany of love. She also 
confirms that representing the Father’s love is life-giving. With this, for theology, the 
opportunity occurs to witness how history and the ‘historicity of the subject’ are addressed 
by grace. Against this background we can sum up Kristeva’s ethical reading of the Passion as 
revealing a ‘narcissistic’ identity crisis of the postmodern subject. Tackling this crisis draws 
attention to the need of presenting to him the Father’s compassionate love as the archetype of 
ethics. This solidary love, by virtue of its nature, transcends the level of individual 
encounters. It is equally important to present the Father’s love as trans-historical love, which 
is intimately connected to individual suffering throughout history. This demonstration will 
make the Father’s love truly universal and will interrupt postmodern fragmentation.  
 
 
5.3.2 The Immanent Reading of the Father’s Kenosis 
 
Kristeva confirmed the Passion as our universal ethical narrative from the ‘sub-psychic 
level’. This complemented her earlier strategy of responding to the loss of paternal authority 
from within the ‘semiotic’.439 By re-reading the Passion, her ‘semiotic’ imagery culminates 
in a genuine synthesis. To the ‘semiotic’ symbols of love the missing ‘Paternal love’ is 
added in a complementary way. As a high-point of Kristeva’s ‘cultural mourning’, this 
                                               
437 Kristeva, Hatred and Forgiveness, p.40. 
438 ‘Suffering’, in Kristeva, This Incredible Need to Believe, p.96. 
439 It ‘gets to the point where some analysts, like me, are then faced with the necessity of thinking and 
identifying the figure of the mother. For the mother is definitely not just a genetrix; instead, she takes 
on a symbolic and civilisational function that our culture goes gooey over, but says little about, 
because we are so busy saving the father.’ In Kristeva, Revolt, She Said, p.28. 
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authority is recovered from the Christian cultural memory of the ‘Father’.440 In her dialogical 
position, theology is rediscovered as a current resource for humanism. This can be seen as a 
further step in deconstructing Freud’s closed ‘oedipal iconography’ of the Father. Kristeva’s 
dialogue with theological economy is a genuine transcending of the reduction of ‘God’ to the 
paternal image, whose consoling function is to overcome existential fears. 441  
 
Kristeva’s reading of the Passion, contrary to Freud’s original critique of religion, made 
the Father’s kenosis a pivotal ethical reference. With this, she set up a creative tension, as it 
is directly addressing the theology of the cross through its core-concept, which Kristeva 
borrows. This making a direct reference to Balthasar’s kenosis-theology of the ‘hiatus’ in 
God 442 is the crucial contact point which connects theology with Kristeva as an ontological 
discourse. My study highlights Kristeva’s use of kenosis as her most important 
epistemological leap (innovation). With this, her relationship to Christian texts, despite the 
materialist position she maintains, becomes intrinsic. Kristeva’s ‘semiotics’ and theology, 
through this, can be linked as genuine ‘inter-texts’. This means that making theological 
statements is not external any longer to her original ontological program. They incite a 
genuine ‘cultural mourning’ which can be shared. 
 
‘Christ’s suffering on the Cross − which cannot but strike you, and me, during this 
period of Lent, which holds human beings in thrall at Easter, preceding the Resurrection 
− Christ’s suffering, therefore, is neither of the same order, nor as mysterious as that 
which faith confronts when it touches upon the virgin birth of the Man God, nor that 
other mystery, which touches upon faith, of the Resurrection. Between these two poles 
of the Incarnation (Immaculate Conception of Marie by Anne, her mother, and virginal 
birth of Jesus by the grace of the Holy Spirit), and of the Resurrection of the Son of God 
on the Father’s right hand, and the promise of the resurrection of all bodies, the suffering 
of Jesus, however paroxysmal it may be, is nonetheless sharable and, in this sense, 
common.’443 
 
Kristeva’s reading of kenosis remains purely psychological. The reference to Balthasar 
remains also unelaborated as, from the theme of the Father’s kenosis, she switches to the 
psychological dimension, her usual field of sublimation. The ‘death of God’, in terms of the 
                                               
440 An important observation of the existential, universal desire for a renewed Father image in culture 
is Kristeva’s early remark on the ‘resurgence of the sacred’. ‘Look at those crowds at World Youth 
days in search of a good father, kneeling before the Pope who enables millions of people (even in a 
country like Cuba, ravaged by dictatorial paternity) to “fix fatherhood”, i.e. to console themselves in 
the shelter of a paternal figure who is neither absent nor tyrannical but simply present and loving.’ 
Kristeva, Revolt, She Said, p.23. 
441 See Freud’s heavy reduction of the God-image, cf. pp 18-30 in Freud, The Future of an Illusion, 
ed. Stracey, p.30.    
442 Her two references are to Urs von Balthasar, La gloire et la croix [Glory and the cross], vol. 3,2, 
“La Nouvelle Alliance” (Paris: Aubier, 1975), in ‘Suffering’, and ‘From Jesus to Mozart’, in Kristeva, 
This Incredible Need to Believe, p.83 and p.94.. 
443 ‘Suffering’, in Kristeva, This Incredible Need to Believe, p.88. 
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suffering of the human self, is seen as a condition of rebirth through thought. Suffering is 
transcended and expressed in the deployment of art.444 The ‘consoling Christ’  
 
‘identifies with the malaise of men and continuously offers them the mirror of his 
suffering onto which to project their own. It is indeed in the revolving door of this 
sharing, by dying like a man for men, that Jesus removes their sin and Evil from the 
world.’445 
 
Besides the theological meaning, Kristeva highlights the moral reading of God’s kenosis: 
 
‘(…) Com-passion brings about a historically unprecedented moral solidarity with 
vulnerable humankind. For two thousand years, right up to the most recent Christian 
humanism, Christian morality comes to drink at the source of this compassion, and one 
can only salute the generosity of the works that put this compassion into practice. I have 
seen for myself, notably in the care for the handicapped, the extraordinary vitality of 
Christians, and Christian institutions dedicated to compassion, that courageously 
supplement the weaknesses of legislator and politics.’446 
 
Though Kristeva, in ‘Suffering’, does not engage in a theological discussion, her 
psychological elucidation of kenosis points to the suffering of Christ and the Father as a 
problem which still poses questions within theology. This reference is important for my 
critique as it will return to dealing with this ‘borderline’ region:  
 
‘It is through this co-presence of the absolute-and-the-nothingness of desire that 
Christianity reaches the limits of the religious. I would therefore say that with kénose we 
are no longer confronted with the religious but with the sacred, understood as a traversal, 
via thought, of the unthinkable: nothingness, the useless, the vain, the absurd.’447 
 
Or,  
‘However, in only attending to the humanist − as I would call it − aspect of Christian 
suffering, one overlooks other advances that revolutionise even metaphysics itself.’448 
 
‘Does Jesus in his suffering speak only to human nature? Son of God, but allowing 
himself to be annihilated, does he not turn the divine itself to nothing? Theological 
debates leave the question open. Is it possible to take it up again today?... The question 
remains: is the suffering to death only due to Christ’s humanity, or does it affect the very 
nature of his divinity? And thus of Divinity? After the Last Supper, and right before the 
Passion, doesn’t Christ tell Philip: “He that hath seen me hath seen the Father” 
Protestants and Orthodox apparently attend more closely to this “descent” (of the Father 
himself) “into the lowest earthly regions”.’449 (Emphasis mine.) 
 
                                               
444 ‘Suffering’, in Kristeva, This Incredible Need to Believe, p.89. 
445 Ibid., p.91. 
446 Ibid., pp.91-92. 
447 Ibid., p.95.  
448 Ibid., p.92. 
449 Ibid., p.93. 
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Kristeva highlights the most difficult theological question to be answered, the theme of 
suffering in God.  Her purely humanist treatment should not be seen as a lack of theology. 
Her stance is explained by her materialist agnosticism. Rather, Kristeva shows the 
importance of the Father’s suffering, and this is the very point at which the question of God’s 
suffering becomes a resource. Rediscovering the Father’s suffering is perhaps our last chance 
as a culture to hold a mirror to our collective suffering. Responding to the Father’s 
compassionate love revealed on the Cross is the last chance to awaken individual and 
collective responsibility for this suffering. 
 
 My response from the theologia crucis will articulate the theological dimension of the 
Passion which Kristeva has left untouched. In her reference to Balthasar’s ‘descent-
theology’, the kenosis narrative of theology is addressed: how can we make the Cross 
become again the icon of the Father’s love? Kristeva’s support for this endeavour is not 
negligible at all. She confirms that the postmodern subject is interested in the ‘suffering of 
the Father’. If this interest is indeed there, then, through his own ‘psychic passion’, the 
‘exhausted subject’ can relate again to his lost religious (predominantly Christian) past.    
 
 
5.3.3 Recovering the Father through the Maternal Metaphor  
 
Kristeva’s re-reading of the Passion is so fresh that there is still no theological 
engagement with it. The importance of this text is the shared terminology with theology. It 
makes a response relatively easier than before as the ‘Father’ is at the heart of theological 
sensitivity. In the work which followed upon This Incredible Need to Believe, Kristeva has 
taken up again the problem of the ‘Father’ and the ‘Passion’ through the lens of her previous 
agenda, the feminine sacred. In Hatred and Forgiveness, the essay ‘The Passion According 
to Motherhood’ occupies a central place. It is the second major offer for a theological 
engagement. It continues her correction of Freud in terms of recovering the ‘Father’s love’ 
through the mother. This piece also continues the ‘maternal metaphor’ from Tales of Love. 
What is added is the dialogue with the masculine theological imagination. Here Kristeva 
theorises the unrecognised experience of the mother in terms of showing the contribution of 
the feminine ‘sacred’. Kristeva submits the maternal passion as the prototype of passion and 
ethics. ‘The Passion according to Motherhood’ speaks of motherhood, since the moment of 
conception is an experience of living with the other ‘inside’. For Kristeva, life with the child, 
from the ‘narcissistic unity’ to allowing the child to become an autonomous ‘speaking 
being’, is an archetype of ethics, ‘preparing for ethics’. The ‘Mother’, just as the Father of 
the Passion, is a sender to love (‘amare’). Kristeva’s central thesis is that it is in this maternal 
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experience that ‘ethics’ for the first time is inscribed into us human beings. A mother’s 
unconditional love for the child grounds the moral self. In other words, the ‘Mother’ is our 
first ethical memory; the sense of morality is the gift of the mother. Maternal love is the 
prototype of human passion and com-passion.450  
 
Because of the limited space I can only recapitulate the ‘theological’ dynamic of the 
‘Passion According to Motherhood’. Re-intensifying the ‘Loving Third’ with the underlying 
ethics is a fundamental need for our culture. This recovery takes place through remembering 
a mother’s love in their particular ‘Passion’. The link for theology is the demonstration that 
the Christian God-image is a vital resource in this recovery. The ‘maternal metaphor’ is also 
present in God, the theology of the cross can liberate the suppressed ‘maternal’ side of the 
image of Father. Kristeva’s ‘maternal Passion’ can be a useful source for presenting the 
Christian Abba as the Father of compassion. Through presenting this enhanced God-image, 
theology enters into an ontological dialogue with Freud’s criticism. It is a non-polemic 
response by proving that God is capable of unconditional love, of ‘maternal kenosis’. The 
Father’s kenosis for man can be seen as an archetype of these ‘non-oedipal’ qualities. 
Demonstrating this is also an important counter-economy to deconstruct the language of 
‘atonement theology’. 
 
Kristeva’s ‘maternal Passion’ highlights the fact that the mother’s identity is renewed 
through the unconscious re-learning of her mother-tongue while teaching her child to 
speak.451 Thus, Kristeva insinuates, mothers have a specific relation to ‘Tradition’. They 
have more of a tolerance toward the canon of culture then men do. ‘Men’, as history shows, 
are ready to eliminate difference, even at the cost of ‘killing’ for the canon. A mother’s re-
learning of her mother tongue can be seen as the archetype of an inclusive attitude to cultural 
difference. A mother internalises this tolerance through her internal journey in the child’s 
language and ‘evolving’ culture. The stabilisation of her shaken identity in pregnancy (Who 
am I? Am I two or one?) also takes place with the support of the ‘father’s love’. In other 
words, her ‘sacrificial’ love needs a support. This dependence of the mother, Kristeva 
implies, is the archetypal experience of fellowship. The mother has to learn that her love for 
the child and for the father comprise a unity. The way the mother detaches herself from ‘her’ 
doublet to allow the child to be an autonomous being,452 is the birth of the sense of 
community, a regained equilibrium of love. She realises that her love for the child is always 
directed to the father. The mother loves the ‘father’ through her child; she loves the child 
                                               
450 ‘The Passion According to Motherhood’ (pp.79-94), in Kristeva, Hatred and Forgiveness, pp.86-
91. 
451 Ibid., pp.89-90. 
452 Ibid., p.86. 
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through her love for the ‘father’. As an analogy, this can be seen as the ‘Trinitarian dynamic’ 
of becoming the ‘loving Third’. This ‘Trinitarian’ direction is another important link with 
theology. 
 
 
5.4 Conclusions for Theological Engagement 
 
Kristeva has brought Freudian imagery to breaking-point. Her Freudian narratives came 
close to the original theological dynamics of the images borrowed from religion. The 
analyses showed that Kristeva’s ‘semiotic’ innovations exhausted all the inner possibilities 
that her immanent regime permits. The dialogue in ‘Suffering’ may be transitory, but its 
theological potential can be exhausted. It is theology’s turn if it can live with the opportunity.  
 
Kristeva’s three readings of the Passion (linguistic, ethical and ‘feminist’) culminated in 
the theologically relevant problem of kenosis. It seems a viable concept for both 
psychoanalysis and theology. Kenosis, in its original theological context, says much about 
God’s self-emptying, which Kristeva does not examine. But this dynamic concept is also 
expressing the existential cries of the human person as a ‘lack of being’.  Kristeva states that 
recognising this lack in us builds up empathy towards our fellow human beings. 
 
 ‘…My fear of castration, narcissistic injury, defect, and death, repressed until now, 
is transformed into attention, patience, and solidarity capable of refining my being in the 
world. In this encounter could the disabled subject become not my analyst but my 
analyzer?’453  
 
That is, who gives meaning to my life? Theology argues that it comes from the 
‘inexhaustible God’, who has become ‘disabled’ (‘handicapped’) for me in history, on the 
Cross. He is so close to me that I should not fear him. Theology argues that the underlying 
discourse of psychoanalytic listening to vulnerability is always the full meaning of the 
Christian Passion. If theology takes up this ‘shared symbol building’, it needs first to present 
a genuine historical reading of the Passion in the sense of re-reading it for our particular, 
present history.  
 
Back to our Homansian context of shared symbol building. Kristeva’s reading of the 
Passion can be seen as an attempt to find the narrative which can integrate the ‘fantasy 
activity’ triggered in culture in the wake of the ‘death of the Father’. My point is that the 
oeuvre needs a confirmation from theology that this project should be developed further. The 
                                               
453 ‘Thinking About Liberty in Dark Times’, in Kristeva, Hatred and Forgiveness, p.44. 
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Passion is not one among the possible references of Kristeva’s project but is the central 
context of her work. Put it differently, the Christian Passion is the principal ‘intertext’ of 
Kristeva and the hermeneutics for approaching her ‘semiotics’.  
 
The Cross, if it reveals the ‘absolute subject’, Christ, in the theological sense, also 
reveals a genuine self-image of the subject. The Cross can be presented as the ‘absolute 
narrative’ of the self. Participation in the Christian Passion is the unnamed desire of our 
culture. Christ’s Cross confronts the person and his communities by shedding light on what 
is ‘irremediable’ in us on our own, from within our resources.454 The theology of the cross 
challenges secular discourse by confronting it with the ‘exhaustible’ resources of the 
autonomous self. ‘Yet the analysand who has not confronted the irremediable in himself has 
not completed his journey to the end of the night.’ 455 The Cross is an honest discourse about 
the transformation of this ‘irremediable’ into a conversation about the meaning of life and 
history lived together with God. This conversation, if it wants to deconstruct the closedness 
of ‘post-metaphysical consciousness’ necessarily has to take place in the borderline region of 
human history, the Resurrection. This is theology’s strategic way to recover the ‘Father’s 
love’. It assigns the direction for my critique to argue that the experience of the Cross has to 
be made a motivation for the postmodern self, an object and source of desire to return to 
‘meaning’ and human bonds. The concept of kenosis and Kristeva’s reinstating belief as a 
‘pre-religious category’ makes possible theology’s translation of faith experience.456 Now it is 
theology’s turn to give witness to that statement: ‘Whether I belong to a religion, whether I 
be agnostic or atheist, when I say ‘I believe’, I mean “I hold as true”.’457 This is the recovery 
of the notion of our particularity (individual, communal) in Christ, who is our ‘absolute 
memory’ of the Father.   
 
Theology needs to admit that Kristeva’s strictly psychological reading of the Christian 
agape is very difficult to access as its references are independent from faith.458 On the other 
hand, themes like the ‘Eucharist’ as the remembrance of the Cross, or the sacrifice which 
sustains the Christian fellowship, have to form part of the response of theology. Kristeva’s 
revision of Freud allows theology to engage with her in the context of the ‘Loving Third 
party’. Objectively, the need to recover the ‘Father’s love’ over against nihilism also requires 
widening the psychological dynamic of the ‘Loving Third’. Kristeva’s re-reading of the 
                                               
454 ‘Thinking About Liberty in Dark Times’, in Kristeva, Hatred and Forgiveness,, p.44. 
455 Ibid., p.44. 
456 Analogous to Kristeva’s translation of her psychoanalytical approach for Christians in ‘Suffering’. 
457 Kristeva, This Incredible Need to Believe, p.3. 
458 Like identifying the underlying dynamic of the Eucharist in ‘a relief of the oral sadism directed at 
the archaic maternal body’. In ‘God is Love’ (pp.137-150), in Kristeva, Tales of Love, p.148. 
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Passion makes the central role of the ‘Loving Third party’ more accessible for theology. 
Though the theme in her early ‘reductive’ readings had already occurred, because of 
epistemological and methodological differences it was less accessible. After her dialogical 
turn, certain aspects of Kristeva’s early reading of religious sacrifice can be revisited and 
completed with their theological meaning.459 The theologia crucis will offer these 
‘completions’ with a special focus on ethical fellowship. In this endeavour theology can 
build on Kristeva’s appreciation of the Christian sacrifice. She highlights that identifying 
with the Father is a sublimation of violence: agape builds psychic space, through which one 
can reach out to include neighbours, foreigners, and sinners.460 
 
Theology when engaging with Kristeva’s recent reading of the Passion will have to 
address her previous Freudianism. The task of ontological critique remains. Kristeva’s 
‘Freudian subtext’ is especially manifest in the essay ‘Liberty, Equality, Fraternity… and 
Vulnerability’, which confirms psychoanalysis as the privileged hermeneutical horizon for 
the critique of culture. The central preoccupation of the third millennium, Kristeva asserts, is 
‘what meaning to give the limits of life: birth, death, deficiencies? Will advanced 
democracies have the means to support life with its limits and shortcomings, soliciting and 
favouring the subject within them?’461 As a source for answering these questions, Kristeva 
assigns listening to the unconscious of our culture. Psychoanalysis’ perennial principle is that 
this disturbed unconscious speaks honestly of the loss of meaning. 
 
The loss of meaning is indeed a shared concern with Kristeva’s psychoanalytical 
‘resourcing’. However, the essential vulnerability of the speaking being is expressed most 
profoundly by the event of the Cross. As for ‘what is missing’ (Habermas), that is, the 
symbol of the Cross, it is now in the unconscious of our culture. The meaning of love it 
reveals is deeply exiled from culture. The vulnerability of the speaking being to which the 
analyst listens to today462 is revealed most accurately in the crucified incarnate Logos, in 
Jesus as ‘speaking being’. A contemporary exposition of the Passion needs to argue the Cross 
as an existential image, which reveals the ‘essential vulnerability of the speaking body’.463 
Implied in it is the historical suffering not only of psychic space, but that of the human soul. 
Theology needs to argue that the human soul is the fullest expression of historicity. Also, 
theology needs to spell out that this fundamental vulnerability arises not only at the 
                                               
459 Like ‘abjection’ or ‘defilement’. See the chapters, ‘Semiotics of Biblical Abomination’ in Powers 
of Horror (pp.90-112) and ‘Qui Tollis Peccata Mundi’  (pp113-132). 
460 See ‘God is Love’ (pp.137-150), in Kristeva, Tales of Love, cf. pp.146-147.149. 
461 ‘Thinking About Liberty in Dark Times’, in Kristeva, Hatred and Forgiveness, p.41. 
462 Ibid., p.41. 
463 Kristeva’s emphasis on the particular suffering of the person. Ibid., p.41. 
 183 
intersection of biology and language,464 but also at the intersection between ‘language’ 
(nature) and revealed faith (Revelation). The capacity of ‘thinking/representing beyond’465 
needs to re-establish a relation with this ‘future dimension’ of history. It might be true that 
‘psychoanalysis is the quintessential intimate experience’.466 However, theology claims this 
quintessentially for the encounter with God who is the radical other to history, while also 
being a radical intimacy to the human self. This is where theology’s ‘Semiotic Passion’ 
begins. 
 
Therefore, theology aims at completing Kristeva’s objective: ‘how do we find a way to 
inscribe in the concept of the human itself…the constitutive part of the destructivity, 
vulnerability and imbalance that are integral parts of the identity of the human race, and the 
singularity of the speaking subject?’467 This is the utmost theological challenge: how can we 
represent the faith narrative of the Cross within the human self? There is an important link 
with Kristeva’s project, particularly her Arendtian emphasis on re-commencement in history. 
The Incarnation has already inscribed the Passion within the human self. Theology says that 
from this standpoint the person of Christ unites Kristeva’s Arendtian program and her 
‘semiotic’ quest for subjective re-beginning. The central event of the Cross is God’s speaking 
to us in Jesus Christ. His revelation through the Cross-Resurrection is our new life, a new 
subjective and collective re-commencement. The ‘Semiotic Passion’ in this sense will spell 
out the ‘missing’ fellowship of grace.  
 
Kristeva’s ‘symbolic mourning’ that produced her ‘Semiotic Passion’ was a natural 
development in her work. My study identified the major motives of this evolution. The inner 
possibilities of her regime (the ‘semiotic directions’ of her materialism), the necessary 
corrections of Freud’s ‘Father-narrative’, her previous engagement with Christian texts, and 
her realisation of the ‘exhaustion’ of the subject together prompted Kristeva to spell out a 
new humanist reformulation of the Passion. My critique from the onset highlighted the 
‘ontological’ cause of her moving towards a ‘semi-theological’ symbolism. The problems of 
the materialist grounding of the self, the isolated self, its unmourned religious past,  
especially contributed to ‘deconstructing’ Freud’s closed hermeneutics of religion. All these 
together resulted in an explicit conversation with Christian faith.468  
 
The whole trajectory of the oeuvre shows that Kristeva’s Freudian hermeneutics is not a 
                                               
464 ‘Thinking About Liberty in Dark Times’, in Kristeva, Hatred and Forgiveness, p.41. 
465 ‘Suffering’, in Kristeva, This Incredible Need to Believe, p.92. 
466 Kristeva, Hatred and Forgiveness, p.41. 
467 Ibid., p.42. 
468 Schweitzer, The Stranger’s Voice, p.4. 
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closed system. In the light of the later development which led to her dialogue with religion, 
Hanvey’s treatment is limited. The absolute closed nature of Kristeva’s hermeneutics of 
religion can no longer be stated. We have seen a definite move away from the ultimate 
reduction of religious meaning.469 Kristeva’s psychoanalytical conversation with faith is an 
objective situation, in which theology can submit its own ‘Semiotic Passion’ as a 
comprehensive response.  
  
                                               
469 Hanvey ‘Other than Stranger’ (pp.121-142), p.134. 
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6 THEOLOGY’S ‘SEMIOTIC PASSION’: RENEWING THE IMAGE OF THE 
FATHER FROM THE THEOLOGIA CRUCIS 
 
The closing interrelated chapters of my work (Ch 6-7) bring to realisation the prime 
objective of my critique: a comprehensive response from systematic theology to Kristeva’s 
‘semiotics’. The ‘Semiotic Passion’ addresses the points of contacts with her work. In a 
narrow sense, it is a response to Kristeva’s dialogue with religion, particularly her reading of 
the Passion. 
 
This chapter argues that the ‘Semiotic Passion’ completes Kristeva’s ‘symbolic 
mourning’ in a way that helps us to arrive at a better understanding of the ‘exhausted 
subject.’ This demonstration aims to show that facing the conflict with Kristeva’s humanist 
subtexts actually brings about a closer co-operation with her humanism. 
  
I present the ‘Semiotic Passion’ in two steps. First, I demonstrate what the theology of 
the cross can achieve from its existing resources (Ch 6). Then, in view of what is missing 
from it, my work offers the Semiotic Passion (Ch 7), which is a theoretical proposal. It is a 
theoretical anticipation of when Kristeva’s ‘semiotic’ anthropology and theology would be 
fully engaged together. Despite its narrow ‘semiotic’ focus, this theoretical proposal will be 
presented as an integrating centre of my study. 
 
The two levels of the ‘Semiotic Passion’, as a clarification of the theological position, 
but also as a translation of Kristeva’s ‘semiotics’ for confessional theology, contribute to 
Kristeva’s participation in the Vatican dialogue with agnostic atheism, which is the wider, 
practical context of my study.470 
  
 
6.1 A Hermeneutical Remark  
 
The most important questions are always raised when conflicting positions are forced to 
operate on their margins. The critique of the immanentism471 of Kristeva’s regime is such a 
                                               
470 In an interview, following the press conference after presenting the project of the Court of Gentiles 
at the Vatican, Cardinal Ravasi emphasised two things which shows the endeavour in a borderline 
situation. First, dialogue is necessary. Second, it listens to what non-believers say. (18 March 2011). 
In Fréderic Mounier, ‘Le grand défi n’est pas l’atheisme, mais l’indifférence’, La Croix online 
version, 24/3/2011, accessed 29 Aug. 11 (www.la-croix.com/Religion) 
471 i.e. when the source of existence is immanent in the world and in the individual 
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borderline situation for theology. Her correction of Freud and her immanent criticism of the 
Enlightenment project have also pushed Kristeva to the limits of her system. It is in this 
‘borderline’ that her dialogue with religious wisdom has emerged. 
 
The event of the Cross by virtue of its nature creates a ‘borderline situation’ for both 
theology and secular reason. Moltmann points out that the Cross addresses the very core of 
Christian identity from this scandalous ‘periphery’.472 Thus, addressing Kristeva from within 
the theology of the cross guarantees a genuine ‘systemic’ engagement.  
 
Choosing the Passion as the hermeneutics for a non-religious thinker compels theology 
to re-learn its mother-tongue. In this limit-situation, in which the cultural mourning of the 
two sides is equally involved, we can expect questions that previously have not been raised. 
In the sense of Jasper’s ‘limit situations’,473 these questions are the most vital ones, as they 
can bring about a paradigm shift in such an important area as the unmourned conflict with 
that atheism which hugely defined modernity, and its inherited form, post-modernity. A ‘full 
interface critique’, which addresses the ontological aspects of Kristeva’s materialist 
‘semiotics’, makes it necessary to abandon the ‘classic’ security of orthodoxy. This new 
theological self-knowledge, in the Jasperian sense, will be the precondition for penetrating 
those regions of secular humanism where the latter is also compelled to abandon the ‘classic’ 
security offered by materialism. The task of the ‘Semiotic Passion’ is to meet Kristeva at 
those ‘borderline-points’ where the two regimes coincide. As there is no epistemological 
correspondence, theology needs also to produce the linguistic contact.  
 
                                               
472 See Moltmann, The Crucified God. 
473 My study regards the ‘cultural mourning’ of the conflict with atheism as a ‘boundary situation’. It 
reveals of Tradition and authentic Christian existence something essential to a contemporary faith. 
Understanding the ‘split’ with ‘atheist humanism’ is revelatory for theology as it liberates it for a 
renewed symbolisation, which transcends impasses in its previous language. The German philosopher 
Karl Jaspers ascribed central status to these ‘limit situations’ (Grenzsituationen) or ‘disclosure-
situations’. ‘Limit situations are moments, usually accompanied by experiences of dread, guilt or 
acute anxiety, in which the human mind confronts the restrictions and pathological narrowness of its 
existing forms, and allows itself to abandon the securities of its limitedness, and so to enter new realm 
of self-consciousness.’ In Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, ‘Karl Jaspers’ (First published Mon 
Jun 5, 2006; substantive revision Wed Jan 12, 2011), Internet (accessed 07.02.2012), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/jaspers/ ‘We become ourselves by entering with open eyes into the 
boundary situations…This happens in a leap: a mind which otherwise merely knows about boundary 
situations may, in historic, singular, non-interchangeable fashion, come to be fulfilled. The boundary 
thus plays its proper role of something immanent which already points to transcendence’. Karl 
Jaspers, Philosophy, Volume 2, Translated by E.B. Ashton, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 
and London 1970 (Originally published in 1932 as Philosophie by Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Göttingen, 
Heidelberg), p.179. For Jaspers’ understanding of the revelatory dynamics of the ‘boundary situation’ 
see Chapter 7 in the volume (pp.177-222). 
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So far my study has developed the point that theology is in dialogue with Kristeva most 
directly through her ‘atheistic sub-texts’. The gateway to the ‘speaking being’ is through a 
response to the underlying materialist ontology. My study identified Kristeva’s ‘Marxian’, 
‘Freudian’, ‘Lacanian’, ‘Arendtian’, and ‘Kleinian’ subtexts. It is also true that Kristeva is 
most accessible for theology through her recent reading of the Passion. But it works only if 
one does not spare taking pains to contact her materialism and face the apologetic tension 
with it. The two layers of access, tension and dialogue together, have created the unique 
chance for a non-apologetic direction, a shared symbol building. In this way, it becomes 
possible to accommodate Kristeva’s materialism itself not as a static regime but as a complex 
‘symbolic mourning’.  
 
I highlight two important references for a theological response. Both refer to the present 
postmodern context of the ‘exhausted subject’. The first denotes the specific environment for 
doing theology in the postmodern context. I present it as the ‘verticality of the Cross’. The 
second ‘guide’ is a contemporary theological strategy from Rowan Williams which connects 
the therapeutic point of view of psychoanalysis and theology. Setting up these ‘updates’ is 
important as I develop my response by drawing on the results of theological modernity.  
 
 
6.1.1 The New Situation of the ‘Verticality of the Cross’ 
 
It is the postmodern subject through which the theology of the cross has to respond to 
Kristeva. 474 What theology needs to realise is that the ‘exhausted subject’ is the new general 
condition of culture; it is not only the crisis of the ‘secular subject’. Postmodern 
woundedness is present also in the Church at the core of its activities. It is a new cultural 
sensitivity with new reactions to ‘meaning’. ‘Exhaustion’ is not simply about losing a 
tradition. The ‘exhausted subject’ primarily stands for the emergence of a new type of 
interlocutor of the Cross. Here an important metaphor needs to be introduced to denote the 
new situation for the Christian kerygma. Theological modernity, in a well structured world, 
spoke to the relatively ‘un-exhausted’ subject of modernity. Community cohesion, 
interpersonal relationships, and the support of the individual by culture were strong. (See 
                                               
474 For one account of the confirmation of the paradigm shift and its effects on theology, see See Ch1 
‘Beyond Fragmentation: Theology and the Contemporary Setting’ (pp.4-27), in Stanley J. Grenz, John 
R. Franke, Beyond Foundationalism, Shaping Theology in a Postmodern Context, Westminster John 
Knox Press, Louisville, Kentucky 2001. Since this realisation of the postmodern condition for 
theology we have arrived at a next phase in the relationship between theology and postmodern culture. 
My point is that the competing theological strategies which Franke describes can only reach an 
agreement (‘syntheisis’) if the crisis of the subject and the latter’s healing are made a priority. 
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Appendix V.)475 The cultural canon was relatively unfragmented. ‘Authority’, religious, 
secular and moral, was respected and unquestioned. This is what can be called the 
‘horizontality of the Cross’. The theology of modernity operated in a rather ‘linear’ way. The 
recipients and the contesters of the message were easily recognisable. Doing theology in the 
‘horizontality of the Cross’ meant that the relationship between ‘grace’, subject, and culture 
was conceived in a rather dualistic way. Theological modernity operated with the program 
that the recovery of secular culture was to take place through the latter’s unilateral 
conversion to the culture of the Church. The ‘secular community’, opposed to the Church as 
‘contingence’, was to relate to a non-contingent fullness. In this scenario, a self-sufficient, 
‘immaculate plenitude’ of orthodoxy communicated with the ‘sinful’ unorthodox entities. 
The offer was a full recovery by re-joining the ‘Mystical Body’ of the Church.476 
 
The new interlocutor of the Christian message, however, inhabits the postmodern 
situation. Metaphorically, when theology responds to this new listener, it is operating in the 
‘verticality of the Cross’. This opposes, or rather completes ‘the horizontality of the Cross’. 
The postmodern situation necessitates the ‘vertical’ reading of the Cross, that is, the 
translation of the Christian message for the ‘exhausted subject’, and the in-depth 
understanding of this subjectivity. In this ‘verticality’ it needs to be realised that the prime 
interlocutor today is literally the ‘speaking being’, the former ‘person of faith’.477 This 
subjectivity is structured by ‘lack’. It inhabits, or suffers the world of isolated individuals, 
the lack of structures and fixed roles, and transitory relations. The ‘exhausted subject’ seeks 
orientation on a secularist horizon with the self at the centre, amidst a competitive 
individualism.478 This subject has as a last possession his own language and ‘psychic 
history’. The main message of our metaphor is that in the ‘verticality of the Cross’ no longer 
can a division be made between the psychologically understood subject and the ‘person of 
faith’. The ‘horizontal’ and the new ‘vertical’ dimensions of the Cross must enter into 
                                               
475 See Gallagher’s excellent summary of Mary Douglas’ four types of culture, where ‘‘grid A’ 
corresponds most to the ‘‘horizontality of the Cross’, and gives an apt description of the subject – 
doctrine relationship in modernity’s Church. I highlight that theological modernity is deeply rooted in 
the world of pre-modernity. The theological concepts with which modernity operates still heavily 
reflect this ‘world before change’. Its characteristics are: order, balance of hierarchical society, sense 
of belonging, plus stable relationship with the other. In Michael Paul Gallagher SJ, Clashing Symbols, 
An Introduction to Faith and Culture, Darton, Longman + Todd, London 1997, pp.26-28, cf. p.26.  
476 As a background of the imge, the Papal Enclyclical Mystici Corporis (1943) by Pius XII summed 
up the ‘sacred’ hierarchical view of the church. The divisions between the Ecclesia sufferans (the 
members of the Church suffering in Purgatory), Ecclesia militans (the Church in its members 
struggling against the world), and the Ecclesia triumphans (the Church triumphant is the Church in 
Heaven) was also an apologetic model of the ‘Secular’. This division between the ‘Sacred’ and the 
‘profane’ proved an archetypal image, which deeply marked theological modernity. 
477 Kristeva, New Maladies of the Soul, pp.124-125. 
478 This characterisation is from Douglas’ description of the transition from capitalist modernity to 
consumerist postmodernity (Grids B-C). Gallagher SJ, Clashing Symbols, cf. p.27. 
 189 
dialogue. This dialogue between theological modernity and postmodern theology produces a 
‘cultural mourning’, the outcome of which is a renewed theologia crucis. I call this new 
responsiveness to the contemporary subject the ‘Semiotic Passion’. 
 
The emergence of the ‘verticality of the Cross’ or the changed sensitivity of the 
‘hearer’479 was already anticipated in the central metaphor of Vatican II. The new self-image 
of the Council, the ‘pilgrim people of God’, anticipated a new cultural dynamic. The 
metaphor assigned the task to critically revise the isolation of the church from the modern 
world. The Church expressed this new ‘Exodus position’ in the dialogue with secular 
humanism. Conversely, this shift also meant the realisation of a previous ‘lack of Exodus’. 
Previously, the Church had reflected on the changing dynamic of culture only within herself. 
Now the task was to detect an ‘unmourned’ Christendom ‘within’ and open up to the 
encounter with new cultural paradigms.  
 
The situation of the ‘verticality of the Cross’ shows another important change in the 
condition of the subject of faith. The ‘pilgrim people’, as a metaphor, referred to a collective 
identity, the emphasis was not so much on the individual ‘pilgrim’. The Church of modernity 
operated with a strong social ethos. From this state she gradually arrived at the situation, 
without realising it, of the culturally uprooted ‘migrant’. This is the cultural milieu which 
Kristeva describes. The subject of the age is ‘a bruised and battered person’ who has to 
create a ‘second’ language. This painful re-birth requires a new awareness of the subjective 
interior.480 It is in this context that an important change in theological language applies to the 
‘verticality of the Cross’. To the emerging ‘migrant’ the new linguistic modality of ‘prayer’ 
corresponds. The dynamic of historical development is as follows: pilgrim/fellowship → 
migrant/woundedness → personal story telling/prayer. This dynamic shows that instead of 
making ‘doctrinal statements’, the understanding of the world takes place through prayer. 
Ruti confirms this secular version when she says that subjective singularity is less a matter of 
‘knowing’ the essence of one’s being than it is of feeding the inner spark that sustains one’s 
aptitude for self-transformation.481 Consequently, abstract theological statements, instead of 
being mere indoctrination, have to become ‘prayers’. That is to say, the primary mode of 
communicating ‘doctrine’ is making it an essential part of self-knowledge. The Church needs 
                                               
479  My reference to Rahner’s idiom ‘hearer’ or ‘hearers’ of the word from his series of lectures 
delivered in 1937 and published in 1941, Hearer of the Word. The focus of the book was not 
revelation and its mediation but rather human beings as possible hearers of God’s word. Daniel 
Donovan, ‘Revelation and Faith’ (pp.83-97), in The Cambridge Companion to Karl Rahner, edited by 
Declan Marmion and Mary E. Hines, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2007 (First publication 
2005), p.84.   
480 Anne-Marie Smith, Julia Kristeva, Speaking The Unspeakable, Pluto Press, London and Sterling, 
Virginia 1998, pp. 81-83. 
481 Ruti, A World of Fragile Things, p.32.  
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to take pains to translate its message, as a new preparatio evangelica (preparing for the 
Gospels), into the linguistic sensitivity of the subject as identity today is constituted on this 
‘last property’.  
 
This communication with the changed listener requires a renewed imagery of the 
Passion. Kristeva showed how the yearning for the ‘loving Third party’ is an objective 
psychic and cultural need. This is an encouragement for the theology of the cross as the need 
for the ‘Father’s love’ is a universal ‘pre-religious’ need. On the other hand, it is a task of 
‘re-imaging’ the Christian Father for the uprooted person, in his specific needs. Christianity 
is challenged by Kristeva’s recognition that temporary rebirths are an objective support when 
the person encounters nihilism. Because external defences are lost (the safety-net of cultural 
groups, family, religion, humanist policy, etc.), Christianity needs to prove that it provides 
symbols which speak to this ‘inner exhaustion’. We can see the dialectic that the situation 
sets in motion for a symbolic response. The ‘verticality of the Cross’ has to address the self 
in its isolation. Yet, on the other hand, it has to re-construct this self by arguing that it cannot 
remain enclosed in its particularities because its innermost need is the experience of 
fellowship. Theology becomes relevant again only if it offers this genuine ‘outside’.  
 
The questions raised by the ‘verticality of the Cross’ prompt a succinct dialogue between 
Kristeva and my theological resources. In order to facilitate this discourse, I outline the 
second reference for the theologia crucis. 
 
  
6.1.2 A Postmodern Reference Point for Evaluation: The Lost Absolute Other 
 
My chosen representatives of the theology of the cross belong to modernity. Kristeva’s 
work is an analysis of both modernity and post-modernity. That is why presenting the 
linguistic renewal of theology has to incorporate the symbolic sensitivity of both periods. As 
Catholic reflection still operates from within the mindset of the theological modernity of 
Vatican II it is worth listening to advice from ‘postmodern theology’. There are certain 
preconditions for making the Father recognisable in this culture. Rowan Williams in Lost 
Icons gives an account of ‘what is missing’ from traditional theological discourse.482 His 
account updates its linguistic responsiveness.    
 
                                               
482 My overview of the ‘theological desires’ of the postmodern self draws on the closing chapter ‘Lost 
Souls’ (pp.139-187), from Rowan Williams, Lost Icons, Reflections on Cultural Bereavement, T&T 
Clark, Edinburgh 2000. (First edition 2000).  
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The first strategic recognition is the need in the postmodern period to communicate with 
the psychoanalytic point of view. In the essay ‘Lost Souls’, Williams gives a non-polemic, 
highly dialogical criticism of psychoanalytical healing. He points out where the Christian 
experience of God’s otherness transcends the psychoanalytical method. Making Williams’ 
critique of the psychoanalytical horizon a reference is an important step in continuing the 
ontological critique of Kristeva.  
 
Williams is helpful in understanding the new dynamics of ‘exhaustion’. The postmodern 
self suffers the loss of the ‘absolute Other’. Having lost its proper grounding, he says, the 
contemporary subject is a ‘panicking self’. Our culture of consumption generates continuous 
responses to a changing environment (‘panic’). Consumption is attuned to the instability of 
the exploited psyche, and creates newer and newer occasions of desire to be reacted upon. 
These panic reactions blot out longer-term memories, the mental world. This nihilism 
suppresses meditation, literally depriving the self of a genuine experience of time and 
interiority. In our context, we can add, these are the preconditions for creating and using 
‘symbols’. 
 
Williams emphasises the need of conflict as the ground of genuine selfhood. Theology 
agrees with the psychoanalytical principle that the person needs a confrontation with the 
image of his own self. The role of the therapist is to oppose and contradict our self-image 
based on our desires. ‘I desire peace, I desire to be at home with myself’.483 The therapist as 
the ‘Other’ to the self becomes the critique of my self and puts it ‘in question’. The purpose 
is to re-open the gap between (my) desire and reality. Genuine inwardness and self-
knowledge develops not by escaping or resolving the conflict between the self and the ‘real’ 
but by deepening the conflict.484 The painful element of therapy is the act of self-questioning, 
and removing what is illusion in the person. It is the same with culture. Both are in need of 
an honest Other, helping to realise ‘meaning’. The therapist prompts us to become genuinely 
reflective and come to terms with reality.  
 
However, the difference with the psychoanalytical horizon also should be noted. 
Williams when speaking sympathetically of the role of the analyst who stays outside my 
story in practice is describing the theological notion of the Other. He highlights the fact that 
the Christian sense of selfhood is radically unlike what can be constructed from the resources 
of culture.  Building the Christian self means ‘refusing to cover over, evade or explain the 
                                               
483 Williams, Lost Icons, p.145. 
484 Ibid., p.146. 
 192 
pain and shock of whatever brings the self into question.’485 In the therapy of divine Love we 
realise that no one completes me, in the sense that no thing completes me.486 The Christian 
amplification of the therapeutic method is expressed in the plus which we denote with the 
term, ‘soul’. Theology witnesses to the fact that the only Other who can refuse all attempts to 
be reduced to simply answering my needs, who does not cease to be the Other, is divine 
Love. This love confronts me, with ultimate authority, as genuine ‘Transcendence’, as God 
radically stays outside my colonising desires. This Love is a truthful recogniser of my own 
limits and incompleteness. This otherness, however, is ‘radical enough to allow me to be 
other, to be distinctive, to be the this-and-not-that of temporal particularity.’487  
 
With Williams, we can define the ‘transcendence’ of the self further. Encountering the 
‘radical Other’ brings to life a different kind of selfhood, which is grounded on gratitude. 
The self learns to exist beyond the sphere of mutual need. Genuine personhood means the 
ability to live beyond the norms of the competitive world which defines the self according to 
its ability to compete, and thus reduces it to an object. The counter-economy theology offers 
is ‘grace’, which presupposes relations as the ground that gives the self room to exist, not as 
an object of desire, but as a joy and as the gift of being contemplated by the other. This 
turning to us, which Williams highlights, is the source of re-orienting the ‘exhausted subject’ 
in terms of providing him with the lost telos of history. For the ‘post-religious’ subject, as 
Peter L. Berger observes, the reaffirmation of the ultimate goodness of the world is needed. 
It is an act of ‘faith’, not unrelated to the Christian Creed. The ultimate validity of joy over 
human existence is at stake.488 The ground of this confirmation is God’s counter-cultural 
love which is a genuine alternative to nihilism. Williams stresses the Judeo-Christian 
conviction that it is only something outside the world of ‘negotiation’ that makes possible 
the abrogation of rivalry [which blurs joy, the telos of history]. This God cannot be reduced 
to a tangible sameness with which we ‘can’ negotiate, as we do with other contingent 
‘others’.489 It is in this sense that Williams calls this challenging otherness as the non-
contingent Other, or absolute Otherness.  
 
Williams reconnects the discourses of psychoanalysis and theological modernity in a 
pivotal way for my critique. What links Kristeva’s ‘atheistic subtexts’, the postmodern crisis 
of the subject and faith is the historical crisis of the God-image. Williams sets up a 
                                               
485 Williams, Lost Icons, p.149. 
486 Ibid., p.151. 
487 Ibid., p.154. 
488 Peter L. Berger, The Questions of Faith, A Sceptical Affirmation of Christianity, Blackwell, 
London 2004., p.6. 
489 Williams, Lost Icons, pp.160-162. 
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dialectical process in which all parties are affected. With his help, one can clearly see the 
distortion in the image of the Father. A ‘counter-thesis’ to this distortion is God’s gratuitous 
otherness. Williams’ pivotal insight is that Christianity failed when it colonised the radical 
otherness of God and made him part of the cultural superego. God became a ‘negotiable 
otherness’, our double, a contingent fact among the phenomenon of the world. This ‘passage 
of our speech about God into silence’ resulted in that the ‘self-criticism of all doctrinal 
utterance’ went silent.490  Self-criticism about this God-image was replaced by that lack of 
reflection, into which Protestantism and its critical twin, the Enlightenment project, burst as 
a deliberate disruption. This silenced God was experienced by the Enlightenment as ‘a this-
worldly other that claimed other-worldly sanction’.491 The Enlightenment, in reality, revolted 
against hijacking genuine Otherness. Before it crystallized into an atheistic narrative, it was a 
genuine claim to restore ‘an Other outside the systems of need and desire; something else to 
find that your identity is prescribed, pre-scripted, by the presence and the gaze of an Other 
who is in fact as historical and contingent as you are.’492 Kristeva’s non-nihilist humanism is 
fuelled by this protest. She put her ‘atheist subtexts’ into the service of preserving subjective 
particularity. Williams’ phenomenological description is also an apt background for the 
criticism of ‘atonement language’. The ‘bloody cross’ reduced to an exclusive ‘totem’ was 
the central image of a Christianity which gradually became ‘silent’ towards culture. As a 
malfunctioning symbol, it became a ‘buffering zone’ with secularity itself becoming the 
source of ‘split discourses’. 
 
As a wider critical background of the psychoanalytical approach, Williams points to the 
crisis of its founding narratives. The secular Enlightenment ended up in losing the Christian 
discourse on Transcendence. The project itself collapsed at critical times, observes Williams, 
under the aspiration of replacing this Transcendent Other. It produced its own version of 
discourses to control identity.493 The ‘universals’ based on autonomous reason produced 
their own historical failures (World Wars I and II, Auschwitz, and our narrower context, the 
‘society of the spectacle’). Now, Williams argues, a time has come when we can reflect on 
the loss of the ‘soul’ as our shared cultural bereavement. His dialectical scheme above 
confirms that Kristeva’s humanist narratives, Freudianism, Marxism, and feminism can be 
seen as past and present contributors to this mourning. The problem of the God image can be 
reopened. If today, when all genuine otherness is compromised, Christians witness to the 
radical historical otherness of God, they make a significant cultural contribution.  
 
                                               
490 Williams, Lost Icons, p.163. 
491 Ibid., p.163. 
492 Ibid., p.163. 
493 Ibid., p.164. 
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The task of the forthcoming sections is to show this witness in the theologia crucis. We 
will see that theological modernity has initiated a ‘symbolic mourning’, through which the 
‘exhausted subject’ can converse with the ‘non-contingent Other’ as a historical God.  
 
6.2 A Response to Kristeva: The Theologia Crucis as a Resource for ‘Symbolic 
Mourning’   
 
This analysis confines itself only to an essential synthesis of my chosen theological 
authorities. The comprehensive response to Kristeva necessarily has to integrate the projects 
of Rahner, Moltmann, Metz and von Balthasar for the following reasons. To start with, one 
can find more up to date theologies then theirs. Yet, their viewpoints need to be privileged 
because they write from a state which is just between theology’s ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ 
positions. We find them precisely at the intersection of the two theological attitudes, the 
‘horizontality’ and the ‘verticality of the Cross’. Their generation was the first to start the 
‘cultural mourning’ the end point of which is the present crisis of post-modernity. These 
voices are contemporaries of Kristeva’s atheistic and humanist subtexts. 
 
Drawing on my chosen theological classics, I demonstrate that the theology of the cross 
has significant resources for a response to our present cultural situation. My specific focus is 
exploring how they answer the needs of the ‘exhausted subject’ and contribute to a better 
understanding of the nihilist crisis. The theological concern will be how these solutions 
correct problematic aspects of the image of the Father and the theological notion of the 
person that Kristeva’s humanist subtexts raised. My critique lays a particular emphasis on 
developing ‘textual bridges’ with Kristeva for systematic theology.  
 
6.2.1 Karl Rahner: Anticipating the ‘Anonymous Sufferer’ 
 
The best starting point is Rahner who first anticipated the conversation between the 
‘horizontality’ and the ‘verticality of the Cross’. He stated the crisis of the symbolisation of 
faith at the heart of modernity. In a very brave way Rahner conceived the situation of faith in 
history in terms of ‘lack’, particularly as the lack of language:494 
 
‘We may think we find in and around us too much of the spirit of the world and too 
little of the Spirit of the Father. While these impressions may frequently be valid, there 
is usually something false in them, too. Something false, I say, because the human eye 
                                               
494 It is a stunning contrast with the paradigm of the ‘Ecclesia triumphans’ (the glorious Church). This 
self-image of the Church enjoyed an undisturbed canonical status at the time of the publication of 
Rahner’s meditation ‘Pentecost’ (1953!).  
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cannot detect the Spirit in us and in the Church….. We must not interpret our 
experience of life falsely, and think that the Spirit of God has become distant and weak. 
Rather, we must learn from these experiences that we are always seeking him in the 
wrong place and in the wrong way, that we are always ready to confuse him with 
something else. If we reflect in this way, then we shall perceive over and over again 
with trembling joy that the Spirit is there, that he is with us.’495 
 
Rahner stated more than the symbolic crisis. His main message is that, though the 
theological language and the love of the Church for the world meet with difficulties, 
nevertheless, the ‘loving Third party’, as Triune love, is always there, awaiting us. Rahner’s 
anthropological sensitivity which reclaims history as God’s loving epiphany is pivotal for 
my critique. His concept, the ‘anonymous Christian’, makes it possible to narrow the gap 
between the ‘psychological man’ (Homans) and the theological person. My focus is the 
‘cultural mourning’ it expresses. My point is that the concept can have a second renaissance 
and a fuller recognition against the background of the ‘exhausted subject’. Rahner’s 
‘anonymous Christian’ is a real bridge concept. With it not only those who are on the 
margins of ecclesial socialisation can identify, but also those with a definite ‘secular’ 
identity. Rahner defined this new consciousness as follows:  
 
‘We prefer the terminology according to which man is called an ‘anonymous 
Christian’ who on the one hand has de facto accepted of his freedom this gracious self-
offering on God’s part through faith, hope, and love, while on the other hand he is 
absolutely not yet a Christian at the social level (through baptism and membership of the 
Church) or in the sense of having consciously objectified his Christianity to himself in 
his own mind (by explicit Christian faith resulting from having hearkened to the explicit 
Christian message). We might therefore put it as follows: the “anonymous Christian” in 
our sense of the term is the pagan after the beginning of the Christian mission, who lives 
in the state of grace through faith, hope, and love, yet who has no explicit knowledge of 
the fact that his life is oriented in grace-given salvation to Jesus Christ.’ 496 
 
Rahner, in the theological segment of culture, observed a dynamic similar to 
Kristeva’s ‘subject in process’. He gave expression to an identity which became 
separated from the ‘homogeneous’ consciousness of modernity. The project of the 
‘anonymous Christian’, which was fully confirmed in Grundkurs (1977),497 time- 
wise strikingly coincides with Kristeva’s critique of modernity in her doctoral thesis 
(Revolution in Poetic Language, 1974).  Beyond the concept one has to see the 
                                               
495 ‘‘Pentecost’, in Karl Rahner, The Eternal Year, Meditations on the Mysteries of Faith Expressed in 
the Liturgical Cycle, Burns & Oates 1964 (originally published in Germen under the title Kleines 
Kirchenjahr 1953 by Verlag Ars Sacra Josef Müller, Münnich 1953), pp.109-110 
496 Karl Rahner, Theological Investigations Ecclesiology, Questions in the Church, The Church in the 
World, Vol 14 (translated by David Bourke), Darton, Longman & Todd, London 1976, p.283. 
497 English translation: Foundations of Christian Faith. It was a new kind of introductory course for 
those who in post-war Germany were questioning whether they were believers at all. Daniel Donovan, 
‘Revelation and Faith’ (pp.83-97), in The Cambridge Companion to Karl Rahner, p.92. 
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presence of the emerged Marxist and Freudian generations. What the theological 
contesters of the concept overlooked is the underlying complex ‘cultural mourning’. 
The image of the anonymous Christian also contains the experience of the 
theological generation of the First World War writing about ‘shaken foundations’ 
and their efforts to find a new symbolic orientation: ‘Never before have we 
experienced that everything became so strange to us and we stood in God’s presence 
naked and alone.’ (Bultmann) 498 It is an early account of the ‘exhausted subject’ of 
modernity, when the ‘consciousness of Christendom’ or post-Reformation 
confidence is put on an ultimate trial. 
 
We find references in Rahner that his re-imagining of the Father’s love was also in 
dialogue with psychoanalysis. Rahner’s emphasis on the correction of the guilt-complex 
clearly shows that the concept of the ‘anonymous Christian’ initiated dialogue with the 
generation of Freud too:  
 
‘We should even know when to regard a patient as a patient for a psychotherapist 
and send him to one. But we possess one word which no psychotherapist can say: the 
word of God, which forgives. The psychotherapist says a word which is meant to cure 
illness; we say a word which forgives sin in God’s sight. Even if we cannot remove 
illness − heavy burden though it is in many cases − we can, however, take away the 
death in illness, the despair in it and the guilt.’499    
 
The basic logic of Rahner’s theology is to ‘name’ the subject who is coming from 
secular experience. In Catholic theological modernity, for the first time, he made central 
what happens on the peripheries. In this sense, we can say that Rahner anticipated the faith-
crisis of the postmodern subject. He assigned as a central task for theology to ‘mourn’ the 
Church’s troubled relationship with secular identity. His vision of the human self in the 
context of grace is also an important support to the ‘exhausted subject’. Its ‘ontological 
thirst’ for resources is given a genuine offer. If the deepest need of the postmodern self is re-
grounded identity, Rahner, in a non-apologetic way, reintroduces ‘graced origins’.  
 
The concept of the anonymous Christian enters into dialogue with both Kristeva’s early 
‘revolutionary’ critique of modernity and her turn to the ‘exhausted subject’ which focuses 
on psychoanalytical healing. As a description of the subject of culture, the ‘anonymous 
                                               
498 Rudolf Bultmann, Existence and Faith, Shorter Writings of Rudolf Bultmann, Translated by 
Schubert M. Ogden, Collins 1964, p.33. 
499 Karl Rahner, Ch 14 ‘Problems Concerning Confession’ (pp.190-206), in Karl Rahner, Theological 
Investigations, The Theology of the Spiritual Life, Vol. III, Translated by Karl Hugo Kruger and 
Boniface Kruger, Helicon Press Baltimore, Dorton, Longman & Todd, London 1967 (First published 
1967), p.205. 
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Christian’ was a construct of theological modernity. The concept reflects the relatively ‘un-
exhausted’ subject of the period. Roughly, it coincides with Kristeva’s ‘bourgeois subject’ in 
Revolution in Poetic Language. His ‘anonymous’ living of basic Gospel values made him 
the potential bearer of the Word. Thus, as a historical snapshot, Rahner described the early 
state, as it were, the ‘first generation trauma’ of losing the ‘name of God’. The whole of 
Grundkurs echoes the conviction that the modern subject, despite having fallen out of the 
Christian tradition, can still be brought back by the language of the Christian kerygma. It 
reminds us of the strategy Kristeva followed in her transition period.500  
 
Today, in place of the one-time ‘anonymous Christian’ we find the anonymous sufferer. 
This ‘exhausted subject’ is anonymous in the sense that he cannot name his suffering 
properly. ‘Grace’, in the original Rahnerian framework, is still offered in the same way, but 
it is now the unrealised ‘grace’ of the Cross. The postmodern subject has no explicit 
knowledge that it is his relation to the Cross that best enlightens his state. What theology 
argues today, together with Rahner, is that the Father’s compassionate love is reaching out 
for him in a way which is not external to his existence. It should be noted that for the Church 
of modernity, which focused on doctrinal orthodoxy and could only envision stable borders 
for the community, Rahner’s vision of ‘anonymous faith’ was a dubious model. The 
participation in Salvation ‘without explicit knowledge’ of God’s self-communication for 
all501, living in hope, love, and faith anonymously, 502 yet participating in God’s permanent 
offer of grace through man’s ‘supernatural existential’, that is, the permanent capacity to 
respond to God’s self-bestowing love503 are concepts without which it is very difficult to 
relate the postmodern subject to the Cross. (The latter, otherwise, is the centre of all 
orthodoxy.) The post-Christian self (see Kristeva’s novels) cannot be tackled without seeing 
in the person an ontological dynamic and openness towards God. Without Rahner’s 
ontological narrative it would be very difficult to speak with the postmodern subject about 
the realm of ‘grace’. 
 
‘Man should be able to receive this Love which is God himself; he must have a 
congeniality for it. He must be able to accept it (and hence grace, the beatific vision) as 
one who has room and scope, understanding and desire for it. Thus he must have a real 
‘potency’ [supernatural existential] for it. He must have it always. He is indeed always 
                                               
500 As a reminder, see section 2.1.1 ‘Transition From Modernity to Postmodenity: Exhausted Subject 
or Exhausted Narratives?’, cf. pp.50-53. 
501 Karl Rahner, Theological Investigations, Concerning Vatican Council II, Vol 6, translated by Karl 
Hugo Kruger and Boniface Kruger, Helicon Press Baltimore 1969., p.391. 
502 Karl Rahner, Theological Investigations Ecclesiology, Vol 14., p.283. 
503 Karl Rahner, ‘Relationship Between Nature and Grace’ (pp.297-317), in Karl Rahner, Theological 
Investigations, God, Christ, Mary and Grace, Volume I, Translated by Cornelius Ernst, O.P, Darton, 
Longman & Todd, London 1965. (First published 1961), pp.311-312.315. 
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addressed and claimed by this Love… The capacity for the God of self-bestowing 
personal Love is the central and abiding existential of man as he really is.’504 
 
The enormous potential of Rahner is that with his help we can extend the ‘anonymous 
Christian’ to the wounded postmodern psyche. As such it becomes a central concept for our 
‘postmodern’ theologia crucis. In the ‘verticality of the cross’, the transformed sufferer of 
modernity can be seen as synonymous with the ‘new maladies of the soul’ in Kristeva. In 
this case, the ‘supernatural existential’ emerges as a theological refashioning of the ‘loving 
Third’. Telling the Passion to ‘anonymous suffering’ presents the Father’s love as that 
graced horizon from which every ‘speaking being’ gets support in his passion. Envisioning 
the ‘secular’ subject on the horizon of grace is a useful framework also when arguing that 
there is an ‘other side’ of human language, not only the biological drive origins. With 
Rahner, we can do it in a way in which the ‘anonymous sufferer’ is seen as possibly closest 
to God’s ‘grace’, and correspondingly, to the Cross.  
 
Recalling Rahner’s Pentecostal witness is fundamental in this context. ‘We shall 
perceive over and over again with trembling joy that the Spirit is there, that he is with us.’505 
Rahner’s grounding of redemption in Pentecost has an immediate anthropological relevance 
for my critique. The theology of the cross stresses that it is through the wounded postmodern 
psyche that the person converts to the Father’s love. The Rahnerian reading of the Passion is 
the revaluation of the suffering self. The very fact that the Father speaks through this 
woundedness restores the dignity of ‘anonymous suffering’. From this follows that Pentecost 
compels us to see the world as an ‘anonymous convert’, and the human self as a full bearer 
of the Father’s love, capable of conversion and joy.  
 
A further point where Rahner proves to be a useful source is his theology of the Sacred 
Heart. Using his reflections, the theologia crucis can offer an important theological analogy 
of the role of the ‘semiotic’ in Kristeva. The essays, ‘Behold This Heart!: Preliminaries to a 
Theology of Devotion to the Sacred Heart’ and ‘Some Theses for a Theology of Devotion to 
the Sacred Heart’506, help in developing the ‘maternal metaphor’ in God. In ‘Behold This 
Heart!’, we can see the human heart of Jesus as the graced ‘chora-thetic’ through which God 
communicates ‘rebirth’. This depth is ‘the most profound of all the mysteries of the Passion, 
in fact the source of them all.’507 Rahner’s mysticism produced here a metaphor, which 
                                               
504 Rahner, ‘Relationship Between Nature and Grace’, in Theological Investigations, God, Christ, 
Mary and Grace, Volume I, p.312. 
505 ‘‘Pentecost’, in Rahner, The Eternal Year, pp.109-110 
506 Chapters 21 and 22 in Karl Rahner, Theological Investigations,Volume I, (pp.321-330) and 
(pp.331-352)  
507 Rahner, ‘Behold This Heart!’ (pp.321-330), Ibid., p.321. 
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offers an analogy, the relationship of the mother and the child, similar in dynamic to 
Kristeva’s ‘passion according to motherhood’.  
 
‘Only a lover is able to pronounce the word “heart” with understanding, and only 
one who is lovingly united to the crucified Lord knows what is meant when the ‘Heart of 
Jesus’ is spoken of. But even the word “heart” itself opens up to the lover new paths for 
his love which can never love enough.’508 
 
The ‘heart’, in terms of introducing us into speaking and responding in love, is 
analogous to the ‘Loving Third’ which incorporates maternal love. In Rahner’s metaphor the 
full dynamics of meaning, the ‘semiotic’, the function of the ‘chora-thetic’, the presence of 
the ‘Loving Third’, and the Symbolic Order (‘Law’) as the destination, are all represented. 
‘The “heart is the name we give to the unifying element in man’s diversity.”’509 Also, there is 
a link with Kristeva’s program of ‘ecce-ness’, the defence of the subject’s particularity: ‘A 
man’s uniqueness, his individuality, is his heart.’510 Where the theologia crucis can draw 
profoundly on Rahner is the witness that the source of our particularity is ‘that the centre of 
our hearts has to be God… And the name of his heart is: Jesus Christ!’511 Rahner confirms 
that the human self (‘heart’) is grounded in God’s unconditional ‘maternal’ and ‘loving and 
caring fatherly’ love. In Rahner’s striking metaphor, the Father is ‘the unfathomable womb, 
in which everything shines brightly.’512  
 
These examples show that there is a potential in the theologia crucis to enter into 
dialogue with Kristeva’s Tales of Love (‘Stabat Mater’). Rahner’s mother-mysticism in God 
is the proof that the masculine imagination can enter into dialogue with a mother’s 
unrecognised Passion. Though the image of a ‘maternal heart’ is not in a fully developed 
form, the theological intention is clear. Rahner’s maternal analogy is a powerful source for 
the correction of the God-image distorted by atonement theology. Indirectly, the corrected 
image of the loving Abba in Rahner is an important contribution to the ‘ontological’ 
criticism of Freud’s mechanistic God-image.  
 
Rahner’s theology of grace also provides the theologia crucis with a concept of history. 
Drawing on his ‘personalism’, the critique of Kristeva can turn to her historical subtexts. It is 
a genuine historical program as grace is always oriented towards the human self. Rahner 
makes the work of the Holy Spirit central in human history: the Spirit purifies history by 
                                               
508 Rahner, ‘Behold This Heart!’, Theological Investigations, Volume I, p.321. 
509 Ch. XIV. ‘Sacred Heart’ (pp.121-128) in Rahner, The Eternal Year, p.121. 
510 Ibid., p.122. 
511 Ibid., pp.126-127 
512 Ibid., p.124. 
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communicating God’s self-bestowing love. It represents and gives Christ as a gift to human 
history from within: ‘The chalice of the Holy Spirit is identical in this life with the chalice of 
Christ.’513 This theology of ‘grace’ completes Bultmann’s attempt to renew the relationship 
between history and God. The work of the Spirit resembles Kristeva’s ‘semiotic horizon’ 
from which the meaning of God can be experienced again as fresh and revelatory. Rahner 
brings to completion a deep seated ‘symbolic mourning’ in European theology: 
 
‘God’s Spirit has begun his work in our hearts, to open our eyes…We have learned 
to pose questions to destiny in a complete new and more profound sense… “The Spirit 
of God searches everything, even the depths of God.” Because it is knowledge of the 
Spirit, it is not a knowledge that rests on conclusions and proofs and that every man can 
understand. Each of us must be ready to bow before the hidden God in reverence and 
humility, so that his heart will be open for God’s Spirit and his eyes will learn to see the 
God who is revealed − the God who endlessly reveals himself.”’514  
 
With Rahner, the theologia crucis shows to post-metaphysical consciousness that 
‘ontology’ can be spelled out in terms of a genuine ‘symbolic openness’ or linguistic 
openness. The critique on Kristeva’s atheistic subtexts has to show how Rahner introduced a 
new complexity into the God image, in which history is emphasised as an integral part of 
divine Love. History justifies Rahner against his objectors who saw in the ‘supernatural 
existential’ a dangerous compromising of God as ‘Wholly Other’. What his opponents 
overlooked was that the ‘emptying of God into anthropology’ was not the denial of His 
Glory515 but showing this radical otherness in the Son, in whose image man was created. 
Rahner spelled out in a pioneering way the ‘Wholly Other’ in the vulnerability of the person. 
With this, he opened up the way for the de-eschatologising of core theological concepts: 
‘grace’, ‘person’, ‘history’, and ‘God’.  
 
As a conclusion, the theological response to the new humanist coalition which Kristeva 
proposed can draw with confidence on Rahner. He taught Christians how to take secularity 
seriously as a source for theology.516 If the theologia crucis is grounded on Rahner’s 
dialogical position, it can hold tradition and openness together.517 Rahner provides my 
critique with a genuine model of the ‘secular’. The lasting value of this approach, according 
                                               
513 ‘Reflections on the Experience of Grace’ (pp.86-90), in Rahner, Theological Investigations, 
Volume III, p.89. 
514 ‘‘The Hidden and the Revealed God’, Sermon for Pentecost, 1917  (pp.25-38.), in Bultmann, 
Existence and Faith, pp.35.37. 
515 For a detailed textual analysis of Balthasar’s critique of ‘obediental potency’ and the ‘supernatural 
existential’ see Marc Oullet, ‘Paradox and/or supernatural existential’ (pp.259-280), Communio 18 
(Summer, 1991.), cf. pp.268-271. 
516 Philip Endean, ‘Has Rahnerian Theology a Future?’ (pp.281-296), in The Cambridge Companion 
to Karl Rahner, p.293. 
517 Ibid., p.294. 
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to Philip Endean, is the critical synthesis of the transcendent and immanent horizons. 
Rahner’s relation to orthodoxy makes him a genuine ambassador in constantly challenging 
humanism when it simply subordinates the Christian truth of revelation to a secular 
analysis.518 What makes a ‘Rahnerian’ theologia crucis credible is his adamant refusal of 
what religious fundamentalism does in reverse. His correction of the God-image responds 
constructively to the criticism of atheistic humanism not only of the nineteenth century, but 
also of the twentieth century. It has two important elements for the dialogue with Kristeva. 
The first is the appreciation of the cognitive and ethical gains that came from the 
Enlightenment, and the parallel criticism of how the natural-scientific models of truth taken 
as normative have distorted Christianity and falsified the reality which is God-among us.519 
Secondly, it is Rahner’s claim for the presence of God in human experience which, as 
Endean puts it, is an implicit opening up to the linguistic structures of human experience.520  
 
My overview of Rahner as a resource does not state that he and Kristeva could be linked 
directly. However, the ontological horizon Rahner draws on can accommodate the 
‘ontological’ critique of the ‘speaking being’.  
 
 
6.2.2 The Cross as the Hermeneutical Centre of History in Moltmann and Johannes 
Metz 
 
Jürgen Moltmann (born 1926) and Johann Baptist Metz (born 1928) contribute to the 
response to Kristeva from a different direction from Rahner’s. They spell out important 
elements of the anthropological turn he envisaged. Mentioning Moltmann, the Reformed 
theologian, as a resource is unavoidable. 521 His theology of the cross provided seminal 
directions for contemporary Catholic theology and anthropology (political theology, 
liberation theology), but most importantly for the theologia crucis of Metz. 
 
Rahner’s theological anthropology is too abstract in itself to ‘communicate’ with 
Kristeva’s psychoanalytical anthropology. The historical realism of her subtexts requires a 
theological version of her immediacy with history. In this respect, Moltmann and Metz 
provide a crucial link. The primary task is to bring closer to each other the historical subject 
and the Father’s love. In Metz and Moltmann, Rahner’s abstract ontology gets more 
                                               
518 Endean, ‘Has Rahnerian Theology a Future?’, in The Cambridge Companion to Karl Rahner, 
p.294. 
519 Ibid., p.282. 
520 Ibid., pp.284. 292. 
521 He writes in the German Lutheran tradition. 
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balanced. They significantly contribute to the ‘de-eschatologisation’ of the traditional 
theological notion of history in which ‘this world’ is devaluated over against the coming 
transformation. Metz and Moltmann spell out the ‘God among us’ in the medium of real 
history. The point I argue is that in theological modernity there is a genuine demand to 
overcome the dichotomies of metaphysics (soul/body, physical/psychical, 
history/Transcendence) which Kristeva also objects to. The Cross in these theologies appears 
as the hermeneutical centre of history, which itself is a critique of the dualisms of Christian 
metaphysics. It is from this Cross (love) that a proper ‘re-eschatologisation’ of history takes 
place. 
 
 
6.2.3 Moltmann: The Passion as Shared Identity with the Suffering Secular  
 
There is a symbolic relationship between Kristeva and Moltmann. Their seminal works 
were developed in the same period and reached the public at the same time. Moltmann’s 
Crucified God (1973) and Kristeva’s doctoral thesis, Revolution in Poetic Language (1974) 
are more than passive contemporaries. At two different points of culture, their hermeneutics 
of culture shows striking similarities. What most relates them is their critique of modernity. 
Moltmann, in the theological setting, develops the critique of a ‘homogeneous’ Christianity, 
which runs parallel with Kristeva’s Desire in Language, in terms of producing a renewed, 
more ‘heterogeneous’ notion of Christian identity. The Cross in Moltmann responds to the 
particularity of the subject, in terms of its critical freedom.  
 
6.2.3.1 Grounds for an Eschatological Anthropology 
 
Christ’s cross in Moltmann is the source for theological anthropology. The Cross 
exhibits a similar ‘invisibility’ to that of the ‘semiotic’ in Kristeva. It ‘resurfaces’ from 
beneath the ‘Symbolic Order’ of culture: it shatters the ‘body’ of history from within. 
Moltmann’s theology is helpful in presenting divine Love as a ‘graced’ regenerative centre 
or ‘chora’. It is against the background of Kristeva’s ‘linguistic transcendence’ that 
Moltmann’s preface to The Crucified God is especially significant. It sums up a complex 
dynamic that embraces human history, including human language, and at the same time, 
transcends it. It is an important ‘re-translation’ of Transcendence for history, when ‘grace’ is 
presented as history’s self-transcending. 
 
‘…I intended to show, the theology of the cross is none other than the reverse side of 
the Christian theology of hope, if the starting point of the latter lies in the resurrection of 
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the crucified Christ. As I said in Theology of Hope, that theology was itself worked out 
as an eschatologia crucis. Theology of Hope began with the resurrection of the crucified 
Christ, and I am now turning to look at the cross of the risen Christ. I was concerned 
then with the remembrance of Christ in the form of the hope of his future, and now I am 
concerned with hope in the form of the remembrance of his death. The dominant theme 
then was that of anticipations of the future of God in the form of promises and hopes; 
here it is the understanding of the incarnation of that future, by way of the sufferings of 
Christ, in the world’s sufferings.’522 (Emphasis added.) 
  
With Moltmann, the theologia crucis concentrates on how to present the Father’s love 
and justice as the internal dynamic of history and a genuinely transcendent love. 
 
There is an element of Moltmann’s reading of the Cross, the theme of historical 
suffering, which makes him a pivotal resource for the response to Kristeva. Moltmann 
explicitly made contemporary suffering, Rahner’s ‘anonymous sufferer’, the interlocutor of 
the Cross. He extends Christ’s suffering to history. A major achievement of his ‘cultural 
mourning’ is connecting the themes of suffering, history, and identity. According to 
Moltmann’s famous thesis, ‘the suffering of Christ is not confined to Jesus…Jesus suffers in 
solidarity with others’.523 This directly addresses Kristeva’s historical subtexts, particularly 
Arendt. On a general level, Moltmann’s ‘graced’ notion of history emerges as a well targeted 
counter-thesis. Christianity is not an ‘opiate for the people’ (Marx), God is not an oedipal 
doublet of man (Freud), nor is He the immanent essence of man (Feuerbach). Alienation in 
history, Moltmann highlights, is a central concern for religious consciousness.  
 
Moltmann initiates a critical dialogue on history with its secular notions. Hope, his well 
elaborated concept, is a radical challenge to Kristeva’s early materialism. The Crucified God 
from the dimension of faith directly addresses her post-structuralist linguistics in Revolution 
in Poetic Language and Desire in Language. Moltmann’s confirmation of an eschatology 
closely related to history challenges Kristeva’s retreat into the self, into language, the 
‘maternal body’, or literary works. This is a genuine offer of Transcendence to get the 
balance right and open up the subject. Unlike recent apologetic solutions from the Radical 
Orthodoxy movement, which condemns secular ontologies as ‘parodies’ of the Christian 
notion of community, and despises the anthropologies of Hobbes, Spinoza, Hegel, Freud and 
                                               
522 Moltmann started the Introduction of The Crucified God by explaining how it relates to the 
previously written Theology of Hope. He felt the need to explain that the final state of man(kind) is 
not removed from history. Moltmann, The Crucified God, p.5. 
523 Jürgen Moltmann, The Way of Jesus Christ, Christology in Messianic Dimensions, SCM Press, 
London 1990 (German edition 1989), p.152. 
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Lacan, because they reduce the self to an isolated monad,524 Moltmann’s position is 
genuinely dialogical with secular humanism. Highly symbolic is the fact that The Crucified 
God dedicated the closing chapter to Freud, in this way initiating an ‘ontological dialogue’ 
with secular humanism. 
 
Drawing on Moltmann, theology makes the claim that language should be ‘open’ to 
God’s language. It is God’s eschaton as the ‘loving Third party’ to history that introduces us 
into the new language of the Kingdom. Another important ‘systemic’ parallel is the emphasis 
on God putting human history into crisis. It is a dynamic similar to Kristeva’s conception of 
the self as a ‘heterogeneous contradiction’. The theology of the cross, with the help of 
Moltmann, articulates it on the ‘collective’ level of the psyche, which is history. ‘The 
modern consciousness of history is a consciousness of crisis.’525 It is this collective level of 
Hope which ‘interrupts’ the ‘melancholic mourning’ in culture for the death of God. 
 
Through the theme of eschatological hope, the theologia crucis can enter into the most 
constructive dialogue with Kristeva’s psychoanalytical horizon. The theology of hope that 
Moltmann elaborated offers a criticism of the psychoanalytic method inasmuch as it is 
confined to the dynamic of the individual self. Moltmann argues the collective dimension of 
the person. It can be read as spelling out a ‘graced’ therapeutic language. The central claim is 
that the human person is also, as it were, in need of rebirth from an ‘eschatological therapy’. 
 
‘What he is and what he can do is a thing he will learn in hopeful trust in God’s 
being with him. Man learns his human nature not from himself, but from the future to 
which the [Christian] mission leads him… The real mystery of his human nature is 
discovered by man in the history which discloses to him his future.’526 
 
The underlying dynamic of healing is hugely significant. Theology argues that there is 
no full psychic rebirth without identifying with the eschatological God as the companion of 
the ‘speaking being’. This identification, on a personal and cultural level, mobilises energies 
(‘desire’), which through self-contemplation cannot be achieved. Correspondingly, the 
Christian community is a community of desire, God decentres this ‘desiring self’, and this 
opening up to the ‘real’ is a precondition for overcoming ‘depression’. The genial insight of 
Moltmann is in offering a ‘graced’ alternative for recovering desire in the self. The ‘graced’ 
                                               
524 Miller highlights the criticism of Graham Ward in his Cities of God (Routledge, New York 2005), 
in Vincent Miller, Consuming Religion: Christian Faith and Practice in Consumer Culture, 
Continuuum, New York 2005, p.111. 
525 Ch IV ‘Eschatology and History’ (pp.230-302), in Jürgen Moltmann, Theology of Hope, Translated 
by James W. Leitch, SMC Press LTD, London 1967 (First published 1964),p.230. 
526 Ibid., p.286. 
 205 
equivalent of ‘re-sexualising’ language in Kristevan therapy527 is joining in God’s kenosis. 
This is healing through participating in the love offered to the world. This communication 
between the individual psyche and the Father’s love is realised through joining in the 
Christian mission. The paralysed ‘particularity’ of the person and culture is rediscovered in 
the fellowship: 
 
‘…Man is hidden from himself, a homo absconditus, and will be revealed to himself 
in those prospects which are opened up to him by the horizons of mission. The mission 
and call do not reveal man simply to himself, with the result that he can then understand 
himself again for what he really is. They reveal and open up to him new possibilities, 
with the result that he can become what he is not yet and never yet was.’528   
 
Now we can locate the ‘anonymous sufferer’ on the very horizon where his healing, the 
recovery of the ‘collective dimension’ of the self, takes place, in service done to others. In 
this approach, the plus is that individual therapy is completed with a ‘collective rebirth’. 
However much this language reminds us of that of modernity, what Moltmann states is that 
salvation history is a regenerative encounter for the individual. ‘That is why according to Old 
and New Testament usage men receive along with their call a new name, a new nature and a 
new future.’529  
 
Introducing eschatological hope into the image of God is a crucial correction in many 
aspects. The ‘Abba-Father’ is a far more complex ‘name’ than its reduction into an oedipal 
authority, either in Freud or in atonement theology, or in other mechanistic readings 
(especially Feuerbach). The theologia crucis shows to the humanist critique of religion that 
there is a complex inwardness in ‘God’. Hope reveals a deep kenotic desire in God for 
man/history, but also in his image, the human person for God. This active imago Dei as 
kenosis is pivotal for my critique. It challenges the universal ground of the self, the ‘sub-
psychic’ in Kristeva’s solution.  
 
‘The concrete humanity disclosed by the Christian mission must therefore enter into 
debate with the universal definitions of humanity in philosophic anthropology, and for 
its part also outline general structures of human nature, in which the future of faith 
shines as a foreglow of the future of all men. The gospel call is addressed to all men and 
promises them a universal eschatological future…A Christian anthropology will always 
insist that a general, philosophic anthropology understand human nature in terms of 
history and conceive its historic character in the light of its future.’530  
 
                                               
527 Kristeva, New Maladies of the Soul, p. 36. 
528 Moltmann, Theology of Hope, p.286. 
529 Ibid., p.286. 
530 Ibid., p.287. 
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Kristeva welcomed the symbolism of self-emptying (‘kénose’).531 In her reading of the 
Passion, the move from the previous narrow ‘sub-psychic’ focus towards universalising 
solidary love makes Moltmann’s hope a promising medium of discussion. The gospel call ‘is 
delivered “in all openness” and must therefore also assume open responsibility for its hope 
for the future of man.’532 Keller’s analysis of the ‘unborn self’ in Beckett also attains a new 
meaning in this context. Keller stated the need for a ‘Transcendent other’ to the self, who is 
genuinely real outside the self. Moltmann’s eschatological anthropology spells out the claim 
that it is God’s love which invites history to be ‘properly born’. This statement forms an 
‘ontological critique’ of Kristeva’s retreat into matter. The ‘speaking being’ cannot be 
confined to a ‘semiotic’ nature. There is an alternative dialectic which transcends and 
completes material-linguistic origins: 
 
‘The comparison with nature and with the animals, or the comparison with other 
men in the present and in history, does not yet bring out what man’s nature is, but only 
the comparison with the future possibilities which are disclosed to him from the 
direction of his life [the ‘graced’ Loving Third]… Man has no subsistence in himself, 
but is always on some expected future whole.’533   
 
This is a constructive dialogue with Arendt’s concerns about a superfluous humanity. 
Moltmann articulates a powerful counter-thesis to the ‘fabrication of soulless men “who can 
no longer be psychologically understood” because their psyche is destroyed before their 
bodies are destroyed.’534 Moltmann resolves the Arendtian dilemma of historical 
recommencement by proposing an alternative freedom for history, without which, he states, 
it necessarily fails. 
 
‘Hoping in the promised new creation by God, man here stands in statu nascendi, in 
the process of his being brought into being by the calling, coaxing, compelling word of 
God.’535 
 
‘To this end it is necessary to take man in his selfhood along with, and not in 
abstraction from, the present constellation of human society, in order to subject the 
whole of present human reality to the future of Christ and to the possibilities of the 
mission that moves towards his future.’536 
 
Despite Moltmann’s repetitive dialectics, Hope emerges as the new Symbolic Order of 
‘grace’. It transforms the paralysed language of culture by offering for imitation the mutual 
                                               
531 ‘Suffering’, in Kristeva, This Incredible Need to Believe, pp.93-94. 
532 Moltmann, Theology of Hope, p.287. 
533 Ibid.,  p.287.  
534 See Kristeva’s reference to Arendt’s reading of the isolated historical self in section 
‘Imperialism…. and Totalianarism’ (pp.129-143), in Kristeva, Hannah Arent, p.139. 
535 Moltmann, Theology of Hope, p.287. 
536 Ibid., p.288. 
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love between the Father and the Son. With this, Moltmann laid down an important strategy 
to bring the ‘apocalyptic’ Father and the ‘Son’ much closer to history. Though, critically 
speaking, the historicity of divine love for the postmodern subject can be problematic if the 
eschatological focus is not balanced with a genuine anthropology, Moltmann’s strategic 
direction is correct. The unexpected confirmation comes from Habermas, whose engagement 
with the theology of Auschwitz affirms the significance of rethinking eschatology in 
theology. 537 Habermas appreciates Moltmann’s attempt to correct the Christian account of 
time which has become too ‘ahistorical’ under the influence of Hellenistic metaphysics. 
Habermas recognises that the correction of the ‘ahistorical’ notion of time and history is a 
pivotal achievement in the ‘cultural mourning’ of theological modernity. 
 
 
6.2.3.2 The Foreigner/Stranger: The Revised Borders of the Church 
 
The second major theme where Moltmann offers an intense contact with Kristeva is the 
problem of the Foreigner/Stranger. As a reminder, according to Kristeva’s criticism, when 
religious identity is constructed dogmatically, a ‘homogenising’ Christianity fails in dealing 
with cultural and creedal otherness. Moltmann particularly touches upon this field. He raises 
the need to correct the ‘social principle of likeness’, which organised the life and theological 
thinking of Christian communities in the past. Moltmann’s analysis of Christian community 
cohesion is a direct response to Freud’s reading of the Father as an ‘external authority’. 
Moltmann shows a significant correction of the ‘tabooistic’ or tribal reading of the Father’s 
love. ‘Christendom’, he states, totalised the ‘principle of likeness’, that is, when ‘like is 
known only by like’. Christian theology adopted it and introduced the principle of ‘analogy’ 
into its doctrine of the knowledge of God. 538 In brief, those who share the Creed are similar 
and recognised; those who stay outside the Creedal community are outsiders, ‘heretics’, and 
are experienced as a threat. In this dynamic, we can identify what Kristeva objects to in 
religious fundamentalism. 
 
Moltmann identifies this cultural pattern as the root of the Church’s apologetic relation 
to culture. The notion of a ‘separate’ Christian culture can easily reject the ‘migrant’ who is 
uprooted from religion. There is a dangerous element in this denial. The nostalgia for a 
                                               
537 Habermas is familiar with the theological projects of Johann Baptist Metz and Jürgren Moltmann. 
He knows of Moltmann’s groundbreaking work through Metz’s Auschwitz theology, and there is a 
significant academic engagement from his part with Metz. He is interested in their affirmation of 
history. Habermas’ is an important account as it confirms my critique on theology’s distance from the 
‘historicity’ of the subject. In Nicholas Adams, Habermas and Theology, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2006 (First published in 2006), p.191. 
538 Moltmann, The Crucified God, p.26. 
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‘homogeneous’ and consequently homogenising Christianity produces a defensive attitude 
which Levinas characterised as ‘Christianity’s hubristic claim to be the exclusive path of 
salvation: ‘Outside the Church there is no salvation.’539 These associations of Christianity 
with this ‘meta-narrative’ show that the problem is real.  
 
Kristeva’s theory of ‘abjection’ is addressed here through the problem of the 
‘boundaries’ of the Church. Moltmann warns that retreating into a pure creedally defined 
ecclesial self gives only a temporary stabilisation of identity and risks the ghettoisation of the 
Christian message. That is why Moltmann contrasts the principle of likeness with the 
‘dialectical principle of God’, revealed in the Cross. His proposal is a dialectical 
understanding of Christ’s unconditional love, in which dialectic an anthropological thrust 
surfaces. Christ reveals a universal likeness in us, which is the likeness of suffering and 
vulnerability. Christ’s cross, as the manifestation of the Father’s love, connects all sufferers. 
This ‘dialectic anthropology’ reflects on the problem of the unwelcomed stranger in a 
historical connection. The ‘foreigner’ or the ‘cultural migrant’ necessarily emerges at the 
crossroads of the ‘horizontality’ and the ‘verticality’ of the Cross, at the time of the ‘split’ 
between modernity and post-modernity. I draw attention to the constructive exchange 
between Moltmann’s historical approach and Kristeva’s sub-psychic approach. Though she 
overestimates the capacity of her psychoanalytical soteriology, 540 Kristeva rightly assigns 
the self as the place for talking about cultural borders: 
 
‘Strangely, the foreigner lives within us: he is the hidden face of our identity, the 
space that wrecks our abode, the time in which understanding and affinity founder. By 
recognising him within ourselves, we are spared detesting him in himself. A symptom 
that precisely turns ‘we’ into a problem, perhaps makes it impossible, The foreigner 
comes in when the consciousness of my difference arises, and he disappears when we all 
acknowledge ourselves as foreigners, unamenable to bounds and communities.’ 541 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
Moltmann warns religious consciousness of the ‘lack of sensitivity to others’ and ‘the 
inability to see ourselves in others’.542 In his solution, when the other is seen in suffering, 
and the ‘we - they’ opposition is transformed into the common image of the suffering Christ, 
fear is removed from the ‘other’. The suffering Son connects me with the suffering 
                                               
539 Richard A. Cohen, Levinasian Meditations, Ethics, Philosophy, and Religion, Duquesne University 
Press, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 2010, p.305. 
540 Hanvey warns that Kristeva’s project is always essentially unstable. ‘Insofar as it relies on the 
recognition of unheimlich it can never be secured: “transference” and “recognition” can never be 
guaranteed and it is precisely the presence of the “uncanny” which not only discloses the wound but is 
an element in it, that ensuring that it stays open. ... It is always a constructed relation.’ Hanvey, ‘Other 
than Stranger’, p.133. 
541 Kristeva, Strangers to Ourselves, p. 1. 
542 Moltmann, The Crucified God, p.25. 
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‘Foreigner’ who is my true image. The ‘Foreigner’ is also the true likeness of the Father, 
who co-suffers with the Son. The coincidence of these images becomes complete when the 
Father sends me to respond to suffering with compassion.   
 
 ‘He revealed his identity amongst those who had lost their identity, amongst the 
lepers, sick, rejected and despised, and was recognised as the Son of Man amongst those 
who had been deprived of their humanity. (…) One must become godless oneself and 
abandon every kind of self-deification or likeness to God, in order to recognise the God 
who reveals himself in the crucified Christ.’543  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Though Moltmann does not supply a sufficient anthropology to his overwhelming 
dialectics, nevertheless he successfully reverses the logic of ‘abjection’. Moltmann 
relevantly and directly addresses Freud who judged Christianity as being incapable of 
coming out from the ‘tabooistic’ reading of the Cross. ‘In origin Christianity is not a father-
religion…. it is a son-religion, namely a brotherly community in the situation of the human 
God, without privileges and without the rebellions that are necessary against them.’544 
(Italics mine.) 
 
 
6.2.3.3 Evaluation 
 
In view of Kristeva’s humanist reading of the Passion, Moltmann’s ‘symbolic mourning’ 
takes forward my critique in the following ways.  
 
a/ Moltmann’s theologia crucis urges a hermeneutical-iconographical renewal. The 
universal likeness of Christ cannot be spelled out fully, neither within his heavy dialectics 
nor within the traditional ‘bloody’ representation of the cross. Moltmann in The Crucified 
God ends up with dialectic variations (repetition) of his statements. To a great extent, this 
systemic limit is owing to the incomplete revision of the underlying images of atonement 
theology. There is an objective need to revise these images in the presence (‘wounds’) of the 
historical subject, which he rightly assigns. 
 
From a critical point of view, Moltmann’s Passion remains detached from the secular 
experience of suffering. Moltmann recognised the need to revolt against an inward looking 
‘bloody imagery’, yet he was unable to create a common iconography with secular 
humanism. The main reason was the lack of an elaborated anthropology. The repetitions of 
                                               
543 Moltmann, The Crucified God, p.27. 
544 Ibid., p.307. 
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his dialectic indirectly reveal (and anticipate) unsettled intra-theological debates between the 
dialogical and the apologetic models of the ‘secular’. In this way, Moltmann’s theology of 
the cross points to the linguistic gap between Church and culture.  
 
Making a genuine connection with history, as Levinas points out, necessarily leads to 
tension with a Christianity based passively on right adherence to doctrine. Here faith is 
exclusively ‘creedal’; the emphasis is on the affirmation of correct doctrine.545 The 
unfinished project of The Crucified God recognises the need for theological risk-taking in 
order to resolve this situation. What the theologia crucis learns is to accept the conflict 
which the renewal of theological images unavoidably brings about.  
 
b./ The Father’s love is the source of ethical community. This is the radical counter-
image to Freud’s ‘oedipal community’ centred on a jealous God. Moltmann witnesses to the 
potential of the Cross to reveal this regenerative love and accommodate otherness. The 
conflict between the ‘symbolic mourning’ of theological modernity and Freud’s critique of 
religion is so tense that it still assigns to the theologia crucis, as a central task, to ‘mourn’ 
this ‘split’. As a first step, the exhaustion of the postmodern subject requires removing all 
violence from the image of the Father. When the postmodern subject is most vulnerable it is 
most exposed to ‘violent’ narratives in culture. As M. Callagher warns, the isolated 
individual can easily be seduced by a ‘strong identity’. This seductive ‘power’ gives an 
instant gratification to shaken postmodern-identity.546 In this very fragile cultural situation, 
when submission to a totalitarian ‘power voice’ (technological, political, or religious) is a 
genuine danger, a radical counter-image of Love is needed. It should be a genuinely ‘intra-
self’ narrative, which is not manipulatable by cultural ideologies. In order to bring to 
realisation this God-image, a further correction of the ‘banal’ images of God is needed.  
 
There is a complementary dimension to this task. Theology, it seems, first has to produce 
a breakthrough in the God-image in order to be able to make an anthropological 
breakthrough. That is why my study now turns to Metz, who elaborates further directions for 
theological anthropology. With him, addressing Kristeva’s historical subtexts attains a really 
secure position.   
 
                                               
545 This is Levinas’ reservation against this, what he regards as, one-sidedness in the Christian 
definition of faith. Cohen, Levinasian Meditations, p.308. 
546 See the cultural dynamics Gallagher attributes to the cultural phase under ‘Grid D’ in (Appendix 
V.) This cultural climate facilitates the emergence of sect-like collectivity, authoritarian regimes, 
fundamentalisms, and a strict separation of insiders/outsiders. Gallagher SJ, Clashing Symbols, 
pp.27.30. 
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6.2.4 Metz: The Cross as the Hermeneutical Centre of History 
 
In contrast to the mechanistic God-image of the masters of suspicion,547 Metz offers a 
highly complex Father narrative. The general background to making him a pivotal resource 
is Kristeva’s dialectical and historical materialism in Revolution in Poetic Language. Metz 
makes the Cross the hermeneutical centre of history. He demonstrates that theology can 
address historical alienation in a way which far excels the ‘linear’ teleological view of 
history like that of Marxism, that of scientific progress, or that of consumerist capitalism.  
 
We can evaluate Metz’s trans-illuminating of history as a parallel dynamic with the 
‘semiotic’ constituent of meaning in Kristeva. Metz shows that theological modernity in 
terms of ‘ethical mourning’ produced a heterogeneous view of history. Metz gives this 
correction by extrapolating the inner divisions of the subject onto the level of history. What 
corresponds to the denied ‘subconscious’ memories and desires548 is the ignored realm of the 
victims. With Metz, we can present the Cross also as the hermeneutic centre of the human 
self. I draw attention to his most forward looking concepts for making this connection, the 
‘dangerous memory of Christ’, ‘conversion’, ‘mystical prayer’, and the ‘eschatological 
interruption’ of history.  
 
Theological modernity, in Metz, brought an anthropological closing of the gap in terms 
of elaborating the collective dimension of the ‘anthropological’ approach to culture. Building 
on this communal dimension, my critique articulates a significant counter-claim to 
‘psychoanalytic listening’. With regard to the nihilist crisis, to the disrupted historical 
situation and the threatened survival of the subject, only radical conversion can offer any 
hope.549 Metz sets up a critical stance with Kristeva’s Enlightenment viewpoint which, 
according to Hanvey, still builds on the vision of the human person as self-redeemed through 
reason, education, and social progress. 550 The paradigm of metanoia, as a re-centring of the 
self on an extra-self dynamism, interrupts this program. 
 
 
 
                                               
547 Paul Ricoeur’s term refers to the common opposition to and demystifying of the sacred in 
Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud. Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, An Essay on Interpretation, 
Translated by Denis Savage, Yale University Press, New Haven and London 1970, p.32. 
548 Kristeva, Desire in Language, pp.86-87. 
549 Chopp’s summary of this counter-claim. In Rebecca S. Chopp, The Praxis of Suffering, An 
Interpretation of Liberation and Political Theology, Orbis Books, Maryknoll, New York 2000, p.80. 
550 Hanvey, ‘Other than Stranger’, p.133. 
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6.2.4.1 The Collective Dimension of Anthropology 
 
Metz provides the ‘Semiotic Passion’ with a fundamental insight. He aimed at an 
anthropological revolution by raising the questions: ‘To whom does the world belong? To 
whom do its time and suffering belong?’ 551 The emphasis on the collective within 
anthropology is just as an important challenge as Kristeva’s ‘semiotic’ is to the Symbolic 
Order. In the ‘verticality of the Cross’, it can be an important counterbalance to the 
individual dimension which postmodern strategies emphasize. Responsiveness to the 
postmodern situation can be developed further when the ‘dangerous remembrance’ of Christ 
is revived for the postmodern subject. Metz helps to reinstate the classic paradigm of 
conversion if we refashion his opening question. What type of Cross is it, to which the 
postmodern subject is being converted? In what sense can we speak of conversion? What is 
the doctrinal content which can motivate this conversion? What memory brings about the 
conversion of the ‘exhausted subject’?  
 
Postmodern theologies of the cross are tempted to be lost in the individual.552 As a way 
out, Metz warns, the Father has to be imitated. Metz always reminds us not to forget the 
collective dimension of conversion. With this, he sets up an important criterion which 
evaluates the ‘iconographical response’ to Kristeva, which my study develops. If the 
renewed representation of the Passion is prompting a genuine conversion, it will be a proof 
that it is not a theological myth which concedes passively to Kristeva’s sub-psychic 
anthropology. Neither is it a ‘passive’ counter-myth to Freud’s murder-myth. On the 
contrary, the theology of the cross takes its own initiatives to deconstruct some of the myths 
of the self-sufficient postmodern self. This Metzian Passion, in R. Williams’ words, ‘is not 
just there as an object of our investigation, but is a challenging and unsettling fact for all of 
us, interrogating us without mercy, questioning our understanding of God and ourselves. The 
truth is that God is the only real and authoritative iconoclast.’553 
 
The first important element of an anthropology grounded in the ‘collective’ is the 
rediscovery of a shared human nature. For Metz, this comes from the anamnesis of a 
common history. The ‘dangerous memory’ of Christ draws attention to forgotten victims in 
                                               
551 Quotation from Metz’s Theology of the World, in Rebecca S. Chopp, The Praxis of Suffering, p.77.  
552 Rowan Williams’ theology exemplifies the struggle not to be lost in ‘translation’. His writings 
themselves reflect how difficult it is not having been caught up in repeating postmodern sensitivity 
and conceding to it. This game is not always won by postmodern theology. See Williams’ ‘Metzian’ 
yearning for the history of God in the sermon, ‘Different Christs?’ (pp.105-111), in Rowan Williams, 
Open to Judgement, Sermons and Addresses, Darton, Longman & Todd, London 2004 (First 
published 1994), cf. pp.109-110. 
553 Ibid., p.110.  
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this collective history. Kristeva’s attempt in Strangers to Ourselves was to ground a new 
universalism in the fragility of the individual self. In ‘Toccata and Fugue for the Foreigner’, 
she gives a moving account of uprootedness and losses, and the rejection by an unwelcoming 
host culture or individual of what constitutes the ‘Foreigner’. The whole being of this 
‘Stranger’ is that of the ‘vulnerability of the Medusa’.554 It is a striking correspondence with 
the absolute woundedness of Metz’s victims, who are forgotten in history: 
 
‘Not belonging to any place, any time, any love. A lost origin, the impossibility to 
take root, a rummaging memory, the present in abeyance…. This means that, settled 
within himself, the foreigner has no self. Barely an empty confidence, valueless, which 
focuses his possibilities of being constantly other, according to others’ wishes and to 
circumstances.’ 555 
 
Metz articulates a collective responsibility for this uncanny ‘Other’. The ‘Stranger’ is 
recognised not as a psychological image ‘in ourselves’ but from History, which is purified 
from the mythical time of the God-lessness of our late modernity (‘polymythicism’).556 The 
‘Foreigner’ is responded to through a radical conversion to the Father of history. The lost 
universalism of the Enlightenment is to be regained not from psychic history as in Kristeva’s 
attempt, but from external history. This ‘radical conversion’, which Metz critically 
highlights, takes place against the fiascos of the Enlightenment. For his theology of the cross 
the categorical imperative is failed history itself: ‘Everything has to be measured by [the 
possibility of] Auschwitz.’557  
 
In the ‘verticality of the cross’, actualising the statement, everything has to be measured 
by individual suffering. The interesting contrast, compared with Kristeva, is where theology 
emphasises individual particularity. Self-consciousness, ethical renewal, arises from the 
recognition of the silenced particularity of the victim. The implied criticism of a self-
sufficient Enlightenment is the way Metz replaces the lost universal, compromised 
‘autonomous’ reason, with the eschatological scandal of the forgotten victims. This is a very 
important opening up to the time experience of the self from the present to someone else’s 
past, the past of one who is my silenced brother. It is liberation from self-indulging psychic-
                                               
554 Kristeva, Strangers to Ourselves, p.7. 
555 Ibid., pp.7.8 
556 Ch 4 ‘Theology versus Polymythicism: A Short Apology for Biblical Monotheism’ (pp.72-91), in 
Johann Baptist Metz, A Passion for God, The Mystical Dimension of Christianity, translated and 
edited by J. Matthew Ashley, Paulinist Press, New York, Mahwah 1998., p.75. 
557 Johann Baptist Metz, ‘Christians and Jews After Auschwitz’, in The Emergent Church, translated 
by Peter Mann, Crossroad Publishing Company, New York, 1981, p. 21.  
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nostalgia, which Part One identified as the predominant time-dimension of the isolated 
self.558  
 
This liberation is my ethical future, a forward-looking responsibility. This future, thus 
turns out to be grounded in love, which enhances Kant’s ‘categorical imperative’ with 
historical anamnesis. ‘Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time 
will that it should become a universal law.’559 What makes this law universal after Auschwitz 
is love, which does not do to the neighbour what was done to the victims of the past. ‘The 
starry sky above and the moral law within’, which inspired genuine awe in Kant, is replaced 
by the memory-lit sky of the victims of the past, and seen as God interrupting human morals 
from without. In the positive, the Logos (Word) who animates this repentance corrects 
reason. Instead of compromised human reason, it is apocalyptic time or apocalyptic 
consciousness that transforms history: ‘To whom does the world belong?’ To whom does my 
love belong? By sharing this answer with secularity, Christianity contributes to a second 
anthropological revolution, as these questions bring about a genuine distance from the 
postmodern situation. In post-modernity, when the sense of history is eclipsed, Metz remains 
a non-negligible source.  
 
The hidden agency of suffering clearly resonates with Kristeva’s model of language. The 
latter showed that it is the ‘semiotic’ depth, the ‘maternal thing’, or the ‘void’ above which 
the edifice of language is erected. In Kristeva’s model this was the zero point of language. 
My point is that the hidden suffering of the victim can be seen as God’s hidden suffering. 
The agony of forgotten victims, which is integrated into God’s Passion, presents Him as ‘a 
semiotic chora’. There is another side to language/suffering which is unconscious. In 
Kristevan terms, the invisible story of the victims needs to be (re)inscribed into the 
‘Symbolic order’ of History. Also, analogously, this past suffering is just as sidelined and 
unlistened to as a mother’s knowledge of dealing with otherness. Whereas psychoanalysis 
somehow implies a conversation with one’s own self, Metz departs from this introvert logic. 
Kristeva says: 
 
‘To give meaning to suffering and begin the associative speech that will transform 
malady and death into a narrative of life, a new life: this is how the value of analytical 
interpretation as pardon can be defined. If you prefer, you can call this experience a 
healing. An endless one.’ 560 
                                               
558 Section ‘3.4 The Problem of the Isolated Self’  
559 Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, in The Age of German Idealism, Routledge 
History of Philosophy Volume VI, edited by Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins, Routledge, 
London, New York 1993 (First published 1993), p.73. 
560 Kristeva, Intimate Revolt, p.24. 
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My critique argues that the extrovert movement that Metz introduces does not eliminate 
self-reflexion, but transforms it. Analytic listening is to be completed by the historical 
transformation in the Father (‘conversion’). The psychoanalytical relevance is that there is a 
connection between my psychic traumas and history. Not only that, through deciphering the 
images of the unconscious, I can realise the traumas of other ‘victims’, but also that, through 
realising the pain of my individual psyche, I become aware of the chain of persons and 
events that inflicted this trauma upon me: history is real. To complete the web, my individual 
wounds are also reminders of my own complicity in this ‘external’ history. I myself, in other 
circumstances, am an active inflictor of pain on others. Metz reminds us of our historical 
responsibility.  
 
Becoming solidary with others’ pain is also a therapeutic energy. This is the beginning 
of a non-oppressive and non-controlling morality. This happens when ‘grace’ is perceived as 
a universal, reaching out for the whole of history. This conception of ethics responds to 
Kristeva at two points. First, the theologia crucis spells out its ‘non-repressive ethics’, 561 
when divine love re-grounds human law. It is true that in Metz the intimacy of this love is 
not elaborated. But the otherness of this love as non-negotiable commitment562 is clearly 
stated. Secondly, it is a genuine counter-thesis to the ‘dolorisme’ or patronising attitude to 
suffering that Kristeva objected to in ‘Suffering’.  
 
‘I have even perceived the limits of this approach, with its attendant risk of 
infantilizing people who are thus excluded from social history as suffering objects to be 
looked after. One can understand, then, that, starting with Diderot and his 1749 Lettre 
sur les aveugles à l’usage de ceux qui voient [Letter on the blind for the use of those who 
see], men and women of handicap, and their families, refuse the charitable and 
compassionate attitude and involve themselves in a political struggle that demands 
equality as a political right for everyone. All the same, realising this political solidarity 
requires mental solidarity between those who have been relatively spared…. 
  
….We are, however, forced to admit that Christian humanism, when it does not lock 
itself into redemptive suffering [dolorisme], prepares the believer to acknowledge this 
vulnerability in himself, the better to share the political struggles of those who suffer.’563 
 
Metz and Kristeva at this point are in a significant approximation on moral forgetting. 
The ‘disabled’ can become an existential metaphor of ignored presence. The Passion is 
                                               
561 Of which Kristeva laid foundations in ‘Stabat Mater’ (Tales of Love). See the conclusion of ‘Stabat 
Mater’, in Kristeva, Tales of Love, pp.262-263.  
562 In Kristeva the source of non-repressive ethics is the ‘maternal passion’, a mother’s experience of 
dealing with otherness. 
563 ‘Suffering’, in Kristeva, This Incredible Need to Believe, p.92. 
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presented in both readings as the interruption of the narcissistic claim for ‘self-redemption’ 
or narcissistic-suffering.  
 
‘“I” exist if, and only if, I suffer; the feeling of pain alone makes me exist; it is pain 
that makes my existence meaningful; without it my being would lack employment, utter 
boredom.”564 
 
The question indeed emerges as a non-negotiable interruption: to whom does my love 
belong? Metz prompts psychoanalysis to ask, to whom does the human self belong? How 
does the self relate to God’s ‘eschaton’? Most importantly, to whom does my suffering 
belong? 
 
6.2.4.2 Radical Conversion to the Father: The Significance of Mystical Prayer 
 
With Metz, the cross introduces ‘heterogeneity’ into history in a way which corrects 
Freud’s charge of the ‘violent Father’ and the charge of atheist humanism that God is 
external to history and is a mere extension of human power aspirations. The Love of the 
Father in history creates a special mode of ‘therapeutic’ speech: mystical prayer. This 
healing space is generated by the divine rupture of history.  
 
Metz’s central recognition is that the meaning of existence is conceived via narratives.565 
Christian prayer forms an existential narrative. It connects the stories of the self with the 
stories of God and, through God’s interest in history, with the stories of the victims. 
Christians assess history through this mystical union. Those who join in this communion 
understand that ‘prayer is the only form of language that can express our lives and feelings 
adequately.’566 What in Kristeva’s model is missing, for understandable reasons, is ‘praying 
the self through’. Christian spirituality states it as the primary mode of the self’s becoming.  
 
These recognitions enter into a structural dialogue with Kristeva’s revolutionary phase. 
In Revolution in Poetic Language the critique of the bourgeois subject was centred on the 
question of human agency as the source of social transformation. Metz reinstates prayer as 
an autonomous modality of human language. It has an analogous function to Kristeva’s 
‘revolutionary praxis’ through poetic language: prayer first transforms the self. Then, it 
capacitates the person to become an active agent of history. The theological dynamic is clear: 
                                               
564 ‘Suffering’, in Kristeva, This Incredible Need to Believe, p.91. 
565 James Matthew Ashley, Interruptions, Mysticism, Politics and Theology in the Work of Johann 
Baptist Metz, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1998, p. 154.  
566 Johann Baptist Metz, ‘The Courage to Pray’, in Johann Baptist Metz, Karl Rahner, The Courage to 
Pray, translated by Sarah O’Brian Thowig, Crossroad, New York 1981., p.3.  
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this potential is the result of conversion, which we can now define further as ‘revolt’ against 
the inertia of the self. The result is ‘mystical prayer’ which, in Metz, is the purification of 
‘bourgeois’ consciousness. In order to constitute genuine human subjectivity, prayer must be 
free in form, uninhibited by linguistic constraints, expressive of emotions. It must heighten 
the sense of the ineffability of suffering.567 Language, when being transformed into prayer, 
becomes the medium of healing. It is never self-healing by itself. Human language becomes 
therapeutic always in relation to ‘sufferers’ and God. The responded to suffering of the 
victim and the responded suffering of God are the source of renewal.  
 
This point also addresses Kristeva’s mature psychoanalytical program. Part One showed 
how the transition from ‘revolutionary aspirations’ of changing the world into healing 
psychic inertia was a realistic change. My position was that there is no need to refute the 
early ‘semiotic’ solutions by the later ones, and that the early insights can attain a new 
relevance in the postmodern context.568 The same applies to the Metz of theological 
modernity. The genuine need to restore a loving authority makes Metz’s emphasis on the 
authority of God’s ‘eschaton’ relevant for our context. The contact point with Kristeva’s 
later program is her suggestion of renewal through ‘self-translation’. Possessions saw the 
only chance of the ‘exhausted protagonists’ for renewal in the absorption of one’s life into 
another’s. This is Kristeva’s general psychoanalytical strategy for the postmodern self; to 
change language is a new way of signifying. She warns through the example of her 
protagonists that the postmodern self can be lost in translation, stranded in 
meaninglessness.569 
 
Metz offers the identity of the victims, their narratives, into which to be reborn. This 
‘radical otherness’ provides the permanent dynamic for self-translation. The reality of the 
victims as the reality of historical suffering sustains the self with a permanent task. The 
subject, because he is so indebted to their presence, can never be lost. It is a double 
identification: with the historical other, and with the Father’s love which is the source and 
animator of this self-translation. With this, the theologia crucis responds to the significance 
of the narrative in Arendt. Here theology proves more ‘Arendtian’ than Kristeva’s one-to-
one psychoanalysis. The question of connecting subsequent generations in history, to 
remember their continuity, is dealt with as a central problem. 
                                               
567 Bruce T. Morril, SJ, Anamnesis as Dangerous Memory, Political and Liturgical Theology in 
Dialogue, The Liturgical Press Collegeville, Minnesota, 2000. pp.50-51. 
568 See the ‘eschatological fellowship’ of Kristeva’s early revolutionary program in section ‘2.2.1.3 
The Materialist Grounding of The ‘Chora-thetic’, pp.80-81.  
569 de Nooy, ‘How to keep your head when all about you are losing theirs’, in The Kristeva Critical 
Reader, p.123. 
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A further contact in this line is the difficulty of ‘revolt’ that Kristeva harps on as the core 
of the postmodern challenge. She states, especially in Sense and Non-sense of Revolt, that 
when limits are lost, when there is a power vacuum and an invisible law, the self cannot be 
mirrored. It is not confronted with a genuine otherness, the precondition for ‘revolt’ (or 
‘critical reflection’). Yet, despite the self-emptied state of postmodern culture, Kristeva 
clings to the premise that revolt is absolutely vital, ‘a continual necessity to keep alive the 
psyche, thought and the social bond itself’.570 The problem is that psychoanalysis as a 
critique of culture cannot provide the subject with this lost, confronting Other. Secular 
humanism, just like the whole of our culture, struggles with the loss of radical otherness. 
That is why Metz’s ‘eschatological horizon’, despite the overtones of the confidence of 
modernity, is an important resource to be rediscovered.  
 
‘Again, and again prayer is a cry of lament from the depths of the spirit. But this cry 
is in no sense a vague, rambling moan. It calls out loudly, insistently. Nor is it merely a 
wish or desire, no matter how fervent. It is a supplication. The language of prayer finds 
its purpose and justification in the silently concealed face of God. Hence the lament, 
supplication, crying and protest contained in prayer, as also a silent accusation of the 
wordless cry, can never simply be translated and dissolved into a discourse.’571 
  
‘Crying’ is a powerful metaphor. It would be worth developing it as one of the central 
images of theology’s ‘postmodern’ reading of the Passion. It is not forcing it to relate it to 
the ‘semiotic’ state of language under formation in Kristeva’s model. ‘Crying contained in 
prayer’ can be seen when the ethical language of a culture is being formed. It recalls, from 
Kristeva, language being in ferment, the struggle to mature into expression, when ‘love is 
neither merely semiotic nor merely Symbolic’ (Oliver).572 
 
‘In a semanalytic interpretation, it would amount, for the amorous and/or 
transference discourse, to a permanent stabilisation-destabilisation between the symbolic 
(pertaining to referential signs and their syntactic articulation) and the semiotic (the 
elemental tendency) of libidinal charges toward displacement and condensation, and of 
their inscription, which depends on the incorporation and introjection of incorporated 
items; an economy that privileges orality, vocalization, alliteration, rhythmicity, etc.)573 
 
The metaphor of crying, if taken up, has a tremendous anthropological potential and a 
‘personalist’ charge. I just hint at the possible link with Kristeva’s program of jouisssance, 
the other key dimension of her non-repressive ethics. Her ‘ecstatic postmodernism’ 
                                               
570 de Nooy, ‘How to keep your head when all about you are losing theirs’, in The Kristeva Critical 
Reader, p.115. 
571 Metz, Rahner, The Courage to Pray, p.13 
572 Oliver, Reading Kristeva, p.122. 
573 (In the French original, Julia Kristeva, Histoires d’amour, p.22.) Kristeva, Tales of Love, p.16.   
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articulates freedom in terms of an ultimate orientation to joy and ecstasy, and desire as a way 
of relating to the Other.574 In ‘crying’, the joy and jouissance of the victims is ‘mourned’. 
This remembrance gives expression to their freedom to live and to be remembered. In 
‘crying’, in a symbolic way, joy (jouissance), suffering, prayer, the ethical variants of the 
‘semiotic’ (sub-lingual) and the ‘Symbolic’ (conscious reflection), are merged. With the help 
of Ricoeur, we can define further the ‘cultural mourning’ which is underlying the language 
of love. Its task is to universalise particular historical suffering. ‘We must remember because 
remembering is a moral duty. We owe a debt to the victims. And the tiniest way of paying 
our debt is to tell and re-tell what happened at Auschwitz.’575 In other words, crying reveals 
what could have happened in place of ‘Auschwitz’ as joy.    
 
In Metz, ‘crying and protest contained in prayer’ connects the pain of past victims, the 
pain of the Son, and the pain of psychic rebirth. But in view of the above, it is also important 
to emphasise that ‘crying’ also connects the joys (‘jouissance’) of the victims, and the joy of 
the Son, and the joy of the Father. Metz’s version of Ricoeur’s ‘second naïveté’ is, as it were, 
our second ‘apocalyptic naïveté’. It scandalises and interrupts the banality and boredom of 
bürgerliche Religion.576 What once interrupted modernity is interrupting post-modernity too. 
For post-modernity, from the Metzian point of view, can be redefined as the acceleration of 
modernity’s forgetting. With the alienating practices it produces through consumerism, post-
modernity indeed can be seen as the intensification of victimisation. The freedom and joy of 
the ‘victims of the present’ is to be paid utmost attention, and care.  
 
I conclude for the Semiotic Passion that if the victims are invisible, their Cross is also 
invisible. Therefore, Metz confirms in the postmodern context that, literally, a new visibility 
of the Cross is desirable. What makes the difference between authentic and inauthentic 
existence is the ability to sense the suffering of the other.577 Also, it is the ability to ‘see’ the 
Cross. This recognition by Metz prompts the kerygma to enter into a new solidarity with the 
‘post-Catholic’ audience. The secular environment of the Church should be seen as the 
unremembered freedom of the successors of the victims. With Metz, the theologia crucis 
develops further Moltmann’s vision of the ‘open Cross of Christ’. The consequence of the 
Metzian opening up to history is that instead of indoctrination, the linguistic modality of 
mystical prayer should be offered. This new modality of language corresponds to the state of 
                                               
574 David F. Ford, Self and Salvation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003 (First published 
1999), p.219. 
575 ‘The Memory of Suffering’, Ch 18. (pp. 289-292), in Paul Ricoeur, Figuring the Sacred, Religion, 
Narrative, and Imagination, edited by Mark I. Wallace, Fortress Press, Minneapolis 1995, p.290. 
576 Morril, Anamnesis as Dangerous Memory, p.42. 
577 Ashley, Interruptions,1998, p.156. 
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the ‘migrant’. Thus, after Rahner, Metz also confirms our opening proposal that in the 
cultural condition of the ‘verticality of the cross’, language to the ‘exhausted subject’ (the 
inheritor of the exhaustion of past victims!) is healing and listening, instead of an old 
fashioned ‘catechising’. At least, Catechesis should offer, among its first approaches, a 
sound knowledge of who the ‘exhausted subject’ is.  
 
To Metz’s eschatological personalism Kristeva might say that the anthropology it offers 
is not sufficient. Spelling out the ‘communal’ element in anthropology in the postmodern 
context is not enough. The ethical dimension of history does not cover the whole of history. 
Indeed, the sub-psychic level, as the personal dimension of anthropology, is missing from 
the Metzian ‘grand-narrative’. Without reaching ‘intra-psychic history’, without 
communicating the ‘eschaton’ to the full self, Christianity does not cease to be a colonising 
narrative. This criticism has relevant points. Metz’s ‘symbolic mourning’, to a great extent, 
still belongs to the world of theological modernity. He has never engaged fully with the 
postmodern subject. On the other hand, Metz’s ‘unfinished mourning’ significantly 
contributes to achieving the above objective. His is indeed a grand narrative, in the fashion 
of modernity. But this is a grand-narrative on behalf of the victims, and it makes a 
difference. To answer the above criticism, theology will have to bring even closer to each 
other the ‘eschaton’ and history. 
 
 
6.2.4.3 Metz’s Mystical Prayer as a Restoration of the Mysticism of History 
 
Metz’s most significant achievement is the correction he made to the mystical tradition, 
which I highlight as the precondition for reconnecting ‘nature’ and ‘grace’ (the self and 
history and God) in a satisfying way. The extension of our eschatological future, when All 
are gathered together, into our present brings about a fundamental change. Metz reversed the 
introverted nature of ‘modern’ Christian mysticism. In this context, we can speak of the 
introvert nature of Christian ‘symbolic language’. From the Metzian eschatological 
viewpoint, a painful, sadly often overlooked, historical retreat becomes visible. The critical 
analysis of this event also has to be at the heart of dialogue with Kristeva’s humanistic 
subtexts. It is, my study claims, a major precondition for recovering the Father’s love for our 
postmodern history.  
 
So, what was this ‘retreat’ or introvert symbolism? Since the Enlightenment, the conflict 
with the secularising dynamic of modernity led to the notion of a ‘High Transcendent God’, 
as we saw in Homans. The conflict with natural sciences, and then notably with Freud, 
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resulted in a retreat into the ‘theological person’. In terms of spirituality, it resulted in a 
retreat into the ‘mystical self’. Different versions of secular criticism pointed to it as an 
isolation from reality. As an un-admitted defeat by the secular Enlightenment, mastery over 
external history was cut off from theological reflection. This isolation sheds a fresh light on 
Dupré’s critical remark on culture’s secular shift: ‘The abandonment of the transcendent 
source of meaning [was] responsible for a crisis in European consciousness.’578  
 
With the help of Metz, we can see in a clearer way the Christian complicity in the 
abandonment of the ‘eschatological’ dimension of Transcendence which, as a result, 
accelerated intra-church secularisation. It was not only secular humanism that ‘abandoned 
the transcendent source of meaning’. Because of the Christian turn away from external 
history (the secular dynamics of culture), an important part of history was cut off from the 
realm of Transcendence. Rahner, being also a great twentieth century mystic of history, 
claimed its re-integration. What was abandoned and left to secular sciences needs to be re-
inhabited. Metz’s theology spelled out this re-bonding in order to make history shared and 
reflected on again as the common mystery of man and God. The whole of nouvelle théologie 
was a witness to this missing Christian presence in culture as a crisis in its own right.579 As a 
model we can propose that it was the undisturbed realm of mysticism from which Christian 
spirituality attempted to restore the lost self-confidence of the pre-Enlightenment period. Our 
mystics need to be urgently re-read, or we need to admit with honesty that their reflections 
are insufficient sources for re-engaging history. Critically speaking, many generations of 
Christian mystics, together with the spirituality of our Catholic seminaries and religious 
communities, fell victim to this dangerous retreat. Historical time, real interest in ‘gracing’ 
secular history was removed from ‘mystical time’. However paradoxical the statement might 
sound, the post-Enlightenment Church lived in a ‘proto-post-modernity’. Their division 
between the ‘sacred’ and the ‘profane’ history was the first anticipation of the postmodern 
fragmentation (a loss of a sense of history). 
 
 It is in the above context that we can speak of a paradoxical ‘feminisation’ of 
mainstream Christian spirituality. The male priesthood (also in retreat from reality), having 
lost its male intelligentsia, was left with a predominantly female congregation. Male 
audience and lay interest in history was lost (or un-listened to), including first rate authorities 
in sciences and humanities. No wonder that in this vacuum emerge, as ‘the’ current critics, 
                                               
578 Dupré, The Enlightenment and the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Culture, p.15.  
579 See the different aspect of the policy of closing the gap between ‘nature’/history and ‘grace’ in 
Ressourcement. 
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‘undergraduate atheists’ like R. Dawkins.580 I deliberately magnify the dynamic, but 
Kristeva’s ‘feminist’ criticism of the masculine theological imagination in interpreting the 
Virgin Mary makes much sense in this context. The retreat from the ‘anthropological 
complexity’ of the human condition can have a connection with the above ‘feminisation’. 
Within the closed hermeneutical circle where a male priesthood was talking to the needs of a 
female audience, a one-sided construction of the female imagination started. Female 
spirituality, predominantly introvert and centred on ‘bonding’, amplified the dynamics of 
introversion.  
 
Metz restored the ‘external’ or the ‘real’ to the mystical self. Since then, theology can 
communicate without any inferiority complex with the Feuarbachian and Marxist critique of 
religion and their later versions. Metz is a powerful resource in contexts where the Christian 
formation of history is involved. His theology, as a whole, blends with Kristeva’ interest in 
the Christian ‘revolt’. In her latest book, The Severed Head (2012), her appreciating remark 
on the theme of ‘Christian revolt’ shows a contact with crucial tenets of Moltmann and Metz. 
Kristeva reads Mary’s famous Magnificat in dialogue with their historical horizon. 
 
‘“My spirit rejoices in God my Savior.” This hymn, whose Latin version, Magnificat 
anima mea Dominum, will live on in Christmas Vespers, bears the perfect libertarian 
message of Western humanity: divine grace is going to re-establish justice for the poor 
and aid its servant Israel. Deposuit potentes et exaltavit humiles proclaims the tenor, thus 
prefiguring the spirit of revolt and hope that animates our civilisation, now two thousand 
years old. It is useful to remember that this glory originated with the Elizabeth and Mary, 
John the Baptist and Jesus duets.’581  
 
Revolt, as an ethical evaluation of history, remembrance, the past of the victims, and the 
need to reanimate ‘wounded’ history are together in Kristeva’s recent ‘cultural mourning’ 
expressed in Christian symbols. Kristeva’s new ‘anamnetic style’ in The Severed Head, as a 
new relation to Christian texts, should be noted. The essay quoted is more than an 
explanatory, unusually detailed, re-telling of the stories of the gospel. My point is that it is 
about more than (re)introducing Christian history and theological concepts to a secular 
audience. My study responds to this by raising the idea that Kristeva’s ‘new accuracy’ with 
Christian texts, almost in the fashion of a ‘documentarian’, can be read theologically. This 
‘mourning’ reveals that among the forgotten victims of history we find the forgotten words 
of Jesus. Seen in this context, Kristeva’s extensive drawing on Christian texts itself is a form 
                                               
580 Mark Johnson’s term, ‘undergraduate atheists’ (Richard Dawkins, Cristopher Hitchens, and Sam 
Harris, e.g.). In Mark Johnson, Saving God, Religion after Idolatry, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton and Oxford, 2009. p.39. 
581 Ch 6 ‘The Ideal Figure: Or, a Prophecy in Actuality, Saint John the Baptist’ (pp.65-73.), Kristeva, 
The Severed Head, p.67. 
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of ‘mourning’. It brings to consciousness the forgotten ‘primary words’, through which 
religion can be re-approachable by ‘post-metaphysical consciousness’. 
 
Now I turn to my third resource, von Balthasar, whose ‘symbolic mourning’ revisits the 
most cherished core-concepts of ‘theological consciousnesses’. The theologia crucis posits 
them as necessary elements for the ‘ontological discourse’ with Kristeva to be reopened 
within the ‘self’. 
 
 
6.2.5 Hans Urs von Balthasar’s ‘Meta-Anthropology’ 
 
My critique presents Balthasar as a surprising dialogue partner of Kristeva’s ‘semiotic’ 
anthropology.  Balthasar can be seen as the answer of ‘theological humanism’ to secular 
humanism. Namely, without remembering the Trinitarian dynamic of the self, the ‘exhausted 
subject’ can never transform postmodern history into his ‘home’, that is, a place of 
anticipation of our final rebirth (psychological and theological). It is the borderline situation 
of Balthasar’s theology which makes him the most ‘heated contact’ with Kristeva’s post-
structuralist psychoanalysis. On the one hand, Balthasar is the classic discourse of Catholic 
theology: he is the ‘face’ of doctrinal orthodoxy. On the other hand, his ‘modernity’ points 
well beyond itself. Balthasar represents not only the ‘Symbolic Order’ of orthodoxy, but also 
its ‘semiotic’ or ‘sub-doctrinal’ dimension, the mystical tradition. In his neo-orthodox 
synthesis there is an anthropological potential which has been overlooked.  
 
Balthasar as a resource confirms for the theologia crucis that in post-modernity a deep-
remembering of Tradition is possible and vital. He completes Metz by stating that we remain 
victims of the present if we do not remember our most expressive anthropological image: 
God’s Triune love. Balthasar’s orthodoxy presents this Love as the theological cognate of 
‘home’, as the ultimate object of postmodern desire. Bouma-Prediger defines this 
‘Trinitarian’ yearning: ‘a home is made of memories and stories and relationships: a place of 
mere residence versus a place of indwelling.’582 This eventful home for Balthasar is the 
Redeemer’s kenotic love. He conceives Divine Revelation as our ‘anthropological’ 
homecoming, when humaneness reaches its fulfilment. In other words, the only way out 
from the crisis of the ‘isolated self’ is to live again in the mystery of the indwelling of God. 
The ‘Mystery’ is God’s inexhaustible life. For Balthasar, ‘mystery’ is an imperative to learn 
                                               
582 Steven Bouma-Prediger, ‘Yearning for Home: The Christian Doctrine of Creation a Postmodern 
Age’, in Postmodern Philosophy and Christian Thought, Ed. by Merold Westphal, Indiana University 
Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis 1999, p. 180. 
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how to dwell, and this ‘mystery’ as kenosis (giving through self-emptying) is also a teaching 
of this indwelling. The ‘mystery’ of indwelling, Balthasar teaches from within theological 
modernity, encompasses postmodern sensitivity. Indwelling is ‘to cherish and protect, to 
preserve and care for.’583 Balthasar’s reply is that the ‘exhausted subject’ is capable of 
reflecting God’s cherishing, protecting, preserving, and caring.   
 
Balthasar anticipated the postmodern hunger for the symbols of love and suffering. In 
terms of the use of ‘symbols’, Balthasar excels his contemporaries from theological 
modernity and many ‘abstract’ (overtly theoretical) postmodern theologies. He exhibits the 
postmodern playfulness of colourful story-telling. Balthasar offers rich, overflowing 
theological imagery, a combination of theological imagination and the discipline of 
orthodoxy. Needless to say, this has an enormous therapeutic potential as he offers an intense 
‘symbolic listening’ to the self. It is a powerful support to the subject who suffers from 
impoverishment of fantasy. On a more general level, underlying Balthasar’s renewed 
orthodox imagery, we find the feverish fantasy activity of a shaken Catholic culture 
(modernity). Balthasar’s linguistic and visual hyperactivity can be well read in the already 
familiar scheme from Homans. (Cultural loss → fantasy eruptions → interpretation of these 
fantasies/mourning → new structure building.) Balthasar also anticipated the situation of the 
‘verticality of the Cross’ as in his work was manifested the effort of the Church of modernity 
to stabilise its traditional images. Balthasar’s is an unfinished ‘symbolic mourning’ and this 
makes him interesting in our context. The most intriguing element of his theology is that he 
simultaneously re-confirms the traditional ‘paternal metaphor’ of God and, with the same 
intensity, also elucidates the ‘maternal metaphor’ in the Father. Balthasar offers his own 
correction by submitting breath-taking metaphors on God’s ‘motherhood’ within a 
Trinitarian framework. I focus on his contribution to the dialogue with Kristeva’s atheistic 
and anthropological subtext. 
 
 
6.2.5.1 A Trinitarian ‘Meta-Anthropology’ 
 
Despite the opposite expectations,584 there is a profound anthropological thrust in 
Balthasar. In striking wording, he states that, with the crisis of old ecclesial metaphysics, a 
new ‘meta-anthropology’ is needed.585 This anthropology grounds the person in God’s 
                                               
583 Postmodern Philosophy and Christian Thought, p. 180  
584 Seeing Balthasar in a debate with Rahner’s anthropological turn is a standard contextualisation. 
See Oullet, ‘Paradox and/or supernatural existential’, cf. pp.268-271. 
585 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Test Everything, Hold Fast to What is Good, An Interview with Hans Urs 
von Balthasar by Angalo Scola, (original German edition 1986), Ignatious Press 1989, p.24. 
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sacrifice. Balthasar articulates the anthropological dynamic of the human person through 
God’s self-emptying for us.  
 
‘The ultimate answer the Church has to offer to the Enlightenment is, beyond all 
reasoning, the simple witness which the apostles and saints have borne in the past, and 
which the persecuted Church is bearing now… She [the Church] exists in direct 
imitation of her Lord, who being the Word of God, did nothing but witness to him who 
uttered it, and because of this, was persecuted and crucified.’586 (Emphasis added.) 
 
Balthasar offers a new synthesis of doctrine by emphasising the necessary process of 
learning from the modern world.587 Critics often overlook Balthasar’s profound commitment 
to dialogue with secular humanism. My point is that he lays down the grounds for this 
dialogue in terms of a theological anthropology. This is an anthropology ‘from above’, 
expressed in Balthasar’s famous question: if transcendentals are banished ‘what will happen 
to Being itself?’588 
 
In Balthasar’s case, we cannot speak of anthropology in the traditional sense. His is a 
‘meta-anthropology’, which underlies the explicit theological narrative. I highlight this as a 
crucial resource for the ‘ontological’ critique of the ‘speaking being’. In Balthasar’s solution 
the communal dimension of Triune life and the historicity of the subject are presented 
together. Emphasising the ontological origin of the person in the ‘fellowship’ of the Trinity 
is an important step in re-centring Kristeva’s ‘semiotics’ in two senses. Balthasar’s ‘meta-
anthropology’ offers a distance from the dialectic of matter. Also, it is an alternative to the 
‘lonely’ agent of Kristeva’s psychoanalytical ethic which has to rely exclusively on the inner 
resources of the self. The ‘imaginary Father’ of her theories also attains the missing 
historicity for, theology argues, when love becomes communal, it becomes genuinely 
historical. The anthropological potential of the Trinitarian approach lies in that it makes the 
‘speaking being’ an active member of an ethical fellowship. The experience of koinonia (the 
ethical and moral communion of joy), we can argue, is also a dimension of the ‘imaginary 
Father/Loving Third’.  
 
Perhaps the most successful element of Balthasar’s ‘linguistic mourning’ is the re-gained 
emphasis on sharing as the central dynamic of the Incarnation.589 As for the classic 
                                               
586 Balthasar, Test Everything, p.31. 
587 Ibid., p.13. 
588 Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord, Vol. I. Seeing the Form, T&T Clark, Edinburgh 
1982 p. 19  
589 Alyssa Lyra Pitstick, Light in Darkness, Hans Urs von Balthasar and the Catholic Doctrine of 
Christ’s Descent into Hell, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, Grand Rapids, Michigan, 
Cambridge 2007, p.96. 
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atonement theology, this is a crucial point where the theology of the cross goes beyond the 
legalistic mindset. In Balthasar’s theology of Holy Saturday, in the visio mortis, Jesus/the 
Son takes upon himself the pain of being deprived of the vision of God as an ‘act of 
sharing’, as com-passio, as co-suffering. The anthropological emphasis that Balthasar 
introduces here is crucial. The self-alienation of the divine Son is governed by his solidarity 
with the creatures of his Father, who are created in His image (the Son’s). In Balthasar, 
Christ’s sharing in the experience of the dead completes God’s kenosis in history. The goal 
of the Incarnation is this ultimate act of solidarity with Creation and Creator, the Cross.590  
 
‘Do you know what you have chosen, Lord? Are you quire clear of the consequences 
of your obedience?’ … ‘You call into the void: Father! The echo returns… The Father 
no longer knows you… He has gone over to the side of your enemies… Father, your will 
be done for them (human beings) and for me. Your loving will for them…’. (Heart of the 
World)591 
 
This dynamic of sharing separates from the ‘dynamic of violence’, which we objected to 
in the language of expiatory sacrifice. In the positive reading of Balthasar’s visio mortis one 
should not forget that, despite Balthasar’s undeniable dependence on atonement idioms, the 
primary word in his kenosis theology is not God’s ‘wrath’, but God’s life giving glory. ‘One 
will see this beauty only when the core of everything is recognised to be the free love of God 
that justifies man’. 592  It is this dynamic of always seeking the other’s well being and 
redemption which grounds a ‘non-violent’ representation of the Father. This Trinitarian 
sensitivity fully ‘counteracts’ not only Freud’s critique of the ‘bloody cross’, but also the 
androcentrism of his oedipal analysis of religion.593 The Trinitarian kenosis in Balthasar, by 
showing the anthropological orientation of grace, also responds constructively to Kristeva’s 
dialogical reading of the Passion. (1) It completes the ethical role she attributes to the Father 
as the sender into compassionate love. (2) It also gives a creative parallel to Kristeva’s 
‘maternal passion’. The origin of ethics in us is our being grounded in the image of God.  
 
 With this, we arrive at the heart of Balthasar’s ‘meta-anthropology’. Presenting the 
relationships in the divine kenosis is the theological solution of introducing heterogeneity 
                                               
590 Pitstick, Light in Darkness, p.96. 
591 Quoted from Rowan Williams, Ch 4 ‘Balthasar and the Trinity’ (pp.37-50), in The Cambridge 
Companion to Hans Urs von Balthasar, edited by Edward T. Oakes and David Moss, Cambridge 
2004 (First published 2004), p.39. (Even the ‘Your wrathful will for me’ with which the quote finishes 
reads as giving emphasis to this ultimate solidarity.) 
592 Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord, A Theological Aesthetics, Vol. 7. Theology: The 
New Covenant, Translated by Brian McNeil, edited by John Riches, T&T Clark, Edinburgh, 1989, 
p.19.  
593 Jonte-Pace, Speaking The Unspeakable, p.7. 
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into the subject. This is a very subtle strategy for grounding this ‘heterogeneity’ in the 
narrative of the divine self. Man is the image, the imitation of this unfolding story in history.   
 
I recapitulate this ‘meta-anthropological program’ from Balthasar’s text, ‘The 
Momentum of the Cross’.594 Triune life is governed by relations of selfless love. This 
selflessness kenosis is the basis of everything in Creation. In Balthasar’s account, in 
salvation history, the first act of Trinitarian kenosis is the creation of the world when the 
creator gives up a part of his freedom to the creature, sharing his freedom and intelligence. 
From a Christological approach, Balthasar embeds the human being in ‘divine origins’ as 
deeply as possible. The ground of the self is not God in general, but our particular image, the 
Son. The subject of kenosis is not the Son who became man, but the pre-existent Son. This 
kenosis as the surrender of the ‘form of God’ becomes the decisive act of the love of the Son. 
He translates his being begotten by the Father into creaturely obedience. This 
anthropological dynamic points to the Son’s obedience as the ultimate archetype of human 
ethics. Also, it is the ultimate ground of our humanness. Being human is the ability to obey 
in freedom and love when obedience is transformed into serving others. The source of this 
freedom is the second act of God’s kenosis (self-emptying), the Incarnation of the Word.  
 
‘The Incarnation has no other ultimate purpose than the Cross… Jesus is the unique 
bearer of the world’s sin, and because the source of his obedience is his unique relation 
to the Father. …The whole Trinity remains involved in this act, the Father by sending 
out the Son and abandoning him on the cross, and the Spirit by uniting them now only in 
the expressive form of separation. Thus the cross of Christ is inscribed in the creation of 
the world from the beginning… Christ does not himself load on to himself the burden 
that is destined for this existence… but is only ready to let this burden be loaded on to 
himself in the “hour” that the Father has determined… the deepest abandonment by God, 
which is vicariously real in the Passion, presupposes an equally deep experience of being 
united to God and of life derived from the Father, an experience that the Son must have 
had, not only in Heaven, but also as a man… [This is] the kenotic readiness of the Son 
for the Father’s will.’595 (Emphasis added.) 
 
This is a pivotal emphasis in Balthasar. To speak of the Incarnation is already to speak of 
the Cross. The whole Trinity remains involved in this act, the Father by sending out the Son 
and abandoning him on the Cross, and the Spirit by uniting them. Thus,  
 
‘the Cross of Christ is inscribed in the creation of the world from the beginning, as 
this is shown in the Johannine theology of the ‘Lamb of God’ (Jn 1.29.36.): the Lamb is 
‘slain before the foundation of the world.’ (Rev 13,8.) 596  
 
                                               
594 Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord, Vol. 7., pp.212-214. 
595 Ibid.,  pp.212-213. 216. 
596 The above recapitulation is an extract from Balthasar’s from Ch.5, ‘The Momentum of the Cross’. 
Ibid., pp.212-214, closing quote: p.214. 
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The underlying anthropological dynamic is an important resource for the critique of 
Kristeva’s semiotic ‘ontology’. We can argue that when we speak of the cross it is always a 
witness to the ‘speaking being’. Here we can recall how Kristeva read the Cross as the 
symbol of the genesis of the subject. Christ, ‘the absolute subject’, reflects our linguistic 
passion, the pains of separation in primary processes through which the subject is 
‘resurrected’ in language. Balthasar’s synthesis of classic soteriology shows that theology 
can offer a similar in-depth reading. What is underlying the Cross is the genuine 
anthropological dimension of divine Love, made manifest in the Incarnate Son. This 
theological dimension of the human self is a genuine ‘ontological’ vision. With it, the 
theologia crucis attains a real critical potential. The theological view of the person, through 
transforming metaphysics into the Narrative of Love, can go beyond the materialism of 
Kristeva’s ‘semiotic’. It spells out love as the ground of matter and personhood.  
 
This ‘meta-anthropology’, with its subtlety, also deconstructs the logic of ideological 
reduction. The latter up to the present is un-mourned in ‘post-metaphysical consciousness’. 
The kenosis of God with the paradigm of sharing addresses not only the classic Feuerbachian 
agenda,597 but its ‘aggressive secularist’ versions, too. Divine kenosis quite simply cannot be 
read as opposing human nature. On the contrary, Balthasar reveals a ‘Trinitarian agape’, 
which literally nourishes human beings with self-giving life. This overcome dichotomy is 
shown by Moltmann: 
 
 ‘In their struggle against each other, theism and atheism begin from the 
presupposition that God and man are fundamentally one being. Therefore what is 
ascribed to God must be taken from man and what is ascribed to man must have been 
taken from God.’598 (Moltmann’s reference to Feuerbach) 
 
Instead, the inner life of God, both as immanent Trinity (‘divine self’) and economical 
Trinity (‘acting in history’), invites the human being to participate in love. Underlying this 
invitation is a correction of the ‘absolute substance’ and the ‘absolute subject’ in which 
Western theology, and Cartesian rationalism, traditionally conceived God. With Balthasar, 
the theologia crucis confirms that it is an erroneous description of the Christian God when 
his ‘distance’ from man expresses his power. Just the opposite, his power is manifest in his 
radical closeness as Resurrected Lord (as ‘Kyrios’) when the radical Otherness of Easter is 
experienced as Emmanuel (that is God is with us). 
 
                                               
597 See ‘Ludwig Feuerbach on the Origins of Religions’ in The Christian Theology Reader, Edited by 
Alister E. McGrath, Blackwell, Oxford 1995 (First edition), p.320. 
598 Moltmann, The Crucified God, p.249. 
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Feuerbach’s extrinsic view of God, which is strikingly ‘proto-Freudian’ in terms of the 
oedipal rivalry, is challenged further by two concepts, in which the theologia crucis of 
modernity culminates. My study, referring back to Moltmann, highlights the imitatio 
Trinitatis and ‘open friendship’, and connects them with Balthasar. They are historical 
manifestations of his ‘meta-anthropology’.  
 
 
6.2.5.2 Imitatio Trinitatis, Open Friendship as the Completion of Balthasar’s ‘Meta-
Anthropology’  
 
Moltmann’s concept of open friendship completes Balthasar by emphasising the socio-
anthropological dimension of the Trinitarian kenosis. The inner drama of self-giving love 
among the Three Persons brings about a fundamental change in history. The order of 
transformation is similar to what we see in Kristeva’s poetic-texts. Triune life sends among 
us God’s ‘revolutionary Word’ which initiates a ‘revolutionary praxis’. God emerges, as it 
were, as the generative chora of ethics. Triune Love is always a correction of corruptible 
human love. God’s kenosis creates a messianic fellowship (Moltmann) which is a re-
enactment of authentic human communities. The source of this ‘open friendship’ is described 
by the perichoresis in the Triune God (co-indwelling, co-inhering), which concept Moltmann 
takes over from Eastern theology: 
 
‘By virtue of the love they have for one another they exist totally in the other.... 
Each Person finds his existence and his joy in the other Person. Each Person receives 
the fullness of eternal life from the other.’ 599  
 
The relevance of this ‘open friendship’ for our critique is that it is an opening up of the 
‘isolated self’ to the Other. ‘Open friendship’ implies the claim that the self needs to be re-
centred on the freedom of the Other. ‘[God's] freedom therefore lies in the friendship which 
he offers men and women, and through which he makes them his friends.’600 Because the 
Trinitarian fellowship creates human beings to be its partner in fellowship, we can speak of 
this God not only as ‘free in love’ but also as the God who ‘frees in love.’601 
 
                                               
599 Jürgen Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom, translated by Margaret Kohl, Augsburg Fortress 
Publishers, Minneapolis 1993 (German original Trinität und Reich Gottes, 1980.),  pp.173-174 
600 Ibid., p.56. 
601 McDougall brings attention to the parallel with Barth’s concept of God who ‘loves in freedom’. 
(Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics 2/1, par.28., quoted in Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom, ‘The 
Return of Trinitarian Praxis? Moltmann on the Trinity and the Christian Life’, Author: Joy Ann 
McDougall, Source: The Journal of Religion, Vol. 83, No. 2 (Apr. 2003) (pp. 177-203), Published by: 
The University of Chicago Press, Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1206872 Accessed: 
25/04/2010 15:00, p.188. 
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Kristeva, from within her materialism and prior to her dialogical stance, had already 
made an ‘anthropological offer’ to theology. She confirmed the anthropological relevance of 
the ‘metaphor’ of the Trinity. Kristeva outlined the fundamental psychic dynamics of 
opening up to the other, as witnessed in therapy: 
 
‘The Trinity itself, that crown jewel of theological sophistication, evokes, beyond its 
specific content…the intricate intertwining of the three aspects of psychic life: the 
symbolic, the imaginary, and the real. 
 
To the analyst, however, the representations on which the Credo is based are 
fantasies, which reveal fundamental desires or traumas but not dogmas. Analysis 
subjects these fantasies to X-ray examination. It begins by individualizing: What about 
your father? Was he “almighty” or not? What kind of son were you?  What about your 
desire for virginity or resurrection?’602 
 
Now the theologia crucis, in view of the ‘open friendship’, can fully take up this 
anthropological reading in its own field. It repeats the questions by re-instating their original 
theological emphases. Who is the father for the person, what kind of sons are we, what is our 
desire for resurrection and identification with the story of the divine Other? But the 
fundamental question is: to what fellowship do you belong? Theology does not simply argue 
the relevance of ‘grace’. Most importantly, Kristeva’s immanent reading invites a critique to 
spell out ‘grace’ as bonding and connectedness within psychic history. The context of ‘open 
friendship’ also confirms that the elaboration of the personal dimension is unfinished in the 
theologia crucis.  
 
The ‘open friendship’ is also linked to the question of narcissism and the question of the 
Stranger. Kristeva herself highlighted these topics when she was asked about her 
preoccupation with the religious texts of the Judeo-Christian tradition.603 Kristeva connects 
Christian love and primary narcissism: 
 
‘Love your neighbour as yourself… To become capable of loving our neighbour as 
ourselves, we have first of all to heal a wounded narcissism. We must constitute 
narcissistic identity to be able to extend a hand to the other… Thus: heal your inner 
wounds, which as a result will render you then capable of effective social action, or 
intervention in the social plane with the other. …We must heal our shattered narcissism 
[our ability to identify with the other] before formulating higher objectives.’604 (Italics 
mine.) 
  
My critique claims two things here. First, the task of healing inner wounds is beyond our 
‘intra-self’ capacity for self-healing. It requires our ‘lost listener’, God, who is a ‘faithful 
                                               
602 Kristeva, In the Beginning Was Love, p.43-44. 
603 Pollock, ‘Dialogue With Julia Kristeva’, Parallax July 1998, p.10. 
604 Pollock, ‘Dialogue With Julia Kristeva’, pp.10-11. 
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presence to hear my narrative’605and who X-rays my narcissistic structure. Theological 
modernity here reminds both Kristeva and postmodern theological sensitivity of the 
communal nature of healing. McDougall highlights in Moltmann the dynamic of healing 
which transforms the self. Accordingly, theology has to depart from the static notion of an 
ideal primordial state that has been damaged or lost in the Fall then restored to grace. 
Paradise lost and regained needs to be seen as our eschatological destiny instead of as our 
lost origin. 606 It is rather a process of theosis (deification, imitation). Theosis, McDougall 
suggests, reintroduces the theology of the cross as a project fully compatible with 
contemporary anthropology. The equilibrium between ‘anthropology’ and ‘eschatology’ 
takes place in ‘open fellowship’. Theosis is a process of becoming open and inclusive 
through learning the fellowship with God, who can be seen as our extended ‘process of 
individuation’ (‘narcissisti structure’). The emphasis is on the future capacity to ‘accept’ and 
‘welcome’. It is a forward-looking freedom.607 The example of the community completes my 
freedom to make this ‘divine’ welcome to the Foreigner: ‘Come unto me, all ye that labour 
and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest.’ (Mt 11:28)608  
 
What happens in this ‘open fellowship’ connects the themes of healing and the 
Foreigner. As a ‘graced’ alternative to Kristeva, the challenge today is a new honesty to 
make the Church an ‘open fellowship’ of healing which invites all forms of ‘exhaustion’. 
‘All’ means that homosexuals, the divorced and those on social margins, unemployed, 
refugees and economical migrants, also have to be included. The precondition of this 
inclusiveness is letting the Father appear as he is. Balthasar’s Trinitarian meta-anthropology 
and the image of God as ‘open friendship’ serve as the ground for this renewed image. The 
closing chapter of my work, the Semiotic Passion, will have to demonstrate the theological 
dynamic of God’s ‘open friendship’ when the Father is governed by the desire to recover 
personal dignity and resurrect all that belongs to Life.  
 
What we learn from this Father is the most active form of forgiving. The apex of 
imitating Triune life is when we are able to mourn together with the Stranger. The ‘social 
messianic fellowship’ (Moltmann) becomes most intense at this point. We can speak of 
welcoming the Stranger only if the fellowship extends also to the losses of the Stranger. The 
Christian community, when it is able to respond to the historical losses of the ‘Foreigner’, 
only then turns the ‘other’ fully into ‘Brother’. The completion of the Balthasarian pattern of 
kenosis is when the imitation of the Son is fully realised in history. That is, we are fully 
                                               
605 Williams, Lost Icons, p.166. 
606 McDougall, ‘The Return of Trinitarian Praxis?’, p.190. 
607 Ibid., p.188. 
608 from the King James Version 
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ourselves and fully in the fellowship of Christ when we become generous enough to mourn 
the wounds and the dead loved ones of the Other. This is the mystery of the radical otherness 
of the Cross. The situation of exile, when there is no place that offers itself as home, ends 
when Christianity is a participant in the Stranger’s ‘cultural mourning’. From the Trinitarian 
program of theological modernity this categorical imperative emerged as the ultimate 
message of the theologia crucis for the ‘verticality of the cross’. This program of 
reconciliation answers Kristeva’s critical observation on the Pauline Church: 
 
 ‘For the Christian, in short, the foreigner was not excluded if he was a Christian, but 
the non-Christian is a foreigner Christian hospitality cared little about… As a foreigner, I 
must attest that I am a Christian, for the right to hospitality is mine only if I can show a 
Christian passport.’609 
 
The tension between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’, which Kristeva observes, is the utmost 
challenge to rethink the image of the Church today (as the manifestation of the Father’s 
love). It has to be done when the whole culture, including the church, manifests a universal 
woundedness through cultural dislocation. My point is that theology has the resources to 
redefine in postmodern culture the relationship between Christ and the ‘Foreigner’. The 
difference with the situation of the Pauline ecclesia is that today, after a long post-modernity, 
we are facing the situation of the ‘post-Christian past’ of Europe. This past, as the story of 
functioning or disfunctioning host-cultures, is about the presence of migrants from ‘other 
cultures’. The theology of the cross as ‘cultural mourning’ opens a window on our present as 
the situation for grieving with the foreigner. This co-mourning is the precondition of future 
rejoicing with the Foreigner; with whom we are turned together into inhabitants of the 
Kingdom of God. The witness of theology is that there is no unifying narrative outside the 
Kingdom-paradigm, which is grounded in Christ’s universal sacrifice. The full dynamic of 
this Passion has to be recovered in our ‘post-Christian’ culture. 
 
We can fully understand the grief of the ‘migrant’ (for lost homeland, lost beloved ones, 
or killed as ‘soldiers of an oppressive/rival regime’), because we have seen the loss of the 
Father when his Son became a non-identity among us. A culture which is unable to mourn 
the losses of the ‘enemy’ is dead. It cannot call itself Christian or ‘humanist’, nor even 
‘democratic’. This ability to mourn the ‘unburied dead’ is the only exit from the cycle of 
violence in which our civilisations have been trapped. The challenge of this task makes us 
realise our inner divisions as subject and culture. The Cross of Easter reveals what is beyond 
the self, what is beyond ‘our time’, what is beyond our contingent autonomy. A hiatus, a 
                                               
609 Ch 4, ‘Paul and Augustine: The Therapeutics of Exile and Pilgrimage’ (pp.77-93), in Kristeva, 
Strangers to Ourselves, pp.86-87 
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false autonomy is pointed out. We realise that the self is unable to achieve similarity to God, 
the ability to ‘reconcile’ with the Foreigner, from its own resources. This metanoia, the 
admittance of our limits, builds up the missing tolerance of the Stranger. 
 
The Father’s love revealed on the Cross is the ultimate unmasking of our false 
autonomy. We can kill the Son, the Foreigner, but we cannot bring him back to life. The 
Resurrection, as pointing to the gap between us and the Stranger (whom we were not able to 
welcome in Christ) has a profound anthropological realism. This realistic view of the self is 
an important answer to Kristeva who, in Hatred and Forgiveness, states that ‘violence’ and 
‘hatred’ cannot be eliminated from human nature. She is critical of the religious illusion 
which attempts to suppress ‘violence’ and ‘hatred’, which are permanent features of the 
psyche. Kristeva’s Freudianism does not believe in this reconciliation on the grounds that the 
permanent condition of psychic life is conflict, and only a certain element of conflict can be 
relieved, soothed, or pacified.610 The dynamic of ethical fellowship, even if it cannot undo 
the difference of opinion, however, can offer an approximation. Theology does not deny the 
conflict as a permanent feature of the psyche and ethical life (R. Williams). The theology of 
the cross, by virtue of its nature, is a confirmation of the conflict at the very being of the 
subject when it draws attention to the relationship between the self and ‘sin’. More 
importantly, it draws attention to the fact that trust in the Stranger requires a permanent 
investment. It is literally a self-sacrifice. The subject has to go against his instinctive mistrust 
of the other, and against Christ’s demands upon the self. Theology gives its own version of 
the permanent conflict when it elaborates the therapeutic dynamic of forgiveness. The 
imitation of the forgiving God can be a field where Kristeva’s above-mentioned objection 
can be creatively tackled. For is there greater ‘anthropological realism’ than realising that the 
self is literally grounded in conflict with divine kenosis? When the Cross lays claim upon the 
human self to mourn all the joys, pains and losses of the Foreigner? 
 
 
 
                                               
610 Pollock, ‘Dialogue With Julia Kristeva’, Parallax, July 1998, p.15 
 234 
6.3. Evaluating the Theology of the Cross as a Resource 
 
My chosen authorities contributed from different directions to a comprehensive 
theological engagement with Kristeva’s ‘speaking being’. They revealed the theologia crucis 
as an important form of ‘cultural mourning’. They responded with relevance to the ‘symbolic 
mourning’ which takes place in Kristeva’s project. My study has emphasised that the object 
of this ‘mourning’ is the ‘exhausted subject’. I highlighted the ‘religious dimension’ of the 
postmodern self and showed why its mourning can be called ‘ontological’. My governing 
thesis was that the problem of the crisis of love, the problem of the self’s relationship to its 
religious past and history have to be addressed together.  
 
  In theological modernity, we can rightly speak of an ‘anthropological shift’ which 
responds to Kristeva. Rahner, Moltmann, Metz, and Balthasar spelled out a genuine 
emergence of a ‘theological anthropology’, according to their specific interests. The first 
conclusion of my study is that they successfully confute the criticism that theology has an 
absolute ‘anthropological deficit’. This criticism is particularly implied by Kristeva’s early 
‘atheistic subtexts’. Instead, theological modernity shows a genuine interest in history. It has 
sensitively responded to an existing anthropological hiatus in theological concepts, with 
significant results. The theology of the cross has sufficient resources for a genuine analysis 
of ‘secular culture’.  
 
Theology fully agreed with Kristeva on a symbolic deficit in culture. We have lost those 
universal ‘symbols’ which make us genuinely human. This loss constitutes the present 
nihilist crisis. The good news is that there is no absolute break between theology which 
wants to counteract the nihilist crisis from the orthodoxy of faith, and Kristeva’s ‘post-
structuralism’ which criticises this approach. The two strategies, recovering the image of the 
Father as a loving Father, and renewing the images of the subject, are not mutually 
exclusive, just the contrary. My study stated their approximation in terms of an intertwining 
‘cultural mourning’ on both sides. 
 
By presenting the theologia crucis as a resource, my study wished to demonstrate that 
the correction of the God-image proves to be a crucial bridge with the anthropological turn in 
culture. This is not inflating doctrine at all. While theology attempts an understanding of the 
motives of the anthropological shift in culture and its critique of religion, it also 
communicates doctrine to ‘post-metaphysical consciousness’.  
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My study outlined those fundamental strategies through which theology can respond to 
the points of conflict with Kristeva. My intention was also to put the problems into a context 
which can lead to a common reflection on the nihilist crisis. My chosen representatives 
demonstrated an anthropological reading of divine Love. Through the Son’s historical 
kenosis, the Father became an Emmanuel to us. We imitate this ‘God with us’ in Christ, who 
is indeed the ‘absolute subject’. The imitation of God’s ‘open friendship’ addressed all the 
major problems we raised in Part One, (1) the problem of the source of a communal ethics, 
(2) the problem of the foreigner/Stranger, (3) and the problem of the isolated self. Of course, 
these solutions were only seminal initiatives. But they confirmed that the theologia crucis is 
the best ‘mediator’ between Kristeva and systematic theology.  
 
The anthropological developments of Rahner, Moltmann, Metz, and Balthasar together 
formed sufficient ground for the ‘ontological’ critique of Kristeva’s materialism. The general 
theological argument is that the materialistically conceived self needs to be opened up to 
‘grace’, which was excluded from Freud’s project. These theological voices argued the 
reversal of the ‘retreat into the self’ in a non-polemic way. The theologia crucis argued that 
the postmodern person should be re-grounded in the Father’s love. To Freud’s criticism my 
critique responded by showing the relevance of the Father in history. Relating the self to 
God’s ‘eschaton’ and the dynamic of kenosis in a Trinitarian framework offered a real 
engagement with Kristeva’s ‘heterogeneous subject’.  
 
A major conclusion of my work is that a shared symbolisation of the Father’s love is 
possible. It requires bringing the sensitivity of the postmodern subject into a dialogue with 
the Passion. It assigns the task of bringing the Cross close to the ‘psychic space’ itself, 
possibly representing its narrative within the psyche. This is what I suggest as re-opening of 
‘ontological discourse’. Surprisingly, theology offers an in-depth engagement compared with 
the Habermasian rationalist position which forbids ‘post-metaphysical consciousness’ to 
make ontological statements. Classic metaphysical discourse can be refashioned in terms of 
speaking on the crisis of Love − as the ontology of love.  
 
Postmodern theologies like R. Williams and R. Kearney confirmed that the 
eschatological horizon is deeply responsive to the crisis of the postmodern self and to its 
quest for a ‘non-contingent Other.’ I especially highlight Kearney’s support which envisages 
Christ as the dialogue partner of the ‘exhausted self’. ‘It is in the carnal giving of his persona 
− the trans-substantiation of his persona into an embodied giver of nourishment − that the 
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transfigured-resurrected Christ reveals his identity.’611 Our transfigured historical persona is 
Christ. Postmodern theological interest confirms that Christ is the unrecognised nourishment 
in our ‘exhaustion’ on the postmodern roads of Emmaus.612 Kearney also confirms the 
diagnosis of my chosen resources. Namely, that the need of the postmodern subject is 
primarily eschatological, not merely historical. Consequently, a new type of eschatological 
grounding of the self is needed.  
 
My chosen resources indirectly raised the critique of an exclusive psychoanalytical 
resourcing of the self. Moltmann, Rahner, Metz, and Balthasar all confirmed that the subject 
needs a renewed historical (and theological) consciousness. They offered important historical 
paradigms. The concept of the ‘anonymous Christian’ (Rahner), past and present victims of 
history (Metz, Moltmann), God’s kenotic self offering (Balthasar) spelled out historical 
dimensions of the ‘Loving third party’. It responded as an ontological completion of, and 
correction to, Kristeva’s ‘loving and caring father’. The dynamic of the loving Third is the 
theoretical platform from which the traditional atonement imagery can be corrected.  
 
The theologia crucis of theological modernity has already made important corrections to 
the ‘mechanistic’ images of God. It gave sufficient answers to the criticism that Kristeva’s 
original atheistic narratives posed (Marx-Feuerbach-Freud). However, in the context of the 
‘exhausted subject’, these corrections are not sufficient. As a further step, the theologia 
crucis needs to speak directly to the identity quest of this subjectivity. Critically, it has to be 
seen that Kristeva’s ‘semiotic anthropology’ still remains unconvinced by the ‘anthropology’ 
of theological modernity. The ‘symbolic mourning’ of theological modernity has remained 
unfinished. On the one hand, doing theology in the ‘verticality of the cross’ has to be 
grounded on these theologies (Moltmann, Metz, Rahner, and Balthasar). They serve as 
‘translators’ between orthodoxy, the subject of modernity, and the present postmodern 
sensitivities. On the other hand, it has to be admitted that the ‘personal dimension’ of their 
theological anthropology is not developed enough. Specifically, what is missing is a 
symbolic anthropological narrative, equivalent to the subtlety of Kristeva concept of ‘chora-
thetic’. If theology could address this ‘semiotic’ core of Kristeva’s project, then, our critique 
could speak of a genuine comprehensive response. With this challenge, my study has arrived 
at the Semiotic Passion. This theoretical proposal attempts to bring about a dialogue between 
the God-image and Kristeva’s ‘semiotic’ narrative.     
                                               
611 Kearney, ‘Transfiguring God’, in The Blackwell Companion to Postmodern Theology, p. 377. 
612 Ibid., p.386. 
 237 
7 THE ‘SEMIOTIC PASSION’: THE LINGUISTIC IMAGERY OF THE FATHER 
 
This closing chapter submits a theoretical proposal which brings into a synopsis all the 
focal points of my study in the form of the Semiotic Passion. It can draw attention only 
sketchily to those theological dynamics which make possible this synthesis. I emphasise the 
experimental nature of the ‘semiotic’ reading of the Passion. 
 
 
7.1 The Semiotic Passion as a Comprehensive Response   
 
The Semiotic Passion completes the argument of the previous chapter, namely, that 
Kristeva’s ‘speaking being’ can be best responded to from within the theology of the cross. 
In the first instance, it completes ‘what is missing’ from modernity’s theologia crucis: a 
psychologically sensitive, personal dimension.  In this way, the Semiotic Passion integrates 
Kristeva’s critique of religion by running a counter-thesis against her early position which 
implied that theology is an ‘anthropologically mute’ discourse in a secular culture. The 
Semiotic Passion will also bring to realisation the ontological critique which Part One 
initiated in the form of re-opening ‘ontological statements’ on Love. This objective 
corresponds with Kristeva’s own objective to map out fully the crisis of the subject, going as 
deep as ‘sub-psychic origins’.  
 
My working hypothesis is that an actual theological engagement with Kristeva has to 
take a different form from that to which systematic theology is accustomed. It cannot be a 
discourse on doctrine. Instead, it has to be a symbolic story-telling which speaks directly to 
the ‘exhausted subject’. It addresses the postmodern subject through his last possession, 
language. My proposal enters into dialogue with Kristeva’s model of language in the 
theological setting which my critique has worked out, the correction of atonement language. 
The central task of the Semiotic Passion emerges at this very point. It should present a 
narrative, which addresses from ‘within’ the religious mourning of the post-Christian 
subject. My working hypothesis is that, if this dimension of the postmodern identity crisis is 
revealed to ‘post-metaphysical consciousness’, it can start communicating with the ‘lost 
Father’ again. The Semiotic Passion will be a comprehensive response to the systemic 
overlapping of Kristeva’s historical materialist (‘Marxist’) and Freudian frameworks. It 
argues that in the situation of the ‘exhausted subject’ the God-image has to be recovered as 
the comprehensive ground of the self. The imagery that this reading of the Passion develops 
will also be an important answer to Freud’s judgement that the ‘Father’ is only an external 
authority. Presenting God as an internal authority to the postmodern self will offer a way out 
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from the impasse of the classic atheist – theist debate on the God-image. In the widest sense, 
the ‘semiotic’ reading of the Cross shows that it is possible to speak of the Passion with 
‘ontological relevance’. 
 
My theoretical proposal emphasises the continuity with the theologia crucis. Making the 
emphasis of my theological resources on the relationship between history and ‘grace’ a 
permanent reference will preserve the Semiotic Passion as a genuine alternative to Kristeva’s 
‘semiotic retreat’ into the body (Oliver). The incorporation of the ‘maternal metaphor’ into 
God, which is at the heart of my proposal, will show the Semiotic Passion in a structural 
dialogue with Kristeva’s particular ‘feminist’ position. Responding to the areas mentioned 
above, the Semiotic Passion brings to realisation a shared symbol building with Kristeva. 
 
The Semiotic Passion becomes a truly comprehensive response if it speaks with an 
awareness of theology’s linguistic (symbolic) crisis. The exegete José A. Pagola’s critical re-
reconstruction of the radical otherness of Jesus’ message confirms the underlying conviction 
of my study that there is an unfinished cultural mourning of the God-image within Church-
culture.613 The Semiotic Passion recognises that a contemporary image of God, in the time of 
cultural transition, must be an ‘open mourning’ and an inclusive discourse (see Rahner’s 
intention). What is at stake in taking further the symbolic renewal of theological modernity is 
the flexibility of theological language. That is, when the language of the Church is 
experienced as a genuine struggle for attaining a new ‘universality in culture’, and when it is 
also a genuine dialogue about our universal inability to speak of Love in culture. When the 
Church exhibits its own linguistic passion, then, it again becomes credible and attractive. A 
mutual dialogue with Kristeva’s dialogical turn is possible only in this linguistic medium. 
My point is that this ‘linguistic passion’ provides the Church with a new visibility. This new 
visibility in culture necessarily manifests itself in risk-taking, theological innovation, and in 
revisiting the most problematic areas with ‘secular culture’. When the ‘Passion of orthodoxy’ 
is shown, it will generate cultural interest. Pagola’s parable points to these birth-pangs of 
Tradition: 
 
‘Everything happens in the synagogue [‘everything happens within the old 
imagery’], the place where the Law is taught officially as interpreted by authorized 
teachers. It is Sabbath day, the day on which practicing Jews come together to listen to 
the explanations of their leaders. It is in this context that Jesus begins to teach for the 
first time…. All of a sudden a man possessed by an evil spirit cries out interrupting his 
                                               
613 See the works of José A. Pagola, Following in the Footsteps of Jesus, Translated by Valentine de 
Souza S.J, Convivium Press, Series Ministeria, Maiami 2011, and Jesus, An Historical 
Approximation, Translated by Margaret Wilde, Convivium Press, Series Kyrios 2011, Second Edition 
(First Publication 2011).  
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teaching. He cannot bear to hear what Jesus is saying. He is terrified. “Have you come to 
destroy us?” That man felt quite well when listening to the teaching of the scribes. Why 
does he feel threatened now?’614  
 
My study identifies the structural cause of both theology’s melancholy (frustration) in 
culture and culture’s own melancholy in the unopened discourse about the Cross. It is more 
than un-mourned atonement imagery (the chief theological direction of my study), though it 
should start with it. The final challenge is to make the discourse on the Cross a public 
discourse again and internal to culture. In this writer’s view, today it is the mourning for the 
‘lost religion’, the second major hermeneutical thrust of my work, which would create a new 
‘symbolic space’ for critical reflexion. 
 
 
7.2 The Need to Complement the ‘Bloody Imagery’ of the Cross 
 
The general objection that we can raise against the ‘bloody imagery’ of atonement 
language is that it can re-emerge as a counterproductive meta-narrative, and not only in the 
theological field. That this type of hermeneutical presence is real is well argued in the essays 
of Consuming Passion, Why the Killing of Jesus Really Matters.615 These criticisms highlight 
that atonement language permanently generates banal and oversimplified images of God, not 
only in Christian spirituality, but also in culture. As a distortive ‘cultural subtext’, the 
‘atonement program’ reduces the richness of God’s love and the richness of God’s sacrifice. 
As Chalke points out, this ‘banalisation’ leads to the reduction of ethics. It insinuates instant 
forgiveness without challenging basic day-to-day moral behaviour; also, it separates 
salvation from discipleship. The reductive reading of the Cross downgrades the Gospel to a 
single sentence: ‘God is no longer angry with us because Jesus died in our place.’ Penal 
substitution also tends to nurture a simplistic understanding of sin. Most importantly, the 
atonement scheme does not resolve the conflict between God’s great love which motivates 
him to send his Son and his ‘wrath’ and need to be placated, which remains the driving force 
behind the need for the cross.616  
 
                                               
614 Pagola, Following in the Footsteps of Jesus, pp.82-83. 
615 For the Semiotic Passion I highlight the essays, Steve Chalke, ‘Redeeming the Cross From Death 
to Life’ (pp.19-26), Stuart Murray, ‘Rethinking Atonement After Christendom’ (pp.27-35) in 
Consuming Passion, Why the Killing of Jesus Really Matters, edited by Simon Barrow and Jonathan 
Bartley, Darton & Todd, London 2005. See also Cavanagh, Making Sense of God’s Love. Cavanagh 
argues from within spirituality. She examines the problem why many people are put off Christianity 
by the idea of God’s punishing his Son for our sin. Writing in an Anglican context shows that it is a 
problem for contemporary consciousness independently of Christian denomination.  
616 The above is a summary of Chalke’s position. In Chalke, ‘Redeeming the Cross From Death to 
Life’, in Consuming Passion, pp.22.24. 
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The banalisation of divine love, however, is not only an internal affair of theology. The 
secular banalisation of God is not unrelated to the above ‘Christian reduction’. Unrevised 
‘atonement language’ in its ‘secular’ derivative emerges as the myth of redemptive violence. 
Walter Wink confirms my point that the ‘old’ vision of the Cross is the meta-narrative of the 
postmodern subject. ‘Atonement language’, because of its re-emergence in the images of 
popular culture, can be regarded as a cultural metaphor. 617  
 
The correction that the Semiotic Passion offers makes it a priority to deconstruct the 
‘banality’ of the God-image. René Girard618 confirms that a ‘theological resourcing’ of a 
critique of nihilism is a genuine contribution. His central thesis is that the death of Christ 
surpasses all other ‘sacrificial religions’. The sacrifice of Jesus is a radical break from 
making the sacrifice of a scapegoat, the sacrifice of which would temporarily channel 
accumulated aggression in culture. According to Girard, ‘sacrificial religions’, as also our 
culture, do not sufficiently unmask violence. He also highlights the fact that modern 
agnosticism and atheism also contribute to perpetuating ‘scapegoat mechanisms’ by keeping 
them invisible. The nihilist narratives of consumerism, we can add, openly build on this 
strategy. My point is that a culture which is based on artificially generated desires, in order 
to maintain consumption and economic growth, necessarily has to rely on ‘scape-goating’. 
‘Instrumental democracies’, which are hijacked by the compulsory need to maintain the 
growth of the market, have to channel the accumulated tension, which the exploitation of the 
human interior (‘community’) generates. Girard convincingly argues, for our context, that it 
is only the imitation of Christ, as an example of self-giving love for the other, which has the 
capacity to deconstruct ‘the imitation of violence’.619 As we saw, Kristeva also confirmed 
Jesus’ sacrifice as a cultural resource. The new symbolic space of the Eucharist, which the 
Son created, the ‘bloodless’ and predominantly verbal re-enactment of the Passion, 
‘counterbalances murder’. As Kristeva highlights the Cross is a cultural narrative in which, 
through personal ‘suffering’, the nihilism of culture can be named. 
620
 
 
 
                                               
617 See Walter Wink, Engaging Powers: Discernment and Resistance in a World of Domination, 
Fortress Press, Minneapolis 1992, cf. pp-23-26. and pp.149-155. 
618 Though he never refers to Kristeva’s work, however, the post-structuralist criticism of Kristeva’s 
formative masters, Jacques Lacan and Roland Barthes, had an important impact upon Girard. In 1966, 
in John Hopkins University, Girard was one of the organisers of the conference Languages of 
Criticism and the Sciences of Man, which was to have a significant impact on the emergence of 
critical theory in the United States. In Andrew O’Shea, Selfhood and Sacrifice, René Girard and 
Charles Taylor on the Crisis of Modernity, Continuum, New York, London 2010., p.3. 
619 The above summary of Girard’s program is from the chapter ‘A NonSacrificial Reading of the 
Gospel Text’, from Things Hidden, In The Girard Reader, p.177.  
620 Kristeva, New Maladies of the Soul, p. 120. 
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7.3 Three Options for Correcting ‘Atonement Language’ 
 
There are two main ‘established’ directions for correcting the old ‘atonement language’. 
The first is to expound the Trinitarian relationship in God. This offers a much more nuanced 
exposition of God’s act in the sacrifice than the ‘juridical’ approach of Anselm.621 This 
approach introduces the theme of love. Presenting love as a fellowship shows how self-
giving love, as the kenosis of the divine persons, is organising the drama of Redemption. The 
theme of love indeed offers a healthier equilibrium to legalistically conceived ‘subjugation’ 
and ‘obedience’ to divine will. Our representatives of the theologia crucis showed how 
history is taken seriously on this Trinitarian horizon. Deconstructing the ‘banal’ clichés of 
God, which culture uses, requires their ‘symbolic mourning’ to be taken further. Mainstream 
theologies still show a linguistic and iconographical dependence on atonement theology. 
This criticism also applies to classic Trinitarian solutions. Moltmann himself detected a 
subordinating ethos that underlies classic Western Trinitarian doctrine. Pitstick warned of the 
‘weak anthropology’ of Balthasar’s ‘descent theology’, which resulted in a sort of 
monophysitism, the devaluation of human nature in both objective and subjective 
redemption.622 It can be seen as a general criticism of the ‘Platonising’ nature of classic 
theological concepts and language. 
 
The second characteristic way to correct the ‘bloody imagery’ emerged from feminist 
theology. It is worth re-reading the pioneering essays of the Concilium 206, Special Column, 
dedicated to the theme of ‘motherhood’, ‘Motherhood: Experience, Institution, Theology’ 
(1989). The early boom of feminist theology launched a radical correction of the ‘patriarchal 
image of God’. The essays of the cited volume show a strong dualism in the correction of the 
God image. This polarisation appears between the ‘maternal metaphor’ they developed and 
the contested ‘patriarchal representation’ of God. The maternal metaphor convincingly 
points to the violence residing in ‘atonement language’, yet it does not offer a sufficient 
theological, anthropological, and epistemological alternative. In these interpretations the 
gender conflict remains. The lack of a sufficient anthropology led to a sentimentalised 
maternal representation of God. The images of mainstream feminist theology, because of the 
unsolved dichotomy between the ‘maternal’ and the ‘paternal’, remain external images of 
God. The previously masculine God now became a ‘Mother’. Even recent works, such as 
Beattie’s, repeat a gender-biased feminism.623 The question is how can the non-violent 
                                               
621 See Appendix III. ‘Anselm’. 
622 Pitstick, Light in Darkness, p.343. 
623 Her metaphoric excesses betray this bias, e.g, when comparing the stongly ‘masculine’ imagery 
and dynamic of God’s creative activity,  God’s kenosis in Creation, to ‘male ejaculation’. She 
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qualities which feminist theology has elaborated through the ‘maternal metaphor’ be truly 
internalised in the image of God. 
 
As a third way, I propose to introduce the ‘linguistic metaphor’ in representing God’s 
love. It aims at an integration of the above two strategies, and it draws on Kristeva’s 
‘semiotic’ model of language and also on her notion of the ‘feminine sacred’. Her concept of 
the ‘loving Third party’624 offers a breakthrough to resolve the above deadlock in feminist 
theology. The Semiotic Passion argues that introducing the ‘loving Third party’ as a 
theological concept for reading the Passion is a genuine paradigm shift in important fields. It 
successfully undoes the dichotomies between the ‘maternal’/‘paternal’ and the 
‘feminine’/‘masculine’. Most of all, by introducing the ‘maternal metaphor’ into God in a 
fresh way it brings to realisation a co-operation with Kristeva in representing the ‘Father’. 625 
Representing God as a ‘Loving Third’ within the self not only updates the classic theological 
images of the Father, but, retroactively, spells out a constructive critique of Kristeva’s 
‘atheistic subtexts’. Positively, to refer back to the agenda of Part One, it integrates the 
epistemological and hermeneutical dynamic of Revolution in Poetic Language. By this 
integration, the Semiotic Passion presents a symbolic narrative which is indeed a 
comprehensive response to the oeuvre, ‘synchronically’ (responding to her themes) and 
‘diachronically’ (responding to the ideological and intellectual development of her 
humanism). 
 
 
7.4 Introducing the ‘Semiotic’ Economy of love 
 
The purpose of the ‘linguistic imagery’ of the Father is to counteract the rightly raised 
objections to the implications of a God who needed satisfaction, who needs to punish, or 
would send his Son to suffer. As Haight points out, self-sacrifice and submission to an 
authoritative Father distorts the ethos of the Gospels.626 My proposition is given support by 
Cardinal Schönborn who suggests correcting ‘atonement violence’ by re-emphasising the 
                                                                                                                                     
counteracts this image of kenosis with the image of ‘child birth’, which would balance Balthasar’s 
‘masculine imagery’. In Beattie, New Catholic Feminism, p.221. 
624 the integration of pre-oedipal paternal and maternal love, or ‘parental’ love 
625 This solution is fresh also in the sense that it chooses a different strategy from Witt’s in Engaging 
Powers, who restores the non-violent character of Jesus’ sacrifice from the Bible. However much the 
image he recovers is an authentic and positive representation of God, in this type of approach a 
‘contemporary ontology’, a genuine interest in the subject’s cultural conditions, is missing. The latter 
is a precondition for translating the restored image for the secular public.  
626 Haight, Jesus: Symbol of God, p.241. 
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presence of love in the Passion. ‘The blood poured out on the Cross is not the only cause of 
our salvation.’ Christ’s sacrifice ‘is not conceivable apart from his infinite love for us.’627  
 
Presenting the theological image of the Father of the Semiotic Passion takes place 
against the background of Haight’s important critical remarks on the present language of 
theology on God. This intra-theological criticism has to be answered in a constructive way. 
The link with the changed ‘linguistic’ horizon of the subject is obvious. Haight comes out 
with a very harsh judgement about the old sacrificial language:  
 
‘The language of Jesus suffering for us, of being a sacrifice to God, of absorbing 
punishment for sin in our place, of being required to die to render satisfaction to God, 
hardly communicates meaningfully to our age. These concepts do not intersect at all 
with present consciousness… More seriously, the images associated with this talk offend 
and even repulse postmodern sensitivity and thereby form a barrier to a salutary 
appreciation of Jesus Christ.’628 (Italics mine) 
  
 The Semiotic Passion is very cautious with Haight’s total refusal of the ‘old imagery’, 
for several reasons. It would be a hermeneutical illusion to remove such an archaic layer of 
our cultural memory; even if it indeed contains erroneous elements. This violent sacrificial 
language seems to be a lasting part of us. It is a constant reminder of who we are; that we are 
‘born of violence’. If there is a timely meaning of what we call original sin, it is such a one. 
My position, contrary to the linguistic ‘iconoclasm’ of Haight’s Symbol of God,629 is 
realistic. Making the old imagery a permanent reference, without demonising it, is an 
important element of the dialogue with ‘present consciousness’. That is why the ‘semiotic’ 
understanding of sacrifice is proposed as a correction of the old imagery. A mechanistic 
castration of its ‘oedipal tone’ would make that part of the Christian and postmodern self that 
should be healed invisible. 
                                               
627 Cristoph Schönborn, God Sent His Son, A Contemporary Christology, Ignatius, San Francisco 
2004 (original German edition 2002), p.227. 
628 Haight, Jesus: Symbol of God, p.241. 
629 I highlight the potential of the Semiotic Passion (that of its theological direction) to mediate 
between intra-theological debates on the language of the kerygma. In his later reflections on the 
official objections against Jesus: Symbol of God, Haight retains his point on the inadequacy of 
inherited christological language. In order to settle the debate, the church needs hybrid-narratives like 
the Semiotic Passion. This and similar constructs offer a ‘shared symbolic mourning’ which opens up 
a new direction instead of purely dogmatic answers or their Haightian rejection. Haight clearly retains 
his position that mainstream (Magisterial) theology is in a linguistic crisis. Haight’s recent work, The 
Future of Christology confirms the direction that my study develops: there is a genuine need for 
linguistic innovation and a non-apologetic, dialogical model of the ‘secular’. ‘Christian theologians 
are more and more called upon to address the world beyond Christianity on the premise that they will 
address the thinking members of their own church only in the measure in which they succeed in 
addressing those outside it.’ (Italics mine.) From ‘Jesus: Symbol of God: Criticism and Response’, in 
Roger Haight S.J, The Future of Christology, Continuum, New York, London 2005, pp.213-214. The 
linguistic impasse is also confirmed in the essay in the same volume, ‘Notes for a Constructive 
Theology of the Cross’ (pp.75-102) 
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Unlike Haight, the Semiotic Passion wishes to preserve the Cross as a central reference. 
For the theologia crucis, through the engagement with Kristeva’s project, it is possible to 
spell out ‘sacrifice’ within a different, more positive, and non-oedipal economy. In order to 
achieve this, my solution incorporates observations from postmodern experience, and takes 
over the ‘feminine’ correction of sacrificial language. The strategy is not replacing one 
iconography with another, but a widening of the iconographical canon. I build on the 
recognition that mothers’ and women’s experience can be made a source for dealing with 
violence in society and culture (Beattie).630 More closely, I especially draw on Kristeva’s 
model of language from the perspective of lived maternal experience.   
 
The three ‘narratives’ which the Semiotic Passion integrates are as follows. In points (a)-
(b) I recapitulate these themes which Part One already touched upon in detail.   
 
(a) Kristeva’s semiotic model of language and ethics.  Kristeva’s theory gives an account 
of how we arrive into language from the original unity with the mother. She maps out the 
pre-oedipal phase of individual pre-history. In it, the mother-child dyad, through what she 
calls the ‘alchemy of love’, is opened up by a loving ‘Third Party’. The loving and caring 
Father draws the child into language. In the process, the child is severed from the mother in 
love. Yet, on the part of the mother, this detachment, when she is ‘letting the child go’ and 
become an autonomous being, is a sacrifice. Kristeva calls it the ‘maternal Passion.’ It covers 
a very intimate relationship between the mother and the child, for it is a mother’s most 
intimate memory: how, literally word by word, the child was introduced into language. This 
memory stays for ever. It is also a deep transformation in the mother. Mothers learn through 
their sacrifice to become ‘a subject of sharing and reflexivity’. They attain an unprecedented 
capacity of opening up to tolerate otherness, and to tolerate plurality.631  
 
(b) Kristeva’s indirect, semiotic critique of the masculine theological imagination. 
Kristeva outlined an autonomous ‘maternal metaphor’ based on the experience of 
motherhood, which stands in its own right.632 In the essay ‘Stabat Mater’ (Tales of Love), she 
showed how this maternal suffering remains ignored, inaccessible, and ‘feared’ by the ‘male’ 
Symbolic order. She calls this complex experience the ‘feminine Sacred’, or lived feminine 
knowledge of meaning. In ‘Stabat Mater’, Kristeva set up an important ‘missing’ 
                                               
630 Beattie, New Catholic Feminism, p.256. 
631 Kristeva, Hatred and Forgiveness, p.88. 
632 See, ‘Motherhood According to Giovanni Bellini’ in Deisre in Language, the image of the holy 
Virgin in ‘Stabat Mater’ in Tales of Love, and ‘From Madonnas to nudes, A Representation of Female 
Beuty’ in Hatred and Forgiveness. 
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anthropological dimension for theology. She argues that the image of the ‘Virgin Mother’ is 
a male construct, which attempts to ‘control’ the bodily and psychological reality of 
motherhood. She emphasises that the theological images of motherhood, ‘Mother and 
Virgin’, to a great extent, accommodate ‘male’ religious projections. The ‘Passion according 
to motherhood’, that is, having a child within and that in the most intimate closeness, 
remains a formless ‘semiotic’ story for male consciousness, and consequently, inaccessible 
to the Symbolic regime of theology. I suggest identifying this ‘masculine imagination’ at 
work in the ‘Father’ of atonement language. The story of the linguistic journey with the child 
that mothers can tell will help to articulate the ‘sacrifice’ in a different logic from the theory 
of satisfaction (atonement).   
 
Kristeva’s criticism can also indirectly point to an underlying cause of the ‘weak’ 
anthropology of theological concepts. The Church is still afraid of listening to the ‘desires’ 
of the female body on its own account.633 My point is that this can be an important source of 
the linguistic gap (linguistic isolation) between church and culture. One should not forget 
that our ‘father-less’ culture has also lost the ability to name genuine ‘maternal’ qualities. 
The way back to the Father is through rediscovering ‘maternal compassion’, that is why it 
would be important to re-tell the Passion through the sensitivity of the ‘missing mother’. The 
Semiotic Passion indirectly points to this problem. Incorporating the ‘maternal metaphor’ 
into God may lead to a liberation of theological language in terms of enunciating the missing 
anthropological images. Articulating the Church’s ‘suppressed’ or unlistened to feminine 
side, which is not controlled/constructed by the ‘Roman celibate’ imagination, we can 
presume can lead to a paradigm shift in the way Catholics talk about the ‘body’ of the 
Church, including the institutional-organisational-doctrinal directions which this Body 
should take. Introducing the maternal metaphor into God is a dangerous affair as it can give 
voice to agendas which are indeed suppressed, and can bring about a paradigm shift within 
Church politics. 
 
(c) Balthasar’s ‘maternal metaphor’ of God. Balthasar prepares this line of correction 
when he recognises that the ‘paternal’ is not the only dimension of divine love. Though his 
elaboration of ‘femininity’ in God is far from being satisfactory,634 his confirmation of 
                                               
633 John Paul II’s pioneering interest in the theology of the body still represents a masculine 
perspective, predominantly from celibate experience. The problematic element of this magisterial 
approach is the ‘a-priori’ doctrinal suppositions from a male-priestly horizon. From ‘the revelation of 
the theological dimensions of the body’ the experiences of the female identity, on its own account, is 
missing. See, John Paul II, Man and Woman He Created Them, A Theology of the Body, Pauline 
Books Media, Boston 2006. (Originally published in 1986) 
634 See the highly critical chapter ‘Redeeming Fatherhood’ (pp.200-217) in Beattie. She evaluates 
Balthasar’s image of God, his role in the sacrifice of Jesus as a classic patriarchal model of divine 
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‘motherhood in God’ gives support to a ‘theological-semiotic’ reading of the Passion. 
Beattie, who is almost excessively critical of the presence of violence in Balthasar’s 
language, draws attention to the positive contrast which his theology of motherhood offers. 
‘His theology of the motherhood of God is remarkable for its lack of violence and its implicit 
openness to a new understanding of the significance of maternal symbols and relationships 
for theology.’635 My study reads this linguistic shift in Balthasar as realising, from within 
‘classic’ systematic theology, the need to correct the masculine ‘bloody imagery’. 
 
 Balthasar’s seminal insight is that feminine responsiveness to the world is inherent in 
God as Trinity. Balthasar repeatedly refers to God’s activity in creating and sustaining life in 
maternal terms.636 ‘God’s relation to the world is not only masculine, as Deus Faber, but 
womb-like and feminine, achieving the redemption of the entire universe through pain.’637 
The re-reading of the Passion through the ‘maternal metaphor’ is given further support by 
the radically courageous image from Theo-Drama II. The human person is ‘being born, 
together with the Son, from the generative primal womb of the Father.’638 Balthasar also 
suggests in Theo-Drama III that this ‘fatherhood’, like ‘motherhood’, is giving away 
everything that the Father is.  
 
‘We begin to discern the meaning of “fatherhood” in the eternal realm when we 
consider the Son’s task, which is to reveal this Father’s love (a love that goes to ultimate 
lengths, for example, in the Parable of the Prodigal Son or of the Vineyard): such 
“fatherhood” can only mean the giving away of everything the Father is, including his 
entire Godhead (for God, as God, “has” nothing apart from what he “is”); it is a giving 
away that, in the Father’s act of generation − which lasts for all eternity − leaves the 
latter’s womb “empty”: in God, poverty and wealth (that is, the wealth of giving) are one 
and the same.’639 (Emphasis added.) 
 
Balthasar’s emphasis on ‘hearing’ offers an analogy with Kristeva’s ‘maternal passion’. 
A mother’s intimate listening, obedient receptiveness to her Other (the child), contrasts with 
the self-sufficient potency of the ‘male’ ‘Symbolic Order’. In the metaphors of ‘hearing’ and 
‘seeing’, a mother’s self-giving is opposed to an ‘oedipal’ possessive attitude.  
  
                                                                                                                                     
fatherhood, which needs to be balanced with the ‘the kenosis of patriarchy’ (Ruether), Beattie, New 
Catholic Feminism, p.216. 
635 Beattie, New Catholic Feminism, p.220. 
636 Ibid., p.221. 
637 Beattie quotes Balthasar’s homilies from You Crown the Year With Your Goodness. Ibid., p. 219. 
638 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama, Theological Dramatic Theory, Volume II. Dramatis 
Personae: Man in God, Translated by Graham Harrison, Ignatius Press, San Francisco 1990, p.315. 
639 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama, Theological Dramatic Theory, Volume III. Dramatis 
Personae: Persons in Christ, Translated by Graham Harrison, Ignatius Press, San Francisco 1992, 
p.518. 
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‘Through the [masculine] eye, the world is our world, in which we are lost; it is 
subordinate to us as an immeasurable dwelling space with which we are familiar.’640  
 
‘Only [the] voice [of maternal compassion] discloses the inner mystery of that which 
lives… it is not we ourselves who determine on our part what is heard, which is heard 
comes upon us [a child’s voice as an unconditional demand/ or that of God], without our 
being informed in advance.’641 (Emphasis added.) 
  
This dynamic of the ‘pre-lingual’ illustrates that in classic theology there is a deep thrust 
towards intrinsic images of God.  My analysis focuses on the above insightful program: 
Christ as ‘speaking being’ is coming from the womb of God. This ‘surprising’ theological 
dynamic in Balthasar gives space for elaborating qualities in the Father which the atonement 
imagery (‘redemptive violence’) and the mechanistic critiques of religion vastly overlook.   
 
 
7.5 Stabat Pater? 642 The Linguistic Imagery of the Father as Response to the 
‘Ontological Yearning’ of the ‘Exhausted Subject’ 
 
The Semiotic Passion outlines a theological alternative to both the traditional attempt to 
correct atonement language, by emphasising love in the sacrifice (Schönbörn, Balthasar), 
and Kristeva’s reading of the Cross as an archetypal image of the ‘speaking being’. Thus, it 
demonstrates that the desirable anthropological shift is possible in the theologia crucis. The 
two theoretical proposals of the Semiotic Passion are as follows. First, the ‘linguistic 
representation’ of the Passion spells out a ‘non-bloody’ imagery of the Cross. What it 
highlights is the dynamism for a new humanist turn in the critique of culture. The second 
theoretical proposal is the new analogy of ‘suffering’ which, as a theological metaphor, 
offers a new access to ‘God’ for the postmodern subject. The image of the ‘mourning Father’ 
is my alternative to the ‘maternal metaphor’. The renewed imagery of the Christian Father 
takes place against the background of our opening problem, the ‘exhausted subject’, and 
Kristeva’s cultural critique. Its underlying questions are the following. In a cultural climate 
where the ‘autonomous subject’ is replaced by the world of the autonomous image,643 what 
‘image of love’ can offer a genuine interruption? What synopsis of human and divine love 
prevents the self from becoming dangerously ‘external’ to itself and uprooted from 
compassionate love? 
 
                                               
640 Hans Urs von Balthasar, ‘Seeing, Hearing, and Reading Within the Chuch’, in Explorations in 
Theology II. Spouse of the Word, Ignatius press, San Francisco 1967. p.474 
641 Ibid., p.475  
642 A paraphrase of the title of the Latin thirteenth century hymn‘Stabat Mater’, it means ‘the Mother 
was standing’. See in Appendix VII. 
643 Debord, Society of the Spectacle, entry 1, p.8. 
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7.5.1 The ‘Loving Third party’ as a Theological Hermeneutics: A ‘Linguistic 
Representation’ of Christ’s Suffering 
 
This model focuses on the suffering Christ, but in a very different way from the ‘bloody 
imagery’. Deploying Kristeva’s theory of language, the focus is shifted onto Jesus, the 
absolute speaking being’644. I am responding to Kristeva’s anthropological subtlety from 
within traditional doctrine. However, my interest is in how the ‘anonymous 
Christian/sufferer’ can relate himself to Jesus’ Passion as his deepest existential narrative. 
That is, from what ‘ground’ can the postmodern self build up the lost relationship with the 
‘Father’ of religion, to whom the moving ‘bloody’ images of the suffering Son point, in the 
ancient Latin hymns of Passiontide?645 Is there a form of the Passion which answers the 
postmodern ‘ontological’ yearning for the lost Transcendent Other?  
 
For a better visualisation of the scene to be refashioned, the setting of the Crucifixion 
from Western and Eastern art can be recalled, especially from the Latin Pietà type.646 This 
‘virtual’ illustration responds to both the postmodern sensitivity to images and to an 
important element of Kristeva’s ‘cultural mourning’. Byzantine iconography, with the 
images of the Virgin Mother and Christ, is a dominant cultural and personal ‘memory’ in her 
novels. 
 
                                               
644 I am paraphrasing Kristeva’s metaphor, ‘Christ, the absolute subject’. The pre-existent Son, who is 
the image of Creation and man itself, is the ‘archetype’ of the ‘speaking being’. 
645 See the hymns, Stabat Mater, Vexilla Regis Prodeunt (Royal Banners Forward Go), Lutris sex qui 
iam peractis (Thirdy Years Among Dwelling) in Appendix VI. 
646 The Pietà presents Mary as a model for compassion for Christ, and also as an object of compassion 
herself. The Pietà as a form of devotion develops further the Passion in the sense of the continuation 
of Mary’s “passion” after the crucifixion. Christ’s suffering ended by his death. Theologically, he is 
already the triumphant victor. But Mary continues to be the sorrowing mother, lamenting over the 
dead body of her son. ‘With the Gothic period, the emphasis was increasingly placed…on Mary’s 
uncontrollable sorrow…’As examples of the Pietà-type which we can associate with the Semiotic 
Passion, I suggest the following representations. Matthias Grünewald’s Crucifixion from the Isenheim 
Altarpiece (Musée d’Unterlinden, Colmar, France). On this piece the sufferings that Christ has 
undergone are not merely emphasized, but intensified. Rogier Van der Weyden’s Descent from the 
Cross, 1436, (St. Pierre, Louvain-Leuven, Belgium). On this piece the figures of Jesus and Mary are 
portrayed in the same focus and light. The body of the fainting Mary is visually parallel to her son’s 
body being lowered from the cross. Their co-suffering and a mother’s mourning are given a particular 
emphasis. The above description of the Pietà type is extracted from Richard Viladesau, The Triumph 
of the Cross, The Passion of Christ in Theology and The Arts From The Renaissance to the Counter-
Reformation, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008. pp.85-86. and p.74, p.87. The third type of 
illustration could be the Eastern icons of the Crucifixion scene.  For the iconographical description of 
the type, see Lossky and Ouspensky. (Leonid Ouspensky, Vladimir Lossky, The Meaning of Icons, St. 
Vladimir’s Seminary Press, New York 1982, pp.180-184.) Becaue of the limited space, I can only 
refer to the icons. This is an important symbolic connection, which Kristeva’s autobiographical 
references confirm. 
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In a personal meeting in 2010,647 I outlined to Professor Kristeva my plan to apply her 
model of the development of human language to Christ’s ‘dying language’ on the Cross. She 
was interested in the theological application of her ‘semiotic’ model of language, and found 
the idea interesting.648 Now I present the outcome of that initiative, also as an illustration that 
my work is not a mere hypothetical dialogue. My model interprets the scenes of the 
Crucifixion and the Pietà as follows. 
 
The divine Word, God’s eternal Logos, the Father’s wisdom became manifest through 
‘human lips’. Self-expression through language is the dominant activity in the teaching 
ministry of Jesus. The doctrine of Chalcedon, according to which Jesus Christ is ‘true God 
and true man’, also means that he truly acquired human language. It is a real language 
acquisition in the sense of Kristeva’s model. The point the Semiotic Passion emphasises is 
that in the dying Christ we see our human language in a reversed journey. The centre of my 
hermeneutics is this event. The fully functioning beautiful language of the Logos, who 
speaks as Emmanuel among us, is silenced prematurely, and violently. Jesus’ language and 
his human psyche undergo a full physical destruction. The classic atonement narrative 
records the cruelty of this historical drama. Its violence conveys a historical truth. It tells of 
the shock of the scandal that this beautiful ‘Language was killed.’ Jesus’ language, which 
was fully expressive of the Father, deteriorates before our eyes. 
 
Kristeva gives an account of how the person arrives from the ‘zero point’ of language, 
from the child’s unity with the maternal container or ‘loving embrace’ (Winnicott), to the 
symbolic language of the ‘loving Third party’. The Cross forces us to face the reversal of the 
story. Reading the Passion in this way establishes a very personal hermeneutics. A further 
element of the new hermeneutics is that we can approach the Son’s suffering by recalling 
our own arrival into language. The concept of the ‘Loving third party’ emerges as the 
unifying framework for this linguistic approach. 
 
 In this symbolism, all protagonists of our linguistic birth are represented in the Passion. 
(1) The love of a mother who, with the father as ‘loving Third’, helped us into language 
                                               
647 An informal meeting at the Oriental Mandarin Hotel at Knightsbridge (London, 24 May 2010), 
before her lectures at the British Academy, ‘Is there such a thing as European culture? In conversation 
with Julia Kristeva’ (24 May 2010), and at Queen Mary College, ‘The forces of monotheism 
confronting the need to believe’ (25 May 2010). 
648 ‘Dear Sir, Thank you for your letter and and for your faithful reading of my work and for the 
"translation" of my texts into your theological meditation. I would indeed be delighted to discuss all 
these subjects with you when we both have more time and could continue a correspondence. I would 
also like to respond to your letter about my upcoming trip to England.  I'm invited to London by the 
British Academy on May 24 and 25, 2010 in conjunction with my friend Marian Hobson's project. 
Best wishes, JK’ (e-mail correspondence, 16.10. 2009) 
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(‘Mary’). (2) The ‘Son-child’ who acquired Symbolic language is also present. He is the 
protagonist of the drama; not a secondary figure, he is also our ‘alter ego’ as a ‘speaking 
being’ (‘Christ’). (3) The love of the father (the ‘Father’), who severed us from the mother, is 
also an active protagonist in this drama.  
 
The Semiotic Passion suggests a creative engagement with Kristeva’s concept of the 
‘loving Third’.  When the stages of nascent language are seen in a reversed order, the 
function of the ‘loving Third party’ to initiate into language appears in the negative.649 
Seeing the process of initiation backwards, an important counter-point to this introductory 
role emerges. This is the act of ‘mourning’. Kristeva’s model does not investigate this 
function of the ‘loving Third party’ when parental love, as the ‘mourning Loving Third’, is 
in the state of losing its ‘Other’, the ‘child’. However, she comes strikingly close to it in her 
own readings of the Passion:  
 
‘The suffering and the death of the Man of God are charged with a complexity that 
the history of Christianity has not ceased to ponder, and at the same time refine, and that 
does not fail to amaze the modern human being that I am.’650 (Italics mine.) 
 
Kristeva herself makes a connection between Christ, the ‘speaking being’ with the 
Father as his ‘Loving Third’.  
 
‘For the interruption, even momentary, of the bond that links Christ to his Father 
and to life, this caesura, this “hiatus” offers not merely an image but also a story for 
certain psychic cataclysms that lie in wait for the presumed balance of each individual 
and, because of this, make a dressing for them [les pansent]. Each and every one of us is 
the result of a long “work of the negative”: birth, weaning, separation, frustration. For 
having staged this rupture as the very heart of the absolute subject, Christ, for having 
presented it in the figure of a Passion, as the other, supportive side of the resurrection.651 
(Emphasis mine.) 
 
Kristeva elsewhere proposes that the relationship to the ‘Loving Third’ party is not 
restricted to individual pre-history. The dynamic of identification with the Other is a 
permanent constituent of identity: 
 
‘Intrinsic to Christianity is an unshakable faith in the existence of an Ideal Father 
and an absolute love for this loving Father, who would be, simply put, the foundation of 
the speaking subject.’ 652   
 
                                               
649 As a reminder, see p.243. 
650 ‘Suffering’, in Kristeva This Incredible Need to Believe, p.89. 
651 ‘Suffering’, in Julia Kristeva, This Incredible Need to Believe, pp.94-95. 
652 Julia Kristeva, ‘Freudian approach, The religious need to believe’, a short essay from her official 
homepage, http://www.kristeva.fr/believe.html, p.1. (accessed 5/10/2010) 
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The Semiotic Passion brings into focus the Father’s involvement in Christ’s drama in 
terms of representing him as a mourning ‘Loving Third party’. My point is that the ‘Loving 
Third’, when witnessing the death of the ‘Son’, reveals an important existential narrative. 
This ‘mourning’ can be posited as a genuine theological dynamic. The semiotic analysis of 
the Passion makes divine Love, seen ‘in the negative’, central. We can call the Father’s 
‘mourning’653 the re-intensification of ‘the loving Third’ in his relationship to Jesus’ 
humanity. Perhaps we should speak not only of Triune life as ‘immanent Trinity’ (internal 
divine life) and ‘economical Trinity’ (Triune life interacting with history), but we should 
also introduce Triune life as ‘psychological’ or ‘anthropological Trinity’, as a specific 
relationship of the Father to the very history of the ‘speaking being’.  
 
The Father’s ‘mourning’ reveals what happens when ‘language’ is lost, when his Son, as 
an incarnate ‘speaking being’, is lost. Christ, as ‘thirty years among us dwelling’,654 
undergoes the drama of losing the Symbolic Order of human language. Following the 
reversed Kristevan pattern, Jesus experiences a falling back into the ‘semiotic’ formlessness 
of language. Christ is gradually engulfed by pre-lingual, unarticulated rhythms to the point of 
losing consciousness, and death. I emphasise, that the formless language to which Jesus 
arrives is not ‘childhood elements of language’. Yet, it is not unrelated to it as we see it in 
Kristeva’s model. It is 
 
‘a different language, the unconscious “language” found in children’s echolalia 
before the appearance of signs and syntax, and especially in the discourse we receive as 
aesthetic (poetry, literature, painting, music)… The semiotic is not independent of 
language, but underpins language and, under the control of language, it articulates other 
aspects of “meaning” which are more then mere “significations”, such as rhythmical and 
melodic inflections….This “semiotic” trans-verbal aspect…is connected to the archaic 
relation between mother and child and allows [us] to investigate certain aspects of the 
feminine and maternal in language, what Freud used to call “the black continent”.’655 
 
The Semiotic Passion makes a parallel between a child’s language under formation and 
Jesus’ deteriorating language that is gradually is reduced to the ‘basics’. This is a state when 
the ‘Loving Third’ is withdrawn from language and is out of reach. Symbolically, it is the 
shared vulnerability of the ‘speaking being’ in the crib (in the Incarnation) and of Christ on 
the Cross. It is the wounded Son-child who is now unable to form words, or even gestures, or 
the simplest rhythms. ‘Jesus, when he had cried again with a loud voice, yielded up the 
ghost.’ (Mt 27:50) In the Gospel account both the ‘loud voice’ and the ‘yielded up the ghost’ 
                                               
653 His involvement in this loss.  
654 Latin hymn from Passiontide, Thirty Years Among Us Dwelling (Lustris sex qui iam peractis), in 
The Monastic Diurnal or the Day Hours of the Monastic Breviary in Latin and in English, Saint 
Michael’s Abbey Press, Farnborough 2004, pp.236-237* 
655 Kristeva, Hatred and Forgiveness, pp.81. and 11-12. 
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are significant. The latter can also be seen as an audible, ‘formless’ sigh, moan, or groan. It 
is the absolute ‘beginning’/‘ending’ of human language, hardly audible, suspended between 
breathing and the first/last ‘vocalised’ expression. The apex of Jesus’ negative journey, I 
suggest, can be seen indeed as His being engulfed by ‘pre-lingual silence’. Symbolically, this 
is the sum total of unrepresented drives, of an unrepresentable ‘semiotic drive eruption’ of 
human history. Killing the Innocent, depriving God, the ‘Metzian victim’, of all dignity, 
name and truth is indeed the full eclipse of the Symbolic Order. (‘…To this end was I born, 
and for this cause came I into the world’. Pilate saith unto him, ‘What is truth?’ John 18:37-
38)  
 
Religious imagination, based on the program of a victorious redemption, here usually 
ends up in a ‘baroque’ triumphalism. The ‘bloody cross’ becomes an expression of a 
theologia gloriae. In contrast to the ‘semiotic’ Passion, the baroque scenario likes to show 
the last sentences, even words, of Jesus as masterpieces of oratory. Contrary to the realism of 
‘suffering language’ which the Semiotic Passion presents, the words of the suffering Christ 
are touched up to be the high points of a glorious scenario. The Logos remains an unshaken, 
confident Logos. On the classic theological tapestry, everyone, the Father, the Son and the 
Holy Spirit, play their roles according to a premeditated divine plan (‘the Father’s will’). If 
unrevised, this is a dangerous scheme of ‘redemptive violence’, where all is subjugated to 
the ‘oedipal’ authority of the Father. To recall Freud’s criticism, in this dynamic the Father is 
fully shown as an external authority to our history. Critically speaking, this ‘gloriously’ 
envisaged program of expiation discloses the cruel sadomasochism of a distorted atonement 
narrative. Despite the magnificence of the unfolding drama, God’s goodness and his 
satisfaction through the willed death of the Son remain in an irresolvable tension. We are left 
with a God who is bound by his own word that sin must be punished. ‘It is impossible for 
God to lose his honour’. This Father is compelled by his own justice. In Anselm’s words, 
‘God needs to act like God’.656 And He does so in ‘majestic’ suffering. 
 
The ‘semiotic’ reading deliberately breaks with the symbolism of triumph. Instead, it 
wants to exploit the realism of Kristeva’s anthropology.  
 
The cross is still a working symbol in Europe. It may be that as religious symbolism it is 
being increasingly forgotten. Yet, and this is of strategic importance in the cultural situation 
of the ‘verticality of the cross’, it is still possible to relate the ‘secular subject’ to the Cross as 
to his own linguistic drama. In this sense, we can speak of the ‘passion according to the 
                                               
656 See Appendix III, ‘Anselm’. 
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postmodern self’. The Cross speaks of people’s suffering in a profound way, in an archaic 
language. There is no other image present in our culture which would better help to reflect 
people’s unnamed pain. My point is that this attraction is more deeply rooted than is the 
strictly doctrinal understanding of the Cross. Unconsciously we all respond to the Passion: 
through our own linguistic drama. Here Kristeva’s linguistic reading has a point: the ‘work 
of the negative’ is a proto-Passion which opens us up to the historical Passio: 
 
‘But Christ’s passion brings into play even more primitive layers of the psyche; it 
thus reveals a fundamental depression (a narcissistic wound or reversed hatred) that 
conditions access to human language. The sadness of young children just prior to their 
acquisition of language has often been observed; this is when they must renounce 
forever the maternal paradise in which every demand is immediately gratified. The child 
must abandon its mother and be abandoned by her in order to be accepted by the father 
and begin talking.’ 657 
 
 The ‘reverse’ story of language manifest in Christ incites this deep remembrance in the 
contemporary listener. Facing the Cross, we realise in us the presence of the ‘child’ who 
once started his or her journey into language. Not only in us, but in the Son, our ‘son-hood’ 
is shared and recognised. The anamnesis of Jesus’ deteriorating language brings our 
relationship to ‘the Loving Third’ into consciousness. Our reaction to the Cross, where we 
see our ultimate ‘disability’ somewhat strikingly, is not the same as when we encounter a 
disabled person. Kristeva describes the fear we feel in relation to the latter as a narcissistic 
identity wound, which the ‘otherness’ of the disabled person opens up in us; in reality, it is 
the fear of our physical and psychical death.658 This archaic fear, in the case of the wounded 
Christ, is overcome by our compassionate solidarity. He is our ‘hidden’ twin-brother/sister, 
who ‘coincides’ with us. As a result, we do not reject him as ‘Stranger’, which we might do 
with a person suffering from a disability. The point is that this profound anthropological 
dynamic of the Crucified should be paid more attention in the way theology deals with post-
modernity and ‘post-metaphysical consciousness’. Christ transcends all disability and all its 
associated fears. ‘Then came Jesus, the doors being shut, and stood in the midst, and said, 
Peace be unto you.’ (John 20:26) He can penetrate closed systems. That is why He can 
reconcile the self with itself and reconnect it with others through the ‘collective memory’ of 
a shared origin. Our linguistic birth becomes a shared universal, realised before the Cross.  
 
The Semiotic Passion spells out that remembering our universal relationship to the 
‘loving Third party’ is an important source to counter ‘violence’. Undergoing the 
remembrance that the Cross makes alive in us is a renewal of our ‘original’ faculty to 
                                               
657 Kristeva, In the Beginning Was Love, pp.40-41. 
658 ‘Liberty, Equality, Fraternity and ….Vulnerability’, in Kristeva, Hatred and Forgiveness, p.29. 
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respond to the other (our ‘Loving Third’) in peace. The adult psyche remembers the 
experience of being unconditionally responded to and accepted in peace by the ‘loving Third 
party’. Also, it is a recollection of our becoming responsive to the Father’s love with 
reciprocal trust and openness. At this point, we can refer to Kristeva’s ‘poetic language’, the 
function of which is to renew the Symbolic Order of culture. The death of Christ, as a deep-
remembrance of our ‘semiotic’ beginnings, is a similar interruption on a personal level. His 
Passion de-stabilises the ‘Symbolic’ in us, both as a personal and as a cultural identity. In 
front of the Cross, somewhere deep down, deeper than the rational level, we enter into 
‘mourning’ over our ‘semiotic’ past, and also over our symbolic or cultural heritage. This is 
the protest of the ‘beloved child’ in us that our whole being, our whole culture is fragile. All 
this vulnerability is mirrored by Christ, ‘the absolute subject’. He emerges as the ‘absolute 
wound of history’: that of the ‘sub-psychic’, that of the psyche, and that of culture.  
 
The Semiotic Passion takes its own initiative to develop further the ‘Loving Third party’ 
as a theological hermeneutics. It contributes to a shared symbol building with Kristeva by a 
symbolic reading of ‘baptism’. It is not only the Cross that can be given a ‘linguistic 
reading’, as we saw in Kristeva. Baptism also can be read as a symbol of language 
acquisition. The symbolism of death in baptism, as rebirth in the Christ-Father, offers the 
analogy of our being transformed into the Symbolic Order of language, or the ‘story’ of the 
Loving Third. ‘As soon as Jesus was baptised, he went up out of the water. At that moment 
heaven was opened, and he saw the Spirit of God descending like a dove and lighting on 
him. And a voice from heaven said: “This is my Son, whom I love; with him I am well 
pleased.”’ (Mt 3:16-17) ‘Coming up out of the water’, ‘voice’, ‘from heaven’, the 
‘descending dove’ ‘lighting on him’ manifest the dynamic which raises the ‘speaking being’ 
from the pre-lingual ‘void’, or the unnameable ‘thing’ (see Kristeva’s model). This metaphor 
is an offer theology can make to develop further Kristeva’s ‘linguistic metaphor’ of the 
Cross.  
 
Symbolically, our baptism in the ‘loving third party’ points to a universal value horizon, 
to a common humanism. What the postmodern ‘uprooted’ subject is in need of most is to 
regain the meaning of words. The human self in these times of apocalyptic distraction simply 
needs to recharge its language ‘with love’. This is what we can regard as the therapeutic 
momentum of the Cross. Just as the mother undergoes a renewal of identity when she re-
learns her mother tongue with her child, in the ‘semiotic Passion’ something similar happens. 
It puts us into relationship with, literally, the primary words of love, that is, with their very 
origin, the Father. ‘The acquisition of language by the child is a re-acquisition of language 
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by the mother.’ 659 The acquisition of the language (meaning) of the Cross is a re-acquisition 
of the Father’s love, as our primary, universal language. There is a profound practicality 
involved in this theological vision. Through the regained ‘psychic’ presence of the Father, 
the postmodern subject can enter into contact with the Father of the Gospels. The 
psychological ‘loving third’, as the conveying icon of the ‘graced’ Loving Third’, the Abba, 
is the bridge to external history. Recovering the ‘father’s love’ bears a transcendent dynamic 
for the ‘exhausted subject’. Here we can re-actualize Kristeva’s proposal to heal ‘wounded 
narcissism’ first, in order to reach external history: ‘heal your inner wounds, which as a 
result will render you then capable of effective social action.’660  
 
As we can see, the ‘linguistic correction’ of the language of atonement theology extends 
the meaning of the Cross in a new ‘epistemological’ direction yet preserves it as the event of 
history. It is at this very point that my solution radically departs from that of Haight. He 
dismisses the historical Cross as the central symbol of Christian faith in the sense that he 
does not regard it as a central linguistic element of faith. With this, Haight inflates the Cross 
in his dialogue with post-modernity. For him, the Cross is always equated with ‘atonement 
language’. He regards the centrality of the death of Jesus in the Christian imagination as an 
erroneous fixation. ‘…Perhaps Jesus’ death as a criminal was such a shock to the first 
disciples that apologetic discussion became focused here, and the ideas which were 
generated took on a life of their own.’ 661 
 
My linguistic imagery argues that there is something more going on than a ‘fixation on 
death’. The atonement language might well be erroneous in its emphasis on the Father 
‘deliberately’ sacrificing the Son. Yet the traditional attraction to the ‘bloody imagery’ 
betrays a profound, underlying anthropological interest. Just as unexplained as children’s 
fascination about the crib at their first visits to ‘Bethlehem’, it is our ‘origins’, personal and 
religious, that excite us in the Cross. The homage is paid not to the ‘bloody imagery’ but to 
the ‘beyond.’ We would like to enter into a deeper intimacy with the Father than the 
‘oedipalism’ of the ‘bloody cross’ offers.  
 
The French contemporary painter, Michel Ciry, can be referred to as a confirmation of 
the ‘personal hermeneutics’ that the Semiotic Passion develops. Ciry developed a 
representation of the classic scenes of the Old and New Testament in which the narrative of 
                                               
659 ‘The Passion According to Motherhood’, in Kristeva, Hatred and Forgiveness, p.89. 
660 Pollock, ‘Dialogue With Julia Kristeva’, Parallax July 1998, pp.10-11. 
661 Haight, Jesus, Symbol of God, p.241. 
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faith is told at two levels, that of faith and that of the ‘psychic’.662 Ciry confirms the 
interplay between the ‘semiotic’ and the ‘symbolic’ constituents of language in the 
visual realm. The event of faith is represented without any external reference to the Biblical 
narrative. The story is told in the most archaic ‘semiotic’ registers, through pre-narrative 
expressions, the face, the eyes, and the hands. The human face with its silences bears the 
most complex narrative of faith, the Passion of Christ.663  
 
This ‘trans-creedal’ nature makes the ‘semiotic’ Cross a profound anthropological 
narrative for the ‘secular subject’. Potentially, it reconnects him with the Father of Jesus. The 
‘semiotic’ Cross is a challenging anthropological narrative for Christians, too. It reconnects 
us with the secular subject as  now we can use the metaphor  it reveals our ‘common 
baptism in language’. The ‘anthropological’ reading which the Semiotic Passion urges is a 
correction, and not a dismissal of the classic imagery of ‘sacrifice’. Contrary to Haight, if we 
dismiss the ‘sacrificial death’ of Jesus Christ as a central event, we dismiss perhaps the most 
profound contemporary image of the Christian Father.  
 
 
 7.5.2 The Mourning Father − ‘Stabat Pater’: The Theological Dynamics of the 
Metaphor 
 
Reading the Passion from the perspective of the ‘loving Third’ enhances the 
understanding of the Father’s kenosis. In a narrow sense, applying the analogy of the 
‘mourning Loving Third party’ to the Father internalises the maternal metaphor into God. 
Through this we can spell out further the claim that there is no cruelty in Him as a 
protagonist in Christ’s sacrifice. Representing Jesus’ Father in ‘mourning’ (losing his Son) is 
a crucial aspect in deconstructing the banal images of God circulated in culture. The analogy 
of ‘mourning’ in the Father, this is my working hypothesis, is the beginning of recovering 
the ‘theological memory’ of the postmodern subject. In what follows I sum up the 
theological dynamics that the image of the ‘suffering Father’ brings up.  
 
                                               
662 For the illustrations see Michel Ciry, Peintures (1970-2007), Introduction de l’artiste, Édité par l’ 
association “Les amis de Michel Ciry” avec le soutien du Département de la Seine-Maritime 2007. 
663 Mentioning Ciry is all the more an apt illustration of ‘semiotic remembrance’ as he is a late 
representative of the French ‘avant-garde’ painting, referring back as far as the late cubist-symbolism 
of Georges Braque. Kristeva’s main reference of the ‘semiotic’ dimension of language was French 
avant-garde literature. Ciry’s journals witness to a close intertwining of the ‘pre-verbal’ power of 
music and the visual-representation in painting. The entries of La Passion de l’amitié (1986-87) 
reflect the parallel emergence of his religious themes and the diarist’s growing focus on the human 
interior. See entry La Bergerie, 22 heures, pp.163-164. In Michel Ciry, La Passion de l’amitié, 
Journal 1986-87, Plon, Paris 1987. For his paintings consult www.museemichelchiry.com  
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The Father ‘takes us up into his inner divine nature and causes us to be reborn from his 
eternal womb.’664 The ‘womb’ symbolism of classic theology can be taken up with a new 
relevance, in view of the new ‘linguistic sensitivity’ of the subject and Kristeva’s discourse 
on motherhood. Linking the un-listened to maternal experience of dealing with otherness and 
the loving Abba losing the Incarnate Son brings into a creative dialogue the ‘maternal’ and 
the ‘paternal’ metaphors of God. This shared economy of ‘mourning’ shows the ‘High 
Transcendent God’ from a radically different perspective.  
 
The birth-giving mother with her unrecognised knowledge of otherness offers a 
symbolic parallel with the God who is un-listened to on Good Friday. I highlight the 
significance of making this connection for the reason that it develops the analogy (‘Stabat 
Pater’) and is a response to Kristeva’s ‘maternal metaphor’. It also makes clear that the Son 
himself is rejected, together with the ‘womb’ of the Father (Balthasar) who, in the Spirit, has 
a unique knowledge of dealing with ‘God’s Other’, man and history. This saving wisdom is 
unrecognised, even actively rejected. Presenting this is an important response to Kristeva, as 
her mistrust in the ‘masculine’ image of ‘virgin motherhood’ is repeated recently in Hatred 
and Forgiveness: 
 
‘Christianity is a religion of triumph and glory, a religion of heaven, beyond infernal 
passion, because it is based on this temporality of beginning – a religion of birth and its 
repetition through the resurrection. But this experience of temporality [the capacity of 
beginning, to re-begin, to start anew] can be frozen in a formidable paranoid horizon in 
which the maternal unconscious is engulfed, caught in the vertigo of manic 
omnipotence: the figure of the Virgin, after being Mater Dolorosa, is a regal figure, 
Queen of Heaven and the Church, who, for two thousand years, has encouraged [this] 
female paranoia.’ 665 (Emphasis added.) 
   
There is a complex criticism beyond this. Kristeva rejects the image of the ‘virgin 
mother’ on the grounds that it suppresses the experience of motherhood in its bodily and 
psychological aspects. Instead, as a compensation, a symbolic participation is offered in 
terms of ‘masculine power’. The disquieting imbalance between nature (biology) and 
‘masculine’ culture is resolved by fully absorbing the ‘maternal body’ into man’s ‘Symbolic 
Order’. The ‘mother’ becomes similar or self-same by being invested with the main requisite 
of the masculine obsession with power, the ‘throne’.  
 
                                               
664 Hans Urs von Balthasar, You Crown the Year With Your Goodness, Sermons Through the 
Liturgical Year, Ignatius Press, San Francisco 1989, (First publication: ‘‘Du kronst das Jahr mit 
deiner Huld’: Radiopredigten, 1982 Johannes Verlag Einsidien), p.77. 
665 ‘The Passion According to Motherhood’, in Kristeva, Hatred and Forgiveness, p.91. 
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Presenting the unrecognised maternal perspective of suffering within God is the 
correction of the triumphalist hermeneutic to which Kristeva rightly objects. The latter is still 
present in much ‘neo-orthodox’ theology. The elaboration of the maternal metaphor as a 
historical narrative is very important for scrutinising the ‘masculine-priestly imagination’ 
which fundamentalist theologies, not accidentally, take as a reference. When this ‘abjects’ or 
rejects the bodily and spiritual reality of motherhood as it is, it betrays a similar mistrust 
towards the ‘secular’. ‘Priestly imagination’ offers an analogous constructed ‘virginity’ 
(behaviour) for culture,666 expecting secular discourse to accept it in the same way as the 
manipulated discourse of motherhood was received.667 Re-imaging the Father outside the 
‘priestly imagination’ is a crucial resource for combating the overlooked ‘nihilism’ of 
fundamentalist theologies. My point is to emphasise the significance of ‘hybrid narratives’ 
like the Father image of the Semiotic Passion. The Semiotic Passion has an important critical 
function. An honest ‘ideological’ response to Kristeva’s atheistic subtexts requires carrying 
out this immanent criticism of theological language.  
 
A further theological dynamic of the metaphor of the ‘mourning Father’ is the renewed 
focus on the Incarnation. Doctrinal commonplaces turn out not to be fresh, intriguing 
questions. No matter how painstakingly laborious it is, theology needs to learn to become 
‘audible’ where ‘post-metaphysical consciousness’ forces Tradition to explain doctrine anew 
and prompts it to become ‘bilingual’.668  
 
The first ‘intriguing’ mystery of the image of the ‘mourning Father’ is that, from the 
moment of the Incarnation of the Word, Jesus speaks a human language, with all its 
                                               
666 That is, an ideal or ‘unconditional’ (uncritical) opening up to ‘grace’. 
667 As an important illustration of this strategy of making the ‘secular’ an abject is David Torevell’s 
revisionist approach. Torevell nostalgically restores the priestly theological imagination, working in a 
‘splendid isolation’ from contemporary anthropological reality. The Semiotic Passion, as a critical 
narrative, points to this attitude as doing theology in an ivory tower. It should be noted that a position 
like his is also a restoration of ‘priestly power’. ‘…It was simply an annual cycle of priestly-led 
repetitive acts of salvation, with the most important being a bloody act of sacrificial ritual − the Mass. 
But crucially, the order and meaning of the world was maintained by such an annual cycle of salvific 
rites. The sacrifical cult, conducted by the priestly office, set in place by the authority of apostolic 
succession, was also responsible for securing a clear understanding of social organisation inside and 
outside the Church. (…) However, a change in the sacrificial role of the priest was less emphasised at 
the Second Vatican Council… The unique sacrificial role of the priest was being eroded.’ In Torevell, 
Losing the Sacred, pp.91-92. 
668 This work, in a sense, takes up the borderline situation of Paul Tillich’s theology in a postmodern 
context. In the Lutheran tradition, Tillich realised the need to re-translate Tradition for modern 
(American) culture in the way in which the Church expresses herself through a genuine linguistic 
rebirth. His was a heroic and unfinished attempt. The reason I refer to him is that the emergence of 
postmodernity posits an even more radical ‘linguistic challenge’ of self-translation. Concerning the 
linguistic tension in which the church with her ‘cultural mourning’ lives, see the sermon ‘We Live in 
Two Orders’ (pp.12-23), in Paul Tillich, Shaking of the Foundations, Charles Scribner’s Sons, New 
York 1953. 
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implications. In support of relating the Father as ‘loving Third party’ to Jesus, it is necessary 
to refer to the exegetical solution of Joachim Jeremias. He pointed out that the most 
important ‘theological’ word that Jesus used was the expression of his full humanity. He 
addressed God in the way a four year old child addresses his father, as Abba.669 My probing 
point is that, in this addressing him as ‘daddy’, a whole ‘semiotic’ dynamic is present. In the 
name Abba (deeply reminiscent of Ima, the short Hebrew word for addressing the mother as 
‘mom’) the childhood rhythms of language, linguistic playfulness, and an intense memory of 
the ‘psychological’ ‘Loving Third’ reverberates. It opens up a whole new perspective for 
working out a theology of language, in concrete dialogue with the anthropological realism of 
Kristeva’s ‘semiotics’, which is deeply attentive to the bodily and psychic reality of the 
‘speaker’. My ‘model’ unites these discourses by emphasising that God is not an external 
entity to human language. It finds it important to refashion the theological situation, when 
God is not a ‘meta-physical’ or meta-lingual presence outside of this segment of history. 
From the very beginning, from the moment of the message of the Archangel Gabriel and in 
Jesus’ relationship with Joseph and Mary, the Father is internally present in this ‘linguistic’ 
communication.  
 
Also part of the theological dynamic of the image is that traditional doctrine has to 
inhabit this situation. My point is that theology has to find a way of incorporating the 
anthropologically fine-grained vision of the person, and their dynamics, into the narrative of 
faith. Without a ‘shared’ anthropological realism, dialogues on macro-level, like the crisis of 
the subject and culture, will always be limited. That is why my study highlights the 
dialogical direction that the Semiotic Passion has taken. It brings to the fore the realisation 
that it is also part of the mystery of the Incarnation that the Father, as a genuine ‘Loving 
Third party’, is a historical experience for Jesus. It prompts systematic theology to explain 
                                               
669 One of the ipsissima verba or the original ‘very’ words of Jesus in the Gospels identifiable with 
certainty is his addressing the Father as ‘Abba’. This contact point between the human and the divine 
needs to be taken seriously. Jeremias’ exegetical solution is not a sentimentalising image, but a 
substantial theological insight. Jeremias’ biblical exegesis of Jesus’ understanding of the Father as 
loving Abba in the Lord’s Prayer is a helpful background for the Semiotic Passion. Jeremias, from a 
biblical perspective, confirms the fundamentally ‘non-oedipal’ nature of divine love. He argues that 
‘Abba’ as an address to God was the ipsissima vox Jesu, and shows a very unique understanding of 
God. It expresses an emphatic [‘semiotic!’] state as Jesus’ ‘Abba’ is derived from children’s speech. 
In the pre-Christian world, abba was a respectful address to an old man. (It should be noted that in its 
use, the ‘loving respect’ and the tender care, exclude any ‘oedipal’ rivalry between the Father and the 
Son!) Jeremias argues that small children used to call their father abba, expressing their trust and love 
in him. It is an untranslatable intimacy, perhaps the closest meaning is ‘daddy’. Grown up children 
cease to address their father in this way. It is important to see the contrast which Jeremias suggests. In 
Jewish prayer it was unimaginable to call God ‘Abba’ in this way. ‘When we cry, “Abba! Father!” it 
is the Spirit himself bearing witness with our spirit that we are the children of God.’ (Rom. 8:15b-16) 
The cry, ‘Abba’, is beyond all human capabilities and is only possible within the new relationship 
with God given by the Son. In Joachim Jeremias, The Prayers of Jesus, SCM Press, London 1967 
(first German publication 1966), pp.54-64.   
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the relationship between the human language of Jesus and divine ‘language’ within the 
Trinity. This questioning can be made an important part of revisiting the relationship 
between nature and grace. This ‘narrative’, if worked out, is an important bridge to ‘post-
metaphysical consciousnesses’. 
 
The Semiotic Passion simply records the fact that in his prayer, through language, Jesus 
experiences the Father as Emmanuel (‘God is with us.’). In a positive sense, the ‘semiotic’ 
reading of the Passion posits that the Abba gives birth to the Son’s human language, too. 
Since the drama of the Incarnation, God is not outside the process of Jesus acquiring human 
language, nor how he uses it. The classic Christological dogmas of Chalcedon (451) can be 
revisited in this ‘postmodern context’. In whatever form this clarification takes place, Jesus’ 
genuine human language is part of his genuine human nature, and should, virtually, be added 
to the key features of his humanness.670    
 
The Semiotic Passion offers a way out of the paradox that Mark C. Taylor observes in 
After God. On the one hand, it is not possible to engage with the anthropological mindset of 
our age through the classic epistemological apparatus of Chalcedon.671 On the other hand, he 
argues, contemporary ‘secular thought’ originates from the Christological solutions of the 
great church councils of the fourth and the fifth centuries.672 Taylor convincingly 
demonstrates (re-constructs) the emergence of anthropological discourse as a cultural shift 
from the doctrine of the Trinity.673 He gives a theoretical confirmation that the conflict 
between transcendence and immanence, which cannot be settled from the classic 
Christological formulations today, can only be resolved by developing an anthropological 
discourse closely related to the doctrine of the Trinity. In our idiom, the theological meaning 
of ‘True God – true man’ needs to be retold in the ‘verticality of the cross’, where language 
is the prime reference of identity. The question is, how can we relate present consciousness 
to the Incarnation of the Son of God?674 In order to answer this question, classic 
Christological language and post-Kantian philosophies alike need to develop a new notion of 
                                               
670 ‘Therefore, following the holy fathers, we all with one voice teach the confession of one and the 
same Son, our Lord Jesus Christ: the same perfect in divinity and perfect in humanity, the same truly 
God and truly man, of a rational soul and a body; consubstantial with the Father as regards his 
divinity, and the same consubstantial with us as regards his humanity; like us in all respects except for 
sin.’ ‘Chalcedon’ by Ivor J. Davidson, in The Cambridge Dictionary of Christian Theology, edited by 
Ian A. McFarland, David A. S. Fergusson, Karen Kilby, and Iain R. Torrance, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 2011 (First published 2011), p.92. 
671 Mark C. Taylor, After God, (Religion and Postmodernism, a series edited by Mark C. Taylor and 
Thomas A. Carlson), The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London 2007, cf. pp.152-153 
672 Taylor, After God, p. xvi. 
673 See chapter 3 in After God, cf. p.133-134. 
674 See the doctrinal overview of the Incarnation and the theological development leading to 
Chalcedon in the chapter ‘The Incarnation of the Son of God’ (pp.110-165), in Schönborn, God Sent 
His Son. 
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the ‘modern subject’. The Semiotic Passion aims at challenging both positions from the 
ground of the ‘exhausted subject’. For secular humanism it states that constructing this new 
notion is far from finished.675 For systematic theology, the ‘semiotic imagery’ raises the need 
to make theoretical proposals in order to become more effective in the still emerging 
anthropological network of culture. 
 
The Semiotic Passion relates the classic doctrine of the Incarnation to our present 
‘anthropological condition’. The ‘Loving Third party’, it argues, though originally it is not a 
theological concept, introduces the missing anthropological dynamic into theological 
concepts, especially with regard to our notion of the Father of the Trinity. Deploying the 
concept confirms the ‘particularity’ of Christ as a historical subject, and through him, a ‘new 
historicity of the Father’. This ‘historicity’ can hardly be accessed from within doctrinal 
debates like the patripassianism and the theopaschite controversy.676 I just highlight the fact 
that the Father who ‘suffers’ through his mourning as a ‘loving Third’, touches on highly 
sensitive doctrinal areas. By revealing a ‘doctrinal vacuum’ it immediately creates a 
resistance from within canonical discourse. I also stress the fact that my concern is not the 
doctrinal implications of the ‘semiotic’ imagery of the Father. A direct evaluation from 
‘orthodoxy’ would only show an anthropological deficit in canonical approaches. The 
Semiotic Passion, being a theory in the sense of Rizzuto, does not have to comply with 
established doctrinal solutions. But it does not mean that as a theoretical proposal our 
metaphor does not spell out important aspects of classic doctrine. As Rizzuto puts it, 
 
‘It should be remembered, however, that theory exists to assist in the 
understanding of complex reality: it is not reality itself. Theory is a tool, a shorthand, a 
vocabulary, to identify an aspect of human perception for oneself and for others. It does 
not create entities, whether they are called self or God. Theory provides a way of 
talking about observable phenomena in order to understand them. Theory is never 
completely true, only partly true to what we say and see. Therefore theoretical 
considerations must be taken with a grain of salt: insofar as they help us to understand 
the phenomena, they may be accepted, not as truth but as the best explanation so far of 
what we see.’677 
  
The ‘mourning Father’, as an experimental concept, is an opportunity to relate the 
Christian Abba with the core of postmodern sensitivity. A God who is unable to ‘suffer’ and 
                                               
675 See Taylor’s overview of post-Kantian responses from Kant, Hegel, Spinoza to the masters of 
suspicion, Marx and Freud. In After God, pp.153-185. 
676 See these entries in The Cambridge Dictionary of Christian Theology, p.375. and p.504. The two 
doctrinal discourses which can be related to the Semiotic Passion are ‘Patripassianism’ and 
‘Theopaschite’ debates. In order to illustrate the ‘hermeneutical gap’ with the classic body of doctrine, 
I refer to them in brief in Appendix VIII. They illustrate the contrast with the new doctrinal and 
epistemological space which the encounter with Kristeva has opened up. 
677 Ana-Maria Rizzuto, M.D, The Birth of The Living God, A Psychoanalytic Study, The University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago and London 1977. p.11. 
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‘feel’ compassion simply cannot be meaningful for our contemporaries. The Semiotic 
Passion argues for renewing the analogy of suffering in God in order to initiate a 
conversation, and if possible, a breakthrough. The Father of the ‘eschaton’ is not an abstract 
historical entity, but must always be expressed through the ‘narrative of love’. In a sense it is 
a completion of the eschatological program of Metz and Moltmann.  
 
The Semiotic Passion indeed offers a non-banal image of a compassionate God. The 
suggested linguistic analogy presents the co-suffering of the Father and the Son through the 
story of Christ as a ‘speaking being’.  The image of the suffering Father draws on a mother’s 
suffering which is expressed in the image of the Mater Dolorosa (Mother of Sorrows). If the 
Father in the life of Jesus can be seen as the presence of the ‘Loving Third’, then Mary’s 
mourning beneath the Cross, analogously, coincides with the Father’s loss. A mother’s grief 
over her child is also ‘the passion according to the loving Third.’ Through Mary’s suffering 
the ‘maternal metaphor’ can be made internal to God as Father. Here our analogy puts an 
emphasis on the Father’s ‘mourning’ as a ‘loving Third’. Envisioning Mary’s linguistic 
journey with Jesus as a shared remembrance with the Father makes it is possible to relate the 
Father, as ‘immanent Trinity’, to the human language of the Incarnate Son. For the 
postmodern subject the main problem is establishing a link with this ‘immanent’ life of the 
Trinity, re-telling the Passion in terms of a linguistic journey introduces an alternative logic 
to the understanding of what the Father’s kenosis is. The only definitive theological claim is 
that the linguistic analogy makes it possible to speak of the Father’s suffering outside the 
traditional metaphysical framework. 
 
The theological dynamic of our metaphor has a profound personalist thrust. Seeing a 
mother crying over the death of her child is the most elementary experience which incites 
solidarity. It is an archetype of ethics in itself; perhaps its most archaic origin. The loss of her 
own child mobilises the deeply buried memories of a mother when she had first ‘lost’ him or 
her at the very beginning of language formation. To recall Kristeva’s model, psychologically 
the mother necessarily goes through the following phases. The narcissistic joy in the original 
unity with the child → the pain of loss when the child is severed from her as a maternal 
container → when ‘her other’ is given over to the father’s language → and finally, the joy 
when the child can express his love by naming her as Mother and becoming aware of her 
kenosis for him or her. In Kristeva’s model, this closing stage is a new communion between 
the mother and child. 
 
 This journey is also a child’s shared memory with the mother. This linguistic bond to a 
great extent clarifies our never explained attachment to our mothers. Usually, this relation is 
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never consciously remembered. The ‘rationality’ of the ‘Symbolic Order’ does not pay 
attention to the suffering of the mother who carries the story of language. A mother loses the 
one to whom she gave not only biological life but also psychical life, ‘language’. Strangely, 
‘men’, though they equally act as ‘loving Third’, do not have this remembrance as intensely 
as a mothers do. In the case of mothers, the shared genesis of language always remains in 
them. It is on this residual knowledge that Kristeva can state maternal love to be the 
prototype of human passion and ethics.678 This journey runs from the first happy exchange of 
glances, through the first pre-lingual rhythms, vocal cathexes and melodic fragments into 
love fully expressed in language. This memory, unless masculine consciousness enters its 
own story as ‘Loving Third party’, remains forever a mother’s second un-listened to story. 
(A mother’s mourning can be just as unrecognised as her ‘first’ motherhood.) Only in the 
moments of the Passion are we given insight into it. It is worth observing that crying is a 
rapture of our being from a ‘Symbolic Order’ of language into this ‘pre-lingual realm’. The 
world of human tears is probably when we get closest to the lost terrain with the mother 
(who is our hidden, ‘absolute Loving Third party’ strangely hiding behind the face of our 
‘loving Father’).679 In the intense moments of mourning, our language collapses into this 
deep remembrance of the lost, beloved person who belongs to us; who belonged to us; who 
had belonged to us. This story of the tears of the ‘mourner’ is the same in the case of Mary 
who is losing Christ; Jesus is being mourned within the full economy of the ‘maternal 
Passion’. 
 
The theoretical suggestion of the Semiotic Passion is that this ‘maternal passion’ 
iconically680 points to the Father’s unique presence in the Passion scene. The Father is never 
represented on Eastern icons, according to the theological principle that no one has seen the 
Father except the Son, who alone can express Him. Western religious art, however, gives 
representations of the Father. Western theology develops an anthropological sensitivity: we 
want to see the Father in the drama of ‘grace’. This dynamic of the Father’s ‘giving’ his 
image to the Son, that is, that the Abba expresses himself through the suffering Christ and 
                                               
678 Kristeva, ‘Passion According to Motherhood’, In Hatred and Forgiveness, p.91. 
679 Perhaps, it is a personal remark, we humans understand a mother’s love for the child most when we 
witness our father’s ‘dying language’. This is a profound realisation of who the ‘Loving Third’ is for 
us, of whose image and love we were created. In the person of the suffering Christ on the Cross, we 
seem to contemplate the dying language of the ‘Father’; that of our own loving father.  
680 Orthodox theology teaches of the ‘iconic knowledge of God’. The tangible categories of the world, 
time, space, colours, the human body, and especially the human face are icons pointing to God’s 
Kingdom. Lepahin Valerij states that language, as part of the human face, is an icon of God and points 
to him. ‘Iconically’ they represent, that is, make the life of God present in our material reality. See, 
Valerij Lepahin, ‘Basic Types of Correlation between Text and Icon, between Verbal and Visual 
Icons’ (pp. 20-30), In: An International Journal of Religion, Theory and Culture., Literature and 
Theology, Oxford University Press, Volume 20, Number 1, March 2006.; and  Valerij Lepahin, Az 
óorosz kultúra ikonarcúsága (a Hungarian publication, it translates as ‘The Iconic Naure of Ancient 
Russian Culture’), JATE Szláv Filológiai Tanszék, Szeged 1994. 
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deliberately wants to emerge through his Son, together with the orthodox rule of not 
representing the Father directly, is already combined in the ‘womb’ metaphor in Balthasar: 
 
‘In some way that is beyond our comprehension, the Father himself is simple too; he 
does not hoard his omniscience but recklessly gives it away, so to speak: “All things 
have been given to me by my Father”, says Jesus. God does not cling to himself; the 
Father’s womb is empty once he has generated the Son, so we must seek the Father in 
the Son, and only in him.’681 
 
The Semiotic Passion adds the emphasis of the linguistic imagery to this, namely that the 
Father emerges through Christ as our ‘absolute linguistic icon’. If we take the economy of 
the Incarnation in language seriously, the Father is present in the Passion, and is 
representable. However brave and inaccurate the analogy of the ‘mourning Father’ might be, 
language represents Him. The mourning for the ‘speaking Son’ represents genuine historical 
pain. It is the Father’s complex relationship to the Son which makes speaking of the Father’s 
Passion legitimate. (‘Mary/The Father’ stood in sorrow weeping/ When her/His son was 
crucified.682) Within this analogy, it is possible to speak of ‘suffering’ in God. The Father as 
a historical ‘Loving Third’ to Jesus experiences ‘pain’ and ‘suffering’.683 As such, the Father 
is manifest as ‘economic Trinity’ in history. 
 
 
7.5.3 The Peaks of Mourning: ‘Becoming a Virgin’ (A Spiritual Re-reading of the 
Metaphor) 
 
The Semiotic Passion makes the claim that there is a genuine legitimacy for preserving 
the image of ‘Virgin Motherhood’ in the context of the Passion. The linguistic reading of the 
Passion restores the original theological dynamic of the ‘Virgin Mother’ by representing it as 
Mater Dolorosa, which ‘merge’, to recall Kristeva’s charge of female paranoia, is void of 
power aspirations. The balance is restored by shifting the emphasis from ‘virgin 
motherhood’ to the mourning mother. To demonstrate further the relevance of developing 
the maternal metaphor in God the Father, the Semiotic Passion suggests an alternative 
reading of ‘virgin motherhood’.  
 
In the ‘anthropological exchange’ that the semiotic Passion brings out, the Father is a 
witness to Mary’s ‘linguistic drama’. In her unarticulated and uncontrollable weeping at the 
                                               
681 Balthasar, You Crown the Year With Your Goodness, p.175 
682 See Stabat Mater in Appendix VII. 
683 I emphasise again that the ‘linguistic passion’ has no intention of revisiting the debate that God in 
his essence or divine Nature cannot experience suffering. The purpose is to make ‘ontological 
statements’ again in a new way, outside the metaphysical framework, within the story of love.  
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foot of the Cross as Mater Dolorosa, Mary is carried back to her first words to the Child. 
First, the Mother of God is brought back to ‘linguistic severance’, when the ‘father’s’ 
language severed her child from her. Before this there had been no words. But Mary’s 
‘mourning’ goes even further back, to the very beginnings of her ‘maternal passion’, that is, 
to the conception of her Son, when there had been only a silent expectation ‘in the womb’. A 
mother’s mourning goes back even beyond pregnancy. Mary remembers the absolute silence 
of the Son/child. This was the time before the annunciation, the time before conception 
(‘pre-annunciation’). This is the time before conception. The very memory of conceiving her 
Child sets her apart from this period of ‘being alone’. Becoming a mother, retrospectively, 
assigns the preceding time of ‘virgin-hood’ as ‘futility’. Having a child is a gift, a ‘plus’. 
Mary’s becoming fertile, her actualised and fulfilled motherhood marked out the time of 
maternity as ‘sacred time’, as kairos.  
 
Going back, forcibly, into the childless state, is to lose this kairos. In her ‘mourning’ 
Mary is brought back to the memory of being ‘not yet a mother’ (or not yet a father as we 
can universalise the pattern), but of being a person who is in search of the ‘Other’ from 
whom she would conceive. She is in the state of waiting, which is the state of not yet being a 
‘Loving Third party’ to the other. It was the time of expectation when Mary’s ‘destiny’ was 
being shaped to reply when the moment came: ‘Behold the handmaid of the Lord; be it unto 
me according to thy word.’ (Lk 1:38) In Mary’s case, her ‘maternal passion’ beneath the 
Cross brings her back to the point when she was a ‘virgin’ in the sense of being without a 
child. Our analogy has no intention of spiritualising this remembrance of pre-birth. Yet, the 
‘semiotic’ reading offers the understanding of seeing Mary ‘as becoming a Virgin Mother 
under the Cross’. This becoming a ‘Virgin’ expresses the total loss of the Son-Child, to the 
point of accepting the irreversibility of this loss. To recapitulate the anthropological dynamic 
which my study has argued, the Father, from the moment Mary heard the voice of the Angel, 
is not outside this journey and endpoint. 
 
A mother’s grieving for the prematurely lost child is our deepest ‘anthropological’ 
drama. When witnessed, this is perhaps the most intense triggering of human solidarity. 
Seeing the mourning mother is the re-birth and the re-confirmation of all ethics. The 
Semiotic Passion, I suggest, is applying this ‘journey’ backwards to the Father of the 
Incarnate Son. This Incarnate Son, theological correctness agrees, suffers death in his human 
nature. Putting aside the Christian doctrine that in the Incarnation Jesus’ human and divine 
natures were united in the second divine Person, in our ordinary, ‘non-theological’ language 
we simply say: it was the death of a ‘real man’. In this case, what does the ‘maternal kenosis’ 
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of the Abba tell us, how do we respond to it?  My study submits the ‘mourning Father’ as a 
source for a new, non-restrictive ethics that Kristeva is urging. 
 
In a narrower sense, the reading of ‘Virgin Motherhood’, when related to the function of 
the ‘Loving Third party’, is a response to Kristeva’s critique of the masculine theological 
imagination. This imagination can be attentive to a mother’s passion. In a wider sense, 
relating Mary (motherhood) and God in an intrinsic way raises the question: can we make 
the ‘Virgin Mother’ speak again? Can we make the Mater Dolorosa a significant source of 
the aimed at ‘non-restrictive’ ethics? Balthasar supports this intention. He shows that classic 
doctrine, including his own theology, has the reserves to recover the ‘lost universal’ from 
maternal compassion. Balthasar presented Mary’s ‘virginity’ as an archetypal experience of 
dealing with otherness, as it were, an ‘open’ existential metaphor.  
 
‘Mary, by bearing and giving birth to her Son, the Head of the Church [Christ the 
‘absolute’ speaking being or the language of the Church], encloses all Christians within 
herself and brings them forth from herself along with their experiences of faith, and this 
in a relationship with them which is somehow physical… Mary’s physico-personal 
experience of the Child who is her God and her Redeemer is unreservedly open to 
Christianity. Mary’s whole experience, as it develops from its earliest beginnings, is an 
experience for others − for all…Mary’s experience of God has her virginity as its 
foundation − her exclusive and spiritual readiness for God [the ‘mourning Father’]…A 
human mother, with all her maternal feelings and experiences, joys and especially 
sorrows, is taken into God’s service in order to bear the mystery of the Incarnate God 
and the Redeemer of the world. Everything about her faith will, therefore, become 
incarnate in her natural and, at the same time, graced motherhood; everything will be 
drenched in the blood of human experience, down to the very foundations of the body 
[the semiotic ‘chora’], of the womb [the first emergence of the ‘loving third party’].’684  
 
It should also be noted that the postmodern subject is in need of recovering the image not 
only of the Father, but that of the ‘Mother’ too. A successful re-presenting of the Father’s 
love also means recovering the remembrance of maternal love. Is it not unquestionably our 
ultimate universal? Or, even in the forthcoming world of ‘bioengineered lives’ without real 
mothers, is this memory of the mother not our universal desire? The image of the ‘Virgin 
Mother’ can be confirmed as an ontological metaphor, when the ‘loving third party’, as the 
grounding orientation of our humanness, first emerges. And this love is grounded, as Mary’s 
particular case shows, in the Father’s inexhaustible Love.  
 
 
                                               
684 Section, ‘The Marian Experience of Faith’ (pp.338-343), in Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of 
the Lord, A Theological Aesthetics, Volume I, Seeing the Form, T&T Clarc Edinburgh 1998. (First 
publication, Herrlichkeit: Eine theologische Ästhetik, I: Schau der Gestalt, Johannes Verlag, 
Einsiedeln 1961.), pp.340-342. 
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7.5.4 Completing the Metaphor: God’s Inexhaustible Love 
 
The theological dynamic of the ‘mourning Father’ cannot be complete without a 
reference to Easter. Mary’s ‘becoming a Virgin’ or her mourning for the loss of the Son, at a 
decisive point, is different from that of the Father. A mother can mourn the child but she 
cannot give life again to her lost child. Jesus’ Abba, faith informs us, has that ‘power’. To 
illustrate my final points, I refer to Kristeva’s Eastern icons. With their colour symbolism, 
they herald this potential in the Father. In the symbolic language of the icon God, as 
represented by the ‘gold’ background, embraces the ‘human self’. The gold background tells 
us in our context that all ‘speaking beings’ are covered by the compassion of the Father. 
Beyond his ‘mourning’, we find his resurrecting joy. To quote Rahner, ‘He is the 
unfathomable womb, in which [everyone] shines brightly.’685 We find the first manifestation 
of this resurrecting joy in the words of the Annunciation: ‘And the angel came in unto her, 
and said, Hail, thou that art highly favoured, the Lord is with thee: blessed art thou among 
women…Fear not Mary: for thou hast found favour with God.’ (Lk 1:28.30.)686 A further 
revealing of this life-giving joy and promise is the scene of Jesus’ transfiguration, which 
foretells his forthcoming Passion and echoes the words which the Father said over the 
baptised Son. In the scene of the baptism, there took place the Father’s first ‘encouragement’ 
as a ‘Loving Third party’: ‘And a voice came from heaven said: ‘This is my Son, whom I 
love; with him I am well pleased’” (Mt 4:17). In the Transfiguration, this audible, historical 
voice sounds again, now as a confirmation of the Son in his mission. The charge is given by 
the Father as an inexhaustible source of renewal. He speaks as Jesus’ abundant ‘loving Third 
party’: ‘In thee I am well pleased’. ‘This is my Son, whom I love; with him I am well 
pleased.’ (Mt 1:5)  
 
This unfolding dynamic of Easter faith is expressed in the colour symbolism of the 
icons. Their representation of the Father’s voice builds on the specific nature of gold: its 
light is not external, but comes from within.687 The ‘silence’ of the golden background 
expresses the nature of the ‘Loving Third’ which, while being the ‘external authority’ of the 
Father, is fully internalised by and in the ‘speaking being’. In this way, the speaking subject 
becomes the true image of the ‘Loving Third party’, the language of the Abba.688 The 
‘golden’ presence of the ‘Loving Third party’ (expressing the Father’s love) tells us that 
‘salvation’ and ‘sacrifice’ are not outside history but address us ‘from the inside’ as 
                                               
685 ‘Sacred Heart’ (pp.121-128) in Rahner, The Eternal Year, p.124. 
686 Original emphasis from the King James Version. 
687 John Baggley, Doors of Perception, Icons and Their Spiritual Significance, Mowbray, London, 
Oxford 1987, p.81. 
688 This is the event of becoming the verbal icons of our father and mother. 
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‘speaking beings’. This reference to icons from Byzantine iconography is not arbitrary as 
these are Kristeva’s icons, with their ‘enigmatic other world, full of gentle suffering and 
mysterious grace’.689 This enigmatic world of ‘semiotic light’ is emphasised in the icons of 
the Crucifixion. There, the body of Christ and the background (‘God’) radiate in gold against 
the dark background of the cross. In our Semiotic Passion, this contrast tells us that the 
Father’s attention never leaves the Son ‘forsaken’. To this ‘mourning’, metaphorically, we 
can apply Kristeva’s ‘central metaphor’, the interplay between the ‘semiotic’ and the 
‘symbolic’ constituents of language. In the Father’s ‘mourning’ we find the genuine 
‘mourning’ of the ‘historical’ Loving Third, which we saw in Mary’s human mourning. But 
from beneath this compassion for the human love in grief, which cannot bring the loved one 
back to life, there also emerges the exclusive potential of God the Father: to recreate lost 
particular existence. God does not allow Jesus (or our selves) to fall back for good into pre-
semiotic ‘no-meaning’. In our analogy, the Father’s ‘mourning’ already anticipates the 
Resurrection of the Son. This is what we can see as the final emergence of the ‘graced 
Symbolic Order’ of the Kingdom. 
 
It is important to emphasise that the ‘Semiotic Passion’ does not stop with Good Friday. 
As such, the ‘mourning Father’ becomes a comprehensive ontological response to Kristeva’s 
atheistic subtexts and to nihilism. The Cross is not a tragic terminus of life itself which 
makes existence, in the Beckettian sense, absurd. Neither does it leave us with a stoic 
overcoming of despair as Kristeva’s early Holbein analysis did. There is more left to us than 
the ‘shortening’ time of psychic-rebirths. Easter, in the Christian witness, is a genuine 
interruption of all anthropology, psychoanalysis, and existing theological language 
(metaphors) itself. The dynamic of Easter warns that ‘grace’ and our present history should 
be connected. It assigns as the task for the present to take (the particularity of) history 
seriously. This task prompts both humanist and theological discourses to revise the ‘scope’ 
of what they understand as ‘psychic and ethical rebirth’. 
 
 The Father’s ‘golden silence’ may answer the opening problem of our analogy. The 
Father, presented within the ‘linguistic economy’, is not a cruel, satisfaction thirsty God. His 
‘mourning’ runs counter to the sadomasochistic demand for expiation, which the ‘murder 
imagery’ of the atonement scenario manifested for Freud. The ‘mourning God’ is not the 
God who is outside human history in the Marxian reading either. The Father’s ‘waiting’ from 
Good Friday to Easter morning is a real ‘work of mourning’: a genuine intra-historical 
experience. From the moment of the Incarnation, when Christ became the ‘absolute subject’, 
                                               
689 Kristeva, In the Beginning Was Love, pp.23-24. 
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God as Father cannot stay outside the economy of ‘divine mourning’, when history is 
ultimately permeated by forgiveness.  
 
To bring our metaphor to a close, in the ‘fellowship’ of mourners, whom we see at the 
foot of the Cross, undoubtedly the most important event is the way the dying Son ‘mourns’ 
the loss of his Father. There is an unsurpassable depth in his final cry: ‘And at the ninth hour 
Jesus cried with a loud voice, saying, Eloi, Eloi, lama sabachthani? which is, being 
interpreted, My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?’ (Mark 15:34) It is indeed true 
that it was a calling, but not for Elijah as the bystanders understood. ‘And some of them that 
stood by, when they heard it, said, Behold, he calleth Elijah.’ (Mark 15:35) Despite the 
horror of the moment, the dying Jesus was calling for Love. It was a call from the ‘semiotic’ 
depths of his identity, addressing the Abba, the Father, as ‘Loving Third’ to whom he 
belongs, but also addressing the (psychological) ‘loving third party’ in us, which connects us 
to him.  Symbolically, is this cry not the endpoint of human language and already the very 
first words of a new creation? Suspended between the ‘maternal void’ (our present history) 
and the new symbolic order of God’s Kingdom, Christ becomes ‘absolute subject’ in this 
borderline situation, in between the two realms of language. This reading re-embeds 
Kristeva’s image of the Cross as the genesis story of language into the horizon of 
Transcendence. This is the completion of the Semiotic Passion. In the ‘Loving Third party’, 
to whom Jesus cries, who is ‘inexhaustible Love’, who is the ultimate ‘loving Third’ of the 
self, already our ability to respond in love is there too. 
 
We do not know how, but the Father ‘having completed his mourning’ emerged as 
Resurrection for the Son. It is impossible to separate the Resurrected and the Resurrector. 
Just as it is impossible to separate the Son of the Father from ourselves as ‘prodigal sons’, 
whom he welcomes with the same intensity. The Resurrection of Jesus suddenly, and 
ultimately, coincides with the life of the Father. Joining in this relationship (‘interpreting’ 
this mystery) is our renewed language in culture. This renewal links our metaphor most 
profoundly with the central thesis my work argued, namely, that the ontic ‘exhaustion’ of the 
‘speaking being’, as a ‘religious mourning’, needs to be answered. Theology’s Semiotic 
Passion cannot but witness to the recognition of faith that God is the resource, who tirelessly 
speaks as ‘Loving Third’ to the ‘exhausted subject’. This ‘speaking embrace’690 or genuine 
human love ‘expressed’ in the Son is the fulfilment of the self’s ontological yearning: 
                                               
690 Here I paraphrase Donald Winnicott’s image of the mother when, in a full ‘loving embrace’, she is 
holding the child. See: Donald Winnicott, The Maturational Processes and the Facilitating 
Environment, Karnac Books and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, London 1990, pp.48-49, and 
Donald Winnicott, Babies and Their Mothers, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Wokingham 
1987, (pp.10-12. This ‘maternal care’ is an expression of unconditional love and attentiveness to the 
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‘For the Son, as Jesus here calls himself, is the unique, incomparable Person whose 
life is exclusively a coming from and going to the Father; he draws wearied men into this 
cyclic rhythm in order to free them from their heavy and often totally unnecessary 
burdens, to save them from inner stagnation. He wants to draw them into the fluid, 
eternal stream of love that circulates between the Father and the Son, where the burdens 
of the temporal dimension hardly seem to weigh anything at all.’691 
   
 
7.5.5 The Semiotic Passion − A Metaphor in Its Own Right? 
 
The Semiotic Passion has kept its promise: it offers a more intimate reading of Christ’s 
sacrifice. More than this, it proposes that the image of the ‘mourning Father’ is a theological 
metaphor in its own right. The theological dynamic it reveals shows that the Semiotic 
Passion is more than a ‘counter-myth’ to Freud. It develops the notion of sacrifice within the 
medium of ‘maternal experience’. The ‘independence’ and the usefulness of the analogy are 
shown in the following areas. 
    
   The image of the ‘mourning Father’ may offer a better revision of the economy of 
‘violence’, which seems to remain unchallenged in the traditional readings of the cross. My 
proposal has sketchily outlined that this economy of non-violence exists within traditional 
doctrine. As a model, it offers an effective way to depart from the epistemology and 
hermeneutical dynamic of the classic atonement narrative. 
  
The image of the ‘Mourning Father’ has prepared a strategic access point to the religious 
sensitivity of the postmodern subject. It addresses the ‘anonymous Christian’ of a post-
Christian culture. A different, anthropologically more sensitive piety can emerge, the 
‘spirituality of closeness’. In it, the cooperation of discourses is also included. The linguistic 
imagery presents the Christian Abba within history. Because it internalises the 
anthropological thrust of Kristeva’s Freudianism, it offers a good ground to integrate other 
humanist approaches to the subject. Closing Tales of Love, Kristeva says that in the 
postmodern age we have all become ‘extraterrestrials with a prehistory bearing a wanting for 
                                                                                                                                     
needs of the child. It is from this archetypal or first act of love, which takes place in the ‘original 
unity’ between the mother and the child, from which the whole later development of the person 
unfolds. From the underlying dynamic of Winnicott’s image, we can draw and explore a theological 
analogy of the Father. Analogously to the loving mother who is in the service of the child’s unfolding 
freedom, the Father (loving Abba) as ‘speaking (loving) embrace’ is capable of embracing us with a 
full ‘motherly’ and ‘fatherly’ love. In it, the ultimate ‘Order’ of the Kingdom is also expressed as the 
full presence of Love, as an initiating ‘maternal’ act, as the nourishment which initiates us into a new 
world of freedom. The loving Abba nourishes us and, as ultimate freedom, at the same time respects 
our needs towards the ultimate freedom, which is the ground of our self.  
691 von Balthasar, You Crown the Year With Your Goodness, p.173. 
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love’.692 The analogy of the ‘mourning Father’ connects God with this ‘prehistory’, which 
had become the only real contact with history in our postmodern age. If this ‘exhaustion’ in  
history is real, and if Kristevan psychoanalysis rightly claims to ‘extend’ the Passion to the 
psychic space, then the deepest yearning of the postmodern self is for the all-inclusive love 
of the lost Father. In response to the critique of religion implied by Kristeva’s ‘humanist 
subtexts’, my study identifies this yearning as the need for a non-oedipal, all embracing 
Father who sustains the psychic space:  
    
   ‘Are we concerned with rebuilding their own proper space, a ‘home’, for 
contemporary Narcissi: repair the father, soothe the mother, allow them to build a solid, 
introspective inside, master of its losses and wanderings, assuming that such a goal is 
attainable?’ 693   
    
The Semiotic Passion presents an image of God which is ‘home’ for the contemporary 
Narcissus, the extraterrestrial of Love (God). The ‘linguistic’ reading of the Passion offers an 
‘interruption’ of the banal images of God which classic orthodoxy does not provide. This is 
the unprecedented closeness of the Father to the human self. Classic doctrine must be 
completed with a contemporary re-reading of the Emmanuel.  
 
The Semiotic Passion presents the radical closeness of the Father as the interruption of 
the ‘narcissistic discourses’ of post-modernity. In the context of ‘postmodern exhaustion’, 
the experienced closeness of the Emmanuel-Father is the deepest motivation for freedom. 
The Semiotic Passion offers a model of opening up to this closeness. It speaks directly to the 
subject living in a nihilist culture by presenting a theological experience of freedom. This is 
God’s ultimate solidarity with the human self. A God who is capable of mourning our 
‘exhaustions’ is the deepest possible encouragement to love. This dynamic is not only 
anthropological but also theological. The image of the risk-taking God, who takes upon 
himself the full story of the human being, and who chooses the fragility of human language 
for self-expression, provides the ground for making the Father relevant to postmodern 
culture. Post-modernity is not interested in tradition-based faith, but it is interested in the 
‘self’. The Semiotic Passion makes a connection between the two. Its Father image is a 
support to the subject in a culture which, as a ‘risk society’ (Giddens), permanently urges 
risk taking as a means of controlling the future, but totally ignores what happens within the 
subject.694  At the same time the ‘mourning Father’ is a counter-image to ‘God’s impassible 
                                               
692 Kristeva, Tales of Love, p.382. 
693 Kristeva, Tales of Love, p.379. 
694 Contrary to the ‘neo-optimist’ argument of Beck and Giddens this is not ‘risk taking’ through 
which a culture becomes reflexive. This reflexivity comes from the level of a personal reflection when 
the ‘Father’ as the very source of origins (psychic, cultural, religious) is revisited. See Ulrich Beck, 
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wholeness’, which is our static, ever tempting, metaphysical construct. By correcting the 
disembodied notions of God in the way the Semiotic Passion does, doctrine becomes 
accessible again in the dynamic of the Incarnation. Its metaphors give a ‘post-modern’ 
interpretation of this dynamic. The images of God’s unprecedented closeness interpret 
reconciliation, the central event of Redemption, in a fresh way. The Father as Emmanuel is 
not a theological cliché. All banal associations concerning God are challenged, including the 
banal association of reconciliation. There is more involved in it than a legal pact between 
divine Justice and fallen mankind. This is a genuine drama of Love.  
 
The fact that the ‘mourning Father’ is a theological metaphor in its own right is shown in 
the way it refashions the classic debate on nature and grace. The analogy offers a 
contemporary solution to what Duffy observed as an unfinished program. ‘The problem of 
nature and grace is the problem of finding a bridge across the abyss separating God and 
humanity, of locating the image of God in the human person, and of discovering how the 
human person makes its way back to God.’695 My Introduction deliberately situated the 
encounter with Kristeva in this wider theological context. The Father-image of the Semiotic 
Passion intentionally aims to socialise us out from the God-image which led to the abstract 
concept of a ‘natura pura’, or pure human nature,696 as an ideal. My analogy profoundly 
agrees with the Rahnerian conviction that human existence cannot be seen without being 
involved with grace. Instead of stating the gap between human nature and ‘grace’ as the 
motive for conversion, the Semiotic Passion intends to show a ‘risk-taking God’ who enters, 
fully and not passively, into human history.  
 
In this way, the analogy also makes a non-apologetic counter-offer to Kristeva’s Holbein 
analysis that ‘there is no other side of language.’ The Christian God in the Semiotic Passion 
                                                                                                                                     
‘Politics of Risk Society’ (pp.9-22.), p.11, and Anthony Giddens, ‘Risk Society: the Context of British 
Politics’ (pp.23-34.), in Politics of Risk Society, edited by Jane Franklin, Polity Press and Blackwell, 
Oxford 1998. 
695 Duffy, The Graced Horizon, p.21. 
696 This tricky concept is assigned to the specific early twentieth century theological debate on the 
relationship between nature and grace in nouvelle théologie. We see a reopening of the debate from 
contemporary revisionist neo-Thomism. As a theological counter-reaction to the ‘risk society’, a neo-
orthodoxy emerges which shows an alarming denial of bringing ‘nature and grace’ closer to 
eachother, which de Lubac and his Conciliar generation achieved. The danger is a new re-absorbing of 
the person into metaphysics under the weight of a God-centred natural law. The risk in this type of 
neo-Thomist discourse is a revisionist extension of ‘High Transcendence’ to human nature by over-
emphasising its ‘spiritual dimension’. In our context, Stevan’s approach confirms an anti-
anthropological shift within theology. In a wider sense, the danger is a revision of Vatican II’s policy 
of dialogue with secular humanism and the undermining of the potential of this dialogue as a resource 
for a contemporary anthropology. The Semiotic Passion is deliberately opposes the re-confirmation of 
the metaphysical God-image which speaks with ‘power’ from a ‘splendid isolation’ from the 
particularities of history. See, Stevan A. Long, Natura Pura: On the Recovery of Nature in the 
Doctrine of Grace, Fordham University Press, New York 2010. 
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appears on the ‘hither side’ of language, on our side. Because of the Son, the Father cannot 
stay outside language/nature. The Father becomes most expressive in human language 
through the Son; in his teaching, in his passion and in his Resurrection. This ‘God-realism’ , 
as an answer, was implicitly claimed by the ‘biological realism’ of Freud.697 From within 
God’s ‘metaphysical isolation’ from the particularities of history, where He is presented as a 
totalised ‘super-nature’, atheism and postmodern scepticism cannot be addressed 
structurally.  
 
The Semiotic Passion offers a personalism which integrates previous theological 
discourses. This capacity is a very important means to see the Father-image as a theological 
metaphor in its own right. The paradigm of ‘radical closeness’ spells out ‘the God above the 
God of theism’ of which Paul Tillich spoke. The Semiotic Passion as theology of the cross 
has transcended those forms of theism in which God 
 
‘deprives me of my subjectivity because he is all-powerful and all-knowing. I revolt 
and try to make him into an object… God appears as the invincible tyrant, the being in 
contrast with whom all other beings are without freedom and subjectivity… The God of 
theological theism is…seen as a self which has a world, as an ego which is related to a 
thou, as a cause which is separated from its effect, as having a definite space and an 
endless time. … This is the deepest root of atheism.’698 
 
The image of the Father, who is compassionate towards the human self, actualises in the 
present the ‘cultural mourning’ of previous theological generations. Moreover, Tillich’s 
generation was an important interlocutor of ‘Freudian’ humanism. The existentialist theology 
of modernity emphasised the need for a personal imagery of God. Tillich’s ‘linguistic 
mourning’ is unsurpassed in its claim to re-introduce the lost intimacy of the God-image. 
The analyses of my work have deliberately hinted at the ‘historical layers’ underlying my 
critique. This drawing on the past makes the renewed image of the Father a resource, when 
the way Freud saw the Cross is properly ‘mourned’. The theological generation to which I 
have referred gave a response on behalf of the human self abandoned by the God of ‘high 
theism’. ‘If the self participates in the power of being-itself [unconditional acceptance of the 
Father’s love] it receives itself back.’699 Tillich’s pioneering meditation, The Courage to Be, 
strikingly anticipated the image of the ‘compassionate’ Father who, through the Son’s 
sacrifice, is intrinsic to the human condition. The Father in the Semiotic Passion gives 
courage to the self to look upon its source. The linguistic analogy is in search of a renewed 
                                               
697 Frank J. Sulloway, Freud, Biologist of the Mind, Beyond the Psychoanalytic Legend, Fontana 
Paperbacks, Bungay, Suffolk 1989.  
698 Quotation is edited with rearranged sequence of parts. In Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be, Yale 
University Press, New Haven and London 2000. (Second edition, First published 1952), pp.184-185. 
699 Being-itself is ‘the God who transcends the God of religions’, ibid., p.188. 
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‘existential iconography’. The continuity with the ‘theological avant-garde’ of the past is 
obvious. The Semiotic Passion showed a similar ‘borderline situation’ for theological 
language, which  
 
‘is without the safety of words and concepts, it is without a name, a church, a cult, a 
theology. (…) It is the Church under the Cross which alone can do this, the Church 
which preaches the Crucified who cried to God who remained his God after the God of 
confidence had left him in the darkness of doubt and meaninglessness.’700 
 
God’s coming close to the postmodern self, sharing his story as Emmanuel revealed on 
the cross, offers ‘a participation in something that transcends the self’.701 The consequence of 
the Father’s radical closeness is ‘the acceptance of God, his forgiving or justifying act.’ This 
‘is the only and ultimate source of a courage to be.’702 This acceptance takes away the 
‘ontological’ anxiety of guilt, death, and fate, passed on by modernity to post-modernity. The 
‘loving Father’ of the Semiotic Passion takes away the fundamental anxiety of our age which 
stems from the un-bridged distance between the postmodern self and its unnamed God. 
 
The Semiotic Passion offers an important ‘theological paradigm shift’, owing to moving 
from the ‘blood-narrative’ to the ‘bloodless’ linguistic imagery. This is a renewed sense of 
universalism. The Semiotic Passion has introduced the ‘Loving Third’ as a universal 
narrative which connects the ‘speaking being’ (the subject of history), Christ the ‘absolute 
subject’, and the Father. I highlight a particular form of this seemingly theoretical ‘cultural 
mourning’. This universalism through the ‘speaking being’ has a powerful potential to 
correct the hidden ‘theological anti-Judaism’ which was attached to the ‘historical’ reading 
of the Passion, when the blame for killing Jesus was put on ‘the Jews’.703 I firmly emphasise 
here the positive deconstructive potential which the anthropology of the Semiotic Passion 
introduces into theological concepts. The Semiotic Passion, at this highly practical level, can 
be made a resource for dealing with historical forms of discrimination. 
 
A further justification of the ‘linguistic metaphor’ is the ethical fellowship which the 
event of the Cross creates. It is in this community that compassionate love evolves. The 
                                               
700 Tillich, The Courage to Be, pp.188-189. 
701 Ibid., p.165. 
702 Ibid., p.166. 
703 ‘Here are the enemies − if we may so judge − in ascending order of guilt: the soldiers, the crowd, 
Pilate and Herod, the Jewish leaders, Judas… But these people, whose behaviour will be so savage 
and inhuman, are not in any degree responsible for the Passion. They are obeying orders; they think 
they are doing no wrong in carrying out a sentence passed jointly by the Jewish authority and by that 
of Rome. These two powers assume all responsibility − the external execution of their commands 
might be regareded as nothing more than an innocent co-operation.’ In A. D. Sertillanges, O.P, What 
Jesus Saw From the Cross, Clonmore & Reynolds, Dublin 1948 (Original publication 1937), p.112. 
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Father’s compassion as ‘Loving Third’ reveals a whole community of mourners in the 
‘semiotic’ scene of the Passion. The participants of this fellowship included the following: 
(1) Symbolically, ‘John’ as the ‘speaking being’ in us whose compassionate response to 
Christ we examined; (2) ‘Mary’ as the ‘loving third party’ symbolising a mother’s solidarity 
with the ‘Son-child’ and with the ‘Father’ who is also losing the child; (3) the Abba who is 
most intensely involved in this ‘mourning’ over Christ’s suffering. In this way, the Semiotic 
Passion draws attention to the communal dimension of ethics, which my critique objected to 
as not sufficiently developed in Kristeva’s psychoanalytical ethics. The ‘semiotic’ reading 
points to the root of this fellowship from a new perspective. It re-actualises, in a postmodern 
context, Barth’s emphasis on the creative Word of God as the origin of fellowship.704 The 
intimate suffering of the Father that the Semiotic Passion presents is just as generative as 
God’s ‘powerful’ voice in Creation. This is the New Testament dynamic of ‘power in 
powerlessness’ or Saint Paul’s voice for post-modernity: ‘But he said to me, “My grace is 
sufficient for you, for my power is made perfect in weakness.” Therefore I will boast all the 
more gladly about my weaknesses, so that Christ’s power my rest on me.’ (2 Cor 12:9) This 
is a powerful revaluation of the postmodern subject: brokenness can ground the fellowship. 
 
The linguistic metaphor of God is a theological statement. It confirms that there is no 
recovery from the ‘death of our language’ without responding to Transcendence as our 
‘Loving Third’. To put this conclusion into context, my study is well aware that the Semiotic 
Passion has always to keep the theology of the cross as a reference. There is a special 
dialectic between the ‘linguistic imagery’ of the Father it has introduced, and the doctrine 
underlying the classic representation of the Cross. The theology of the cross of theological 
modernity has not given an exhaustive response to Kristeva’s ‘semiotic’ anthropology. 
Without the personal direction of the Semiotic Passion, we cannot speak of a comprehensive 
response to Kristeva. However, it also has to be emphasised that the Semiotic Passion would 
remain a theological myth without the orthodoxy and theological approach of 
Rahner/Metz/Moltmann/Balthasar. This ‘Balthasarian’ orthodoxy itself confirms the 
reciprocity between ‘man’ and God in the ‘maternal metaphor’, upon which dynamic I 
grounded my experimental reading of the Father: 
 
‘The heart, man’s centre, where soul and body are one, must decide to become a 
womb for God’s seed. Here the heart, the most secret and yet most vulnerable, the most 
central and yet most exposed part of man, has the power to open or close itself.’705 
 
                                               
704 See: ‘The Problem of Special Ethics’ (pp. 1-46), in Karl Barth’s Church Dogmatics Vol. III, 
Four, The Doctrine of Creation (Editors, G.W. Bromiley and T.F. Torrance), T&T Clark, Edinburgh 
1958-61, cf.pp-4-9. 
705 von Balthasar, You Crown the Year With Your Goodness, p.194. 
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‘The good will is ‘received’, accepta, as the seed of God and of eternal freedom in 
the womb of human freedom, and the ‘opening’ of this womb to God − as obedience − is 
precisely the reception of freedom.’706 
 
‘…Man becomes the womb that receives the word that is initially foreign to him. 
This word is sown in him, and he bears this seed to birth − not for himself, but for God, 
since it is a divine seed. And he gives back to its possessor the fruit that has reached its 
term, which belongs to God and yet is also the product of the womb. Man is expropriated 
a first time, when God lays claim to him as a field for his seed, and a second time, when 
the fruit that is borne is taken from him so that it may be brought into God’s granary (Mt 
3,12). But in the midst of all this he is endowed at a deeper level with creative force that 
is able to respond to the requirement to bear divine fruit; indeed, he is endowed with a 
divine principle of fruitfulness that is the very word of God that has been sown in him: 
the seed makes over to the womb the appropriate form of fruitfulness, so that − in the 
image of the vine − the logic of relationships is inverted: Christ becomes the womb that 
bears, the fruitful vine-stock, and the believers become the branches that it produces 
without in any way being released from the obligation to produce grapes, which is the 
ultimate concern of the owner of the vineyard.’707 
 
Elucidating the theological potentials of the ‘linguistic’ representation of the Passion has 
to comply with the ultimate theological criterion: there is no replacing of Jesus as access to 
the Father with either ‘Mary’ or with any anthropological insight. It is the Son, exclusively, 
who reveals the anguish of the Father. However, there is an important dialectic between the 
theophany (appearance) of God and human language. Man’s involvement in love, our 
common origin with Jesus from the ‘Loving Third party’, the ‘loving and caring father of 
individual pre-history’, is revelatory of ‘God’s interior’. Human love discloses and 
recognises, as a response to his self-revelation, what happens in the divine interior as 
‘absolute Love’.  
 
The theological dynamics, which I have summed up, present an image of God which 
actually communicates with Kristeva’s materialist regime. The Semiotic Passion also 
communicates with the Trinitarian approach which Hanvey’s groundbreaking reading of 
Kristeva assigned for her theological critique.  
 
‘The being, life, truth and beauty that are ensured by God’s being are the therapeutic 
chora; metaphysics is not a superstructure but the deep grammar of the goodness of what 
is. [Augustine] places the becoming of human subjectivity within the dynamic of longing 
and desire, under the salvific force of the pondus amoris, for the other who is God: we 
are not so much governed by the fear of dissolution and death in the sea of finitude but 
                                               
706 Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord, A Theological Aesthetics, Volume II, Studies in 
Theological Style: Clerical Styles, Ignatius Press, San Francisco, T&T Clarc London 1998. (First 
publication, Herrlichkeit: Eine theologische Ästhetik, II: Fächer der Stile, I: Klerikale Stile, Johannes 
Verlag, Einsiedeln 1962.), p.245. 
707 Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord, Vol. 2, p.420. 
 277 
drawn, searching and thirsting for life and the integrity of our being – the stable ordering 
of desire and love – the supreme beauty that is God [‘s compassionate love].’ 708 
 
The Semiotic Passion has translated this ‘Trinitarian’ program in a non-apologetic way. 
It has spelled out a ‘comprehensive response’ to Kristeva’s intention to bring about a new 
‘intimate revolt’ in culture. It has to start with a new intimate reading of the Christian cross 
and the post-Christian self. 
                                               
708 Hanvey, ‘Other than Stranger’, pp. 134-135.  
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8 SUMMARY OF THE THESIS AND CONCLUSIONS  
 
The two major objectives of my work were to offer a theological critique of Kristeva and 
present her as an important dialogue partner for systematic theology. Part One set up the 
framework for realising these objectives, which Part Two completed by relating the theology 
of the cross to Kristeva’s project. My work argued the thesis that the central problem of 
Kristeva’s work is the ‘exhausted subject’ of modernity and post-modernity, and that this 
‘ontic’ crisis can only be resolved through a theological engagement, namely, through the 
‘Semiotic Passion’, which is a comprehensive response from the theology of the cross. It is 
this which provides the best ground for developing a systemic engagement. 
 
The three levels of engagement which my study established were as follows. The 
apologetic relationship, the inter-textual relationship (potential dialogue), and the ‘intra-
textual’ relationship (actual co-operation). These corresponded to the critique of Kristeva’s 
materialism (Part One), engaging her through representatives of the theologia crucis, and the 
image of the Father in the Semiotic Passion (Part Two). These levels have translated 
Kristeva’s project into a theological dynamic. Theology has learnt that the secular experience 
of suffering is a passion narrative in its own right; and it has to be seen within the economy 
of Christ’s cross. Kristeva spelled out these two claims. 
 
Part One posited the ‘speaking being’ as an ontological vision of the postmodern subject, 
based on materialism. Kristeva’s response to the changing conditions of the subject from 
modernity to post-modernity showed the ‘speaking being’ as a complex humanist program. 
The ‘semiotic’ vision of the person from the outset was intertwined with Kristeva’s critique 
of religion. She defined her psychoanalytic viewpoint as a necessary substitution for 
religious discourse. In an increasingly secular culture, she argued, religion does not pay 
sufficient attention to ‘psychic suffering’. For her, it is psychoanalytic anthropology and 
ethics which fulfil this task and keep discourse on love alive. This stance, however non-
polemic in intention, has set up an apologetic relationship with theology. A major task of my 
work was to tackle this tension. Part One explored the ‘ontological’ background of 
Kristeva’s position in order to see clearly the motives of her project. I made a ‘structural 
analysis’ of the tension by pointing to her ‘humanist subtexts’ at work. In line with the 
classic approach of theology, first I gave a critique of the grounding of the ‘speaking being’ 
in materialism. The theological critique of Kristeva, I argued, has to start with this 
‘ideological’ response.   
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Focusing on Revolution in Poetic Language, my study pointed out the intrinsic 
connection between the program of the self-transcending subject and Kristeva’s early 
materialism. Identifying the systemic exclusion of ‘grace’ was an important step in 
developing a theological reading of Kristeva’s work. The other major access point was 
pointing out the ‘exhausted subject’ as the main problem of the oeuvre. Kristeva’s 
materialism and the development of her work from revolutionary post-structuralism to 
healing in a postmodern culture suggested a specific historical approach. From the analysis 
of Kristeva’s ‘historical program’, I concluded that it is possible to see Kristeva’s ‘semiotic’ 
account of the relationship between the person and culture as a complex ‘ontological 
program’ which, at the same time, is a correction of traditional metaphysics. 
 
The analyses of Part One identified important points of contact between Kristeva and 
religion. Her critique of religion, her use of Christian imagery, her substituting 
psychoanalysis for religion gave support to engaging with her ‘semiotic soteriology’. Part 
One primarily focused on the ‘ontological tension’ with Kristeva’s semiotic strategies, and 
pointed out the limits of her immanent resourcing of the self. At the same time, with regard 
to the ethics she developed, I also sought a dialogue between her objectives and theology. I 
concluded that theology has to recognise her as a valuable anthropological resource for 
approaching the subject in a postmodern culture.  
 
Identifying the ongoing ‘exhaustion’ of the subject was pivotal in finding an alternative 
to the ‘apologetic criticism’, which the ideological tension ‘automatically’ suggested. The 
challenge of the ‘exhausted subject’ brought into critical dialogue the psychoanalytical and 
the theological resourcing of the self. The emphasis was shifted from difference to a co-
operation. In view of the objective need to give support to the endangered ‘person’, my study 
developed a sympathetic reading of Kristeva’s synthesis of the resources of the 
‘Enlightenment’. I suggested reading her Freudianism in terms of a complex ‘cultural 
mourning’. This ‘cultural mourning’ revealed an inner revision of resources within secular 
humanism. My critique posited at the heart of this ‘cultural mourning’ the Habermasian 
agenda that ‘something is missing’ from the secular understanding of the Enlightenment 
project and modernity. My work articulated the ignored religious dimension of the self as 
‘what is missing’. I explored the paradoxical situation that a dialogue between Kristeva and 
theology is a more realistic prospect than between her Freudianism and neo-rationalist 
humanisms.  
 
In view of the conflict with Kristeva’s materialism, my work made central the 
‘ontological exhaustion’ of the subject. I identified it as an unfinished mourning for the lost 
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Christian past. Kristeva’s novels revealed this unacknowledged suffering of the postmodern 
subject. Though Kristeva did not regard the lost Christian past as an ‘ontic’ exhaustion of the 
subject, nevertheless the ‘post-Christian self’ has became her recent focus. This shared 
historical concern with her made it possible to raise the critique onto a symbolic level. That 
Kristeva’s ‘cultural mourning’ on behalf of the Freudian tradition is not unrelated to religion 
was confirmed by her recent dialogical position with Christians. This dialogical turn offered 
a real resolution for the aporias which, within a traditional critique of her materialism, could 
not have been resolved. 
 
Given the objective tension with Kristeva’s founding materialism, my strategy was to 
continue my critique by responding positively to her ‘cultural mourning’. In this way, it 
became possible to evaluate her ‘ontological’ utterances in a fresh way. The critical 
questions which Kristeva’s ‘atheistic subtexts’ posed to religion revealed that theology itself 
is in the process of ‘mourning’ for the past (cultural and symbolic). As the outcome of the 
interaction of the two ‘symbolic mournings’ (Kristeva, theology), my working hypothesis 
was that it is possible to reopen the ‘ontological discussion’ which Habermas forbade.  
 
Part Two linked the two ‘symbolic mournings’ to the situation of the lost Father. I 
arrived at a common denominator by making central the loss of the ‘Father’s love’. This loss 
offered a dynamic which could be shared between psychoanalysis and faith. The dynamic of 
love described analogously the loss of the psychologically understood ‘loving third party’, 
and when this loss is understood as the lost relationship with the Christian Abba. The cultural 
role of the ‘loving third party’ was raised onto the level of a genuine cultural metaphor. 
Evaluating its support in recovering meaning was actually again making ontological 
statements about the human being. This solution has repositioned the Kristeva-Habermas 
relationship, the opening image of my study. The crisis of the ‘exhausted subject’, as the 
intensification of the nihilist crisis, made it necessary to develop an in-depth description of 
the situation. The common ground for a non-metaphysical approach to origin was an 
understanding of the crisis ‘from within’, which rightly can be termed the ‘ontology of love’. 
The crisis, Kristeva fully agreed, can be explicated best through the lens of the regenerative 
dynamic of love. My study presented three ways of reading the Passion, that of Freud, 
Kristeva, and that of theology.  
 
Highlighting Kristeva’s Freudian subtext was significant because it raised the question 
of the quality of the God-image. In this critical dialogue the motives of the two types of 
humanism interacted, rather than their ‘ontological’ and ideological statements. Having 
made the God-image central in this way, it became a unifying centre of my critique. The 
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emphasis was shifted to the objective quest to counteract the nihilism of culture. My study 
identified this counter-cultural economy, in agreement with Kristeva’s critique of culture 
from a sub-psychic viewpoint, in ‘non-violent’ and all inclusive love. This cultural dynamic 
made it possible that, instead of a metaphysical and onto-theological epistemology, the 
image of the Father could be presented as a narrative which grounds the genuine humanism 
of the self and that of culture.  
 
Freud’s historical critique of the ‘bloody imagery’ of the Cross and the underlying 
‘oedipal’ nature of a God which he read into it, I argued, was a critique of a distorted 
atonement theology. The latter has never been fully revised in modernity. Under full 
revision, I also understood the potential for co-operation with secular humanism to resolve 
the problem. My working hypothesis was that, if this revision takes place, a whole new 
symbolic dialogue opens up between our ‘split’ discourses. As a result, an effective 
partnership to preserve the ‘European subject’ can be brought to realisation. That is why Part 
Two brought into dialogue all the relevant major narratives about the God-image and the 
person. These were Freud’s reading of the Cross, Kristeva’s correction of Freud’s approach 
to religion, her critique of religion and culture, her recent reading of the Passion, and the 
theologia crucis.  
 
Kristeva’s Lenten meditation on ‘Suffering’ could be singled out as a direct point of 
contact. Her secular reading of the Cross not only expressed a dialogical position, but also 
made the Cross an internal reference within her system. Kristeva’s interest in the crisis of the 
symbols of love showed the Cross as the Symbol which can be shared with her ‘immanent’ 
regime. This offered a point of contact with her notion of Christ as the ‘absolute subject’. In 
the essay, ‘Suffering’, Kristeva recapitulated her semiotics as an ethical project. She made 
her important ideological correction of Freud in reference to the Cross, the central symbol of 
Christianity. Religion for her, faith in the other, is not an illusion but our innermost pre-
religious need. Kristeva rehabilitated the ‘Father’ in her psychoanalytical ethics too. The 
Father was presented as the source of compassionate love and solidarity with the sufferer. 
With this correction, Kristeva made it possible to establish an ‘inter-textual’ relationship 
with my theological sources.  The heart of making these connections was the theme of divine 
kenosis. My study submitted a comprehensive response which I termed theology’s ‘Semiotic 
Passion’. This argued that the theologia crucis has sufficient resources for a response to 
Kristeva. My central concern was pointing out that it has already undertaken a ‘symbolic 
mourning’, from which ground an anthropologically and theologically relevant dialogue can 
be started with Kristeva’s humanism in the present.  
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The synopsis of my chosen resources (Rahner, Moltmann, Metz and Balthasar) had 
firmly in view Kristeva’s psychoanalytical critique of religion and the problems that her 
system as a whole raises for religion, particularly for theology. As a response to her most 
recent reading of the Passion, my study developed a particular interest in the psychological 
dynamic of ‘idealisation’. Kristeva’s concept of the ‘Loving Third’ as the ‘centre’ of love 
allowed for the possibility of tackling constructively the Freudian critique of religion and 
Kristeva’s claim to incorporate the ‘feminine sacred’ into the ‘meaning’ (of life). The other 
area to which I wished to respond was Kristeva’s psychoanalytical interest in history. The 
relationship between the self and culture, my sources argued, should not be seen only as an 
‘individual’ relationship. I presented Metz’s concept of eschatological solidarity with the 
sufferers of the past, and Moltmann’s notion of the suffering Christ present in secular culture 
as resources for bringing out the collective dimension of anthropology. I presented 
Balthasar’s Trinitarian kenosis theology as a ‘meta-anthropology’ which helps in recovering 
the sense of external history. I found their contributions indispensable for opening up the 
‘isolated’ self. I presented these authorities as especially essential in our postmodern culture, 
in which the sense of history has been erased. Opening up the self to the future is an 
important defence against culture’s ‘melancholy’ which locks us into the present. Moltmann 
masterfully explained that the Cross of the suffering Jesus is the cross of the risen Christ. 
Christ’s Passion is the incarnation of the future of God with humanity. Together with Metz, 
they gave a real historical weight to Balthasar’s ‘meta-anthropology’.  
 
The closing part of my study presented the Semiotic Passion. It was the culmination of 
the aim to bring into a synopsis the major themes of Kristeva and the theology of the cross.  
Despite its narrow focus on the scene of the Passion, it proved to be a ‘master-narrative’ in 
terms of a shared hermeneutical centre. The Semiotic Passion ‘updated’ my chosen resources 
by making divine kenosis internal to the postmodern self. I presented it as the contribution of 
theology for recovering the Father’s love in the postmodern context. The linguistic or 
‘semiotic’ imagery of the Cross, I argued, is a theological metaphor in its own right. It 
brought to realisation a shared symbol building with Kristeva. 
 
My critique focused on establishing textual links between Kristeva and the theology of 
the cross. As there is no established response from systematic theology, it was a meticulous 
task to build up these textual ‘dialogues’. I presented them throughout the full course of my 
work as bridges. These textual gateways can be developed into fully articulated dialogues. A 
theological reading of Kristeva could not be based on the sporadic engagements of secondary 
literature. This is why I have concentrated mainly on dialogue with primary texts. 
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What did my critique achieve, particularly the Semiotic Passion? The response to 
Kristeva’s ‘historical subtexts’ required drawing on theological resources not only of the 
present but also of the past. My study deliberately referred, however briefly, to works of 
previous theological generations who worked in the shadow of the Church’s ‘apologetic 
epoch’. In the context of theology’s ‘symbolic mourning’, we can say that the ideological 
failures of the older generations are also useful in understanding the present situation. Their 
struggle to overcome the weighty apologetics of the past through their pioneering discourses 
(e.g., Barth, J.A.T Robinson, Tillich, Brunner) has a continuity with the present. Today it is 
easier to remove what was ‘fear’ or mistrust in their work. Their apology of faith can also 
work positively. They can unmask naïve expectations in present dialogues with ‘post-
modernity’. Deliberately pointing to voices beyond my immediate resources was meant to 
show that, in a theological context, the ‘post-structuralist principle’ should not be feared. 
Language [theology] is a process, and meaning is always multi-layered. Past agendas can be 
integrated, and they can enhance analysis. A further dialogue with Kristeva could include the 
solutions of theologians who were contemporaries with Freud, Melanie Klein and Arendt. 
 
The Semiotic Passion can be regarded as a response to all major groups of questions that 
the ‘exhausted subject’ and Kristeva’s project have raised. To theology, the answer is that it 
is possible to present Christ’s sacrifice outside the language of the atonement. To Kristeva’s 
critique of nihilism, the response is that it is possible to present the Christian Father as a 
counter-cultural image which counteracts ‘violence’. The close relating of ‘God’ with the 
human self showed the Christian Father not simply as ‘counter-cultural’ but as an intra-
cultural image. The classic theological program of ‘interrupting culture’ can be maintained, 
but from a different angle. Today God as an intimate interruption of our age has to be 
spelled out. To the humanist critique of religion, the answer is that theology can learn from 
the ‘psychoanalytical shift’ in culture, and represent God within the self, particularly for the 
postmodern subject. To Kristeva’s wider context, ‘post-metaphysical consciousness’, the 
theologia crucis presents the Trinitarian theology of divine kenosis. There is a communal 
dimension of reason, ‘anthropology’ and ethics which is missing from secular discourse. In 
other words, what is missing is the ‘mourning’ of the subject’s religious past. This is the 
self’s yearning for its genuine communal Trinitarian grounding.  
 
My study demonstrated a co-operation between psychoanalysis and faith in a similar 
logic to the way Charles Taylor related secular humanism with theology. According to his 
thesis, there are certain elements of Christian truth which could not have developed within 
the religious framework of Christendom. There are authentic developments of the Gospel 
which took place within the secular Enlightenment to the extent that ‘some of the most 
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impressive extensions of a gospel ethic depended on the breakaway from Christendom.’709 It 
is this ‘borderline situation’ in which my study envisages Kristeva as a lasting dialogue 
partner of theology. I am convinced that the bridge-narrative of the ‘mourning Father’ can 
integrate Kristevan psychoanalysis, which is centred on the ‘autonomy’ of the self, with 
theology, which ab ovo questions this self-sufficiency and the immanent resources of the 
self. My metaphor is not an easy synthesis as it recognises that between psychoanalysis and 
faith there always remains a tension.  
 
The common symbolic mourning has resulted in the possibility that theology can make 
some legitimate requests. First, it asks psychoanalysis to revise as much as possible its 
ideological premises concerning ‘theology’. The Semiotic Passion also legitimately asks of 
the psychoanalytical hermeneutic of culture to revise its fears of the symbolic language of 
faith. Referring back to Kristeva’s position in post-metaphysical consciousness (Habermas), 
there is an important common platform with her. Ricoeur showed that the main challenge 
that Western civilisation faces today is the general loss of sensitivity to symbolic language. 
710 He firmly criticised both Cartesian rationality and the late masters of suspicion, Freud and 
Marx, for their ‘demystifying hermeneutics’.711 Kristeva fully agrees with theology about the 
need to return to symbolic language. This ‘unverifiable’ medium was a main cause of her 
departure from Habermas’ rationalism. The ‘monologism of reason’ is unable to ‘symbolise’ 
and let reason dream of love. The Semiotic Passion, in this context, aimed at offering an 
image of the Father which can dispel the fear that the use of religious symbolism might 
endanger the competence of Enlightenment reason. In my work I found it important to 
address constructively these ideological fears in Kristeva’s ‘atheistic subtexts’. 
 
The Semiotic Passion as a mode of ‘symbolic mourning’ aimed at correcting the 
reductive view of religion which underlies secular humanism. This fundamental conflict for 
theological critique cannot be avoided as the ontological statements of theology inevitably 
point to the latent ‘Feuerbachian’ ground of ‘post-metaphysical consciousness’. ‘They still 
accuse us, and all transcendent language users, of “false consciousness”.’712 I regard as the 
main achievement of the Semiotic Passion that it initiated a shared symbolisation with 
‘secular’ anthropology. It showed the Cross as an important ‘reality detector’ in our 
postmodern world. The symbol, including the religious symbol, is a ‘reality detector’ which 
                                               
709 Taylor, A Catholic Modernity? p.36. 
710 Lewis S. Mudge, ‘Introduction’ to Paul Ricoeur, Essays on Biblical Interpretation, edited by Lewis 
S. Mudge, Fortress Press, Philadelphia 1980, p.4. 
711 Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, p.35. 
712 Mudge, ‘Introduction’, in Ricoeur, Essays on Biblical Interpretation, p.5. 
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enables us to discern a human possibility that could not be discerned in any other way.713 As 
Ricoeur puts it, ‘through these “detector” representations, man tells the origin of his 
humanity.’714 
 
From a dogmatic point of view, there are questionable parts in the ‘semiotic Passion’. 
But nevertheless, I emphasise, it is a model. That there may imprecise doctrinal formulations 
is obvious, as the ‘semiotic Passion’ touches on a long unvisited theme, ‘suffering in God’. 
Since the heresy of ‘Theopaschism’ up to the present, there is no satisfying solution as to 
what it means that ‘God has suffered’.715 I have indicated the doctrines this imagery touches 
on, but they were not my main concern. Yet I posited the ‘maternal metaphor’ of God as an 
important internal subject for theology. I argued its spiritual potential. It prompts a fresh 
reflection on the meaning of the cross for the ‘exhausted subject’ who is always an 
‘anonymous Christian’. Can we re-phrase Tertullian by raising the question if ‘cultura 
naturaliter Christiana est’, that is, if European culture is naturally Christian. 
 
A major conclusion of my research is that it is no longer possible to reflect on faith today 
while staying outside the Freudian critique of religion. Where the image of the ‘mourning 
Father’ can prove especially useful is the encouragement that Christians should not be 
frightened away from the thought that there are projections in their religious language.716 The 
Semiotic Passion highlighted our common anthropological drama with the Father. God, as it 
were, took a serious risk in the Incarnation when he opted for revealing Himself in images 
based on ‘identification’ with the parental imago. But what else could he do? If our primary 
experience of love is expressed through this ‘parental’ imagery, there is no other way for 
Him and for us but a shared human language. We cannot become extraterrestrials to our 
anthropocentric images. 
 
The biggest difficulty is not to fall back into Kristeva’s own immanentism, i.e. 
Christianity providing another range of symbols for what is essentially an internal subjective 
drama. If these remain only at the psychic level they will eventually suffer the same fate of 
‘exhaustion’ as the human psyche. What added riches Christianity brings are the historical 
rootedness of Redemption, its ‘facticity’, and its capacity for transcending time and space 
while being rooted in it. In other words, it is the challenge and the possibility, the shock of 
the real Other. Moreover, the other dimension of this Christian Other is that there is a 
                                               
713 Ricoeur, Essays on Biblical Interpretation, p.7. 
714 Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, , p.540. 
715 Cantalamessa, Life in Christ, p.94.  
716 See Rizzuto’s attempts to dialogue with the Freudian critique of the Christian God-image, Rizzuto, 
The Birth of The Living God. 
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redemptive community created by this otherness in which we are inscribed. My study 
repeatedly asked the question if this is what is essentially lacking in Kristeva’s 
psychoanalytical ethics. In other words, the ‘Semiotic Passion’ had to show that it represents 
the full dynamics of the Passion and that it offers more than a psychological liberation. That 
is why I presented the linguistic imagery as a complementary image of the Passion. I 
emphasised that the link should be retained with the ‘orthodox imagery’ of my chosen 
resources. 
 
It is putting the ‘Semiotic Passion’ into a wider context that answers the question 
whether the ‘semiotic’ Father is a theological myth or not. This wider context is post-
Conciliar Trinitarian theology. This is the most important source for demonstrating God’s 
inexhaustible love. The Semiotic Passion understood the imago dei as the ‘imitatio 
Trinitatis’. There is an analogy between our dynamic (personal and social) and the Trinity. 
In so far as we enter into this dynamic, this is the moment of salvation. Where the Semiotic 
Passion departs from the position of a non-believer is in choosing this imitation of the 
Trinity as the self’s ultimate reference. In order for us to be the true image of God, fulfilling 
the self’s potential, we have to love and actualise (‘perform’) his image in us. This is a 
movement into a salvific economy when God’s own life becomes the norm. My critique 
followed Hanvey’s Trinitarian imperative: ‘We must come to understand that we are not 
self-grounding but given. Until we grasp this we are exiles in a land of self-alienation, not 
Narcissus but Sisyphus, caught in the limitless futility of self-healing and self 
construction.’717 This principle prevents theological myth-making.  
 
The image of the ‘Loving Third party’ in the Passion makes sense only if the Father 
really points to the ‘graced’ Symbolic Order of the Kingdom. In order to meet this criterion 
the Semiotic Passion harmonised the Kristevan and the Kierkegaardian notions of the self in 
this context. We can evaluate the ‘semiotic’ reading of the Passion as a more realistic and 
critical synopsis of the two programmes than the one suggested by Lorraine. The linguistic 
imagery of the Passion joined Kierkegaard’s program by arguing that the psychic economy 
of love has a ‘beyond’, which is faith in the infinite Other. Fellowship with the ‘mourning 
Father’ translates quite well both Kristeva’s emphasis on the subject’s uniqueness and 
Kierkegaard’s notion that the self’s uniqueness is grounded in God’s universal and eternal 
love. That is why the Semiotic Passion presented the Father’s ‘suffering’ as the anticipation 
of Easter. I imagine a continuation of the ‘semiotic’ Passion as a conversation with the 
‘celebrating Father’ who rejoices in the self’s resurrection, psychic and ontological. It could 
                                               
717 Hanvey, ‘Other than Stranger’, p.139. 
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be a reinterpretation of Kristeva’s program of jouissance, the joy over our historical 
‘incarnation’ in the body. This possible direction unfolds perhaps the most important 
strategic recognition of my study. Namely, that in the fragmentation in which theological and 
humanist discourses live, their new integration becomes possible only with a new ‘subjective 
turn’. That is when the suffering of the ‘exhausted subject’ becomes their central and 
common reference.  
 
In this writer’s view, the future of the Church in Europe will depend on the dialogue 
with secular humanism or ‘atheism’. This is a borderline situation which alone can bring 
about a ‘revolutionary’ renewal of the language of faith. The encounter with Kristeva was 
such a linguistic encounter. This encounter revealed the dialectical structure of my study. 
That is to say, Kristeva made her corrections of Freud’s critique of religion in reference to 
the Cross; the Semiotic Passion corrected the atonement language of sacrifice in reference to 
Kristeva’s semiotic symbolism. As we have seen, this dialectic became alive in refashioning 
Rahner’s metaphor, the ‘anonymous Christian’. My ‘Good Friday dialogue’ identified him as 
the ‘anonymous sufferer’ or the ‘exhausted subject’ of our post-Christian and ‘post-
Enlightenment’ culture. The engagement with the ‘speaking being’ has led theology and 
secular humanism to a crucial recognition. The postmodern self is always a post-Christian 
self, deeply marked by its own (un-reflected!) Christian past. This ‘exhausted subject’ bears 
a heritage which neither he nor our culture can sufficiently name.  
 
The Semiotic Passion showed an example of the linguistic innovation which such a 
‘Good Friday dialogue’ can bring about. The stake is very high: theology has to re-learn its 
language and that of the world. For it is through such encounters that the ‘mystical language’ 
of the Church can again open up to contemporary history. As the metaphors of the Semiotic 
Passion aimed to show, a dynamic can emerge where the ‘Mystery of God’, understood in 
the human interior, can be offered to the secular quest for love and meaning. It is a 
retroactive learning process.  
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Appendix 1.a 
 
KEY HERMENEUTIC TERMS OF THE THESIS 
 
 
Inter-textual relationship, ‘inter-textuality’ 
 
‘Inter-textuality’ is a major concept of Kristeva’s post-structuralist linguistics, coined by 
her. ‘Inter-textuality’ means interpreting texts as crossing of texts. The meaning of a text is 
never fixed, it is always in relation to other texts and traditions. I apply the term to denote the 
internal dialogue between Kristeva’s Freudianism and theology.  
 
‘Inter-textuality’ is ‘defined in La Révolution du Langage Poétique as the transposition 
of one or more systems of signs into another, accompanied by a new articulation of the 
enunciative and denotative position’. In the specific context of our study, ‘inter-textuality’ is 
closely related to the process of ‘cultural mourning’.718  
 
 
‘Cultural mourning’ 
 
‘Cultural mourning’ or ‘symbolic mourning’ is the underlying hermeneutical principle of 
my work. Drawing on Peter Homans, my method is to reconnect the ‘split discourses’ 
underlying Kristeva and theology. We can approach her work as an intense reflection on a 
‘lost’ Christian past and how its heritage is preserved in secular humanism. Theology, on its 
side, also develops a ‘symbolic mourning’ when it reflects on the conflict with secular 
humanism. Through this concept my study brings Kristeva’s materialism, Freudianism and 
theology into a constructive dialogue.  
 
 
‘Sub-text’, Kristeva’s ‘sub-texts’ 
 
The term refers in general to Kristeva’s formative traditions, such as her Marxism and 
Freudianism, as her atheistic or humanist sub-texts. Their importance is that while these 
‘sub-texts’ are never direct objects of Kristeva’s investigations as ‘ideologies’, they remain 
effective. My critique also develops a dialogue with the ideological dimension of these ‘sub-
texts’. 
 
 
The ‘exhausted subject’ and ‘ontic’ exhaustion 
 
The ‘exhausted subject’ is the central and most frequently recurring term of my thesis. 
As a hermeneutical concept, it denotes what historically has happened to the subject of 
modernity and post-modernity. The crisis of the subject is a central problem for critical 
theories. My study, while being attentive to these findings, is primarily interested in the 
theological aspects of the crisis. ‘Exhaustion’ in my use is always linked with the 
regenerative dynamic of ‘grace’. When used in this sense, its synonymous meaning is the 
‘ontic’ or ‘ontological exhaustion’ of the subject. ‘Ontic’ or ‘ontological exhaustion’ 
emphasises the fact that the crisis affects the whole being of the person. 
 
                                               
718 Roudiez’s definition from the ‘Introduction’ to Kristeva’s Desire in Language, p.15. 
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‘Good Friday dialogue’  
 
First, the metaphor ‘Good Friday dialogue’ refers to the actual borderline situation of 
engagement with Kristeva. It makes the theological problems that her psychoanalytical 
horizon generates central. ‘Good Friday dialogue’ has a second symbolic meaning: it brings 
together the themes of common interest to Kristeva and theology, such as language, the 
person, love, suffering, and Christ. 
 
 
‘Split discourses’, ‘shared crisis’ 
 
I use the term ‘split discourses’ to denote the historical conflict with Kristeva’s major 
formative traditions (‘Marx’, ‘Freud’). There are two standard ways of relating to the ‘split’. 
The first actively accepts the division. This is the ‘apologetic approach’. The second way is 
bringing the opposing positions closer by understanding their historical motives. My 
preference is for the latter. The novelty of my approach is that whereas the promoters of 
dialogue with secular humanism on the religious side (e.g., Charles Taylor, William 
Meissner, Peter Homans, Louis Dupré) do not operate with the notion of a shared crisis of 
the subject, my study makes it central. The term ‘split discourse’ will always refer to the lack 
of a shared approach to the crisis of subject or culture. Operating with a shared crisis of the 
person in a shared culture, facing a shared nihilism forces the secular and the religious 
positions to revisit their ‘unshared past’. 
 
 
 ‘Semiotic Passion’ 
 
The ‘Semiotic Passion’ expresses a dialogue in which theological critique does not 
remain extrinsic to Kristeva’s psycho-linguistic system but has a thorough understanding of 
her system (which is called her ‘semiotics’).   
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Appendix I.  
 
KIERKEGAARD’S GROUNDING THE SELF IN GOD 
 
 
 
‘The self is the conscious synthesis of infinitude and finitude that relates itself to 
itself, whose task is to become itself, which can be done only through the relationship to 
God…. Consequently, the progress of the becoming must be an infinitive moving away 
from itself in the infinitizing of the self… But if the self does not become itself, it is in 
despair, whether it knows or not.” (Sickness unto Death) 719 
 
‘But this self takes on a new quality and qualification by being a self directly before 
God. This self is no longer merely a human self but is what I, hoping not to be 
misinterpreted, would call a theological self, the self directly before God. And what 
infinite reality the self gains by being conscious of existing before God, by becoming a 
human self whose criterion is God!... But what an infinite accent falls on the self by 
having God as the criterion! The criterion for the self is always: that directly before 
which it is a self, but this in turn is the definition of ‘criterion’…. So everything is 
qualitatively that by which it is measured, and that which is its qualitative criterion is 
ethically its goal.’ 720  
 
‘The self is intensified in relation to the criterion for the self, infinitely when God is 
the criterion. In fact, the greater the conception of God, the more self there is; the more 
self, the greater conception of God. Not until a self as this specific single individual is 
conscious of existing before God, not until then is it the infinite self. …’ 721  
 
 
                                               
719 Lorraine, ‘Amatory Cures for Material Dis-ease, A Kristevan Reading of The Sickness unto 
Death’, in Kierkegaard in Post/Modernity, p.99. 
720 Kierkegaard, Sickness Unto Death, p. 79.  
721 Ibid., p. 80.  
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Appendix II. 
 
THE HERMENEUTICAL PRESENCE OF A ‘MALE’ GOD IN KRISTEVA’S CRITIQUE 
OF THE REPRESENTATION OF MOTHERHOOD AS A ‘MALE CONSTRUCT’ 
 
 
 
The controlling function of the constructed male image of the Virgin Mother: 
 
I am not unaware of the traps that this sacra woman has set to snare our femininity for 
the last two thousand years: the body reduced to the ear and to tears; concealment of the 
sexuality I would not look at, under all the draping possible and imaginable by the best 
painters, and by the rest; sanctification of suffering and sorrow and, only afterward, the 
recognition of an incomparable power.   722   
Because the birth of Jesus was without sin, should not that of his mother, in a certain 
way, also be free from the same sin? Logical coherence requires it. Saint Bernard still 
bristled at celebrating the conception of Mary by Saint Anne and Saint Joachim, thus trying 
to check the assimilation of Mary to Christ.   723 
‘A clever construction, all things considered, which calms the social anxiety on the 
subject of birth, satisfies a male being anxious about femininity, and also satisfies a woman, 
no less anxious about femininity.’ 724  
On the one hand, she satisfies women's aspirations to power: I told you, she flatters our 
latent paranoia − every women who finds her reflection in the Virgin is implicitly destined 
for the same glory.... But, at the same time and on the other hand, she bridles them when she 
does not bully them: on your knees, ladies, you are only a place of transition, look after the 
children and the sick, no sex or politics, the ear and understanding are worth more than a 
sexed body, you can never be told often enough.   725   
 
 
The unrecognised real experience of motherhood: 
 
‘The Orthodox Marian cult has feminized the men, it may have virilized the women, but 
it does not seem to have contributed toward bringing recognition to the particular ways a 
woman feels and thinks.’ 726   
Primo, from the Nativity to the Pieta, and including the Mater Dolorosa and the Regina 
Caeli, the Virgin is nothing like a lover: she is exclusively the devoted mother. The ‘good 
mother,’ as Melanie Klein would say, who gives herself body and soul to her son, to the 
extent that, without her, the dear son would have no body, since that god is a man, precisely, 
only by the grace of his journey through the body of Mary ‘full of grace.’ That grace is an 
extraordinary apologia for oblative motherhood, on the brink of primary narcissism: the 
origin of the love every human being needs to proceed. And the deficiency of same is the 
sinister source of all depression, if not psychosis. In short, Mary rehabilitates that primal 
bedrock of our identities, which modem analysts call ‘mother-baby co-excitation. (…)   727   
 
 
 
 
                                               
722 Kristeva, The Feminine and the Sacred, p.73. 
723 Ibid., p.74.  
724 Ibid., p..75.  
725 Ibid., 2011, p.79.  
726 Ibid., p.74.  
727 Ibid., p.76. 
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An expression of sublimating the death-instinct and destructiveness of bodily drives 
underlying language and psychic life: 
 
 The desire to devour and murder remain, however, underlying every baby and every 
mother in their co-excitation, even if it is serene: you don't have to be a psychoanalyst to 
know that. But, via a strong cathexis of the breast − oh, the holy breast of the Virgin! − and 
the valorization of sorrow - oh, the sobbing of our Queen! − the aggressiveness inherent in 
that archaic link is obliterated, and we are saturated solely with the being of serenity. Which 
we miss so much, right?, an indelible fantasy!   728   
 
 
The image of the Virgin is the meta-narrative of the genesis of language. Language 
is suspended above the maternal ‘void’, that is, the linguistic moment of being severed 
from the mother: 
 
Within the Word, two things will come about: on the one hand, part of the Son’s 
trajectory toward his Father and, on the other, the rationality of Christianity, which will per- 
mit it to rediscover Aristotle and to clear its name through Descartes’ cogito, before opening 
the way to modem philosophy. Well now, the Word, in fact, revolves around Mary. ‘The 
hole of the Virgin, says Sollers, by which he means − I'm simplifying, how can you help it? 
− that it is around an empty space left for Mary that the Trinity of the Father, the Son, and 
the Holy Ghost revolves. 729 
                                               
728 Kristeva, The Feminine and the Sacred, p.77. 
729 Ibid., p, 78.  
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Classic sacrificial language as the standard hermeneutical code to the Cross. A collection of 
doctrinal statements of classic Eastern and Western soteriology:730 
 
EASTERN SOTERIOLOGY:  
IRENAEUS: 
  
 the primary words of ‘atonement’ are already 
present 
 emphasises the obedience of the new Adam 
 this obedience reverses the whole tide of sin 
and disobedience in history 
 Christ’s death is salvific because it is the 
supreme test of obedience 
 Jesus saves ‘by his blood’ means the degree of 
his commitment to the Father’s will 
 for his obedience Jesus is raised from the dead 
into glory 
 he stresses the goodness of this world, we are 
saved not from the world, because creation is 
good, 
there is an emphasis on the bodyliness of Christ 
 there is a permanent presence and closeness of 
God to history 
 Jesus saves by becoming incarnate and 
revealing as the pre-existent word incarnate 
 
ATHANASIUS: 
 
 Incarnation Christology: ‘The reason of his 
coming down was because of us, and that our 
transgression called forth the loving kindness of 
the Word’ (On the Incarnation of the Word) 
 With sin humanity lost its knowledge of God 
and was pursuing a course of corruption and 
death 
 the true word of God restores human existence 
to its previous state 
 with him emerges the fundamental tension 
between God’s goodness   and God’s 
justice: God had to be true to the promise of 
death if human beings disobey the original 
commandment; yet, on the other hand, it was 
against God’s love to allow human existence to 
be destroyed after God created it 
 Jesus Christ saves by incarnation 
 the divine Word undergoes a sacrificial death: 
the divine Incarnate Word surrenders his body 
to death in our place 
 this death is sacrifice; the idea is substitution 
or representation; as head of humanity Jesus 
represents all, he undergoes death for all of us, 
and thus pays the debt or the ransom (with 
Athanasius in a diffused way to God, to Satan, 
and to death) 
 critically: Jesus is not for Athanasius a human 
WESTERN SOTERIOLOGY: AUGUSTINE 
 emphasis on divinisation: ‘God became human 
so we would become divine’ 
 the motive of the Incarnation is God’s love, but 
this redeeming love of God is not as total and 
universal as in Origen or Gregory of Nyssa; 
 there is a considerable reference to God’s 
wrath and anger; 
 salvation is being cleansed from sin 
 Jesus’ work is sacrifice, the sacrifice is offered 
to God 
 the logic of history lies in making satisfaction 
to God 
 Christ, the innocent victim reconciles us with 
God’s justice 
 developed substitution theory: the sacrifice is 
offered on our behalf, for us, and in our place 
 Christ is a priest who offers the definitive 
sacrifice for sin 
 sacrifice is a transaction between God and 
God, done on our behalf 
 within the Trinity it is the divine Word who is 
the subject of Jesus’ action 
 it is a redemption through ransom 
 meta-scenario: human beings, because of sin, 
are given over to power of Satan; sacrifice is 
performed and ransom paid to overcome sin: 
‘Christ was the price given for us in order that we 
might be loosened form his chains’ 
 
ANSELM: 
  is operating within the Augustinian tradition. 
He presents the satisfaction theory, which 
became the basis of western soteriology. 
 original sin is an infinite offence against 
God, the consequence is infinite debt towards 
God  therefore it requires either eternal 
punishment or satisfaction. 
 repay + and repair  
 God saves: through the act of surrendering 
his life freely for the sake of justice, he chooses 
his own death 
 Jesus acts as a representative of human 
beings (Cur Deus Homo) 
 the will of every creature should be subjected 
to the Creator and any failure is sin 
 "It is impossible for God to lose his 
honour": God is compelled by his own justice 
"God must do what is God like"  
ABELARD: 
In Jesus Christ God demonstrates his love for 
                                               
730 Extract from Roger Haight, S.J, Jesus: Symbol of God, Orbis Books, Maryknoll, New York 1999 
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being like us. 
 the actor in history is God or the divine 
Word who was defined as consubstantial with 
the Father of Nicea: his body and flesh is an 
instrument through which divine being, in effect 
God, is the subject or actor in history. 
REFORMERS:  
 
LUTHER 
 
 shows the intensification of the atonement 
scheme 
 we are saved from sin and the wrath of God 
 the larger framework for understanding God 
is God’s love and mercy 
 the logic of Christ’s work is substitution and 
satisfaction 
 the Logos or Word of God, Christ, becomes 
incarnate and takes the place of sinful human 
beings: "Christ became a sinner" 
 "Despite being divine, experienced himself 
as sinner": Luther maximizes the pain and 
suffering of Christ, especially internally 
 Christ, in substituting for all human beings, and 
being our representative, is obedient to death in 
our place 
 for Luther satisfaction takes place through 
punishment 
 after Jesus Christ, God no longer regards the 
sinfulness of human beings, but only looks 
upon the righteousness of the representative 
 a cosmic battle between the forces of evil and 
good ( we see it again in Balthasar) 
 a duel between the incarnate Logos and a 
whole series of personified forces: sin, death, 
God’s curse, God’s wrath, the Law 
 but Christ the innocent, obedient, holy, and 
divine one overcomes and defeats all of these 
forces 
 although he accomplished this in his humanity, 
it was the work of divinity 
 the place where this duel took place is within 
the person of Jesus Christ 
 the appropriation of Salvation is the wonderful 
exchange: what is Christ’s becomes mine, his 
innocence and righteousness, just as what was 
mine becomes Christ’s, that is, sinfulness, fear, 
condemnation by the law, being the object of 
God’s wrath and curse. 
 how people were included in Luther’s story: the 
believer clings to Christ in faith 
 Luther attributes nothing to human freedom, 
the act is attachment to Christ ("sola fidei") 
 strong antithesis between the Gospel and the 
Law 
humankind 
 Jesus Christ binds human beings to God in 
love and by being God’s love towards us and 
enkindling our love of God and neighbour in 
return 
 
 
CALVIN:  
 
 Law is positive, it is a guide to the Christian 
 takes over God’s wrath, substitution, 
obedience, satisfaction 
 Christ is a sacrifice, he substitutes for us, and 
by his obedience to death, he satisfied God’s 
anger and wrath against sin 
 we must appease God because God’s wrath and 
hostility is upon our sins 
 our acquittal: the guilt that held us liable for 
punishment has been transferred to the head of 
the Son of God: we must above all remember this 
substitution 
 it is God’s righteous vengeance, which the 
Son has taken upon himself, still hung over us 
 Christ was offered to the Father in death as 
an expiatory sacrifice that when he discharged 
all satisfaction through his sacrifice, we might 
cease to be afraid of God’s wrath (Institutiones) 
  Calvin finds an aspect of salvation in every 
aspect of the narrative of Christ’s life 
 he distinguished purification and justification: 
once justified, the Christian should lead a holy 
life in the world, guided by Law  salvation is 
played out in society 
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Appendix IV. 
 
Kristeva’s Linguistic Reading of the Cross, Christ the ‘Absolute Subject’: 
 
‘But Christ’s passion brings into play even more primitive layers of the psyche; it 
thus reveals a fundamental depression (a narcissistic wound or reversed hatred) that 
conditions access to human language. The sadness of young children just prior to their 
acquisition of language has often been observed; this is when they must renounce 
forever the maternal paradise in which every demand is immediately gratified. The child 
must abandon its mother and be abandoned by her in order to be accepted by the father 
and begin talking. If it is true that language begins in mourning inherent in the evolution 
of subjectivity, the abandonment by the father – the symbolic “other” – triggers a 
melancholy anguish that can grow to suicidal proportions. (…) 
 
The “scandal of the cross”, the logos tou stavron or the language of the cross, which 
some, according to Saint Paul, call “foolishness” (1 Cor. 1:18 and 1:23; Gal. 5:11) and 
which is indeed inconceivable for a god as the ancients understood the term, is 
embodied, I think not only in the psychic and physical suffering that irrigates our lives 
(qui irrigue notre existence) but even more profoundly in the essential alienation that 
conditions our access to language, in the mourning that accompanies the dawn of 
psychic life. (…) 
 
Christ abandoned, Christ in hell, is of course the sign that God shares the condition 
of the sinner. But He also tells the story of that necessary melancholy beyond which we 
humans may just possibly discover the other, now in the form of symbolic interlocutor 
rather than nutritive breast.’731 
 
And: 
 
‘For the interruption, even momentary, of the bond that links Christ to his Father 
and to life, this caesura, this “hiatus” offers not merely an image but also a story for 
certain psychic cataclysms that lie in wait for the presumed balance of each individual 
and, because of this, make a dressing for them [les pansent]. Each and every one of us is 
the result of a long “work of the negative”: birth, weaning, separation, frustration. For 
having staged this rupture as the very heart of the absolute subject, Christ, for having 
presented it in the figure of a Passion, as the other, supportive side of the resurrection, 
Christianity brings to consciousness the essential internal dramas of each person’s 
becoming. It thus gives itself an immense…unconscious…cathartic power.’732  
                                               
731 Kristeva, In the Beginning Was Love, pp.40-41. 
732 ‘Suffering (Lenten Lectures, March 19, 2006)’, in Kristeva, This Incredible Need to Believe, pp.94-
95. 
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Appendix V. 
 
TYPES OF CULTURES: AN ILLUSTRATION OF DOING THEOLOGY IN THE 
‘HORIZONTALITY’ AND THE ‘VERTICALITY OF THE CROSS’ (THE WORLDS OF 
THEOLOGICAL MODERNITY AND THEOLOGICAL POSTMODERNITY)733 
 
 
 
‘Grid A’ corresponds most to the ‘horizontality of the Cross’, and gives an apt 
description of the subject – doctrine relationship in the Church of modernity. Community 
cohesion, interpersonal relationships, and the support of the individual by culture were 
strong. The cultural canon was relatively un-fragmented. ‘Authority’ − religious, secular, and 
moral − was respected and unquestioned. I highlight that theological modernity is deeply 
rooted in the world of pre-modernity. The theological concepts with which modernity 
operates still heavily reflect this ‘world before change’. Its characteristics are: order, balance 
of hierarchical society, sense of belonging + plus stable relationship with the other. ‘Grids’ 
(B-C-D) describe the situation of the ‘exhausted subject’, the transition from capitalist 
modernity to consumerist post-modernity. This is where a new linguistic sensitivity to faith 
and religious narratives emerges, the ‘verticality of the cross’. The main danger at the 
endpoint of the process (D) is the emergence of sect-like collectivity, authoritarian regimes, 
fundamentalisms, and a strict separation of insiders/outsiders. 
                                               
733 Illustration from Michael Paul Gallagher SJ, Clashing Symbols, An Introduction to Faith and 
Culture, Paulist Press, Mahwah 2004 (Second, new and revised edition, first published by Darton, 
Longman and Todd, London 1997.) p.30. (My comment is based on the first edition, Michael Paul 
Gallagher SJ, Clashing Symbols, An Introduction to Faith and Culture, Darton, Longman + Todd, 
London 1997, pp.26-28, cf. p.26.)  
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Appendix VI.  
 
HYMNS ON CHRIST’S SUFFERING FROM PASSION TIDE 
 
a./ The Royal Banners Forward Go (Vexilla 
Regis Prodeunt)734 
 
The royal banners forward go, 
The Cross shines forth in 
mystic glow, 
Where He in flesh, our flesh 
Who made, 
Our sentence bore, our 
ransom paid. 
 
Where deep for us, the 
spear was dyed, 
Life’s torrent rushing from 
His side, 
To wash us in that precious 
flood 
Where mingled Water  
flowed, and Blood. 
 
Fulfilled is all that David 
Told 
In true prophetic song of old: 
Amidst the nations, God, 
saith he, 
Hath reigned and triumphed  
from the tree. 
 
O Tree of beauty! Tree of light! 
O Tree, with royal purple dight! 
Elect on whose triumphal  
Breast 
Those holy limbs should  
find their rest. 
 
On whose dear arms, so widely flung, 
The weight of this world’s 
ransom hung; 
The price of humankind to pay, 
And spoil the spoiler of his 
Prey. 
  
O Cross, our one reliance, 
hail! 
This holy Passiontide avail 
To give fresh merit to the saint 
b./ Thirty Years Among Us Dwelling (Lustris 
sex qui iam peractis)735 
 
Thirty years among us  
dwelling,  
His appointed time fulfilled,  
Born for this, He meets His  
Passion,  
For this He freely willed;  
On the Cross the Lamb is 
lifted, 
Where His life-blood shall  
be spilled. 
 
He endured the nails, the  
spitting,  
Vinegar, and spear, and  
reed: 
From that holy Body broken 
Blood and water forth  
proceed: 
Earth, and stars, and sky,  
and ocean, 
By that flood from stain are 
freed. 
 
Faithful Cross! above all 
other,  
One and only noble Tree! 
None in foliage, none in  
blossom, 
None in fruit thy peers may be; 
Sweetest wood, and sweetest  
iron! 
Sweetest Weight is hung on 
thee. 
 
Bend thy boughs, O Tree 
of glory! 
Thy relaxing sinews bend; 
For awhile the ancient rigor, 
That thy birth bestowed, 
suspend; 
And the King of heavenly 
beauty 
On thy bosom gently tend! 
                                               
734 The Monastic Diurnal or the Day Hours of the Monastic Breviary in Latin and in English, Saint 
Michael’s Abbey Press, Farnborough 2004, pp.233-234*. 
735 Ibid., pp.236-237* 
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And pardon to the penitent. 
 
To Thee, eternal Three  
in One,  
Let homage meet by all be done: 
Whom by the Cross Thou 
dost restore, 
Preserve and govern ever 
more. Amen. 
 
Thou alone wast counted  
worthy 
This world’s ransom  
to sustain; 
That a shipwrecked race 
for ever 
Might a port of refuge gain: 
With the sacred Blood  
Anointed 
Of the Lamb for sinners 
slain. 
 
Glory be to God, and 
honour 
In the highest, as is meet, 
To the Son, and to the 
Father, 
And the eternal Paraclete, 
Whose is boundless praise  
and power 
Through the ages infinite.  
Amen. 
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Appendix VII. 
 
STABAT MATER, hymn, 13th century, Latin 
 
STABAT MATER 
At the cross her station keeping,  
Mary stood in sorrow weeping  
When her Son was crucified.  
While she waited in her anguish,  
Seeing Christ in torment languish,  
Bitter sorrow pierced her heart.  
With what pain and desolation,  
With what noble resignation,  
Mary watched her dying Son.  
Ever-patient in her yearning  
Though her tear-filled eyes were burning,  
Mary gazed upon her Son.  
Who, that sorrow contemplating,  
On that passion meditating,  
Would not share the Virgin's grief?  
Christ she saw, for our salvation,  
Scourged with cruel acclamation,  
Bruised and beaten by the rod.  
Christ she saw with life-blood failing,  
All her anguish unavailing,  
Saw him breathe his very last.  
Mary, fount of love's devotion,  
Let me share with true emotion  
All the sorrow you endured.  
Virgin, ever interceding,  
Hear me in my fervent pleading:  
Fire me with your love of Christ.  
Mother, may this prayer be granted: 
That Christ's love may be implanted 
In the depths of my poor soul. 
At the cross, your sorrow sharing,  
All your grief and torment bearing,  
Let me stand and mourn with you.  
 
 
Fairest maid of all creation,  
Queen of hope and consolation,  
Let me feel your grief sublime.  
Virgin, in your love befriend me,  
At the Judgment Day defend me.  
Help me by your constant prayer.  
Savior, when my life shall leave me, 
Through your mother's prayers 
receive me 
With the fruits of victory.  
Virgin of all virgins blest!  
Listen to my fond request:  
Let me share your grief divine  
Let me, to my latest breath,  
In my body bear the death  
Of your dying Son divine.  
Wounded with His every wound,  
Steep my soul till it has swooned  
In His very Blood away.  
Be to me, O Virgin, nigh,  
Lest in flames I burn and die,  
In His awe-full judgment day.  
Savior, when my life shall leave me, 
Through your mother's prayers 
receive me 
With the fruits of victory.  
While my body here decays  
May my soul your goodness praise,  
Safe in heaven eternally. Amen Alleluia.  
The Collegeville Hymnal  
Liturgical Press, Minnesota 1990.  
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Appendix VIII.  
 
DOCTRINAL DEBATES WHICH CAN BE RELATED TO THE IMAGE OF THE 
‘MOURNING/SUFFERING FATHER’ IN THE SEMIOTIC PASSION: 
PATRIPASSIANISM AND THE THEOPASCHITE CONTROVERSY 
 
What is known as the theopaschite controversy (Greek, theos /God/ and paschein /to 
suffer/) was a debate on the implications of using a theopaschite language which had been 
used from the beginnings of Christianity. The theopaschism brought into theological 
discourse that the divine Logos (i.e, the second Person of the Trinity) suffered on the cross. 
The how of this suffering was at the heart of the debate. Initially the ‘movement’ was a 
polemic reaction to positions which opposed Jesus’s full humanity (like Nestorius /ca 385-ca 
450/ who denied that Mary truly could be called Theotokos (‘Mother of God’), he coined the 
abusive term ‘theopaschite’.) In the debate theological aspects of the suffering of God in 
Christ were raised, and the theopaschite formula, after many difficulties, became part of 
orthodoxy. The orthodox teaching on Jesus’s suffering was formulated at the fifth 
ecumenical council at Constantinaple (533), which is called the theopaschite formula. 
‘Divinity as such (i.e, the triune Godhead) does not suffer. It affirms rather that the 
hypostasis of the Logos (i.e, the second Person of the Trinity), by virtue of the Incarnation, 
suffered “in the flesh” (i.e, carne or secundum carnem or ‘in the flesh’). In short, the formula 
asserts that the human nature of Jesus suffered, and the second Person of the Trinity suffered 
by virtue of entering into a hypostatic union with that nature, but not that the divine nature of 
Jesus suffered.’736  
 
Patripassianism was a Trinitarian heresy. Tertullian who accused Praxeas of teaching 
that the Father himself suffered on the Cross coined the nickname. (The term is derived from 
the statement, Pater passus est, ‘the Father suffered’.) Praxeas’ position in reality was not 
erroneous. ‘He distinguished between the Son, that is, the flesh of the man Jesus, who 
suffered on the cross, and the Father, identified with the Holy Spirit, God, or Christ. The 
Father did not suffer himself, but suffered with the Son. Tertullian rejected this attempt to 
safeguard divine impassibility (the doctrine that God cannot suffer), arguing that because 
compassion is a form of passion Praxeas implied that the Father himself suffered. 
Patripassianism is, formally speaking, a Trinitarian heresy, because proponents refused to 
make strict distinctions between the Father and the Son, on the grounds that this would 
compromise the unity (monarciha) of God. For them, the Son was a mode of appearance 
(modus) of the Father’.737  
 
 
  
                                               
736 Extract and quote from the entry ‘Theopaschite Controversy’ by Marcel Sarot, The Cambridge 
Dictionary of Christian Theology, p.504. 
737 Extract and quote from the entry ‘Patripassianism’ by Marcel Sarot, Ibid. p. 375. 
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